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ABSTRACT
This thesis aims to rescue the tradition of corporation theory from the implications of 
ontological and ethical individualism, which form important tenets of mainstream 
political theory. My argument for corporate personality builds on the Lockean and 
Humean theory of personal identity over time. According to this theory, personal 
identity is not rooted in the identity of a deep and indivisible Self, but in the relatedness 
between temporally distinct psychological stages. A person is a group of desires, 
beliefs, memories, traits and other attitudes, tied together by a causal string. On the best 
interpretation of the Humean view, personal identity has normative consequences. We 
are bundles but the string that ties the stages of one life together is formed by the 
normativity of action-guiding principles and by the mutual recognition of certain 
associative obligations. This normative claim is often meant to buttress ethical 
individualism against those who deny that persons exist at all. However, this thesis 
demonstrates that the claim also reinvigorates the idea of corporate personality. The 
argument develops along two different strands. First, it is shown that corporate 
personality is a political theory. It is the theory that compares co-operative relations 
between people with the co-operative relations between the stages of one person. For 
contractualist theories, the core virtue is justice. For corporate theories, the highest 
virtue is integrity. Second, corporation theory makes a real contribution to the field of 
political theory, in particular in an area where contractualism has traditionally 
encountered problems, to wit, the continuity of the contract. This thesis argues 
corporation theory is much more successful in explaining our transgenerational 
obligations to the past and future.
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INTRODUCTION
THREE JUSTIFICATIONS FOR CORPORATE 
PERSONALITY
Most people believe that human beings have special ethical significance. Humans are 
moral persons, who have interests, rights and duties. This separates us from animals, 
mountains and oceans. However, most people do not believe that human associations 
are persons, with interests, rights and duties. The idea of a corporate person is 
commonly thought to be politically dangerous and metaphysically defunct. Individual 
and association, it is widely believed, are different moral entities. Individuals have basic 
standing in our ethics; associations do not. This thesis challenges that belief. It argues 
that corporate personality is alive. Indeed, it claims that corporation theory and ethical 
individualism spring from a common source, a single theory of the moral person.
Liberalism has become too individualistic. This was the central claim of the 
communitarian movement two decades ago. To restore the balance, communitarian 
theory claimed that language and culture and belonging were constitutive of our 
identities and of the human good. However, this claim does still not prove that 
associations have true ethical standing, as liberal theorists have since pointed out. 
Contemporary political theory, therefore, has learnt all it can learn from 
communitarianism and its rediscovery of culture and belonging. To appreciate the true 
ethical significance of associations, we need to look elsewhere. We need to turn to the 
tradition of corporation theory. This tradition agrees with ethical individualism in a 
basic respect. Persons are what ultimately matters. It suggests however that ethical 
individualism makes one, fatal mistake. It is wrong in thinking that only individuals 
may be persons.
I argue that corporation theory can be recovered without having to rely on 
implausible metaphysical assumptions. In fact, I claim that corporate personality and 
ethical individualism rely on the same ontological basis. To understand this, we first
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need to focus on theories of personal identity. There is a school of thought that 
conceives of personal identity through time in terms of the relatedness between 
psychological states -  thoughts, desires, beliefs, memories -  at different moments. On 
this view, what we normally call a person is a mere bundle of experiences or 
psychological parts of a person. Opposed to the bundle theory stands another school of 
thought, which advances the position that a person is not a sequence of thoughts or 
psychological occurrences, but the subject of such mental experiences. On this view, a 
person is an Ego. That is to say, a person is that which owns certain thoughts and 
experiences, and therefore exists separately from them.
The latter theory of personal identity finds relatively little support among 
philosophers these days. Even so, it has been claimed that the Ego theory is implicit in 
our ethics. Hence, if it were false, this could have implications for our theories of 
practical reason. Indeed, Derek Parfit argues that the bundle theory undermines 
traditional accounts of prudence and rights-based moral theory.1 According to Parfit, 
these accounts are viable only on the basis of the Ego theory, which he deems 
indefensible.
Others have challenged this position. From a Kantian viewpoint, they hold that we 
should begin from a conception of the person as a deliberative, accountable and 
temporally extended agent. Persons may be bundles of psychological states. But this 
view restores the temporal unity of agency, not by reviving the Ego theory, but by 
understanding this relatedness in terms of obligations and responsibilities of 
membership. To be related in the manner of a person, on this view, is to acknowledge 
past and future actions and interests as your own. Thus it is argued that the bundle 
theory, important though it may be in metaphysics, has no major consequences for 
practical reason.
1 D. Parfit, Reasons and Persons, third and revised edition (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987).
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Part of what this thesis argues is that these critics are right. We need to reject the idea 
that practical reason should become more impersonal. But more important than this is 
that in rejecting Parfit’s argument, these critics get more than what they bargained for. 
The gist of what I want to demonstrate is that their arguments, while clearly 
individualist in spirit, facilitate a paradoxical move from ethical individualism to a form 
of ethical holism that includes the idea of corporate personality. To put it differently, 
while the bundle theory may not have the kind of consequences that Parfit and others 
envisage, it does significantly alter our perception of how the notion of a person fits into 
normative theory. And this change challenges certain important assumptions regarding 
the ethical standing of associations.
By way of introduction, I want to begin by saying something about the idea of a 
corporate person and what it entails. In this thesis, corporate personality refers to the 
idea that human associations qualify as persons in and of themselves, as so-called group 
persons, much in the same way that human beings qualify as individual persons. To 
flesh out what this means, we should begin by specifying what the concept of a person 
refers to in general. Above all, it is important to emphasise the following two 
components.
First, the term person or personality is often used to indicate that a thing is a unit 
capable of having a good or a unified interest. By ascribing personality or personal 
identity to something we also denote that this thing holds rights and imposes legal and 
moral duties on others. In short, corporation theory puts forward a view on which 
human groups in general form the loci of interests and rights that are irreducible to, and 
may even outweigh the interests and rights of individual constituents.
2
Throughout this thesis I use the term ‘corporate’ to refer to human groups, collectives or associations in 
general. The notion o f corporate personality does not refer only, and not even principally, to the firm, but 
also to states, churches, trusts, foundations, nations, clubs, cultural groups, and so forth.
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Second, the terms person and personhood are used to refer to agents and agency. 
When we describe something as a person, we point out, not just that it has unified 
interests, but also that it is capable of having and critically appraising a will, truly 
capable, therefore, of authorising action and speech. Corporate personality, in this more 
philosophical context, entails the view that associations are reflective intentional 
systems not reducible to the intentions of their individual members. Groups have a will 
of their own. Consequently, this group will may have greater authority than the 
member’s individual wills.
Scruton sums up nicely what corporation theory implies:
All of the following can be said to be true of corporations (whether clubs, 
churches or firms):
—they make decisions;
—they act freely and responsibly;
—they have moral rights and duties 
—they have legal rights and duties;
—they can make laws for themselves and their members, for the breach of
which they are held responsible;
—they are objects of praise and blame; of loyalty, pride and affection; of anger, 
resentment and hate;
—they are historical beings, which flourish and decline according to the success 
of their undertakings;
—they have habits of mind, including moral virtues and vices;
—they stand in personal relations, and can adopt many of the roles adopted by 
human persons.3
In its many different manifestations, the idea that associations are somehow 
analogous to persons has, of course, a very rich and complex history in Western
thought. Perhaps the most influential example is Plato’s analogy in The Republic
between virtue in the soul -  reason ruling the appetites -  and the just political order.4 
The idea of a transindividual will also makes an important appearance in Rousseau, 
Hegel, Bradley and Bosanquet.5 It assumes an even greater role in Gierke’s theory of
3 R. Scruton, ‘Corporate Persons’, Proceedings o f  the Aristotelian Society, 63 (1989), pp. 239-26, at p. 
245.
4
Plato, The Republic, D. Lee, (ed.), second edition (London: Penguin Books, 1987).
5 J. J. Rousseau, The Social Contract, in: G. D. H Cole (ed.), The Social Contract and Discourses 
(London: Everyman, 1997); G. F. W. Hegel, Philosophy o f  Right, T. M. Knox, (ed.) (London: Oxford
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the ‘Genossenschaft’ and the work of his British pluralist followers, Figgis, Cole and 
Laski.6
Given this long history, it is perhaps remarkable to see that corporation theory 
receives only little discussion in political theory today. The analogy between group and 
person has almost vanished, and if it appears at all, it is commonly greeted with 
suspicion or glee. Since the latter half of the twentieth century, at least, and in particular 
since the resurgence of contractual and rights-based approaches, political theorising has 
evidently been dominated by the principle of ethical individualism. This principle 
maintains that the notion of a person, either as a right-and-duty-bearing unit, an 
intentional agent or both, should only be applied to the individual. To attribute interests, 
rights and intentions to human groups, at any rate, is to lapse into philosophical error. 
Corporate personality, then, may boast a long tradition, but mainstream theory has 
resolutely consigned it to the dustbin of history. Thus, the idea belongs to an earlier 
epoque and only merits examination in the context of the history of ideas. Theories of 
corporate personality have little to teach us today, as David Runciman confirms in his 
critical book Pluralism and the Personality o f the State.
To be sure, this verdict may well be correct for some or even many of its 
manifestations; there are probably numerous particular theories of corporate personality 
that have little to recommend. Nevertheless, the idea that groups are persons is in my 
view too easily dismissed, by Runciman, and also by many others. It seems to me that 
corporation theory still contains a kernel of truth. What is more, I think it capable of 
making an important contribution to normative political theory. In any event, it is 
important to emphasise that in revisiting this notion, my thesis does not aim to provide 
another historical study of an ancient idea. Rather, its overall aim is to revive the notion
University Press, 1967); F. H. Bradley, ‘My Station and Its Duties’, in: Ethical Studies, second edition 
(Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1927), pp. 160-204; B. Bosanquet, The Philosophical Theory o f  the State, 
fourth edition (London: MacMillan, 1958).
6 For a discussion o f the work o f Gierke and the pluralists, see D. Runciman, Pluralism and the 
Personality o f  the State (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).
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of corporate personality, that is to say, to put it into a fresh guise, and to argue that, in 
other manifestations, it is still very much alive and even superior to ethical 
individualism. The ambition to rejuvenate and reconstruct corporation theory is also 
what sets this thesis apart from other work on the subjject. By developing this 
constructive dimension my thesis adds a distinctive and relatively novel argument to 
political theory.
Consistent with this overall ambition, my approach is mot historical but mainly 
analytical. I shall not be concerned to study what the ‘diustbin’ contains, how its 
contents have developed, and how they have ended up there in the first place. 
Interesting though this exploration may be, the priority is here to articulate an 
understanding of corporate personality that addresses the challenges set by 
contemporary political philosophy. Put differently, I want to investigate whether or not 
there is something in the idea of corporate personality that is; still retrievable. And this 
means that the merits of this idea have to be assessed against ithe background of current 
debates in normative political theory and the individualist piremise on which they are 
largely based.
However, to set out the challenge more clearly, it is useful to briefly look at the 
different arguments for corporation theory as they were advamced in the first part of the 
twentieth century. Received wisdom has it that there are omly two justifications for 
corporate personality, the one juristic and the other philosophical. What is more, so it is 
usually argued, both justifications collapse under the weight off important objections and 
limitations. Essentially, my thesis argues for a third amd irreducibly normative 
justification for corporate personality. However, I first wantt to discuss why the two 
standard accounts turned out to be dead ends.
The first justification for corporate personality focuses on tihe person as a legal right- 
and-duty-bearing unit. Legal persons are the subjects of rights and liabilities as defined
11
by the legal system.7 They may be represented in court, sue or be sued, enter in 
contractual engagements, own property, vote in elections, run for public office, claim 
welfare rights, and so forth. All mature legal systems recognise that individual human 
beings are legal persons in this sense. However, it is apparent that legal personality is 
usually not exclusively applied to individuals. More specifically, most legal systems 
also count human groups -  companies, universities, cities and the state itself -  as
o
persons. Associations are summoned to court, they own property, and enter in 
contractual relations. Associations may not have the right to vote, they cannot marry, 
they do not have a right to health care, but at the same time it is evident that they hold 
certain other legal rights and obligations.9 We know, for example, that a university 
college could own property and enter into contractual transactions with other persons. 
No one seriously believes that the entitlements and obligations that are so acquired are 
ultimately divisible in separate parts belonging to the individual fellows. That would 
imply, absurdly, that every fellow owned part of the college’s property and owed part of 
its debts on a personal title.
That said, while it is one thing to point out that associations are commonly 
recognised as legal persons in practice, it is quite something else to offer a coherent 
explanation for this fact. How could groups possibly qualify as persons? The fiction 
theory provides an answer to this question.10 It maintains that the legal system itself
7
P. A. French, Responsibility Matters (Kansas: University o f  Kansas Press, 1992), p. 134; S. J. Stoljar, 
Groups and Entities: An Inquiry into Corporate Theory (Canberra: Australia National University Press, 
1973).
g
S. J. Stoljar, Groups and Entities: An Inquiry into Corporate Theory (Canberra: Australia National 
University Press, 1973). See also F. W. Maitland, ‘Moral Personality and Legal Personality’, in: H. A. L. 
Fisher (ed.), The Collected Papers o f  Frederick William Maitland, Volume III (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1911), pp. 304-320.9
For an account that traces the history o f the idea o f legal corporate personality back to Roman law, see 
P. W. Duff, Personality in Private Roman Law  (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1938).
10 For a discussion o f  the idea, see D. Runciman, Pluralism and the Personality o f  the State; M. Wolff, 
‘On the Nature o f Legal Persons’, Law Quarterly Review , Volume LIV (1938), pp. 494-521; J. Dewey, 
‘The Historic Background o f Corporate Legal Personality’, Yale Law Journal, Volume XXXV (April, 
1926), pp. 655-673. For a more critical treatment: F. Hallis, Corporate Personality: A Study in 
Jurisprudence (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1930), pp. 3-28; F. W. Maitland, ‘Introduction’, in: O. 
Gierke, Political Theories o f  the Middle Age, edited and translated by F. W. Maitland (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1927), pp. vii-xlv.
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determines who or what is to bear rights and obligations in its own name. And it is 
thought to be able to do so regardless of whether or not a being is a person in the 
philosophical and moral meaning of the term. Individuals are naturally perceived as 
legal persons since they are truly capable of having a will. But legal personality rests 
just as comfortably on the fiction of a will entertained by the legal system and its 
officials. According to this theory, in short, we need not look for whatever moral or 
psychological reality lurks behind the legal person. Legal and other meanings of the 
term ‘person’ refer to unrelated predicates. As Dewey once made the point: “What 
‘person’ signifies in popular speech, or in psychology, or in philosophy or morals, 
would be as irrelevant, to employ an exaggerated simile, as it would be to argue that 
because a wine is called ‘dry’, it has the properties of dry solids; or that, because it does 
not have those properties, wine cannot possibly be ‘dry’.”11
According to the fiction theory, legal personality should be compared with the term 
persona in the theatre. There it initially used to refer to the mask worn by an actor in a 
play. Later, the term was used simply to indicate the role or character of a particular 
part.12 According to the fiction theory something similar could be said about legal 
personality, which is merely a mask or role in a juristic play, enacted by agents and 
created by an author. Legal persons, of course, must perform real actions and at some 
point we need real agency. However, groups need not be real agents themselves. They 
rely on individuals acting on their behalf. A group cannot literally sign a contract or 
transfer money itself. But the point is that these activities can be performed in its name. 
While its representatives act and decide, the consequences of their actions and decisions 
are assigned to the association.13 Conveniently, this construction allows us to contend
11 J. Dewey, ‘The Historic Background o f Corporate Legal Personality’, p. 656.
12 P. W. Duff, Personality in Private Roman Law , pp. 3-6. However, that this metaphor ultimately proves 
only little is one o f the problems in Runciman’s Pluralism and the Personality o f  the State.
13 The fiction theory should not be confused with the so-called ‘bracket theory’ or ‘aggregate theory’. 
This theory argues that while the legal rights o f groups are in the end reducible to individual rights, 
corporate personality has a function as a technical devise to diminish the complexity involved in such a 
reduction. The bracket theory is sometimes offered as a third justification o f corporate personality, but it
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two seemingly contradictory things. We can admit that only individual human beings 
are moral persons, but retain corporation theory. We could treat associations as right- 
and-duty-bearing units in the legal sphere, and yet let go of the view that they are real 
agents. Indeed, on this basis we could just as easily go on to award legal personality to 
animals, trees, ghosts and idols.14
However, the use of fiction has limitations in political theory. One problem is that we 
still have to explain how the state becomes a corporate person itself. For, as the author 
of fiction, the suggestion that the state is a legal fiction itself raises logical puzzles that 
are difficult to resolve.15 But a more fundamental problem is that while fiction creates 
legal personality for associations, it cannot produce moral rights and obligations. And 
corporation theory does not merely entail that groups figure as persons in positive law. 
It also includes the view that associations are valuable and worthy of respect. The idea 
suggests, in other words, that groups are ethical persons, specific units whose interests 
and liberties demand protection from a moral point of view.
The second kind of justification rejects the bifurcation between legal and moral 
concepts of the person. It suggests that both the individual and the group are legal 
persons precisely because they are real and moral persons. I refer to this kind of 
justification as corporate realism because, in contrast to the fiction theory, it calls 
attention to the reality that lurks behind the mask.
ultimately simply dismisses the idea. See S. J. Stoljar, Groups and Entities: An Inquiry into Corporate
Theory, pp. 186-188.
14 S. J. Stoljar, Groups and Entities: An Inquiry into Corporate Theory, p. 2.
15 D. Runciman, ‘What Kind o f Person is Hobbes’s State? A Reply to Skinner’, The Journal o f  Political 
Philosophy, Volume 8 (2000), number 2, pp. 268-278, argues that on the Hobbesian theory the state is 
shown to be a fictional person, which relies on representation by the sovereign, rather than a real (or 
artificial) person relying on the representation by the sovereign. But the difficulty with this construction, 
apart from its ridiculous complexity, is that some real person will still have to authorise this fiction. The 
problem becomes visible when Runciman writes (p. 273) that the multitude ‘create the conditions which 
allow the actions o f  the sovereign to be attributed to them as a single unit, since they are jointly committed 
[my emphasis] to taking responsibility for what the sovereign does.’ But i f ‘the multitude’ are capable o f  
joint commitment, are they not thereby capable o f joint action after all? See also Q. Skinner, ‘Hobbes and 
the Purely Artificial Person o f the State’, The Journal o f  Political Philosophy, Volume 7, Number 1, 
1999, pp. 1-29; D. Copp, ‘Hobbes on Artificial Persons and Collective Action’, The Philosophical 
Review, Volume 89, Issue 4 (October, 1980), pp. 579-606, especially pp. 603-606.
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As an alternative to the fiction theory, corporate realism was perhaps most notably 
advocated by Otto von Gierke (1841-1921), mainly in the four volumes of Das 
Deutsche Genossenschaftsrecht, his magnum opus.16 Gierke's main objective was to 
defend the freedom and value of German associative life, which he saw originating in 
mediaeval guild society and the political theories o f that era. Since then, the ancient 
notion of fellowship had been forced on a steady retreat by the natural law tradition. 
According to Gierke, the latter set of ideas encouraged rampant individualism on the 
one hand and an omnivorous sovereign state on the other, leaving only little room for 
civic life to flourish in the middle. The fiction theory, while attempting to retain 
corporate ideas in law, inevitably fell short in Gierke’s view. It made corporate 
personality too vulnerable to the whims of the sovereign. Corporate realism wanted to 
restore the balance by pointing out that group personality existed independently of the 
law. As Barker put it: ‘Legal group-personality is the shadow cast by real group-
1 7personality: it is the reflection of reality in the mirror of law.’ The state may have been 
a corporate person too, but it had to recognise, in step with a federalist ideal, that it was 
a person made up of corporate persons.
Corporate realism faced a number of difficulties. Most importantly, since it relied on 
the notion of the group as an agent, it needed to explain how associations could have a 
will separately from the wills of their individual members, without relying on the aid of
1 Sfiction or representation. Gierke sought refuge in a biological metaphor. A group 
mind, he thought, acts through the bodies of their individual members, just as the 
individual mind acts through the body’s arms and legs. While not directly observable,
16 Only parts o f this work, which was published between 1868 and 1913, have appeared in English. See 
O. von Gierke, Political Theories o f  the Middle Age, edited and translated by F. W. Maitland (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1927); Natural Law and the Theory o f  Society, edited and translated by E. 
Baker (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1934); Community in Historical Perspective, edited by
A. Black, translated by M. Fisher (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).
17 E. Barker, ‘Introduction’, in: O. Gierke, Natural Law and the Theory o f  Society, edited and translated 
E. Baker (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1934), p. lxvii.
See here O. Gierke, ‘The Nature o f Human Associations’, edited and translated by J. D. Lewis, in: The 
Genossenschaft-theory o f  Otto Von Gierke (Madison: University o f Wisconsin Studies in the Social 
Sciences and History, 1935), pp. 139-157.
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the reality of a folk-soul, folk-feeling and folk-will could be deduced from the fact that 
there were communal laws and language, which he thought could not be explained 
without it. More importantly, according to Gierke, we could infer the reality of the 
‘corporeal-spiritual unity’ of a Group Ego from its impact on our own consciousness.
The incorporation of our Ego in a social Being of a higher order is a matter of 
our own inner life. We are conscious of our self as a being enclosed in itself; 
but we are also conscious of our self as a part of a living whole which is 
operative in us. If we abstract our membership of our particular nation or State, 
our religious community and Church, our family and a variety of other groups 
and associations, we cannot recognise ourselves in the pitiable residue. But if 
we reflect on all these factors, we see that there is here no question of merely 
external bonds and fetters by which we are chained. It is a matter of psychical 
connections which extend down into our inmost being, and constitute integral 
parts of our spiritual existence. We feel that a part of the impulses which 
determine our activity proceeds from the communities by which we are 
permeated. We are conscious that we share in a life of community. If we derive 
from our internal experience a certainty of the reality of our Ego, this certainty 
is not limited to the fact of our being an individual life-unity: it also extends to 
the fact of our being a part-unity within the higher life-unities.19
In sum, on these realist foundations, corporate personality was closely linked with a 
robust version of metaphysical collectivism according to which groups had minds, 
thoughts and wills of their own.
We have here two very different justifications for corporate personality. The problem 
is that they both fall short for a variety of reasons. In point of fact, looking at 
corporation theory in law, it is apparent that the controversy between fiction theorists 
and realists has since long been dead. It is commonly thought that this debate ended in 
stalemate, that both theories were right in one sense and wrong in another, and that they 
made no difference to legal practice. Hart drove the final nail in the coffin by arguing
19 O. Gierke, ‘The Nature o f  Human Associations’, cited in E. Barker, ‘Introduction’, in: O. Gierke,
Natural Law and the Theory o f  Society, pp. lxviii-lxix.
20 For example: S. J. Stoljar, Groups and Entities: An Inquiry into Corporate Theory, pp. 182-186; G. 
Teubner, ‘Enterprise Corporatism: New Industrial Policy and the ‘Essence’ o f  the Legal Person’, in: S. 
Wheeler (ed.) A Reader on the Law o f  Business Enterprise (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), pp. 
51-79. For further reconciliatory approaches: E. Barker, ‘Introduction’, in: O. Gierke, Natural Law and 
the Theory o f  Society; F. Hallis, Corporate Personality: A Study in Jurisprudence, pp. 239-246; A. W. 
Machen, ‘Corporate Personality’, Harvard Law Review, Volume XXIV, No. 4 (February, 1911), pp. 253- 
267.
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that both theories, but realism in particular, were essentially mistaken about the nature 
of legal concepts.21 He famously suggested that legal concepts should be compared, not 
to fact or fiction, but to the rules of games.22
Having said that, the debate on corporate personality has run a different course in 
political and ethical theory. There the idea of a group person means that associations 
form the loci of rights and duties, not just in legal practices, but also in moral and 
normative reasoning. Obviously, the fiction theory cannot deliver normative 
conclusions.23 It is one thing to say that groups can be legal person, but it is quite 
something else to argue that they should have that status. The one is a claim about the 
legal order, the other a claim about the moral order. However, it is all too commonly 
surmised from this limitation that corporate personality could only be justified by 
realism. It is important to point out that this inference rests on a mistake. But i f  it were 
valid, and we still want to say something about the moral order, then we face a choice 
between two theoretical alternatives. We would have to either dismiss corporate 
personality altogether or claim instead that group persons are somehow metaphysically 
real.24 Presented with this choice, it is not too difficult to see why corporation theory 
was completely dismissed.
The first alternative leads to the principle of ethical individualism. Briefly, this 
principle declares that only the individual enters into the Kingdom of Ends. To human 
associations it assigns the role of mere instrument. To be sure, ethical individualism 
does not rule out that associations are important, but the key is that their importance 
derives from the service they render to the individual’s good.25 The principle holds that
21 H. L. A. Hart, ‘Definition and Theory in Jurisprudence’, in: Essays in Jurisprudence and Philosophy
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983), pp. 21-48.
22 According to Hart, legal personality is an ‘institutional fact’. For this last notion, see also J. R. Searle, 
The Construction o f  Social Reality (London: Penguin Books, 1996) and my discussion in Chapter IV.
Notice also that, on this view, the same applies to the legal personality o f individuals.
23 See P. A. French, Collective and Corporate Responsibility (New York: Columbia University press, 
1984), pp. 32-38.
24 See F. W. Maitland, ‘Moral Personality and Legal Personality’, pp. 318-319.
25 For example, M. Dan-Cohen, in his book Rights, Persons, and Organizations: A Legal Theory fo r  
Bureaucratic Society (Berkeley: University o f California Press, 1986), argues that while organisations
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the interests of the association are not in the final analysis normative or reason-giving.
To put it differently, if somebody suggests that you have a reason -  either of prudential
or moral nature -  to do x, then x  must be justifiable in terms of your own well-being or
that of other individuals. An appeal to the interest of the group as a whole -  if  this
notion were intelligible at all -  does not count as a reason for or against x. Whether
measured in terms of preference satisfaction or pleasure or by some objective standard
of goodness, only the good of an individual provides us with a reason for doing this or
that. In Barry’s words, the principle ‘rules out appeals on behalf of God, Nature,
History, Culture, the Glorious Dead, the Spirit of the Nation, or any other entity -  unless
that claim can be somehow reduced to terms in which only individual human interests 
>26appear.
The principle of ethical individualism receives perhaps its most prominent 
expression in the rights-based theories of Rawls, Nozick, Buchanan and Dworkin. 
Albeit with different substantive conclusions, these theories are united in their rejection 
of the classical utilitarianism of Bentham and Sidgwick, as has often been noted 
before.28 Crucially, all point out that utilitarianism falls short precisely because it fails to 
acknowledge the full importance of the individual. While agreeing that the well-being 
of each counts equally in the calculus, utilitarianism fails to also attach significance to 
the distinctness of persons. For the utilitarian, it does not matter -  not in a fundamental 
sense -  whether utility is experienced by one individual as opposed to another. Since his 
guiding principle is maximisation, what matters more than anything is that utility,
could have rights, they could only derive them from consequentialist considerations. McMahon argues: 
‘organizations and other social entities -  viewed as distinct from their members -  are not appropriately 
accorded moral consideration in their own right.’ See C. McMahon, Authority and Democracy: A General 
Theory o f  Government and Management (Princeton: Princeton University press, 1994), p. 62.
26 B. Barry, ‘Self-Government Revisited’, in: Democracy and Power (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991), 
]3j3. 156-186, at p. 159.
J. Rawls, A Theory o f  Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992); R. Nozick, Anarchy, State, and 
Utopia (New York: Basic Books, 1974); J. M. Buchanan, The Limits o f  Liberty: Between Anarchy and 
Leviathan (Chicago: University o f Chicago Press, 1975); R. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, seventh
impression (London: Duckworth, 1994).
28 See for example, H. L. A. Hart, ‘Between Utility and Rights’, in: Essays in Jurisprudence and 
Philosophy, pp. 198-222.
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pleasure or want-satisfaction is experienced. Thus, the problem is that utilitarianism 
places no checks on trade-offs between the utility of different persons. As Rawls points 
out, in neglecting such checks, it makes the major mistake of conflating the principle of
9Qrational prudence for one man with the principle of justice for society. Indeed,
utilitarianism conceives of society or of humanity in its entirety as one organism aiming
to maximise its own want-satisfaction over time. The desires or experiences of different
individuals are mistakenly treated as if they belonged to one super-person, who decides
to sacrifice a lesser to a greater personal good.
In contrast to this view, Rawls and Buchanan aim to establish principles of
distributive justice on the basis of the criterion of general agreement. Justice, they
claim, is not grounded in the criterion of welfare maximisation, but in the more basic
idea that distinct individuals have distinct and vital interests in the distribution of
welfare or resources. Nozick advances a Lockean theory of justice on which individuals
enjoy natural rights that serve as side-constraints on the maximisation of social welfare.
And Dworkin bases his entire theory of justice on the principle that governments and
law should always treat individuals with equal concern and respect. Interestingly, he
fleshes out this principle by introducing a distinction between ‘personal’ and ‘external’
11
preferences. A personal preference is a ranking of outcomes defined over what I could 
do or obtain. An external preference is a ranking of outcomes defined over what 
somebody else could do or obtain. According to Dworkin, the trouble with preference 
utilitarianism is that it does not shield the individual from the external preferences of 
other people, and he points to this failing in particular in order to explain why that 
theory infringes on the basic principle of equal concern and respect. To remedy this 
problem, Dworkin suggests that individuals have anti-utilitarian, trumping rights. While 
this may initially seem a matter of sophistication rather than a full rejection of
29 J. Rawls, A Theory o f  Justice, pp. 22-33. A similar point is made by T. Nagel, The Possibility o f  
Altruism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970), p. 134, 138.
30 R. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, pp. 180, 272-274.
31 Ibid., pp. 234, 275-278.
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utilitarianism, the emphasis placed on the pivotal distinction between personal and 
external preferences evidently forces Dworkin back into line with the more obviously 
anti-utilitarian theories offered by Rawls, Buchanan and Nozick.
In sum, without neglecting their considerable internal differences, these theories all 
subscribe to one common assumption. Each individual person forms a distinctive unit of 
well-being, interests and preferences, and it is this unity that determines what we have 
reason to do, either morally or prudentially, not some greater whole of society, not even 
humanity as such.
The second alternative looks unappealing. This road leads straight back to the pitfall 
of realism. We would have to claim that collectives have preferences, intentions and 
various other mind-states. By choosing this path, in other words, we come to depend on 
something like the Ego theory of the person applied to the group. Like Gierke, we need 
to postulate a collective mind, existing underneath and entirely separate from the 
physical and psychological reality of individual human beings, and capable of deciding 
how its individual members should act. While it may be impossible to falsify such a 
theory, we also know -  precisely, perhaps, because it is beyond refutation -  that we 
cannot expect to marshal any serious support for corporate personality.
It is here that corporate personality is confronted by the objection of ontological 
reductionism and perhaps to a lesser extent also by methodological individualism. Like 
moths to the flame, ethical individualists are naturally drawn to both forms of 
reductionism, but it is important to note that these objections actually form different 
strands of individualism, which can in principle be detached from ethical and political 
concerns.32 Ontological reductionism claims that institutional and group action is 
always the aggregate of or the causal relatedness between individual actions and their 
(intended or unintended) consequences. We should always realise that collective
32 See for example C. McMahon, Authority and Democracy: A General Theory o f  Government and 
Management, pp. 52-69. For the many forms that individualism can take, see S. Lukes, Individualism 
(Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1985).
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intentions are the product of individual intentions. We habitually personify groups in 
everyday language, but this personification is never more than a convenient manoeuvre 
to avoid the staggering complexity of detail that collective action often involves. For 
example, the simple statement ‘Arsenal are looking for goals’ does not refer to a 
separate mental entity, which intends to commit its men forward. Rather, it is simply a 
figure of speech. This is how we sum up the dynamics in which individual players, in 
response to each other, decide to abandon their defensive positions, move in slightly 
different patterns, and so switch to a more attacking strategy. As J. S. Mill once put it, 
‘Men are not, when brought together in society, converted into another kind of 
substance!’33 Popper was perhaps the most famous advocate of the closely related 
principle of methodological reductionism. In his words, the principle stipulates ‘that all 
social phenomena and especially the functioning of all social institutions, should always 
be understood as resulting from the decisions, actions, attitudes, etc., of human 
individuals, and that we should never be satisfied by explanations in terms of so-called 
‘collectives’ (states, nations, races, etc.).’34 And Hayek, having brutally exposed the 
flaws of constructivism, was no less outspoken about ‘the even more primitive attitude 
which personifies such entities as society by ascribing to them possession of a mind’.35
While methodological individualism forms the subject of ongoing debate, it is 
important to note that even in the communitarian literature we find few traces of 
corporate realism. What we learn from Sandel, for example, is that communities are 
constitutive of our identities, and that we cannot, therefore, completely abstract 
ourselves from our roots and traditions. Similarly, Taylor makes the point that we all 
need a communal background of meaning in order to be able to become choosers at
Cited in M. Gilbert, On Social Facts (London: Routledge, 1989), p. 408.
34 K. R. Popper, The Open Society and its Enemies, Volume 2 (London: Routledge, 1945), p. 98.
35 F. A. Hayek, Law, Legislation and Liberty, Volume 1 (London: Routledge, 1982), p. 27.
36 For a history o f  methodological individualism, see L. Udehn, Methodological Individualism: 
Background, History and Meaning (London: Routledge, 2001). For a critical discussion, D. H. Ruben, 
The Metaphysics o f  the Social World (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1985).
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all.37 But what we do not get from these theories is the view that groups and 
communities are persons in and of themselves. Pettit, in his misleadingly named book 
The Common Mind, holds to the typical view that, while our ability to think depends 
‘horizontally’ on our relatedness with other individuals, our agency is not ‘vertically’ 
overruled by the intentions of collectives.38 He claims to be a ‘holist’ rather than an 
‘atomist’, but at the same time he supports ‘individualism’ rather than ‘collectivism’. 
Thus, while social relatedness is deemed to be crucially important to human agency, it 
is still the individual rather than the collective that is the agent. Anthony Black writes: 
‘To think of groups as having some inner core (analogous to that of the human 
personality) is to bring down on oneself all the problems of holistic explanation, and a 
justifiable charge of anthropomorphism.’39 And from this he concludes that an 
associational right is merely the kind of right that individuals have ‘in virtue o f their 
personal relationships or the groups to which they belong’. His view resembles 
Kymlicka’s, who rejects the idea that ‘communities have rights independent of, and 
perhaps conflicting with, the rights of individuals who compose them.’40 So while 
communitarianism clearly awards greater value to groups and associations than 
atomistic strands of liberalism, at a deeper level it still appears to be committed to 
individualism. The key problem, therefore, is that communitarianism does not explain 
why groups should have ethical standing comparable to that of individuals. This is 
precisely why so much of the communitarian argument is in the end diluted into 
‘ liberal-communitarianism’.
37 M. J. Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits o f  Justice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982); C.
Taylor, Philosophical Arguments (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1995).
38 P. Pettit, The Common Mind: An Essay on Psychology, Society and Politics (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1993).
39 A. Black, State, Community and Human Desire (Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1988), p.
131.
40 W. Kymlicka, ‘Individual and Community Rights’, in: J. Baker (ed.), Group Rights (Toronto: 
University o f Toronto Press, 1994), pp. 17-33, at pp. 18-19. For an alternative account o f group rights 
along individualist lines, see also P. Jones, ‘Group Rights and Group Oppression’, The Journal o f  
Political Philosophy, Vol. 7, No 4. (1998), pp. 353-377.
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Corporate realism, of course, did offer such an explanation by claiming that 
associations have their own personality. But it is clear that this justification for 
corporate personality has lost its credibility. Human associations, social facts and 
collective actions are decomposable, if not to their non-social parts, then to the social 
network that connects the parts. And this, crucially, would appear to stamp out 
corporation theory. McTaggart, for example, claimed:
Compared with the worship of the state zoolatry is rational and dignified. A bull 
or a crocodile may not have great intrinsic value, but it has some, for it is a 
conscious being. The state has none. It would be as reasonable to worship a 
sewage-pipe, which also possesses considerable value as a means.41
As Nozick once put it:
Individually, we each choose to undergo some pain or sacrifice for a greater 
benefit or to avoid a greater harm: we go to the dentist to avoid worse suffering 
later; we do some unpleasant work for its results; some persons diet to improve 
their health or looks; some save money to support themselves when they are 
older. In each case, some cost is borne for the sake of the greater overall good. 
Why not, similarly, hold that some persons have to bear some costs that benefit 
other persons more, for the sake of the overall social good? But there is no 
social entity with a good that undergoes some sacrifice for its own good. There 
are only individual people, different individual people, with their own 
individual lives 42
Corporate theory has thus been forced to the margins. Scruton still advocates the 
idea43 He hopes to revive corporate personality as an alternative to social choice 
theories and liberal contractualism. From an entirely different standpoint, the idea 
emerges also in work by Graham. His analysis of group personality seems to derive 
mainly from an interest in analytical Marxism, especially how it could benefit from a 
conception of class as a collective agent44 French defends a realist view on which
41 Cited in: A. Quinton, ‘Social Objects’, The Aristotelian Society Volume LXXVI (1975/76), pp. 1-27, at 
p. 13.
42 R. Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia, pp. 32-33.
43 R. Scruton, ‘Corporate Persons’.
44 K. Graham, ‘Morality, individuals and Collectives’, in: J. D. G. Evans (ed.), Moral Philosophy and 
Contemporary Problems (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), pp. 1-18; Karl Marx, Our 
Contemporary (New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1992). Graham, in his recent book Practical 
Reasoning in a Social World: How We Act Together (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), has 
significantly extended his analysis too other groups and theories. He confronts the doctrine o f the
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organisations qualify as agents in virtue of having a ‘corporate internal decision 
structure’.45 He argues that business corporations are morally and legally responsible for 
their actions. But these approaches struggle to convince us that something like a 
corporate person is possible at all.
This thesis argues that corporate personality really is possible. It aims to do so, not by 
returning to corporate realism, but by carving out a third justificatory theory of 
corporate personality. The negation of ethical individualism is implicit in the very idea 
of a corporate person. However, this is not necessarily true for ontological 
individualism. I have no quarrel with the latter strand of individualism. I subscribe to 
the view that associations are relational bundles of individuals without leaving any 
ontological residue. (The knack is that individuals are similarly reducible.) What I 
object to, however, is the claim that this reductionist ontology is incompatible with 
corporate personality.
I aim to provide a theory of corporate personality that frames this idea in terms 
altogether different from corporate realism or the fiction theory. I want to look for this 
justification in the view that the concept of a person, and especially the concept of the 
identity and distinctness of persons, is ultimately itself part of normative inquiry. 
Whereas some approaches in political theory hold that all normative considerations 
should be grounded in an antecedent view of the person, I argue, as Rawls has done in
distinctiess o f persons, in various interpretations, with the fact that individual actions tend to be causally 
intercoinected. This leads him to suggest that the distinctness o f persons is much less sharp than believed 
by mos ethical individualists. According to Graham, that means that groups may play a significant part in 
moral tieory, both as ‘moral agents’ and as object of concern or ‘moral patients’. I have been unable, at 
this lat( stage, to incorporate in this thesis the extensive discussion that his work here deserves. Suffice it 
to say that while some o f  Graham’s findings run parallel to my own, there remain what I think are 
importmt differences, specifically in how we arrive at our conclusions. First, I have tried to develop the 
notion )f  a corporate person by showing how it compares to the Lockean and Humean conception o f  
persona identity through time. Second, I have given the notion o f a person in general, and the idea o f  
corporae personality in particular, a more explicit grounding in a normative -  some would say 
conservative -  conception o f transgenerational continuity.
P. A French, Collective and Corporate Responsibility (New York: Columbia University Press, 1984).
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later work, that conceptions of the person are not prior to practical reason.46 Theories 
about what we have reason to do are validated or invalidated, not in relation to a 
conception of the person, but in reflective equilibrium with our considered judgements 
and intuitions. For my purposes it is more important to emphasise that normative 
theories -  albeit often implicitly -  presuppose a particular conception of the person and 
personal identity. Hence, to argue for a certain type of reason -  prudence is a good 
example -  is also to argue for a particular kind of personal unity. On this view, then, 
personal identity appears as a normative category, an obligation or a virtue. To put it 
differently, the conception of a person is an outcome of normative theorising, not an 
ontological theory about what we are.
As we shall see, Rawls and others have turned to this ‘practice theory’ to augment 
their own, largely individualist theories. However, along the same lines, I want to 
entertain the view that there are irreducibly normative justifications, not for ethical 
individualism, but for corporate personality. This practical justification thus moves 
away from both the fiction theory as well as the problem posed by ontological 
reductionism. For while it concedes that ontological reductionism about groups may 
well be true, it rejects the view that this has ethical individualism as its implication. It 
rejects this implication because it argues that corporate personality, like the notion of 
the individual person itself, is implicit in particular views and conceptions about what 
we have reason to do. Corporate personality is a view about what we have reason to do, 
and such views, I argue, are ultimately rooted in reflective equilibrium. In short, 
corporate personality is ‘political not metaphysical’.47 On this theory, the notion of a 
corporate person is interchangeable with a particular view of associative obligation and 
responsibility.
46 For example, J. Rawls, ‘The Independence o f Moral Theory’, in: S. Freeman (ed.), John Rawls:
Collected Essays (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999), pp. 286-302.
47 This Rawlsian turn o f  phrase was suggested to me by Paul Kelly.
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Let me finally explain how the argument is structured. Chapter I introduces the 
bundle theory of personal identity. This theory holds that the diachronic identity of 
persons consists in a kind of relatedness or bundling between temporally distinct 
psychological states. Essentially, it suggests that the analogy between groups and 
persons holds up after all, but inversely. However, as a consequence, it could be claimed 
that less importance should be awarded to the good of persons, and more importance to 
the temporal stages of a person.
Chapter II concentrates on the individualist’s reply to this view. Ethical individualists 
argue that, although personal identity is a relation, it is a relation which is in part 
constituted by a certain type of obligation and reason. To become a unified person you 
have to assume responsibility for your past and you have to recognise that your future 
selves have a bearing on your present reasoning. I refer to this response as the 
‘moderate claim’. Two further steps are important here. First, while Parfit uses a 
particular theory of personal identity to appraise certain theories of rationality and 
morality, I use practical considerations to appraise conceptions of the identity of 
persons. Second, the latter approach is fleshed out in terms of integrity.
Chapter III turns to the idea of corporate personality. To support this notion, the 
claims of the previous chapter have to be replicated at the associative level. First, on the 
basis of the practice theory, we have to demonstrate that the relatedness between 
persons has the same ethical significance as the relatedness between person-stages on 
the moderate interpretation. Second, we need to explain how we could apply the virtue 
of integrity, not only at the hz/rapersonal level, but also at the m/erpersonal level. This 
chapter concentrates purely on that second task and introduces the notion of a ‘shared 
intention’.
Chapter IV argues more specifically that corporate personality and integrity could be 
applied at the larger scale of the state. It is one thing to argue that relatively small and 
egalitarian groups could come to share an intention. But it is something else to claim
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that the model could be applied to institutionalised groups like states. Some of the 
problems are that states are highly complex organisations, that their membership and 
boundaries are sharply demarcated, and that they commonly harbour a great variety of 
different worldviews and identities. To cope with these three challenges, I argue that 
collective intention should be understood interpretively. I also argue that the corporate 
personality of the state is largely institutional.
Chapter V shifts the focus of the thesis to substantive normative issues. I argue that 
the concept of corporate personality, like the concept of an individual person, should be 
understood as a theory about what we have reason to do. But if theories of the person 
are theories about reasons, then we also have to make sure that corporate personality 
makes a telling contribution to normative theory. That is, it must be capable of doing 
normative work that ethical individualism leaves undone. This chapter explores a 
number of hypotheses to that effect and settles on the view that corporate personality 
explains how we are morally connected with past and future generations.
Chapter VI expands this hypothesis by looking in greater detail at the problem of 
future generations. To understand why we take future interests into account at all, I 
argue, we have to appeal to corporation theory.
Chapter VII, finally, investigates the normative relatedness between present and past 
generations, which plays a central role in the notion of political and associative 
obligation. Implicit in that notion is the idea that we are presently bound and obligated 
by the commitments of previous generations. I discuss and reject a model that frames 
such obligations in terms of our higher-order duties of impartiality. I then argue that the 
commitments of a previous generation are comparable to the commitments of a 
previous self. What this involves is a view of associative obligation that is not derivative 
from the higher source of duty, but from integrity.
To conclude, let me briefly reiterate what makes this thesis into an original 
contribution to the field of political theory. First, it recovers a previously defunct
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tradition. Corporation theory was abandoned in the Twentieth Century because it was 
thought to depend on spooky metaphysics, which had moreover been linked with 
fascism and communism. This thesis shows that corporation theory and liberal 
individualism build on the same, non-metaphysical assumptions. It shows that corporate 
personality is ultimately rooted, not in the heady obscurantism of German nineteenth 
century romanticism, but in the clear-headed, Anglo-Saxon empiricism of John Locke 
and David Hume. Second, this thesis further demonstrates that corporate personality has 
a practical contribution to make to political theory, in particular in an area where ethical 
individualism and liberal contractualism have traditionally found it hard to make 
headway, to wit, the transgenerational continuity of the social contract. That is to say, 
corporation theory allows us to make better sense of our ethical and political obligations 
to the past and the future.
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CHAPTER I
THE STRANGE RESURRECTION OF A 
LONG FORGOTTEN ANALOGY
...the true idea of the human mind, is to consider it as a system of different 
perceptions or different existences, which are link’d together by the relation 
of cause and effect, and mutually produce, destroy, influence, and modify 
each other... In this respect, I cannot compare the soul more properly to any 
thing than to a republic or commonwealth, in which the several members are 
united by the reciprocal ties of government and subordination, and give rise 
to other persons, who propagate the same republic in the incessant changes of 
its parts.
David Hume
Introduction
Corporate realism attempts to assign to the state and other associations the ontological 
status commonly ascribed to the individual. That is to say, associations are depicted as 
intelligent organisms with minds and intentional states of their own. Few contemporary 
theorists believe that this analogy makes much sense. I do not disagree. In this realist 
form, the idea of a corporate person should be rejected. The view that I discuss in this 
chapter, however, puts the analogy between association and individual on its head. I 
want to begin the case for corporate personality right at the opposite end of the 
spectrum. Granted, associations are not individuals ‘writ large’. However, it could be 
argued that individuals are associations ‘writ small’.
The reversal of this analogy, as I shall present it here, treads a fairly thin line 
between two affiliated claims. The first claim is that individuals have the same 
ontological status as associations. It is based on the extrapolation of the standard form
1 A Treatise o f  Human Nature, second edition by L. A. Selby-Bigge and P. H. Nidditch (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1978), p. 261.2
For such an organic theory o f association, see O. von Gierke, ‘The Nature o f Human Associations’.
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of ontological reductionism to a form that applies tout court, that is, to associative and 
individual persons alike. The second argument claims that, in consequence, individuals 
need to be awarded the same ethical status as associations. Together, both arguments 
show that ontological reductionism forms a double-edged sword for ethical 
individualism. On the one hand, it provides the tool that exposes the weakness of 
corporate realism. Collectives, of course, are not free-floating consciousness. They 
should be broken down in individually conscious parts. But on the other hand, a more 
thoroughgoing ontological reductionism uncovers that individuals are in turn like 
miniature associations. In other words, there is the possibility that reductionism is 
pointed at its own conceptual heart, namely that of the individual person as the apex of 
our rational and moral universe.
This possibility has been most notably advanced by Parfit in his Reasons and 
Persons? In Part Three of that book, Parfit sets out to achieve two main ambitions. 
First, he seeks to develop a particular ontological conception of the nature of personal 
identity. Second, he aims to show how this particular conception of identity undermines 
all person-based conceptions of rationality and morality, also under attack in the other 
parts of the book, and which claim or imply that personal identity is something that 
fundamentally matters.
To avoid any confusion, I should pause to point out in advance that I do not support 
Parfit’s views across the board. I rely on them only in part. To be more precise, his 
second conclusion, that we should liberate morality and rationality from the idea of 
personality as such, cannot be sustained. In Chapter II, I shall explain why. But the 
premise of this conclusion strikes me as correct. That is, I find little at fault with the
3
My discussion focussed mainly on Reasons and Persons. Different statements o f essentially the same 
argument can be found in: D. Parfit, ‘Personal Identity’, The Philosophical Review , Vol. 80, Issue 1 
(January, 1971), pp. 3-27; ‘On ‘The Importance o f  Self-Identity” , The Journal o f  Philosophy, Vol. 68, 
Issue 20 (October 1971), pp. 683-690; ‘Personal Identity and Rationality’, Synthese, Vol. 53, No.2 
(November 1982), pp. 227-241; ‘Later Selves and Moral Principles’, in: A. Montefiore (ed.), Philosophy 
and Personal Relations: An Anglo-French Study (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1973), pp. 137- 
169; ‘The Unimportance o f Identity’, in: H. Harris (ed.), Identity: Essays Based on Herbert Spencer 
Lectures Given in the University o f  Oxford (Oxford: Clarendon press, 1995), pp. 13-45.
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claim that the personal identity of individuals is reducible to a bundle or web of 
constitutive parts in a way that mirrors the plight of associations.
I propose to elaborate this latter claim first. In Section 1, I sketch the Lockean and 
Humean background to Parfit’s reductionism tout court. Next, in Section 2 ,1 discuss the 
conflict between this view and the Ego theory. Section 3 claims that the reductionist 
criterion of personal identity corresponds in important ways to that of associations. 
Ontologically, it is argued there, individuals and associations are on a level pegging. 
Finally, I explore Parfit’s ideas -  arguably his most daring -  on the ethical implications 
of this ontology of persons in Section 4.
1. The Psychological Principle of Personal Identity
In order to set out the backdrop to the argument, I want to start by drawing a broad 
distinction between two schools of thought in the philosophy of personal identity. The 
first school is inspired by the ideas of Locke and Hume, while its modem members 
include Grice, Parfit, Perry and Quinton. It advances what is often described as the 
psychological criterion of personal identity. According to this criterion, personal 
identity over time consists in the relatedness between a series of mental states at 
different moments. It is also referred to as the bundle theory. The second school is 
mainly inspired by the ideas of Descartes. It maintains that personal identity is 
grounded, not in a bundle of psychological states, but in the identity of the underlying 
substance of an Ego.
It is in accordance with Locke’s own viewpoint that we should start with an account 
of what the concept or idea of a person essentially means? To be a person, according to 
Locke, is to be something that can only be described as a particular mental faculty or 
state of being. Briefly, it is to be a thinking and self-conscious system or ‘a thinking
4
J. Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Book II, Chapter 27, edited by P. H. Nidditch 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975), pp. 328-348.
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intelligent Being, that has reason and reflection, and can consider it self as it self, the 
same thinking thing, in different times and places; which it does only by that 
consciousness, which is inseparable from thinking, and as it seems to me essential to 
it’.5 Locke focused on mental states and faculties because in his view the notion of a 
person was essentially a moral one. According to Locke, the term person ‘is a Forensick 
Term, appropriating Actions and their Merit; and so belongs only to intelligent Agents 
capable of a Law, and Happiness and Misery.’6
Consequently, the crux of the Lockean concept of the person is that it severs the 
psychological aspects of personality from the substance or stuff that does the thinking. 
On the one hand, there are thoughts, beliefs, memories, or as Hume put it, ‘perceptions’, 
while, on the other hand, there is the being of which we might say that it ‘owns’ these 
mental states. There are, of course, distinct views as to what the nature of this being or 
stuff might be. Descartes, in his Meditations, proposed that there exists purely spiritual 
substance.7 Other views hold that there is only material substance. Locke believed in 
spiritual substance. In any case, he did not seek to dismiss this idea. Parfit and other 
Lockeans seem more partial to the materialist position. But whatever our view of the 
nature of substance might be, the decisive point for all Lockeans is that the idea of a 
person is separable from the idea of thinking substance. Ultimately, the person is 
constituted purely by conscious thought, by reflection and self-awareness, and 
emphatically not by whatever stuff does the thinking.8
Locke, then, first distinguished between the ‘Idea of a Thinking Substance’, the ‘Idea 
of a Person’, and the ‘Idea of a Man’. By person is meant a self-consciousness, 
intelligent, reasonable and accountable being. By substance we mean the stuff that
5 Ibid., p. 335.
6 Ibid., p. 346.
7
R. Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy, translated and edited by J. Cottingham (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1996).
g
Thus, this bifurcation o f  ideas allows us the benefit o f metaphysical agnosticism. See A. Quinton, ‘The 
Soul’, in: J. Perry (ed.), Personal Identity (Berkeley: University o f California Press, 1975), pp. 53-72, 
especially pp. 53-58.
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ultimately renders us capable of consciousness and thought. And by man we mean a 
living organism. Consistent with this tripartite division of ideas, Locke devised three 
distinct criteria of identity, each ‘suited to the idea’. These criteria are not meant to 
settle what sort of things substance, man, or person are, that is, what separates them 
from each other. Rather, they decide what separates one substance from another, one 
man from another man, and one person from the next. What is at stake here is the 
principle of individuation, ‘which determines a Being of any sort to a particular time 
and place, incommunicable to two Beings of the same kind.’9 To be more specific, 
Locke wanted to address how substance, man and in particular persons retain their 
identity through time. To say that a thing is identical in this sense is to point to a 
specific unity relation between that thing at t and at tj. And Locke argued that 
substance, man and person each have a different unity relation.
(1) Perfect identity. The identity of substance is identity in what Butler called ‘the 
strict philosophical sense of the word’.10 A singular substance at t is identical at tj if, and 
only if, it continues to exist as numerically the same, unchanged and discrete particle. 
This criterion presumes that there is some indivisible substance, either of material or 
immaterial nature. But applied to a number of monadic particles, it implies, according to 
Locke, that if one particle were removed or added, it were no longer the same body or 
mass. A mass or body remains identical, however, if the same parts were ‘differently 
jumbled’.11
(2) Organic identity. The idea of man refers to a living body of which the parts are 
organised so as to sustain a continued life. In this sense, the idea of a man is not 
different form the idea of animal or vegetable. Both are living and growing organisms. 
For Locke, the identity of a man is the continuation of the same life ‘by constantly 
fleeting particles of matter, in succession vitally united in the same organized body’. So,
9
J. Locke, Essay Concerning Human Understanding, p. 330.
10 J. Butler, ‘Of Personal Identity’, in: J. Perry (ed.), Personal Identity, pp. 99-105, at pp. 100-101, 
originally in The Analogy o f  Religion (1736).
J. Locke, Essay Concerning Human Understanding, p. 330.
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while the parts can be replaced, a living body remains identical as long as the body parts 
sustain the same life.
(3) Personal identity. The identity of a person refers to the ‘sameness of a rational 
being’. But in what consists this sameness? According to Perry, we first need to 
distinguish between the two sub-questions to fully appreciate the complexity of the 
problem. Where K stands for person, we have to determine:
1. What relation obtains between simultaneous K-events that are events 
belonging to the same K;
2. What relation obtains between K-stages that are stages of the same K.12
The first question is less important. It probes into the synchronic nature of a person at 
any one moment in time. What makes me one person at this very moment? As we saw, 
for the Lockean, a person is constituted by a variety of psychological experiences or 
what Hume called perceptions. On one view, we could have just one such experience at 
a time, so the question does not arise. We are a thought, desire, perception, or some 
other ‘person-event’. On another view, such events first need to be bundled in a 
synchronic unity relation. But both views eventually arrive at the notion of a temporal 
part of a self or a ‘person-stage’.13 The second question examines the diachronic unity 
of a person over time. WTiat historical relation should hold between two or more person- 
stages such that we could say that these person-stages form one person with one 
personal history? Is there a special connection such that if  and when person-stages are 
so connected, certain psychological experiences at t and tj are the experiences of the 
same person?
According to Locke himself, the faculty of consciousness was the key to both 
questions. It is through consciousness, he argued, that simultaneous sensations, 
experiences and thoughts are identifiable as mine. If I am thirsty and tired these 
experiences are mine because I am aware of them. These events are suitably linked into
12 J. Perry, ‘The Problem o f Personal Identity’, in: J. Perry (ed.), Personal Identity, pp. 3-30, at p. 9.
13 For a comparable notion, see H. P. Grice, ‘Personal Identity’, in: J. Perry (ed.), Personal Identity, pp. 
74-95; at p. 86, ff. See also the notion o f a ‘soul-phases’ in A. Quinton, ‘The Soul’, p. 59.
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the same person-stage, that is, because they figure in the same state of consciousness. 
More importantly, Locke went on to claim that personal identity is extended through 
time by means of memory.
This personality extends it self beyond present Existence to what is past, only 
by consciousness, whereby it becomes concerned and accountable, owns and 
imputes to it self past Actions, just upon the same ground, and for the same 
reason, that it does the present.14
If I remember visiting New York in 1996, then I am consciously aware that I then 
visited New York. In other words, I know this experience to have been mine.15 Thus, 
my person-stages are linked into the same personal history if  a later person-stage 
contains or could (if I made a proper effort) contain a memory of an experience of an 
earlier person-stage.
This memory criterion invited much early critique, most notably by Joseph Butler 
and Thomas Reid.16 In response to this, others have extended and fine-tuned Locke’s 
argument in diverse and elaborate ways. While it goes beyond the scope of this thesis to 
address all these developments, it is important to mention the following two. First, as 
Hume points out, personal identity should include connectedness between all kinds of 
psychological states.17 Personal identity does not just consist of memory, but also of 
thoughts, beliefs, intentions, desires, character traits, and so on. This extension is 
important because the idea that memory is a necessary rather than a sufficient criterion 
for personal identity is in itself implausible. I do not now remember many of my 
experiences last year. Consequently, the basis of my personal identity would seem 
indefensibly weak. On the extended version of the criterion, however, my identity is
14 J. Locke, Essay Concerning Human Understanding, p. 346.
15 Ibid., p. 336.
16 J. Butler, ‘O f Personal Identity’; T. Reid, ‘Of Identity’, pp. 107-112; ‘Of Mr. Locke’s Account o f our 
Personal Identity’, pp. 113-118, both in J. Perry (ed.), Personal Identity, originally in Essays on the 
Intellectual Powers o f  Man (1795). For a discussion o f the idea o f personal identity in a historical context, 
see R. Martin and J. Barresi, Naturalization o f  the Soul: Self and Personal Identity in the Eighteenth
Century {London: Routledge, 1999).
17 Hume discusses the issue o f personal identity in A Treatise o f  Human Nature, Book I, Part IV, Section 
6, pp. 251-263. For this extension o f the criterion, see especially pp. 260-262, and also D. Parfit, Reasons 
and Persons, p. 205, 208.
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more robust. I may not remember much about last year, but I have the same character 
traits and mostly the same beliefs and long term plans. Hume argues that two person- 
stages are linked into one personal history whenever they sufficiently resemble each 
other. So if a desire or some other mental characteristic at t is still present at tj, then 
both person-stages are connected in the relevant way. He also suggests that person- 
stages are relevantly linked by causal connections. As Shoemaker puts it, two person- 
stages are linked ‘if the later of them contains a psychological state (a memory 
impression, personality trait, etc.) which stands in the appropriate relation of causal 
dependence to a state contained in the earlier one.’18 So even if a desire or a conviction 
is not retained in a later person-stage, it may still have inspired or formed the source of 
a later desire or conviction. On this view, then, person-stages are linked in the way of a 
person, not just if there are connected by memory, but also if they resemble each other 
or if a person-stage contains a ‘successor state’ of an earlier self.
Second, building on the work of others, Parfit makes a distinction between 
psychological connectedness and psychological continuity. Connectedness refers to the 
direct psychological links between two person-stages. If I could remember an 
experience I had twenty years ago, then there is one such link. Locke seems to have 
thought that connectedness is a necessary condition of personal identity through time. 
However, as his critics noted, psychological connectedness is not a transitive relation.19 
Neo-Lockeans have since tried to amend this criterion in order to overcome this 
difficulty. The solution usually advanced grounds the criterion in the continuity of
9 0mental states rather than just the direct connectedness between them. Parfit points out 
that continuity refers to an overlapping chain of strong psychological connections. On
18 S. Shoemaker, ‘A Materialist Account’, in: S. Shoemaker and R. Swinburne (eds.), Personal Identity 
(Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1984), pp. 67-132, at p. 90, and the subsequent discussion o f functionalism at 
pj). 92-97.
See T. Reid, ‘O f Mr. Locke’s Account of our Personal Identity’, pp. 114-115, and the discussion in D.
Parfit, Reasons and Persons, p. 206.
20 See H. P. Grice, ‘Personal Identity’. A. Quinton, ‘The Soul’, sets out a similar idea explaining the 
relatedness between ‘soul-phases’.
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this view, each connection is like a strand in a rope. While most strands do not touch 
each other directly, they are all indirectly connected into one rope. Hence, Parfit defines 
the criterion of personal identity -  or what he refers to as ‘Relation R’ -  in terms of
i
‘psychological connectedness and/or psychological continuity’.
Briefly, I now want to turn to the second school of thought. At the deepest level, this 
school rejects the Lockean distinction between the identity-criteria for person and 
substance. The identity of a person, in fact, is not given by the temporal continuity of 
purely mental states such as thoughts, intentions and memory, but rather by the 
persistence of an underlying substratum, an Ego, to which these thoughts and intentions 
are said to belong. Personal identity through time is not the identity of thought and 
perception, but the identity of the subject that thinks and perceives. As Reid expressed 
the difference between Locke’s view and his own:
My personal identity [...] implies the continued existence of that invisible thing 
which I call myself. Whatever this self may be, it is something which thinks, 
and deliberates, and resolves, and acts, and suffers. I am not thought, I am not 
action, I am not feeling; I am something that thinks, and acts and suffers. My 
thoughts, and actions, and feelings change every moment; they have no 
continued, but a successive, existence; but that se lf or /, to which they belong, 
is permanent, and has the same relation to all the succeeding thoughts, actions
99and feelings which I call mine.
In other words, thoughts must belong to a Thinker, something that exists separately
9^from our mind-states. The most important upshot of this theory is that personal 
identity is irreducible. Persons are not bundles of the temporal parts of a person, tied 
together as the strings in a rope, but indivisible. As Reid put it: ‘The identity of a person
21 D. Parfit, Reasons and Persons, p. 216. A further objection holds that the Lockean criterion presupposes 
personal identity. For example, if  I remember a past experience, then we presume that I had that past 
experience. But this presumption may be false. For solutions, see for example D. Parfit, Reasons and 
Persons, pp. 220-222; S. Shoemaker ‘Persons and their Past’, American Philosophical Quarterly 7 
(1970), pp 269-285; J. Perry, ‘Personal Identity, Memory, and the Problem o f Circularity’, in: J. Perry 
(ed.), Personal Identity, pp. 135-155; S. Shoemaker and R. Swinburne (eds.), Personal Identity (Oxford: 
Basil Blackwell, 1984), pp. 80-88.
22 T. Reid, ‘Of Identity’, p. 109.
23 For a contemporary defence, see R. Swinburne, ‘Personal Identity: the Dualist Theory’, in: S. 
Shoemaker and R. Swinburne (eds.), Personal Identity, pp. 1 -66.
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is a perfect identity: wherever it is real, it admits of no degrees; and it is impossible that 
a person should be in part the same, and in part different; because a person is a monad, 
and is not divisible into parts.’24
2. Person and State
I do not want to concern myself here with the debate between both theories. I shall 
simply assume that the reductionist account along psychological lines is the more 
plausible theory. I now want to flesh out the psychological approach by looking at 
some of its most remarkable upshots. That is, if the bundle theory were correct, 
individuals would after all be comparable to states and other associations. I already 
remarked that this (inversed) analogy has two different aspects. First, it claims that the 
identity-relations of persons are like the identity-relations of associations. Second, it 
argues that we should consequently treat persons like we normally treat associations in 
normative theory. I want to concentrate on the issue of identity first.
Reductionism about personal identity turns the analogy between person and state 
upside down. Like Hume, Parfit argues:
24T. Reid, ‘OfIdentity’, p. 111.
25 Brian Garrett, in his book Personal Identity and Consciousness (London: Routledge, 1998), 
distinguishes between no fewer than seven forms o f reductionism. Here, I make do with a basic form, 
shared by all models, according to which ‘we should see the ontological status o f persons as somehow 
secondary or derivative relative to the supposedly primary elements o f our ontology’ (p. 25). I should 
further point out that there is a third school o f  thought, which is also reductionist, but places a greater 
emphasis on the physical nature o f a person’s existence. See for example J. McDowell, ‘Reductionism 
and the First Person’, in: J. Dancy (ed.), Reading Parfit (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1997), pp. 230- 
250, who accuses Parfit o f advancing an implicit form o f Cartesianism. Briefly, this school claims that 
psychological states are in the end physical states o f our bodies or specific parts thereof, and, inasmuch 
this is true, the continuity o f these physical states is a necessary part o f the criterion o f personal identity. 
Philosophers often use thought experiments like brain transplantation and tele-transportation to tease out 
our intuitions in these matters. Clearly, it goes beyond the scope o f  the thesis to look at this controversy at 
length. What is more, it has been suggested that our intuitions in this matter are essentially unclear. See B. 
Williams, ‘The Self and the Future’, in: J. Perry (ed.), Personal Identity, pp 179-198. I agree with 
Rovane, who, in her book The Bounds o f  Agency: An Essay in Revisionary Metaphysics (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1998), argues that if  we start from the ethical point o f view o f persons as 
intelligent and therefore deserving and accountable agents, we should incline towards the psychological 
criterion. While mental capacities may depend on the body and brain, the latter matter only contingently 
from this ethical standpoint.
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When considering nations, most of us are Reductionists. We believe that the 
existence of a nation involves nothing more than the existence of its citizens, 
living together on its territory, and acting together in certain ways. In contrast, 
when considering persons, most of us believe the Non-Reductionist view. We 
believe that our identity must be determinate. This cannot be true unless a 
person is a separately existing entity, distinct from his brain and body, and his 
experiences. Most of us are thus Reductionists about nations but not about 
people. It is the difference between these common views which explains the 
two comparisons. The claim that X is like Y typically assumes the common 
view of Y. We shall therefore say, ‘People are like nations’ if we are 
Reductionists about both. If we are Non-Reductionists about both, we shall say, 
‘Nations are like people’. The belief in super-organisms may be a Non- 
Reductionist View about nations.26
The nub is that psychological reductionism cannot account for personal identity in the 
strict or perfect sense of the term. Personal identity thus becomes comparable to the 
identity of political parties, churches, nations, states and other relational facts. Like the 
identity of associations, the idea of personal identity must be applied in the imperfect 
sense.
As we saw, perfect identity is identity of the kind that admits neither of degrees nor 
change. Whether a thing is perfectly identical at another time is a question that has a 
determinate answer. A, is identical to Ati in the perfect sense if, and only if, they are 
numerically the same thing. On the Ego theory, personal identity is perfect, a matter of 
all or nothing, not of degree. However, if the person is constituted by psychological 
events, this is no longer true. Reid wrote: ‘Our consciousness, our memory, and every
97operation of the mind, are still flowing like the water of a river, or like time itself.’ 
Thus, psychological events form a stream of incessant change and movement. My 
thoughts, feelings and ideas now are never numerically identical to my thoughts at the 
next moment. They might be matching in content, or they might be connected in a 
causal chain, but they are not literally the same thoughts. So once the bifurcation
26 D. Parfit, Reasons and Persons, p. 332. For a similar analogy, though not grounded in this conception 
o f personal identity, see G. S. Kavka, ‘Is Individual Choice Less Problematic than Collective Choice?’,
Economics and Philosophy, 7 (1991), pp. 143-165.
27 T. Reid, ‘O f Mr. Locke’s Account o f our Personal Identity’, p. 116.
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between the ideas of substance and a person goes through, personal identity, in this 
perfect sense, must be a fiction.
We have to turn, therefore, to a relaxed understanding of identity, a notion more 
forgiving of change and degrees. As Hume noted, many of our everyday judgements on 
the identity of objects are relaxed in this sense. For example, when I shave off my 
beard, I do not conclude that my body is no longer the same. We believe that such a 
partial change is simply too insignificant to warrant this conclusion. As the bulk 
remains intact, so my body endures. Hume mentions the example of a river. The water 
molecules that form that river are forever in flux, hurtling down to the sea, eventually 
merging with it within days or weeks. Yet we do not hesitate to refer to it as the same 
river. Even rapid motion may not affect our sense of the identity of things. What these 
examples show is that our sense of identity survives in the face of change as long as this
98change is ‘identity-preserving’. And this means that changes have to respect certain 
constraints. It matters, for instance, that change is gradual or insignificant in proportion 
to the whole. Usually, it also matters that the replacing parts perform the same function 
or are causally related to the previous parts. Such constraints form the basic elements of 
a theory of imperfect identity.
Essentially, Hume and Parfit apply this understanding of imperfect identity to 
persons.29 Relation R refers to the extent to which some person-stage Jack at t is 
psychologically connected and/or continuous with some other person-stage John at t\. 
But this entails that the identities of persons are now comparable to those of political 
parties, states and other relational facts. For example, we know that the identity of
28 I borrow the terminology from D. H. Ruben, The Metaphysics o f  the Social World, pp. 63-38.
29 Having said that, the conclusion that Hume ultimately reached, in the Appendix to A Treatise o f  
Human Nature (pp. 633-636), was sceptical. The entire notion o f personal identity was in the end merely 
a fiction. The fact that people assigned identity to changing things merely meant that we were prepared to 
deceive ourselves. We merely conjectured identity by ‘a customary association o f  ideas’. Hume agreed 
with Locke that mental states or ‘perceptions’ were ‘distinct existences’ that could ‘form a whole only by 
being connected together’. However, for him, it was unclear how such connections could ever be 
discovered or perceived, as he also generally held that ‘the mind never perceives any real connexion 
among distinct existences. ’
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groups and associations is indeterminate. Is France the same country as it was fifty 
years ago? While some things have changed, other things have not. Is this change 
identity preserving? Here the problem is that there is no non-arbitrary cut-off point. 
Whether France is the same cannot be decided with accuracy. We know that there is 
some measure of historical continuity. But to say that France is or is not the same 
country is arbitrary. The same is now true for personal identity. According to Parfit, the 
question whether or not some person is identical through time has no determinate
■JA
answer. The psychological connectedness between person-stages tends to vary. 
Remote person-stages are often less connected. Indeed, they may no longer be 
connected at all. As he puts it:
On my proposed way of talking, we use ‘I’, and the other pronouns, to refer 
only to the parts of our lives to which, when speaking, we have the strongest 
psychological connections. When the connections have been markedly reduced 
-  when there has been a significant change of character, or style of life, or of 
beliefs and ideals -  we might say, ‘It was not /  who did that, but an earlier 
se lf.31
Do two such person-stages still belong to the same person? Contrary to what people 
tend to believe, the answer is not simply ‘Yes’ or ‘No’. The only answer available is 
that they are to some degree psychologically connected. We could say that they are 
either weakly or strongly connected, but we cannot conclusively decide that they are 
identical or not.
We also know that associations often split up. Belgium may divide in a Flemish part 
and a Walloon part. In which part, if at all, will Belgium continue? Or does it continue 
in both? These seem hard questions. But they are equally hard for personal identity. One 
consequence of the psychological criterion of personal identity is that persons could
^9branch or divide in two. In such cases, a person-stage Jack at t has strong 
psychological connections with John at tj and with Jim at tj. Personal division may be
30 D. Parfit, Reasons and Persons pp. 229-243
31 Ibid., pp. 304-305.
32 Ibid., pp. 245-266.
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technically impossible, but it is not inconceivable. Parfit imagines a world where 
surgeons could separate the two halves of Jack’s brain, each half retaining 
consciousness. Both halves could then be transferred to different bodies resulting in the 
birth of John and Jim. Both John and Jim are psychologically connected with Jack in the 
way of a person. They have memories of Jack previous experiences, they share his 
beliefs and values, and so on. Now, on the non-reductionist theory, persons cannot 
divide into parts. However, on the basis of the reductionist theory, Jack can be seen to 
survive as both John and Jim. According to Parfit, personal division is ‘almost as good 
as survival’ because R-relatedness is what fundamentally matters. So he claims that 
‘Since my relation to each of the resulting people is about as good as if it were identity, 
it may carry most of the ordinary implications of identity.’34 For example, John and Jim 
may both be held responsible for Jack’s actions. The key is that Jack and John and Jim 
are all psychologically connected. There is simply nothing we could sensibly add.
On the reductionist account, in short, the identity of a person is pulled together from 
temporally separate parts. Hence, it should be obvious that a person cannot be a 
monadic unity. The unity of a person is a measure of organisational integrity. 
Comparing persons to associations, Parfit writes:
In 1881 the French Socialist Party split. What happened? Did the French Party 
cease to exist, or did it continue to exist as one or other of the two new Parties? 
Given certain details, this would be an empty question. Even if we have no 
answer to this question, we could know just what happened.35
And elsewhere he argues:
Talk about successive selves can easily be misunderstood, or taken too literally.
It should be compared with the way in which we subdivide a nation’s history.
We call this the history of successive nations, such as Anglo-Saxon, Medieval, 
and Tudor England.36
33 Ibid., pp. 258-259.
34 Ibid., p. 271.
35 Ibid., p. 260.
36 Ibid., p. 306.
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Persons, in other words, should not be contrasted with groups. We are merely 
associations of a particular kind.
3. The Extreme Claim
Parfit’s analysis puts associations and individuals back on a par. Associations are 
constituted by numbers of individuals bound together by a particular relation. And this 
means that associations have no identity in the strict sense. However, this fact does not 
differentiate associations from persons. For, as we have seen, persons are in turn 
constituted by a number of person-events and person-stages bound together like the 
strings in a rope.
Now, of course this is not the kind of analogy that corporate realism had hoped to 
uncover. Rather than raising the moral stature of associations, the analogy may only 
show that we ought to demote the moral standing of persons across the board. It may 
prove, in other words, that individuals ought to be treated like we normally treat 
associations, rather than the other way around. To put it differently still, this analogy 
could now be used to argue that ethical individualism is just as old-fashioned as 
corporate personality.
Locke’s Eighteenth Century critics thought that this would inevitably be the 
outcome. Reductionism about personal identity, that is, would inevitably result in moral 
bankruptcy. They therefore thought that Locke had to be wrong. ‘A part of a person’, 
Reid wryly remarked, ‘is a manifest absurdity.’ Even the briefest of introspective 
moments or the tiniest morsel of common sense would surely indicate that much. For 
Reid, strict personal identity was the ‘foundation of all rights and obligations’. For if
30Locke were right, he thought, ‘no man could be responsible for his actions.’ Butler
37 T. Reid, ‘Of Identity’, p. 109.
38 Ibid., p. 112.
30
T. Reid, ‘Of Mr. Locke’s Account o f our Personal Identity’, p. 117.
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pointed out that Locke’s theory was equally hostile to prudential reasoning: ‘for if the 
self or person of today, and that of tomorrow, are not the same, but only like persons, 
the person of today is really no more interested in what will befall the person tomorrow, 
than in what will befall any other person.’40 Put differently, Locke threatened to explode 
all the familiar reasons that guide human action. Concepts like desert and punishment 
would, sure enough, lose their last shred of authority. The choice we faced, according to 
this objection, was between reason on the one hand and moral anarchy on the other.
Now, whatever he meant to say, Locke did certainly not want to leave morality in 
ruins. However, note that for the hardnosed reductionist these practical objections 
merely beg the question. According to Parfit, indeed, the objection only shows how 
much practical reason is tainted by Cartesianism.41 Parfit claims that we should simply 
revise our theories of rationality and morality. Having said that, the practical upshots of 
reductionism are by no means self-explanatory. Parfit makes an important distinction 
between the ‘extreme claim’ and the ‘moderate claim’. Both claims are essentially at 
odds over how to appraise the moral and rational status of R-relatedness. The extreme 
claim bluntly denies that relational facts could have moral and rational significance. 
Thus, it denies that the interests and intentions both of past and future person-stages are 
in any sense relevant to my present self. And by doing so it denies exactly what the 
moderate claim wants to affirm.
According to Parfit, either claim is in principle defensible and thus his own 
positioning remains obscure, straddling both views 42 When confronting the effects of 
reductionism on prudence, responsibility, punishment and obligations of commitment 
he adopts a decidedly moderate stance. However, there is less trace of this moderate 
stance in his treatment of justice. While it is clear that Parfit’s overall agenda is to show
40
J. Butler, ‘Of Personal Identity’, p. 102.
41 D. Parfit, Reasons and Persons, p. 324.
42 He writes on p. 312 o f  Reasons and Persons'. ‘Though we are not forced to accept the Extreme Claim, 
we may be unable to show that it should be rejected. There is a great difference between the Extreme and 
Moderate claims. But I have not yet found an argument that refutes either.’
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that practical reason ought to become more impersonal, it is not entirely transparent 
whether these implications must be understood in an ‘extreme* or ‘moderate’ way. As I 
hope to make clear in the rest of this thesis, much rests on this distinction. Hence, in the 
remainder, I am going to ignore Parfit’s own somewhat awkward positioning in 
between these opposing claims. I shall concentrate on the extreme claim first and only 
turn to the moderate claim in the next chapter.
3.1 Prudence and Future Selves
I want to begin by exploring the consequences of reductionism for prudential or self- 
interested reasoning. To illustrate the problem, let us assume that Jack is a heavy 
smoker. Jack is well aware that as a result he might die twenty years from now. But why 
should he care? The standard reply rests on two basic arguments. First, Jack has 
prudential reason to care because it is his future. The reason for him caring is agent- 
relative. Second, his future well-being is equally his well-being. The reason why he 
should care is time-neutral. His future interests are no less important than his present 
interests.43
There is, of course, one further assumption on which the standard reply depends: it 
must really be Jack who will die in agony. Now, on the Ego theory this condition may 
(perhaps) be met. But on the bundle theory, this is much less evident. There are two 
ways in which this is less evident. First, it is not inconceivable that the psychological 
relatedness between Jack and John will be weak. So it is unclear to Jack that he will 
suffer terribly later. Second, even if Jack and John were strongly linked, we could still 
deny that their psychological relatedness provides the proper agent-relative reason for 
prudential concern.
The extreme claim advances the latter version of the argument. It asserts that, if 
reductionism were true, Jack could never have a genuinely agent-relative reason to care
43 For the view that prudential reason is time-neutral and agent-relative, see for example T. Nagel, The 
Possibility o f  Altruism, Chapter 8. J. Rawls, A Theory o f  Justice, pp. 293-298.
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about a future person-stage of his.44 According to this claim, there could be such a 
reason only if Jack and John were perfectly identical. Only this kind of identity would 
guarantee that he would be the same self in the appropriate, reason-giving sense. It 
could be said that the extremist argues for what Parfit describes as the ‘full relativity of 
reason’.45 Standard prudential reason is agent-relative but neutral across time. The 
extreme claim argues that reasons should also be relative across time. Not only does 
Jack have an agent-relative reason to care for himself rather than for others. He also has 
reason to care for his present self rather than for the well-being of a future self. To put it 
differently, his future self is like another person, whose interests or preferences do not 
figure as a basic element in his prudential calculation 46
What is the argument for temporal relativity? The argument ultimately revolves 
around the normative appreciation of relational facts. The standard view supports a very 
sharp and far-reaching distinction between a person on the one hand and the social 
relations between persons on the other. If John were a different person, his suffering 
would carry no direct or non-derivative weight for Jack. Nor would it be of ultimate 
significance, on this view, if Jack had been closely related to John. Interpersonal 
relatedness does not matter in the sense that it facilitates agent-relative reasons. 
However, if this last claim were true, why still be neutral across time? What is so 
special about my future person-stages in contrast with my friends or relatives or 
neighbours? After all, we know now that personal identity is itself merely one kind of 
relatedness among many. Put differently, the extremist applies the agent-relativity of 
reason not just to the separateness between persons, but also to the separateness 
between person-stages.
44 D. Parfit, Reasons and Persons, pp. 307-311.
45 Ibid., pp. 140-141.
46 For a more explicit defence of the extreme claim, see J. Stone, ‘Parfit and the Buddha: Why There Are 
No People’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Volume 48, No. 3. (March, 1988), pp. 519- 
532.
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Notice that on this view the strength of the relatedness is entirely inconsequential. 
Jack may be psychologically connected to John, but this is still no reason to take his 
suffering more seriously than the suffering of others. Granted, he may have 
longstanding ideals, plans and hopes, and John may have many memories of Jack’s 
earlier experiences. Indeed, all these connections may give his life the relational 
coherence of a Humean bundle of experiences. But psychological relatedness, however 
strong, will still not suffice to give him an agent-relative reason to prevent his future 
misery. Thus, although Jack may be psychologically linked to John, both remain 
separate agents. Consequently, it is not imprudent or irrational for Jack to pay no heed 
to his future suffering.47
Notice further that the extreme claim could still condemn imprudent behaviour by 
shifting towards moral reasons.48 According to Parfit, the standard view of prudential 
reason is flawed because it is a hybrid.49 It is agent-relative, but time-neutral. 
Alternatively, there are two pure theories. First, we could resort to the full relativity of 
reasons. This is the pure theory of rationality. Second, we could advocate the full 
neutrality of reasons. This is the pure theory of morality. Moral reasons are agent- 
neutral as well as neutral to time. According to morality, our future selves could be 
compared to future generations. Whereas most of us believe that we are one and the 
same person throughout our biological lives, and possibly even afterwards, 
reductionism permits that one biological body may sustain several persons. 
Consequently, we have to say that someone will suffer terribly as the result of my 
actions. That person will not be me, but there will be terrible suffering at some point in 
the future. In other words, while the extreme claim rules out an appeal to prudence, it
47 Whiting distinguishes between a ‘weak’ and ‘strong’ version o f the extreme claim. The former claims 
that we are not required by reason or rationality to care about the future. The latter claims that it is 
irrational to have concern for your future person-stages. Here, I am interested in the extreme claim in its 
weak version. See J. Whiting, ‘Friends and Future Selves’, Philosophical Review, Volume 95, Issue 4
(1986), pp. 547-580.48D. Parfit, Reasons and Persons, p. 106
49 Ibid., pp. 137-148.
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unlocks the door to morality. Morality suggests that Jack has reason to prevent John’s 
agony, not because it is rational, but because he has a duty to avert terrible future 
experiences, regardless of whose experiences they are. If the extremist is correct, we 
may have a moral duty to act ‘prudentially’.
3.2 Desert, Responsibility, Obligation and Past Selves
Essentially, the extreme claim asserts that the relatedness between temporal person- 
stages is of no non-derivative significance. From the practical point of view, the fact 
that person-stages are connected and/or continuous in the ways that Locke and Hume 
describe bears no genuine weight. That is, these relations ought to have no greater 
impact on our rational and moral judgements than the relations we have with other 
people. We have seen what this implies for prudential reason. The interests of my future 
person-stages do not count as reasons for me now. What, then, are the implications for 
backward looking concepts such as obligations of commitment, desert, responsibility 
and punishment?
Locke himself suggests one astonishing answer. According to him, a person cannot 
deserve punishment, on principle at least, for a crime committed in the past if that 
person has no recollection of that crime.50 Reid suggests, even more radically that no 
one could ever be held responsible for any of his past deeds.511 cannot, after all, deserve 
punishment or reward for something I did not do. Desert and responsibility, that is, can 
only be allocated to those entities that meet the proper identity conditions. Clearly, I 
may well be related to an earlier person-stage. And I may even remember doing this or 
that. But that cannot justify that I should now be held responsible for these actions. 
Stone makes the point as follows:
If I say that I feel remorse because I murdered my brother, you would be right
to be puzzled. For all this comes to is that I happen to stand in certain causal
50 J. Locke, Essay Concerning Human Understanding, pp. 346-347.
51 T. Reid, ‘Of Mr. Locke’s Account o f our Personal Identity’, p. 117.
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relations to the man who killed my brother and no one else does, and why feel 
remorse over that? Why feel guilt? And if identity is merely psychological 
continuity it becomes impossible to account for the fact that people bear 
responsibility over time. ‘I am the man who did the deed,’ the criminal 
confesses, ‘but all this comes to is that I have the misfortune to stand in certain 
causal relations to the man who did it and no one else does. I’m not to blame for 
this situation; I find myself this way. Punishing me for his crime is no better 
than punishing the son for the crimes of his father.’52
Reductionism, on this extreme view, is simply incompatible with notions like 
responsibility and desert.
Similar implications follow for commitments and promises. A promise retains its 
validity over a period of time only if ‘promisor’ and ‘promisee’ retain their perfect 
identity.53 John may be related to Jack, but this cannot bind him to a commitment or a 
promise originally assumed by Jack. Their psychological relatedness is, in this sense, 
simply irrelevant. Jack may have promised to meet you for lunch. But that promise 
cannot obligate John. Jack’s promise is not merely a past commitment; it is the 
commitment of another person.
Desert, responsibility and obligation are backward looking in the sense that they 
presuppose a view on which present and future selves could be bound by the actions, 
intentions and commitments of an earlier self. Past intentions, promises and actions, that 
is, must carry normative weight such that I can later be said to deserve, owe, be 
obligated, and so forth. The extreme claim, however, denies that personal identity has 
these normative aspects. Psychologically relatedness has no normative upshots.
3.3 Justice and the Separateness o f Persons
There is yet another way in which reductionism might have important implications. 
Parfit argues that it lends credibility to impersonal versions of utilitarianism. It is in 
arguing for this position that Parfit’s own view becomes almost indistinguishable from
52 J. Stone, ‘Parfit and the Buddha: Why There Are No People’, p. 529.
53 D. Parfit, Reasons and Persons, p. 326.
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the extreme claim.54 Rights-based theories of justice, of the kind advanced by Rawls, 
Nozick and Dworkin, commonly claim overriding importance for persons and personal 
identity.55 This claim is often described in terms of the separateness of persons. The 
appeal to this separateness revolves around what Parfit calls the ‘compensation claim’. 
This states that the benefits of one person cannot compensate the burdens of another. So 
we cannot justify imposing certain costs on Ralph, merely by claiming that this will 
greatly benefit Paul. To do so would be unfair. Extreme cases aside, this is true even if 
the benefits outweigh the costs. It is for this reason that, apart from an increase in 
benefits, these theories are also interested in finding just distributions of burdens and 
benefits. Thus, the notion of the person puts constraints on consequentialist morality. 
About the tradition of classical utilitarianism, Rawls remarks that it ‘does not take 
seriously the distinction between persons’, and mistakenly adopts ‘for society as a 
whole the principle of rational choice for one man.’56 Utilitarianism, that is, ignores the 
crucial distinction between social justice and rational prudence. As he puts the criticism: 
‘if we assume that the correct regulative principle for anything depends on the nature of 
that thing, and that the plurality of distinct persons with separate ends is an essential 
feature of human societies, we should not expect the principles of social choice to be 
utilitarian.’57 And Nagel writes: ‘To sacrifice one individual life for another, or one 
individual’s happiness for another’s is very different from sacrificing one gratification 
for another within a single life.’58
Notice that Rawls and Nagel assume compensation within one life to be fairly 
unproblematic. That is, a burden for someone now could be compensated if benefits 
would accrue to that person later. We generally do not think it wrong to incur certain
54 Ibid., pp. 329-345. See also B. Schultz, ‘Persons, Selves, and Utilitarianism’, Ethics, Volume 96, No.
4. (July, 1986), pp. 721-745; D. Parfit, ‘Comments’, Ethics, Volume 96, No. 4. (July 1986), pp. 832-872, 
at pp. 837-843.
55 I concentrate here on J. Rawls, A Theory o f  Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), especially 
£|). 22-33. As we already saw, a similar view is found in the work o f Dworkin and Nozick.
J. Rawls, A Theory o f  Justice, pp. 26-27.
57 Ibid., p. 29, my emphasis.
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burdens presently if this will pay off later on in life. Trade-offs over time are not 
objectionable, then, as long as they occur within the life of one person. Thus, it is 
evident how much rights-based theories rely on sharp boundaries between persons. 
Within the unity of a life compensation and trade-offs are permitted. Here, we can just 
maximise. But as soon as costs and benefits are assigned to separate persons, 
maximisation should be abandoned.
However, on the reductionist account of personal identity, there are no fixed and 
clear boundaries. According to Parfit, reductionism has a dual effect on theories of just 
distribution. First, it leads to an extension of the scope of justice. That is, benefits and 
burdens ought also to be distributed fairly between the temporal person-stages that 
make up our lives. As Parfit observes, the question ‘When?’ should be compared to the 
question ‘Who?’59 As a result, the maximising principle should be constrained not less, 
but further. Incurring a present cost in order to reap a later benefit is precisely 
comparable to the case of Paul and Ralph. Future benefits do not make up for present 
costs because my future self and I are not strictly the same person. We may be 
psychologically related, but compensation still constitutes an injustice. After all, Paul 
may also be psychologically related to Ralph, but this fact does not justify 
compensation either.
However, Parfit goes on to show that the principles of fairness and equality lose 
weight at the same time. In fact, the entire notion of distribute justice becomes blurry at 
this point. Over what should burdens and benefits still be distributed? Why is it bad that 
some bundles of experiences are miserable and others happy? Surely, what is more 
important than the distribution of misery and happiness over such bundles, is that there 
are as few as possible miserable experiences. The problem, Parfit suggests, is that the 
units over which we distribute sink to the micro-level of temporally discrete 
experiences. But at this level, justice as fairness is simply on par with utilitarianism.60
59 D. Parfit, Reasons and Persons, p. 340.
60 Ibid., p. 344.
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Rawls argues that classical utilitarianism ‘extends to society the principle of choice of 
one man’ and that it does not recognise the separateness of persons as ‘an essential 
feature of human societies’. Parfit points out that Rawls is making a similar mistake. He 
extends to man the principle of rational choice for one temporally discrete person-stage, 
and he fails to see that the separateness of person-stages is an essential feature of human 
life.
The bottom line can be expressed in terms of the analogy between individuals and 
groups. The extreme claim maintains that individuals are like associations not just from 
the ontological point of view, but also from the point of view of justice. Justice as 
fairness presupposes that the well-being of persons has non-derivative and reason- 
giving value. But Parfit claims that persons are of no greater moral importance than 
nations. From the point of view of justice, the boundaries between people are like 
boundaries between countries. They delineate nothing of ultimate significance. 
Individualists agree when he claims:
If there is nothing more to a nation than its citizens, it is less plausible to regard 
the nation as itself the primary object of duties, or possessor of rights. It is more 
plausible to focus upon the citizens, and to regard them less as citizen, more as 
people. We may therefore, on this view, think a person's nationality less 
morally important.61
However, because persons are really only groupings of experiences, we should focus 
more on ‘experiences themselves’ rather than the ‘subject of experiences’. So, he goes 
on to argue analogously:
It becomes more plausible, when thinking morally, to focus less upon the 
person, the subject of experience, and instead to focus more upon the 
experiences themselves. It becomes more plausible to claim that, just as we are 
right to ignore whether people come from the same or different nations, we are 
right to ignore whether experiences come within the same or different lives.62
61 Ibid., p. 340.
62 Ibid, p. 341.
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Of course, Parfit is always careful to couch his argument in terms of relative 
plausibility, but on a more bold statement, we might say that individuals, like nations, 
are no more than the receptacles of what really matters. In fact, moral individualists are 
exactly like extremists when considering relatives, friends and nations. They do not 
think that such ties and relations are themselves reason-giving. To use Godwin’s famous 
words, there is no magic in the pronoun ‘my’.63 But the extremist’s point against ethical 
individualism is precisely that persons, too, are associations.
Conclusion
This chapter argues for the inversion of the analogy between individual and group. We 
no longer believe in Gierkean collective Egos. Reductionism about personal identity 
suggests that we should also stop believing in the Self. On this basis, individuals and 
groups are once again on a level pegging. Associations are not super-individuals, but 
individuals are miniature associations.
This analogy has two different aspects. The bundle theory of personal identity 
provides the ontological side of the argument. It is a common view that groups consist 
merely in a plurality of individuals who are related or associated in a specific sense. 
According to the bundle theory, something similar applies to the individual itself. 
Personal identity is based on the psychological relatedness between intentional episodes 
or person-stages. A continuous person is an association between beliefs, desires and 
intentions at different points in time, not some ‘further fact’ that exists underneath 
them.
The practical side of the argument claims that, as a consequence, our theories of 
rationality and morality need serious revision. According to the extreme claim, reasons 
should become more impersonal. We should regard persons more like ethical
63 W. Godwin, An Enquiry Concerning Political Justice, in: Philp, M., (ed.), Political and Philosophical 
Writings o f  William Godwin, Volume 3 (London: William Pickering, 1993), Book II, Chapter II, p. 50.
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individualists regard nations and other associations. Ethical individualists believe that 
the value of nations and states derives from the extent to which they contribute to 
individual well-being. The extreme claim holds that the value of personal identity is 
similarly derivative. Like associations, the good of an individual is not valuable in a 
fundamental sense, but only insofar as this contributes to the well-being of person- 
stages. Moreover, the extremist claims that we should reject notions of desert, 
responsibility and obligation.
The analogy between groups and association, then, appears to hold up in spite of 
everything. But, it will be objected, does it actually strengthen the case for corporate 
personality? For although individuals are like groups, it is also obvious that this is a 
Pyrrhic victory. The problem is that we have levelled down rather than up. We may 
only have shown that the idea of a person should be expunged from rationality and 
morality altogether. Chapter II aims to circumvent this objection. What that chapter 
looks for is an argument that could demonstrate that continuous persons, rather than 
temporally discrete person-stages, should remain the basic unit in practical analysis, in 
spite o f  the fact that personal identity is relational. Once this argument is up and 
running, the remainder of this thesis is no more than an attempt to extend its scope to 
interpersonal associations.
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CHAPTER II
INTEGRITY
Like our conception of eudaemonia, unified agency is an achievement -  in 
fact, the same achievement, seen from a different point of view. The process 
resembles the day-to-day activities of a sculptor I know. He begins work with 
a pile of found metal objects -  rebar, cotter pins, washers, steel plate, and so 
on -  which he pieces together to form larger units: the head of the hoe is 
joined to a length of bent reinforcement rod, and is now a hand. Similarly, we 
start our practical lives with haphazard collections of desires so poor in 
content as to amount to no more than reflexes -  some innate, some 
conditioned, and some supplied by adults around us. Pressured by experience 
to resolve practical conflicts, we weld disparate desires into larger and more 
structured practical judgments.
Elijah Millgram1
Introduction
According to one objection, corporate realism simply had to fail. It had to fail for the 
reason that it was ultimately based on an untenable metaphysical theory of collective 
Egos. As this theory no longer has credibility, corporate personality is defensible only 
on the basis of juristic fiction, leaving the domain of moral personality exclusively to 
the individual.
However, it is now evident that the issue is more complicated. In Chapter I it 
emerged that the notion of the individual person faces a similar objection. There is a 
view, we saw, that claims that ethical individualism is based on a metaphysical theory 
of personal identity over time. This theory grounds personal identity on the bedrock of 
the Self that exists separately from our brain and our thoughts. But this theory has also 
lost much of its credibility. Consequently, just as little stands in the way of discarding 
ethical individualism.
1 ‘Incommensurability and Practical Reasoning’, in: R. Chang (ed.) Incommensurability, Incomparability, 
and Practical Reason (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1997), pp. 151-169, at pp. 162-163.
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Such a m ove would rest on two claims:
(PI) Psychological reductionism claims that selves are temporally punctuated and 
not grounded in the substratum of a Self. On this view, personal identity over time 
consists in the degree of relatedness between mental events, such as thoughts, 
intentions and beliefs, occurring at different times.
(P2) The extreme claim asserts something about the normative aspects of personal 
identity, conceived as such a temporal relationship. It argues that temporally 
extended persons should no longer be a basic unit of analysis in morality and 
rationality. All things equal, the fact that two person-stages are in some 
psychological sense connected is of no greater reason-giving importance than the 
fact that two individuals are so related. From the standpoint of morality and 
rationality we ought to assign fundamental weight only to the stages of a person. 
That is, every intentional episode should be seen as a discrete agent, with basic 
interests and rights in and of itself.
If true, these claims leave the realm of real personality completely empty of inhabitants 
and thus strike at the very heart of liberalism as we find it in the political theories of 
Locke, Kant and Rawls, Nozick and Dworkin. It suggests a radically impersonal form 
of utilitarianism, according to which temporally isolated person-stages form the only 
unit of well-being and responsibility.
Together with these theorists, I believe the latter view to be false. But in order to be 
able to claim this, we need to reconfigure our picture of what it means to be a person. 
This means that we have to reject either (PI) or (P2). I want to argue in this chapter that 
we should reject the latter and accept its counterpart:
(P3) The moderate claim maintains that even though personal identity should be 
conceived of as a relationship, the person is still the basic unit or currency in 
morality and rationality. All other things being equal, the fact that two person- 
stages are in some specified sense connected is just about as significant as the 
unity of a person on the non-reductionist view. Thus, we should give normative 
priority to the bundle or relatedness -  what I below describe as integrity -  that 
makes us into continuous persons, rather than the interests and desires of the 
temporal stages of a person.
Why accept P3 rather than P2? The key to this question is found in two important 
arguments.
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The first argument is what I generally refer to as the practice theory. This theory 
captures something akin to what Rawls proposed in his essay ‘The Independence of 
Moral Theory’. Instead of grounding normative theory in a conception of the person 
and personal identity, we have to begin by assuming that certain practices are a basic 
feature of human life, at least as we know it. And from these practices we then reason 
towards a certain general and normative understanding of the person and personal 
identity. In sum, the practice theory argues that we need to accept the moderate claim 
because certain basic intuitions, judgements and practices would not be intelligible 
otherwise.
Second, we need to extend Parfit’s account of R-relatedness with a normative 
dimension. On the bundle theory, personal identity consists in the psychological 
relatedness between person-events, where each of these events is just an experience 
being had. We need a better and more specific theory of what we mean by this 
relationship. Basically, we need a conception of personal identity that defines this 
relationship in normative terms. Among other things, we need a conception on which 
person-stages are connected in such a way that prudence, responsibility and 
commitments are possible. I shall refer to this normative dimension of identity as 
integrity.
In this chapter, I want to say more about these two claims. However, it is important 
to warn that in pressing these claims my ulterior aim is seditious. Ultimately, I want to 
show that the moderate claim can be applied, not just to zw/rapersonal but also to 
mterpersonal relatedness. My aim is covert, so to speak. It is to show that the practice 
and integrity-based approach restore the possibility of corporate personality.
This is a concern for later chapters. Here, I proceed by introducing the moderate 
claim in Section 1. Section 2 outlines the practice theory of personal identity. In Section 
3, I discuss a number of objections. Section 4 takes up the idea of integrity. Then, in
2
J. Rawls, ‘The Independence o f Moral Theory’.
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Section 5 ,1 suggest that integrity is a virtue separate from morality. Finally, Section 6 
puts the idea of personal integrity back into a temporal context.
1. The Moderate Claim
The extremist does not turn a blind eye to the fact that most of our lives are 
psychologically connected in the way that Locke and Hume describe. However, the 
issue turns entirely on how this relational fact is appraised. On the one hand, the 
extreme claim denies that R-relatedness is reason-giving in various ways. So the 
connectedness between person-stages does not carry with it obligation, desert and guilt, 
justice does not allow for trade-offs, and future preferences do not count as present 
reasons. The separate parts of a person are conceived to be separate agents. On the other 
hand, the moderate affirms that psychological connectedness has precisely this kind of 
moral and rational significance. To put it differently, the moderate wants to restore the 
temporal unity of agency by claiming that personal identity refers to a kind of 
relatedness that is reason-giving in the various ways that the extremist denies.
What, for example, does the moderate claim imply for our standard conception of 
prudential reason? Take again the case of Jack, a heavy smoker, and his future self, 
John, who dies in agony as the direct consequence. Assume that Jack and John are 
psychologically connected. Does Jack have reason to take John’s interests into 
consideration? Essentially, the moderate argues that prudential concern is inherent in 
the idea of personal identity. The idea is not so much that psychological relatedness 
justifies prudential concern -  as something external to and detachable from the relation 
itself -  but rather that prudence is constitutive of personal identity. The moderate claim 
has been rightly compared to friendship in this regard. It is a common view about 
friendship that it implies mutual concern for each other’s interests. Again, the point is
3
J. Whiting, ‘Friends and Future Selves’.
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not that friendship justifies concern, but that the two cannot be analytically 
distinguished. To be a friend simply is to care about that person’s well-being in a 
particular way. In other words, the concept of friendship is defined in terms of mutual 
concern. According to the moderate, the connectedness between present and future 
selves should be seen in the same light. To be related as one continuous person simply 
is to care about your future selves.
The moderate claim has a similar impact on backward looking concepts such as 
desert, responsibility and obligation. The moderate argues that personal identity should 
be understood to carry with it responsibility for past crimes. While personal identity is a 
relation, it is the kind of relation in which mutual accountability is inherent. Consider 
the following case. I hatch a plan to rob the National Gallery, which I then proceed to 
carry out in a step-by-step manner. Altogether the plan comprises many separate sub­
plans and many separate actions. I start by making all the required preparations. I buy 
equipment, arrange for a get-away-car, and so forth. On the night of the robbery, I 
switch off the alarm, sneak in through the back, stun the guards and make off with a 
painting. Now, if the extremist were correct, we would have to break down this 
sequence in temporally discrete actions, and then allot moral responsibility for these 
actions to each of the person-stages. One stage is responsible for illegal entry, another 
for stunning the guards, and so on. We could, possibly, judge the wrongness of the 
event by adding up the wrongness of each action, but even if this produced the right 
results, there is no present agent who could be held responsible. The moderate, in 
contrast, emphasises that personal identity is precisely the kind of relationship of which 
it is constitutive that the members assume responsibility for each other. My person- 
stages, that is, intend to achieve something together, and they embrace each other’s 
actions as their own. They are collectively accountable.4
4
The notion o f collective responsibility is, o f course, the subject o f ongoing controversy. See L. May and
S. Hoffman (eds.), Collective Responsibility: Five Decades o f  Debate in Theoretical and Applied Ethics 
(Savage: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1991). However, the bundle theory suggests that, if
59
By now the gist should be sufficiently clear.5 The moderate claim retains person- 
based ethics, while at the same time it embraces the reductionist truth about the identity 
of persons. Reductionism about personal identity fragments our agency in intentional 
episodes. But the moderate claim re-establishes the unity of agency by arguing that 
these episodes share responsibility for their actions and put each other under 
obligations. To put it differently, the moderate argues that identity is a relation with 
normative standing.
2. The Practice Theory
The attempt to undermine person-based theories of rationality and morality by 
advancing a reductionist theory of personal identity could be resisted, I argue, by 
putting more emphasis on the moderate claim. We do not need a non-reductionist 
conception of personal identity; we just need to argue that persons continue to matter 
morally and rationally, even though their temporal identity is relational. The knack is to 
deepen the psychological relatedness between person-stages with a normative 
dimension. Section 4, 5 and 6 present a more detailed account of this dimension of 
personal identity. But I first want to look at another question.
Why should we be moderates at any rate? I already mentioned that Parfit thinks that 
the extreme claim and the moderate claim are both defensible. This dithering, I believe, 
stems from the fact that no metaphysical argument could in principle decide this issue. 
Ontology tells us what personal identity is. It clearly does not tell us how personal 
identity should be appraised. For this we need a different sort of argument, a kind of
responsibility is possible at all, the difference between individual and collective responsibility is much 
less profound than often believed.
5 Similar claims can be made about commitments to third parties and the importance o f the separateness 
o f persons. That said, it is probably more important to mention here that on the moderate claim the weight 
o f prudential reasons and o f obligations, desert and responsibilities may be mediated by the strength o f  
the connectedness. For example, it may be rational to discount my future interests at a rate proportional to 
the degree to which my psychological connectedness weakens through time. I will come back to this issue 
in Chapters V and VI.
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argument, I claim, that is in itself normative. I proceed by unpacking this argument 
below.
Notice first that Parfit would reject such a practice-based argument.6 Buried in 
Parfit’s writings on personal identity lies a particular view about the order in which 
normative theory should be conducted. The presupposition is that normative theory 
should in the end be grounded in some account of what persons really are. This account 
of the self will ultimately reveal the truth about rationality and morality. Parfit, then, 
seems to believe that we need to begin by ironing out the issue of personal identity. For 
only with this out of the way could we pass a judgement on human practices.
What I shall refer to as the practice theory departs from this method. The limitation 
of Parfit’s approach is precisely that it cannot arbitrate between the extreme claim and 
the moderate claim. The practice theory proposes that we therefore reverse this 
procedure. It begins by looking at certain basic human practices and judgements and 
intuitions and then tries to manufacture a theoretical conception of personal identity that 
achieves a decent fit with these data. For example, we worry about going to the dentist, 
we get nervous about job-interviews and many people agonise over growing old. We 
also tend to think that promises create future obligations. It may of course be true that 
‘promisor’ and ‘promisee’ are merely earlier selves, but we still think, all things being 
equal, that promises have an obligating force. We are, moreover, all engaged in 
numerous kinds of enduring social relationships and networks. Friendship, trust, 
citizenship and contracts are difficult to imagine without assuming the temporal 
continuity of a person.7 The vows we make, the contracts we sign, the love for our 
children, the debts that need to be repaid, all these everyday institutions and practices 
presuppose a sense of personal continuity. Characteristically, when we fail to live up to
6 Cf. T. Chappell, ‘Reductionism about Persons; And What Matters’, Proceedings o f  the Aristotelian 
Society, Vol. XCVII (1997-1998), pp. 41-57, p. 47.
7 See S. R. Wolf, ‘Self-Interest and Interest in Selves’, Ethics, 96 (1986), pp. 704-720; R. M. Adams, 
‘Should Ethics Be More Impersonal?’, in: J. Dancy (ed.), Reading Parfit (Oxford: Blackwell, 1997) pp. 
251-289, in particular pp. 263-273.
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our social responsibilities, we cannot simply get ourselves off the hook by saying: ‘It 
was not I, but an earlier self! ’
While Parfit clearly wants to review those ethical practices on the basis of an 
antecedent theory of personal identity, the practice theory evaluates conceptions of 
personal identity on the basis of these and other practices and intuitions. Moreover, if 
we proceed along this order, it becomes evident that we really have no choice but to 
accept the moderate claim. The attractiveness of the extreme claim quickly evaporates 
when we consider, as Wolf puts it succinctly, ‘the way in which our identification of 
and our concern for ourselves and each other as persons essentially contributes to, if 
you’ll pardon the expression, our form of life.’8
The idea that we could rebut the extremist argument by inverting the relation 
between personal identity and normative theory emerges in bits and pieces from a 
number of diverse practical angles, each raising what is at a deeper level the same 
objection. Rather than providing the grounding premise of a theory of rationality and 
morality, so that objection goes, a conception of a person is a conclusion of normative 
theorising. And this means that theories of the person should be validated in what is 
commonly known as reflective equilibrium or some form thereof.9 Like other principles, 
then, the extreme and moderate claims are to be tested against our well-considered 
judgements and intuitions on normative matters in general. I shall now briefly discuss 
three more specific versions of this objection to Parfit’s extreme thesis and then focus 
on a number of counter objections.
First, Korsgaard and Blackburn present a broadly Kantian version of the practice 
theory.10 We could describe it as the argument from action ownership. This argument
8 S. R. Wolf, ‘Self-Interest and Interest in Selves’, p. 708.
9
For the notion o f reflective equilibrium, see J. Rawls, A Theory o f  Justice, pp. 46-53; R. Dworkin, 
Taking Rights Seriously, pp. 159-168.
10 C. M. Korsgaard, ‘Personal Identity and the Unity o f Agency: A Kantian Response to Parfit’, 
Philosophy and Public Affairs, Volume 18 (1989), pp. 101-132, especially pp. 119-121; S. Blackburn, 
‘Has Kant Refuted Parfit?’, in: J. Dancy (ed.), Reading Parfit (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1997), pp. 
180-201.
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appeals to Kant’s distinction between practical and theoretical reason. Briefly, the 
former is concerned with the justification of action, while the latter essentially aims at 
the explanation and prediction of behaviour. Practical reason is essentially locked into 
the first-person-point-of-view of the agent who needs to decide what to do. Theoretical 
reason requires the external standpoint of the objective observer, who studies the world 
but is not part of it.
Now, according to this strand of the argument, we may well build a case for 
reductionism from the disengaged perspective. But once we assume the perspective of 
practical reason, we are forced to conceive of the issue in a different light. Essentially, 
we have to view ourselves as deliberators. And this means that we have to conceive of 
ourselves not passively as ‘experiences being had’, but rather as the free choosers and 
therefore the owners of our words and actions. Korsgaard writes:
... from the practical point of view our relationship to our actions and choices is 
essentially authorial, from it, we view them as our own. I believe that when we 
think about the way in which our own lives matter to us personally, we think of 
ourselves in this way. We think of living our lives, and even of having our 
experiences, as something that we do.u
And Blackburn similarly claims:
When I deliberate, I wonder what to think or do: I do not try to predict, 
passively from the outside, what I shall do. When I judge, I wonder what to say 
about something: I do not try to predict, passively and from the outside, what I 
shall end up saying about it. These activities proceed under the discipline of 
reason, and hence are subject to norms, and they involve myself as an agent, not 
the latest stage of a bundle of separately individuated psychological states. 
When I think, I as it were take charge of the bundle, and it is only from the 
outside perspective that this is to be thought of as the passive arrival of more 
states for it.12
Clearly, the extreme claim is fundamentally at odds with the deliberative point of view 
of agency. If the extremist were correct, we could never authorise and guide action at 
all. The very idea of practical deliberation and action ownership appears to rest on the a-
11 C. M. Korsgaard, ‘Personal Identity and the Unity o f Agency: A Kantian Response to Parfit’, p. 121.
12 S. Blackburn, ‘Has Kant Refuted Parfit?’, in: J. Dancy (ed.), Reading Parfit, p. 192.
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priori conception of temporally extended agency, that is, a view on which person-stages 
are rationally and morally integrated. As Korsgaard and Blackburn point out, it is 
ultimately inconsistent to advance a conception of personal identity that contradicts our
• • • 1 'Xcapacity for deliberation. Assuming that the extremist still wants to say something 
about rationality and morality, he cannot at the same time deny what is the pre­
condition of practical reason.
Second, Taylor, MacIntyre and Williams advance a different version of what I think 
is at bottom the same objection.14 Their argument is that we can only come to grips with 
the issue of personal identity from the vantage point of the good. Human beings, so the 
claim goes, inevitably have to face up to the question of the goodness of their lives 
taken as a whole. Our self-understandings take shape
... in a certain space of questions, through certain constitutive concerns. The 
questions or concerns touch on the nature of the good that I orient myself by 
and on the way I am placed in relation to it. But then what counts as a unit will 
be defined by the scope of the concern, by just what is in question. And what is 
in question is, generally and characteristically, the shape of my life as a whole.
It is not something up for arbitrary determination.15
What makes a life worth living? And how does my life measure up to this standard? 
According to Taylor, these questions have a certain inevitability, if not universally, then 
at least in our culture. We inhabit ‘moral space’. And because we need orientation and 
direction in this space, it is equally inevitable that we require conceptions of the good, 
plans or ‘ground-projects’ (as Williams calls them). We all have and need such 
conceptions, for ground-projects are ‘the condition of my existence, in the sense that
13 P. Pettit, A Theory o f  Freedom (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2001), in particular pp. 82-85, similarly 
claims that ‘discursive control’ is constitutive of the idea o f a person. At p. 83 he claims: ‘What is said to 
make two people at different times the same person is that they are connected in such a way -  whatever it 
is -  that under existing discursive practice the later can be held responsible for and to the earlier.’ See also 
C. Rovane, ‘Self-Reference: The Radicalization o f Locke’, The Journal o f  Philosophy, Vol. 90, Issue 2,
(1993), pp. 73-97; The Bounds o f  Agency: An Essay in Revisionary Metaphysics.
14 C. Taylor, Sources o f  the Self: The Making o f  the Modern Identity (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1989), in particular Chapter 2; A. MacIntyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory (London: 
Duckworth, 2001), tenth impression, especially Chapter 15; B. Williams, ‘Persons, Character and 
Morality’, in A. O. Rorty (ed.), The Identities o f  Persons (Berkeley: University o f California Press, 1976), 
pi). 197-216.
C. Taylor, Sources o f  the Self p. 50.
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unless I am propelled forward by the conatus of desire, project and interest, it is unclear 
why I should go on at all’.16
The extreme claim fails to come to terms with this basic feature of human life. It fails 
to grasp that human agents need an anchoring in life-plans, which will also provide 
them with the kind of diachronic unity that gives us our identity.17 As Williams notes: 
‘the problems that face Utilitarianism about agency can arise with any agent whose 
projects stretch over enough time, and are sufficiently grounded in character, to be in 
any substantial sense his projects’.18 To put it differently, the entire notion of the 
goodness of a life as whole is inconsistent with the extreme claim. According to the 
extremist, it does not matter that a life is good. What matters is that there are good 
experiences. The whole question of what makes a life go well could not even arise.
We could describe this last objection to the extreme claim as the argument from the 
good. Rawls offers a third and justice-based version of the same objection.19 His 
‘political’ conception of the person is tailored to fit within a wider, democratic tradition 
that conceives of society as a fair system of co-operation over time. This democratic 
conception, he argues, is deeply embedded in the public culture and the political 
practices of Western societies. Rather than positioning itself outside history, Rawls’s 
theory of justice simply aims to construct the principles and ideas that are implicit in 
this culture and practice. Essentially, then, the claim is that the principles of justice 
organise what already are ‘our most firmly held convictions’, for example, that slavery 
is wrong. This practice-based approach also shapes the Rawlsian conception of the 
person.
16 B. Williams, ‘Persons Character and Morality’, p. 208.
17 Robert Nozick would appear to have agreed: ‘A person’s shaping his life in accordance with some 
overall plan is his way o f giving meaning to his life; only a being with the capacity to so shape his life can 
have or strive for meaningful life.’ See his Anarchy, State, and Utopia (New York: Basic Books, 1974), p.
50.
18 B. Williams, ‘Persons, Character and Morality’, p. 202.
19 J. Rawls, ‘The Independence o f Moral Theory’; ‘Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical’, 
Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol. 14 (1985), pp. 223-251; Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1993), pp. 18-20, 29-35.
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There are, of course, many aspects of human nature that can be singled out as 
especially significant, depending on our point of view. This is witnessed by 
such expressions as ‘homo politicus’ and ‘homo oeconomicus’, ‘homo ludens’ 
and ‘homo faber’. Since our account of justice as fairness begins with the idea 
that society is to be conceived as a fair system of cooperation over time 
between generations, we adopt a conception of the person to go with this idea.20
Thus, since Rawls locates himself within a democratic practice, he settles on a view of 
the person that allows us to fully take part in this practice. And this means, among other 
things, that persons have or ought to have ‘a capacity for a sense of justice’ and ‘a 
capacity for a conception of the good’. As we have already seen, it also means that the 
separateness of persons retains its significance. There is, then, no place for something 
like the extreme claim. That claim is so radically at odds with our political and 
democratic practices that it could hardly be taken seriously.
3. Three Objections to the Practice Theory
The moderate claim allows us to still engage in longstanding relationships, it validates a 
view in which our good on the long term importantly figures, and it further feeds into a 
widespread sense of justice and fairness. As opposed to this, it is far from evident what 
the ethical attractions of the extreme claim are supposed to be. There is the vague 
promise of a highly impersonal brand of utilitarianism. But the extremist, I believe, is 
hard pressed to persuade us that his conception of personal identity has any practical 
appeal at all. The problem is not just that the extreme claim looks distinctly 
nightmarish, it is also incredibly remote from how we actually live and understand our 
lives, so remote that that we find it hard even to imagine what it means to be a mere part 
of a person, to have no past and future at all. While he says little about this, Parfit 
confesses to the following:
Is the truth depressing? Some may find it so. But I find it liberating, and 
consoling. When I believed that my existence was such a further fact, I seemed
20 J. Rawls, Political Liberalism, p. 18.
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imprisoned in myself. My life seemed like a glass tunnel, through which I was 
moving faster every year, and at the end of which there was darkness. When I 
changed my view, the walls of my glass tunnel disappeared. I now live in the 
open air. There is still a difference between my life and the lives of other 
people. But the difference is less. Other people are closer. I am less concerned 
about the rest of my own life, and more concerned about the lives of others.21
But these advantages seem also available to the moderate. In fact, if the extremist were 
right, it would be difficult to understand why I should care about anyone at all, my own 
future self or some other stage of a person.22
That said, the main thrust for the extreme claim, in all fairness, should probably not 
be sought in its intuitive appeal, but rather in a number of objections to the practice 
theory as such.
3.1 Is Personal Identity Bifurcated?
To begin with, Korsgaard and Blackburn seem sympathetic to the view that theoretical 
and practical reason provide us with two irreducible standpoints that, while obviously 
conflicting, have their own autonomous validity. On their view, there are two concepts 
of personal identity: one normative and one theoretical. While they concede that Locke, 
Hume and Parfit may well be right about personal identity at one level, they go on to 
point out that their theories have no practical consequences. From the practical point of 
view, the idea of temporally punctuated agents is ruled out on the a priori basis of what 
Blackburn describes as a ‘unity reaction’. The temporal unity of agency cannot be 
questioned. But if this claim is correct, then it seems we would also have to also accept
21 D. Parfit, Reasons and Persons, p. 281. For a critical discussion o f the ethical attractiveness o f Parfit’s
reductionism, see also T. Chappell, ‘Reductionism about Persons; And What Matters’.
22 Cf. S. Scheffler, ‘Ethics, Personal Identity, and Ideals of the Person’, Canadian Journal o f  Philosophy,
Vol. XII, No. 2 (June 1982), pp. 229-246.
23 If I understand him correctly, Taylor, in his book Sources o f  the Self (Chapter 2), argues that it is on the 
whole wrong to conceive o f personal identity from the theoretical viewpoint. Rawls, on the other hand, 
argues for a view on which both standpoints are reconcilable. See J. Rawls, ‘The Independence o f  Moral 
Theory’, p. 296, and more recently Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, E. Kelly (ed.) (Cambridge MA: 
The Belknap Press o f  Harvard University Press, 2000), p. 19.
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a deep and, it may be objected, unhappy bifurcation between two perspectives of reason 
and two concepts of personal identity.
I think, however, that we could avoid paying this price. Of course, Parfit too avoids 
this separation of domains. But in his view this means that we have to customise the 
normative to the disengaged perspective. The latter demonstrates that there is no 
personal identity, and so he argues that we should revise our views of rationality and 
morality accordingly. More precisely, Parfit claims that rationality and morality rely on 
the metaphysical illusion of a Self from which we should rid ourselves. Difficult though 
he admits this to be, we ought at least to try to concern ourselves more with temporally 
discrete utility and less with persons per se. However, the problem with Parfit is that the 
disengaged view of personal identity only has consequences for normative theory when 
funnelled through either the extreme or the moderate claim. And these claims are not 
themselves part of the disengaged truth about personal identity. There is no disengaged 
reason to support either of these claims.
What I am suggesting here is that these funnelling claims should be judged on the 
basis of the practice theory. So we do not have to deny that identity is relational. What 
we need to deny is the extreme claim. A bifurcation between deliberative and 
theoretical perspectives is thus prevented. To recap, Locke, Hume and Parfit claim that 
persons are temporal bundles of psychological events. From the normative standpoint, 
and by appealing to the importance of deliberation, prudence, obligation and justice in 
our judgements, we should then claim that these bundles have reason-giving weight in 
appropriate ways. Both claims are entirely consistent. We do not have to presuppose a 
‘reaction of unity’ that is somehow inconsistent with what we think is true when we 
look at the issue from the disengaged standpoint of theoretical reason.
3.2 Rule and Indirect Utilitarian Justifications fo r  Person-based Ethics
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It may next be objected to all this that a rule-consequentialist argument could be 
wheeled in to redeem the extreme claim. After all, Parfit only wants to argue that 
personal identity has in itself no ultimate value. Presumably, we should still attach some 
weight to Relation R. The idea is rather that we should only do so if and insofar as this 
turns out to be helpful, on the whole, to the realisation of the overall utilitarian goal, 
which in his case is to maximise the temporally discrete well-being of human beings. 
Thus, as a rule, it could still makes sense to hold people to their word, to worry 
specifically about our own future, to punish the guilty for their crimes and to distribute 
equally over bundles rather than person-stages. It could still be that, in service of 
maximisation, we should treat people as more or less continuous persons. It could even 
makes sense to promote the kind of non-instrumental attitudes and dispositions that tend 
to bolster compliance to these rules, for example, the conviction that persons should be 
treated with basic respect.
But there are well-known problems with this view. Most importantly, while it is true 
that this could be the case, it is an unacceptable simplification to suggest that following 
these rules, conventions and dispositions will indeed always facilitate the utilitarian 
goal. Whether it will or not, is ultimately an empirical question. Following a rule may 
be maximising nine times out of ten. But what do we do the tenth time? If we want to 
remain loyal to the initial utilitarian thought, then we would have to reform and fine- 
tune that rule to the circumstances. David Lyons has pointed out that this means that 
utilitarianism must spell out not just what rules are useful, but also when they are 
usefully complied with and by whom.24 And once we start accommodating exceptional 
and special cases within the rule, then the level of complication simply becomes too 
high for moral theory to generate clear results. If I understand Lyons correctly, his 
objection is that the rule-consequentialist principle requires a level of empirical
24 D. Lyons, ‘The Moral Opacity o f Utilitarianism’, in: B. Hooker, E. Mason, and D. E. Miller (eds.) 
Morality, Rules, and Consequences: A Critical Reader (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2000), 
pp. 105-120.
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information that we cannot possibly possess. In the absence of this information, rule- 
utilitarianism is merely indeterminate.
Moreover, rule-utilitarianism may or may not describe what morality demands, but it 
clearly does not offer a motivation for human agents to follow the rules. After all, we 
think a man punishable, not because punishment promotes utility in general, but 
because of his culpability. And when I break my word, you will feel personally hurt and 
angry. There could be indirect utilitarian justifications for the inculcation of non­
utilitarian kinds of attitude that would motivate rule-following. But if this is the 
solution, utilitarianism is going to include the intuitively awkward idea of the state 
having to publicly promote the discourse of person-based ethics, knowing full well that 
this discourse is false. This kind of duplicity, which has been described as Government 
House utilitarianism, is hard to reconcile with an open and democratic society.25
3.3 Pluralism and the Practice Theory
Finally, Parfit’s extremist may object that the practice theory begs the question in 
assuming what needs to be explained. Certainly, it is true that most of us feel that selves 
matter -  our own selves in particular. But the whole point of a theory, it will be claimed, 
is to investigate and challenge these pre-analytical beliefs on the basis of a more or less 
objective criterion. The point is that we ought to become less selfish, less preoccupied 
with persons, and more with the experiences of person-parts. Why have long-term 
projects and relations and responsibilities? Why distribute? Why engage in deliberative 
action?
The best response to this objection may simply be to deny that there are foundational 
answers to these questions to begin with. I certainly do not possess them, but nor do 
Parfit and the extremist. As Parfit admits, there appears to be no disengaged reason to
25 See J. J. C. Smart and B. Williams, Utilitarianism: For and Against (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1973), pp, 138-140; A. Sen and B. Williams, ‘Introduction: Utilitarianism and Beyond’, 
in: A. Sen and B. Williams (eds.) Utilitarianism and Beyond (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1994), pp. 15-16.
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prefer the extreme claim to the moderate claim. And this is the point where the 
objection gets stuck. If we abandon the foundational project, normative theory is 
commonly understood to operate on the basis of a different method. According to this 
method, normative theories and conceptions need to be brought on the same wavelength 
with our considered judgements and intuitions on the matter. That is to say, our theories 
need to be bom out in a version of reflective equilibrium. Of course, the notion of a 
reflective equilibrium has been criticised for being inherently conservative.26 And 
indeed, there would be little point if a theory perfectly reproduced all our intuitions and 
judgements. But an appropriate understanding of reflective equilibrium entails that our 
theories should simplify, re-organise and abridge the data to make them cohere at the 
deeper and more general level of principle. This will inevitably mean that some of the 
pre-analytical intuitions will have to be rejected. That said, conceptions of the good life, 
long-term relationships and social responsibilities form so overpowering a part of our 
lives that the moderate claim is likely to provide the better theory on any understanding 
of reflective equilibrium.
To be sure, Parfit goes out of his way to show that it is at least not logically 
impossible to think and live like a reductionist, and he points to the Buddha as an
9 7example. While difficult, he argues, it is at least possible to strive for ‘Liberation from 
the Self. This may well be true, even on the extreme interpretation. It may even be true 
that some Buddhists have indeed managed to live according to the extreme claim. These 
people do not have the same intuitions and judgements as Rawls about justice; they do 
not have a ‘conatus of desire, project and interest’ of the kind by which Williams is 
propelled forward; and they do not deliberate or author action like Korsgaard and 
Blackburn do. Do we have an argument that proves that they should nonetheless accept 
the moderate claim? Granted, here the practice theory has no such proof available. We 
cannot avoid appealing to certain pre-theoretical practices, drawing out the principles
26 See the discussion in S. Kagan, The Limits o f  Morality (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991) pp. 11-15.
27 D. Parfit, Reasons and Persons, p. 280.
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and ideas that are immanent in them, and recognising that those who do not share these 
practices and intuitions may forever slip through the fingers of our theories. But the 
claim that such a way of life -  if we can call it that -  is logically possible achieves little 
else. To begin with, once we realise how much depends on the moderate claim, it is 
plain how unbelievably far removed this possibility is from human reality. Not all 
people share Rawlsian intuitions about fairness, but where are the hordes that know of 
neither personal interest nor deliberation? Here, we should probably follow Aristotle’s 
example and claim that such beings are either beast or God, but certainly not human.28 
In other words, while it is one thing to show that a way of life is logically possible, it is 
quite something else to claim that it is also an attractive possibility. How could the 
extremist ever convince us?
4. From Identity to Integrity
I have argued that, on the basis of the practice theory, the moderate claim is 
demonstrably superior to the extreme claim. However, the theory that emerges from this 
discussion, although in some sense rooted in the psychological principle of personal 
identity, should still be distinguished from the Lockean view in one important sense. 
Locke defined the identity relation for a person in terms of memory connections. Hume, 
Parfit and others are less choosy. They propose to extend the scope of the criterion from 
memory connections to the temporal connectedness between psychological events 
understood in a more general manner, including the relations between believes, 
intentions, desires, values and character traits. One idea is that two mental events are 
relevantly linked if the are qualitatively similar. Thus, if a desire or belief at t is 
reiterated at //, both person-stages are connected in the way of a person. Another 
suggestion is that the relevant conditions are given by the causal connectedness between
28 Aristotle, The Politics, in: S. Everson (ed.), The Politics and the Constitution o f  Athens (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1996).
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two psychological states. However, if we want to follow the moderate claim, we have to 
propose a different account of this psychological relatedness. We need a view on which 
the relevant identity conditions specify a normative relationship between the stages of a 
person. According to this normative account of personal identity, psychological events 
are internal to one person if they are reason and obligation-giving to each other. I shall 
refer to this relationship with the term integrity.
In the remainder of this chapter, I want to explain this notion of integrity in greater 
detail. I want to begin, however, by setting aside the issue of the identification of 
persons over time. For the idea that one mental state could be normative or authoritative 
for the other is commonly linked with the conditions of personhood or agency per se. 
Most accounts of personhood hold in common that the concept refers to a system to 
which intentional states can be plausibly ascribed. Agents are not subject to external 
causes, but their actions spring from a set of desires that are internal to the agent. 
However, it is much less clear whether or not every desire should be counted as internal 
to the intentional system. To qualify for personhood, it is often argued, intentional
90systems also need the capacity for self-reflection. That is, a desire is claimed to be 
internal only when the agent is able to evaluate and endorse it from a higher-order level. 
To flesh out this idea of personhood, I briefly want to consider the following two 
models.
4.1. The Hierarchical M odel
The core feature of the first model is the distinction between ‘first-order volitions’ and 
‘second-order volitions’, introduced in a seminal article by Frankfurt.30 Briefly, 
Frankfurt’s suggestion operates on the common enough assumption that humans 
primarily act on the basis of desires or inclinations or ‘pro-attitudes’. However, we
29 See for example P. Pettit, The Common Mind; D. Dennett, ‘Conditions o f  Personhood’, in: A. Rorty
(ed.), The Identity o f  Persons (Berkeley: University o f California Press, 1976) pp. 175-196.
30 H. G. Frankfurt, ‘Freedom o f Will and the Concept o f a Person’, The Journal o f  Philosophy, Volume 
68 (January 14, 1971), pp. 5-20.
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clearly also have the capacity to evaluate these first-order volitions. I have the desire to 
stop writing and to go out to enjoy what is left of fine autumn day. But I have also 
formed the view that it is not appropriate to translate this desire into action. I also desire 
to finish this paragraph. And I have judged the latter desire to be more important or 
commendable than the former. So I have compared and weighed up two first-order 
desires and I have been able to do so because I have second-order views, beliefs and 
perceptions regarding the desirability of first-order desires.
The decisive argument for Frankfurt is that an action can be assigned to an agent or a 
person, only if it issues from a higher-order volition. The idea behind this is that we 
often feel a distance to certain first-order desires in the sense that we do not necessarily 
see them as ‘mine’. We have all sorts of cravings and impulses, but clearly we do not 
always want to act on them. There is then a sense in which my desire to take the rest of 
the day off is external to my will because I do not in fact want to act on it. A first-order 
desire counts as a desire of mine only if it finds backing in a second-order volition. 
Thus, I need to step back and embrace it by forming a judgement about the desirability 
of that desire. When I do so, the desire becomes internal in the sense that I identify 
myself with it.
On the hierarchical model, then, we need a second-order volition to properly 
authorise that we act on a particular first-order desire. It is difficult to deny that people 
have such second-order volitions. But several philosophers have nonetheless expressed 
an important reservation about Frankfurt’s analysis, objecting to the authority that 
second-order volitions purportedly possess over first-order mental states.31 Why do 
second-order volitions count as internal? This objection is nourished by Frankfurt’s 
original discussion, in which second-order volitions appear like ordinary, first-order 
desires in every other sense but the fact that they are of a higher order. They are just
31 Most famously, G. Watson, ‘Free Agency’, in: G. Watson (ed.), Free Will (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1982), pp. 96-110. See also P. Pettit, A Theory o f  Freedom, Chapter 3.
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preferences about preferences. However, there are no restrictions on the content of or 
the procedures for forming such volitions. He writes:
... a person may be capricious and irresponsible in forming his second-order 
volitions and give no serious consideration to what is at stake. Second-order 
volitions express evaluations only in the sense that they are preferences. There 
is no essential restriction on the kind of basis, if any, upon which they are 
formed.32
Put this way, we could still distinguish second-order preferences from first-order 
preferences. But there seems to be no deeper ground for preferring the one to the other. 
Consequently, the hierarchy collapses. Frankfurt seems to presuppose that second-order 
volitions are always internal to the agent, but this assumption is ultimately arbitrary. His 
approach, then, stumbles over the objection that it fails to justify the overriding 
authority it grants to second-order volition. The latter desires turns out to be ‘just one 
more wiggle in the psychic stew’.33 Of course, we could introduce ‘third-order 
volitions’ to patch up the theory, but the main worry is that we end up in an infinite 
regress. In order to side step the problem that third-order volitions might also be 
external to the agent, we need to introduce higher-order volitions ad infinitum.
Frankfurt argues that we can break through the regress by claiming that higher order 
volitions become internal if the agent ‘decisively’ identifies with it.34 So the 
appropriation of action by an agent is possible on the condition that the agent 
conclusively decides to embrace a first-order desire as his will. But the whiff of 
circularity refuses to go away. The problem is that we remain uncertain about what goes 
on behind the process of deciding to identify with a particular volition. We still do not 
know whether or not it is the agent who truly decides on this identification. In other 
words, we need to make sure that the decision to identify with a particular desire is itself
32 H. G. Frankfurt, ‘Freedom o f Will and the Concept o f a Person’, p. 13 (footnote).
33 As M. E. Bratman puts in his ‘Reflection, Planning, and Temporally Extended Agency’, The 
Philosophical Review, Vol. 109, No. 1 (January 2000), pp. 35-61, at p. 38.
34 H. G. Frankfurt, ‘Freedom o f Will and the Concept o f a Person’, p. 16. Frankfurt has refined his 
position further work. See his ‘Identification and Externality’, pp 58-68, and ‘Identification and 
Wholeheartedness’, pp. 159-176, in: H. G. Frankfurt, The Importance o f  What We Care About: 
Philosophical Essays (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).
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internal. Thus, we would need a decision to identify with a decision to identify with a 
desire, and so forth.
The idea that we can distinguish between external and internal desires solely by 
means of a hierarchy of volition has thus been forced to retreat. The fundamental 
problem of regress is that
... the agent’s role cannot be played by any mental states or events whose 
behavioural influence might come up for review in practical thought at any 
level. And the reason why it cannot be played by anything that might undergo 
the process of critical review is precisely that it must be played by whatever 
directs that process. The agent, in his capacity as agent, is that party who is 
always behind, and never in front of, the lens of critical reflection, no matter 
where in the hierarchy of motives it turns.35
We can never solve the problem of regress by pointing to some antecedent mental 
event, a desire or a decision pertaining to my willing to identify with a certain mental 
event or desire.
4.2 The Reason M odel
Velleman suggests that we modify the model more radically. His account distinguishes 
between external and internal desires in terms of reasons. To begin with, however, 
Velleman focusses on the mental events or desires that are ‘functionally identical’ to 
agency. As I understand him, the idea is that we isolate that mental state, the desire or 
aim, without which we would not be able to be agents at all. Consequently, it makes no 
sense to describe this desire or volition as external to the agent. Perhaps this can be 
explained in a slightly different manner. Velleman claims that the agent ‘is that party 
who is always behind, and never in front of, the lens of critical reflection’. So what we 
need to track down are the mental states or desires that cannot be subjected to further 
scrutiny and that do not beg the question whether or not I  have embraced them 
antecedently. The only mental states or desires that fit this description are the states or
35 J. D. Velleman, ‘What Happens When Someone Acts’, Mind, Vol. 101, Issue 403 (1992), pp. 461-481, 
at p. 477.
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desires that are constitutive of my agency. These desires cannot be external to the agent 
because it is precisely in virtue of them that there is agency to begin with.
Velleman then claims that agency must be understood as the capacity and the 
inclination to act on the basis of reasons. Our agency rests on the very desire to act in 
accordance with reasons. Such a desire, then, never appears in front of the lens of 
critical reflection because it is the lens of critical reflection itself. An agent can never 
externalise the desire to act in accordance with reason because that would, impossibly, 
externalise his agency. What agency entails, in short, is a desire to commit oneself to 
the process of reflection and deliberation on one’s desires. As agents we do not just 
want to act on any desire, nor just on what proves to be the strongest desire, but we 
want to be able to give an intelligible account of why we desire something. It is when 
we are motivated by this desire to act in accordance with a reason that agency 
contributes to our behaviour.
According to Velleman’s model, a person authorises an action if, and only if, he acts 
on a desire that counts as a reason for action. Put differently, the distinction between 
internal and external desires is drawn in terms of desires constituting reasons and 
desires not constituting reasons. However, if this is our approach, we require a more 
detailed argument spelling out why some desires count as reasons and others do not. 
Thus, we need to bring in some of the restrictions on higher-order volitions that 
Frankfurt wanted to avoid. That is, we need to isolate the property in virtue of which 
these volitions are not just part of the ‘psychic stew’, but reason-giving. Such 
restrictions, I think, could be delivered in two ways.
First, we could try to impose certain objective restrictions on the content of the 
desires of the agent. Here we need to bring in a certain standard stipulating which 
desires count as valid reasons for action, independently of what a person wants or 
deems to be reason-giving desires. This approach, then, carries the considerable burden
36 Ibid., p. 478 ff.
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of having to make available an agent-independent account of such standards and 
restrictions.37 It must stipulate which desires we reasonably ought to have, irrespective 
of our particular engagements and projects. Second, we could try to deal with the 
imposition of such restrictions subjectively. Here the agent decides himself which 
desires are reason-giving. The trouble with this approach is that it again raises the 
problem of circularity. For it remains unclear why this decision should count as his.
But there is a way by which we could steer clear of these pitfalls. The sort of 
restrictions that I think should invite consideration are procedural and therefore largely 
neutral to the content of an agent’s desires. Giving a reason, I suggest, merely means 
giving some explanation, giving some coherent and intelligible account of why we 
desire one thing rather than another. On this procedural approach the most pressing 
concern is to rule out the volitions that Frankfurt wanted to rule in, precisely on the 
ground that they are capriciously formed. And if this is in some sense an objective 
standard, I think we should be prepared to defend it as such.
Consistent with this approach, Michael Bratman argues that a desire is reason-giving
*50
when it is ‘end-setting’ for practical reasoning. What is more, end-setting desires 
should not be conflicting with each other. In other words, there is a coherence 
requirement. As he puts it himself, it is necessary that one be ‘satisfied’ with treating a 
desire as reason-giving. ‘One is satisfied with such a decision when one’s will is, in 
relevant ways, not divided: The decision to treat as reason-giving does not conflict with 
other standing decisions and policies about which desires to treat as reason-givmg.’ A 
desire counts as a reason, ultimately, also because it fits in a wider framework
37 See J. D. Velleman, ‘The Possibility o f Practical Reason’, in: J. D. Velleman, The Possibility o f
Practical Reason (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 170-199, mainly pp. 173-180.
38 M. E. Bratman, ‘Identification, Decision, and Treating as a Reason’, in: Faces o f  Intention: Selected 
Essays on Intention and Agency (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp. 185-206; 
‘Hierarchy, Circularity, and Double Reduction’, in: S. Buss and L. Overton (eds.), Contours o f  Agency: 
Essays on Themes from Harry Frankfurt (Cambridge MA: The MIT Press, 2002), pp. 65-85. See also L. 
Waddell Ekstrom, ‘A Coherence Theory o f Autonomy’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research,
Volume 53, Issue 3 (1993), pp. 599-616.
39 M. E. Bratman, ‘Identification, Decision, and Treating as a Reason’, p. 201.
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explaining how all our end-setting desires are logically connected. That is, we need to 
understand reasons on the basis of general principles or policies. Bratman points out 
that ‘self-governing policies’ serve to integrate our more specific end-setting desires 
such that we arive at a ranking and can resolve conflicts. But they also provide 
constraints on the sort of desires that merit consideration at all. That is, they rule out 
desires. The gist, at any rate, is that end-setting desires must be endorsed by principles 
and policies in order to fully count as reason-giving.40
In order to flesh out this point a bit further, I want to bring into play the specific 
brand of Kantianism that Korsgaard sets out in her Tanner Lectures -  though it 
(initially) appears, perhaps, as a somewhat bleached version of what Kant’s theory is 
usually thought to entail.41 On her interpretation, the idea of the Categorical Imperative 
captures precisely what we need. Kant framed the issue of agency or the authorship of 
action in terms of autonomy and the free will. But, according to Korsgaard, a will could 
be free in the Kantian sense only if constituted in a general form. Agency comes in the 
shape of applying a regulative principle to your choices. As was noted by Hegel, the 
perennial difficulty is that we are unlikely to be able to say much about the content of 
the maxims that should guide a person’s action.42 What we can say, however, is that 
action needs to rest on a justification that has the form  of law. Action is authorised if 
validated by a principle that covers all my actions, or to put it in Kantian terms, if  I act 
on the basis of a maxim that I could will as a general law governing my own actions. At 
least, this is what Korsgaard’s rendering of the Categorical Imperative tells us to do.
40 On this view, what appropriates action is a certain kind o f decision mechanism linked with the idea o f  
giving a reason for action. Agency is identified with the presence o f that mechanism, not with 
metaphysical freedom. It may be important to note that this mechanism or the principles or policies from 
which action must issue are not themselves required to be exempt from the causal chain. In fact, it must 
be true in some analytical sense that they are not entirely o f our own choosing. However, once in place 
they nevertheless enable us to embrace or reject desires as reason-giving. And according to this theory, 
this explains agency. For a more elaborate defence o f this view, see S. R. Wolf, Freedom within Reason 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1990).
C. M Korsgaard, The Sources o f  Normativity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), in 
particular pp. 94-100. I should point out that I am not so much interested in the exegetical accuracy o f  
Korsgaardian reading o f  Kant as in how the argument answers the question at hand.
42 G. F. W. Hegel, Philosophy o f  Right, Knox, T. M., (ed.) (London: Oxford University Press, 1967).
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The Categorical Imperative, as she understands it, articulates what it is to be a 
deliberative agent. It does not specify what it is to be a moral agent. It is only when we 
act on general precepts that we act on reasons, and it is only when we act on reasons 
that we are persons.
Now, it is important to stress that the restriction thus put in place is entirely 
procedural, and therefore much less ambitious than full-blown Kantianism. However, it 
is not hard to see what tighter restrictions might look like. Part of the customary 
attractions of Kantian morality is that it is grounded in the notion of agency as such. 
According to this view, the Categorical Imperative takes us all the way to the moral law. 
In order to become agents we need to be guided, not just by general laws, but also by 
those policies that actually fall under the moral law. That is to say, we are persons, and 
thus capable of action, only if our higher-order volitions have the property that they 
could be willed as a universal law, not just governing our own action, but those of all 
agents. Under this restriction, it is an analytical truth that all persons are moral, because 
being moral is precisely what constitutes our personhood. The critical difference 
between the former interpretation and this moralised version lies in the specification of 
the domain over which reasons are universal.43
I shall come back to Korsgaard’s treatment of this issue in Section 5 below. For now, 
just note that on her view, agency is constituted by a set of codes, principles and laws 
that guide action. Like Velleman and Bratman, she primarily understands action as 
flowing from principles or the deliberative standpoint. However, this standpoint, she 
goes on to point out, also gives us our identity. It provides us with an answer to the 
question ‘Who am I?’
When you deliberate, it is as if there were something over and above all of your 
desires, something which is you, and which chooses which desire to act on. This 
means that the principle or law by which you determine your actions is one that 
you regard as being expressive of yourself.**
43 C. M. Korsgaard, The Sources o f  Normativity, pp. 98-100.
44 Ibid., p. 100.
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I want to describe this kind of coherence with the term integrity. Integrity refers to the 
normative order that is constitutive of the person. Without it, we would be unable to act 
in a unified way. As Korsgaard notes, we would not be anyone at all. The colloquial 
meaning of the term also captures another important aspect of the idea of the person 
here proposed. Integrity is normally thought of as a virtue.45 When we say that someone 
has integrity we usually mean that he is a dependable person, someone who is true to his 
convictions and values, and refuses to buckle under certain pressures. Thus, consistent 
with the practice theory canvassed above, integrity is something that we should aim to 
realise. We do not always act in perfectly principled ways, but we should recognise that 
integrity is an important standard of conduct. We are expected to be able to justify our 
actions in terms of principle and coherence.46
5. Integrity and Morality
I now return to the distinction between integrity and morality. Korsgaard argues that 
personal identity is a source of normativity, by which she means that it explains why we 
ought to do some things rather than others 47 This claim may be correct. But it is correct 
in a somewhat trivial sense, as we already defined personality in terms of integrity, and 
integrity in terms of action-guiding principles and standards. However, Korsgaard takes 
a more controversial step. Ultimately, her view is that integrity also provides us with the
45 This notion o f integrity is, o f course, strongly reminiscent o f Plato’s concept o f the just soul in The 
Republic, wherein reason governs spirit and passion. Without this order conflicting passions struggle 
endlessly for control, thus rendering us incapable o f doing anything at all.
46 Chapter IV below proposes a view on which integrity is not understood as a kind o f mind state or a 
thought that predates an action but emerges through the constructive interpretation o f past activity. The 
point is that integrity should apply as a regulative ideal, a standard o f conduct that persons recognise and 
ajjply to their deliberations.
C. M. Korsgaard, The Sources o f  Normativity, pp. 100-104. As she puts it there (p. 101): ‘Your reasons 
express your identity, your nature; your obligations spring from what that identity forbids.’
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answer to the question ‘Why should I be moral?’48 In fact, on her treatment of the issue, 
the distinction between integrity and morality seems to disappear entirely.
I want to argue that her efforts to erase this distinction are mistaken. However, begin 
by noting that Korsgaard does not appeal directly to the Categorical Imperative 49 The 
hitch in Kant’s deduction of morality from agency, she concedes, is that it fails to 
explain why agency requires that we extend the domain of the Categorical Imperative to 
the universal level. The question ‘Why be moral’ is ultimately only answered by what 
she refers to as our ‘practical identities’. In other words, what we ought to do is 
contingent on who we are. Consequently, she cooks up an additional, identity-based 
argument to get Kantian morality off the hook.
Korsgaard begins by pointing out that people foster many different practical 
identities, mostly depending on the social circumstances they find themselves in. We 
are citizens belonging to a particular state, servants to a particular God, soldiers bound 
by codes of strength and honour, and so forth. However, over and above these 
‘contingent’ and ‘local’ identities, we have to conceive of ourselves as the members of 
‘the party of humankind’.50 And she goes on to claim that this universal identity is not 
contingent but essential. Ultimately, we must identify ourselves as bare human beings. 
This is, she says, ‘simply the truth’.51 And even though we are not always fully aware of 
it -  presumably because we are not smart enough -  it is a truth that we cannot escape 
from.
The argument is that we must identify with a principle under which we value human 
agency as such if we are to value anything else at all. Our local identities may give us a 
reason for doing this or that, but having such local identities, and acting on them, only 
makes sense on the antecedent condition that we value our humanity as such. As she 
writes: ‘It is the value we place on our humanity that stands behind our other roles and
48 C. M. Korsgaard, The Sources o f  Normativity, pp. 7-10.
4Q
Ibid., pp. 98-100. See Section 3 above.
50 Ibid., p. 117.
51 Ibid., p. 123.
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imparts normativity to them.’52 What is more, and this is the critical step, once we 
recognise our own agency as an end in itself, then we are forced on pain of logical 
inconsistency to appreciate everyone’s agency in a similar way. Thus, an important part 
of the argument is that the process of reasoning as such is essentially public, 
presupposing the presence of and interaction with certain other agents.53 At any rate, 
from the fact that we must value ourselves as agents, she deduces that we must award 
basic value to all other agents and equally respect their reasons. It is this argument that 
is supposed to deliver the normativity of morality.
But I fail to see why this identity-based argument is any less debatable than a direct 
appeal to the Categorical Imperative. The received objection to the Kantian deduction 
precisely calls into doubt the validity of Korsgaard’s last step. I may have to value my 
agency if I am to value specific commitments, but why does this imply that I have to 
value human agency across the board? Why could I not apply codes, rules and standards 
to my life that are distinctly immoral, as Cohen suggests in his example of the 
Mafioso.54 The question is still whether or not Vito (or similar ‘hard cases’), who 
identifies with and strictly abides by the unsavoury principles and the codes of honour 
of the mob, could do so with full integrity. Korsgaard needs to show that the answer is a 
resounding ‘No’.55 She needs to show that Vito is mistaken about who he really is, such 
that, after having given the matter some further thought, he will come to accept the 
moral law, his true identity. But again, I fail to see any logical argument that clearly 
proves that a person must be moral to qualify as a person as such. And if the answer is
52 Ibid., p. 256.
53 Ibid., pp. 131-166.
54 G. A. Cohen, ‘Reason, Humanity, and the Moral Law’, in: The Sources o f  Normativity, pp. 167-188, at 
pp. 183-184. See also B. Williams, ‘Internal and External Reasons’, in: Moral Luck: Philosophical 
Papers 1973-1980 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), pp. 101-113; Ethics and the Limits o f  
Philosophy (London: Fontana Press, 1994), third impression, Chapter 4.
55 Instead o f being resounding, Korsgaard’s reply to this objection in The Sources o f  Normativity, pp. 
254-258, is ambiguous. She argues that the Mafioso should come to see, upon deeper reflection, that this 
local identity harbours an inconsistency and should therefore be given up. ‘But suppose -  as is likely 
enough! -  that he never does work all this out?’ If I understand her correctly, Korsgaard admits in this 
case that the Mafioso has no reasons to act morally. Whether morality is normative or not, she writes 
‘depends on how much o f the light o f reflection is on’.
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‘Yes’, then Korsgaard merely offers the existential hope that people will reconstruct and 
mould their identities such that impartial morality emerges as normative.
There is another problem with this idea. The upshot of the Korsgaardian approach is 
that morally bad actions do not count as actions at all. Korsgaard welcomes as a virtue 
of her theory that
An agent cannot simply set aside the question whether his action is 
universalizable or just, for if he falls too far short of the internal standards for 
actions, what he produces will simply not be an action. In effect this means that 
even the most venal and shoddy agent must try to perform a good action. 
Performing a good action and performing an action are not different activities.56
However, we cannot just start by ruling out actions on the basis of their moral 
shortcomings. Many people act in violation of the moral law -  presumably -  but surely 
we do not mean to suggest that these people are not persons and their doings not 
properly constituted as action? Yet this is precisely what we would have to say on 
Korsgaard’s theory. The implication of importing moral restrictions into this framework 
is that immoral and unjust action may not be action at all. We could not will evil. 
Whether or not this conclusion is at all plausible may be a point of some controversy. 
But if we choose to accept it, we are also going to have to re-examine the claim that 
people could be held responsible for their immoral conduct.
I want to argue that integrity is best thought of in a context that is deprived from this 
moral input. Korsgaard is correct, I think, to argue that integrity is constitutive of our 
being someone at all. But in her case this proves to be old wine in a new bottle. Loyal to 
the Kantian project, she still wants to show that impartial morality is the perfect 
fulfilment of our rational agency. In contrast, the approach I want to defend rejects this 
ambition. I am happy to understand integrity as a virtue separate from morality, a virtue 
that demands that we justify our action in terms of general rules and principles that 
apply to our past and future actions. While this may rule out indiscriminate and random
56 C. M. Korsgaard, ‘Self-Construction in the Ethics o f Plato and Kant’, The Journal o f  Ethics (3: 1999), 
pp. 1-29, p. 15.
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action, there is no reason to think that integrity eliminates actions that are wrong in a 
stronger, moral sense.57
6. Integrity and Time
Essentially, integrity provides us with a theory of what personhood or agency is. As 
agents we are expected to be able to justify our desires and actions in terms of principles 
that are general in the sense that they guide and cover all our action. In other words, we 
have to be able to justify our actions in terms of their rational coherence. Integrity is a 
virtue separate from morality, but it nevertheless forms a regulative ideal.
I now want to reintroduce a temporal element in the argument. When we conceive of 
persons as acting on reasons as we have above, this also facilitates a more specific and 
normative understanding of the relatedness between person-stages. In order to show that 
integrity extends through time, we need to argue that these action-guiding principles, 
laws and policies could also direct our actions across time. As Michael Bratman 
explains in his book Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason, we need to understand that
C Q
these precepts could be future-directed. In fact, we need to see that action would be 
impossible to understand without such future-directed plans.59
For example, why am I, as a rational agent, engaged in writing these sentences? One 
answer would be that I desire to write just these sentences. As I move on to write the
57 For another ‘thick’, but Aristotelian approach to the issue o f agency, see J. Hampton, ‘Selflessness and 
the Loss o f S e lf, in: E. F. Paul, F. D. Miller and J. Paul (eds.), Altruism (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1993), pp. 135-165, and in particular pp. 151-156.
58 M. E. Bratman, Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1987). 
See also his ‘Intention and Personal Policies’, Philosophical Perspectives, 3 (1989), pp. 443-469; 
‘Reflection, Planning, and Temporally Extended Agency’, The Philosophical Review  (2000): 35-61; 
‘Planning and Temptation’, pp. 35-57; ‘Toxin, Temptation, and the Stability o f Intention’, pp. 58-90, all
reprinted in Faces o f  Intention. All page references are to this book.
59 Notice that there is an experience-based objection to Parfit that runs parallel to this action-based 
concept o f temporally extended persons. See D. Carr, ‘Narrative and the Real World: An Argument for 
Continuity’, in: L. P. Hinchman and S. K. Hinchman (eds.), Memory, Identity, Community: The Idea o f  
Narrative in the Human Sciences (Albany: State University o f New York Press, 1997), pp. 7-25 and more 
generally his Time, Narrative, and History (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1986).
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next few sentences, I am doing this because I have formed a new and separate desire to 
write just those sentences. In this way, I have to make a separate and new choice for 
every single sentence, every single word, that I write today. At some later point, I will 
probably stop writing, I then will decide to walk to the station, and only after having 
arrived there, I will choose to board the train. Half an hour later, I will make up my 
mind to get off the train and buy some things in the local store. At home, I will cook a 
meal, watch some telly, and so forth.
Now, perhaps this explanation is not entirely off the mark. For obvious reasons it 
must be the case that every action is motivated by a present desire. An earlier desire or 
intention cannot govern action like a ‘ghostly hand’ ruling from the past, as Bratman 
expresses the point.60 Having said that, the image of a sequence of temporally discrete 
decision-moments has little intuitive appeal. The picture that emerges here has been 
described as that of a ‘time-slice agent’, an agent who permanently starts the process of 
deliberation from scratch.61 The key is that for time-slice agents, the actions of his past 
and future selves are like those of other people. Past and future actions are like natural 
facts to which he can react in particular ways. They can be anticipated, but never 
controlled.
What is the alternative model? Bratman argues that we have to turn to a holistic 
mode of thinking he refers to as ‘the planning theory of intention’. Essentially, his 
model advances a kind of reasoning that (1) plots, compares and evaluates alternative 
series of actions, each covering a sustained period of time, and (2) takes this plan or 
evaluation to be normative or reason-giving for each of the temporally separate selves. 
The first component of the model requires a particular attitude to the future. The second 
component comprises a particular attitude to the past.
Beginning with the future-directed component, it is surely not the case, in the above 
example, that I write each single sentence just for its own sake. These sentences are
60 M. E. Bratman, Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason, p. 5.
61 Ibid., p. 35.
86
meant to form an integral part of a wider argument, which is part of an even wider 
structure. The point is that the ‘present-directed’ intention to write this current sentence 
is interwoven with the broader and ‘future-directed’ intention to generate a more 
extensive thesis. That is, the former is subsidiary to a future-directed plan in which this 
sentence has a specific role and meaning. In fact, it only makes sense to engage in 
writing this paragraph given that I also intend to achieve a greater project.
A similar kind of reasoning is involved as I set off for the station. It seems inaccurate 
to suggest that I just intend to head for the station, while a separate decision to board the 
train awaits my future self only after having arrived there. For the second decision is 
already implicit in the decision to leave for the station. Although it is true that my future 
self will have to form an intention to actually board the train, both intentions are 
hierarchically interlinked. They are linked by the fact that I decided on the plan to spend 
a quiet evening in. To complete this plan, my future selves need to form the subsidiary 
intention at tj to walk to the station, then to board the train at and so forth. But all 
these intentions are linked by the higher order plan to spend the evening in a particular 
way. The key is that this plan co-ordinates and guides my future activities.62 I do not 
have to fill in all the details in advance. Should I buy tomatoes or peppers? This I may 
well postpone to later. But while there is a level of discretion, I have also ranked 
sequences of actions. In any case, I do not look upon my future selves as other agents, 
whose actions I may predict but never control. I conceive them as actions that I am 
currently in charge of.
This brings us to the second, backward looking component of the planning model, 
namely that my future selves have to accept the earlier plan as authoritative. Notice that 
Bratman’s model recommends a kind of practical deliberation that is two-tiered. On the 
higher tier, I have to settle on a particular future-directed intention or preference, which 
is then put in charge of a series of future selves. As we just saw, here I need to make a
62 Ibid., Chapter 3.
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ranking of alternative sequences of actions. On the lower tier, there are present-directed 
intentions pertaining to how the plan should be put into action at separate moments. 
However, once I have settled on a future-directed intention, the model only achieves 
something if my future selves will actually recognise the plan as reason-giving. To put it 
differently, if we are to reason according to the planning model of agency, then we 
should give normative priority to future-directed intentions over our present-directed 
aims and the considerations of our temporally discrete selves. For example, future- 
directed intentions should frame what further problems need addressing. My future 
selves have to focus on the instrumental question how to get home, rather than again 
assess the merits of the entire plan.
This implies that future-directed intention should be relatively secure from 
reconsideration and change. While no plan is in principle irrevocable, all plans require 
some degree of stability. Once we settle on a plan we need to persevere with it, for 
without steadfastness we would remain locked in time-slice mode. If I were to review 
and revise my plans at every instant, this would defeat the very purpose of having plans 
and projects at all. This is not to say that we cannot critically re-examine and reject our 
plans. Clearly, changing circumstances could invite us to re-assess some of our plans. 
But the idea that our plans are permanently up for reassessment and revision or ought to 
be so rationally speaking makes no sense either. According to Bratman, what we need is 
a habitual rule or a policy of plan-reconsideration that controls the stability or firmness 
of our plans.63 Such rules or policies could run the gamut from the utterly rigid and 
stubborn on the one end to the indecisive and erratic on the other. But it is likely to be 
somewhere in between these extremes that the planning model should be able to find a 
reasonable solution, or so he argues.
Now, the idea that rational agents should commit themselves to a mode of reasoning 
in which earlier plans have the authority to govern present choice and action is not
63 Ibid., Chapter 5.
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uncontroversial. An obvious conflict arises if a person-stage prefers to deviate from the 
initial plan.64 For example, while it has been my plan to finish this chapter, my current 
person-stage strongly prefers to stop writing and go out for a walk. Faced by this 
temptation, the key question is whether I should persist with the original plan or simply 
do what I prefer at that moment in time. On the one hand, the planning model suggests 
that I should persist in my efforts, for this model awards higher authority to my past 
intention. The time-slice model of agency, on the other hand, claims that the preference 
of my present self is ultimately reason-giving. It rejects the authority of the earlier plan 
to finish this chapter, as it considers this to be the mere preference of another agent.65 
Here, we need an argument that could demonstrate that the planning model is in some 
sense superior to the time-slice model of agency.
What could this argument be? The answer to this question brings us back to the 
practice theory of personal identity and the notion of integrity as a virtue. As we saw, 
this theory argues that we ought to be able to own up to our past actions. And it also 
points to the importance of the idea of the goodness of a life as a temporal whole. In 
other words, the planning model seems more attractive from the normative standpoint of 
the practice theory. The point is that we should conceive of ourselves as temporally
64 Here, I am interested mainly in examples o f temptation and myopia. In such cases we have set out to 
achieve a certain long-term end but at some point I have a momentary reason to abandon the plan. A  
famous instance o f a similar problem, but with added complications, is G. S. Kavka, ‘The Toxin Puzzle’, 
Analysis, 42 (1983), pp. 33-36. On this, see also D. Gauthier, ‘Assure and Threaten’, Ethics, Volume 104, 
Issue 4 (1994), pp. 690-721; M. E. Bratman, ‘Toxin, Temptation, and the Stability o f Intention’, in: Faces 
o f  Intention, pp. 58-90.
Notice that this argument claims that I should rationally abandon my plan. So the issue does not just 
arise because o f a temporal lack o f rationality or weakness of will. Rather, the time-slice model o f agency 
offers a genuine reason for me to abandon the initial plan. In other words, the question is deeper than the 
one discussed in accounts o f temptation as a form o f irrational myopia. Take for example the view  
defended by J. Elster in his book Ulysses and the Sirens: Studies in Rationality and Irrationality 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979). Elster is led to explore a variety o f reasons and methods 
for binding or committing oneself to a future action. As in the case o f Ulysses tying himself to the mast, 
he argues, we often have good reasons to constrain our future liberties in order to increase the probability 
that we continue to act rationally so as to assure certain benefits on the long run. But it is important to see 
that, insofar as Elster already assumes -  pace the extremist -  that it is rational to assure benefits on the 
long run, he begs the question at this deeper level. To put it differently, in arguing that human rationality 
involves ‘global’ as opposed to ‘local maximisation’ he precisely assumes the notion o f a temporally 
extended self that the extremist calls into question. For a perspective similar to Elster’s, see G. Ainslie, 
Picoeconomics: The Strategic interaction o f  Successive Motivational States within the Person 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).
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extended agents. I shall not go over this argument again. However, are there alternative 
strategies?
Consider briefly what Bratman claims. First, given the limitations of human 
cognition, he argues that rational agents will simply do better by avoiding a potentially 
costly process of continuous plan-reconsideration.66 So the claim is that there are 
straightforward efficiency reasons to stick with the plan as the ‘default-option’ and to 
ignore the temporary preferences of certain later selves.67 I could of course go on to re­
think and re-evaluate my plan at each single moment, but it is far better, in terms of my 
own good, to first narrow down my options and then target my scarce deliberative 
resources to specific problems. Second, he argues that future-directed intention 
facilitates the temporal co-ordination that we need in order to successfully attain long­
term ends. In other words, Bratman argues that the planning model tends to yield better 
prudential results than the time-slice model.
But we have to be careful to specify what we exactly mean by better results. Take the 
‘pragmatic’ view that McClennen advocates. What he calls ‘resolute choice’ entails 
that agents first decide between certain future-directed plans, that is, between whole 
sequences of actions, and then direct their future choice on the basis of this adopted 
plan. Like Bratman, he argues that once agents have settled on a plan, they should apply 
their deliberative energy to put the plan into action. Again, the claim is that resolute 
choice is superior in consequentialist terms to the step-by-step-approach of the time- 
slice model, mainly because it facilitates a greater degree of temporal co-ordination. 
However, McClennen goes on to back the more specific view that the superiority of
66 See also J. Rawls, A Theory o f  Justice, p. 418.
67 M. E. Bratman, Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason, p. 17
68 E. F. McClennen, ‘Rationality and Rules’, in: P. A. Danielson (ed.) Modelling Rationality, Morality, 
and Evolution (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), pp. 13-40, and more generally, Rationality and 
Dynamic Choice: Foundational Explorations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990). For a 
similar though at the same time critical view, see D. Gauthier, ‘Resolute Choice and Rational 
Deliberation: A Critique and a Defense’, Nous, 31:1 (1997), pp. 1-25; ‘Commitment and Choice: An 
Essay on the Rationality o f Plans’, in: F. Farina, F. Hahn, and S. Vannucci (eds.), Ethics, Rationality, and 
Economic Behaviour (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), pp. 217-243.
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resoluteness must be demonstrated on the basis of mutual advantage. That is to say, he 
thinks that resolute choice is rationally feasible only if it benefits each of the temporally 
discrete person-stages. He even claims that we need ‘a theory of what constitutes a fair 
bargain between one’s different, time-indexed selves’.69
McClennen may be right to conclude that resoluteness sometimes yields 
/wfrapersonally optimal results, but the notion that the planning model should always be 
cashed out in micro-contractarian terms is unnecessarily limited. Ultimately, this 
approach leaves us trapped in the position of the extremist, namely that each intentional 
episode forms a separate agent, a view, as he puts it himself, that sees plans as ‘the 
means whereby the earlier and later self co-ordinate their choices in a manner that each 
judges acceptable.’ But if plans should be so acceptable in order to be rationally 
feasible, then resoluteness will not get us far. For it seems to me a vital ingredient in 
most of our plans that they aim to achieve certain ends at a later stage in our lives in 
spite o f  the fact that this goes at the expense of some person-stages.
Consider again the case where I am tempted to abandon my original plan to finish the 
chapter. Now, persisting with the plan is typically not going to be acceptable to my 
present person-stage. After all, why should I spend a single second in this dimly lit 
room if I could also be out there, in the sunlit streets? How does sticking with the plan 
make me better off at this discrete moment? It is entirely plausible that there is no 
answer to this question. By continuing to write, in fact, I sacrifice the interests of my 
present self to the interests of ‘plan-fulfilment’. The whole point about my resoluteness, 
and about seeing the plan through, is that it will pay off at the end, and that the
70temporary cost of the present self will be compensated by a later benefit.
A more promising variation on this argument, I think, is that the temporal co­
ordination facilitated by the planning model yields better results for the agent than the
69 E. F. McClennen, ‘Rationality and Rules’, p. 25; Rationality and Dynamic Choice, Chapter 12.
70 I think that Bratman recognises this when he argues that we should follow through with our plans if  we 
thereby avoid later regret at ‘plan’s end’. See his ‘Toxin, Temptation, and the Stability o f Intention’, pp. 
85-90.
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time-slice model, but mainly when we look at the goodness of a life as a whole. The 
planning model is superior, but often only on the basis that doing better means doing 
better in the long run, that is, ‘as a temporal bundle of person-stages’. The standard we 
require here may include reference to the addition of temporally discrete well-being, 
and it will probably include much else, but my point is here that in order to reject the 
time-slice model we rely on the claim that this is the kind of standard that matters in our 
comparison between both models of agency.71 Another way of putting this is to say that 
we rely on the practice theory and its claim that it is the goodness of lives that matters 
fundamentally, not the discrete interests of person-stages.
To sum up, when placed in a temporal context, integrity demands a certain attitude 
towards the past and the future. We have to regard the intentions and actions of earlier 
and future selves as internal to our agency. So, within certain confines, we have to 
recognise that our past intentions and actions have a measure of authority over our 
present choices. Our present choices are constrained by what our past selves set out to 
do. What is more, integrity requires future-directed deliberation. We evaluate projects 
and lives with a long-term horizon, thus incorporating our future person-stages into our 
practical deliberations. To put it differently, integrity means that we place ourselves in a 
historical chain of action, which we recognise as a connecting framework that supplies
nous with normative reasons, responsibilities and obligations.
71 I discuss this standard in Chapter VI below.
72 Notice that the communitarian literature on the subject captures the same idea in terms o f narrative 
identity. See A. MacIntyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory, Chapter 15. According to MacIntyre, 
we need to see our lives in terms o f a ‘narrative quest’. He also dismisses the idea that history more 
broadly conceived consists essentially out o f a sequence of temporally discrete action-moments, while the 
meanings or the narrative structures -  the beginnings, turning points and endings -  are imported 
retrospectively by the historian. For this sceptical view, see H. White, ‘Historical Emplotment and the 
Problem o f  Truth’, in: G. Roberts (ed.), The History and Narrative Reader (London: Routledge, 2001), 
pp. 375-389, and more generally H. White, Meta-history: The Historical Imagination in Nineteenth- 
Century Europe (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973). See also David Carr, ‘Getting the 
Story Straight’, in: G. Roberts (ed.), The History and Narrative Reader, pp. 197-208, at p. 198; N. 
Carroll, ‘Interpretation, History and Narrative’, in: G. Roberts (ed.) The History and Narrative Reader, 
pp. 246-265.
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Conclusion
Chapter I showed how associations could be compared to persons after all. Two 
arguments play a central role in this analogy. First, there is the reductionist position that 
personal identity over time is a relationship between psychological events or person- 
stages without these states being grounded in a deeper substratum. Second, there is the 
extreme claim that this relationship of identity carries no rational and moral 
significance. However, the problem with this analogy is that it levels down. Ethical 
individualism now faces a kind of predicament similar to theories of corporate 
personality.
While retaining the reductionist view, this chapter addressed the levelling down 
objection by switching to the moderate claim. According to this claim, the identity- 
relatedness between the temporal stages of a person is imbued with normative 
significance. Two stages are related in the way of a person if the one could be held 
responsible for the other, if the one could obligate the other or if the good of the one 
could form a reason to the other. Whereas the extreme claim conceives of identity as 
morally and rationally neutral -  as social relations, too, are sometimes considered to be 
neutral -  the moderate defines personal identity in terms of normative components or 
reasons.
The moderate claim rests on two further arguments. I first claimed that we have to 
embrace the practice theory to grasp why the moderate claim is superior to the extreme 
claim. Instead of grounding normative theory on a conception of personal identity, the 
practice theory begins by assuming that certain practices are essential to human life, at 
least as we conceive of it in the Western tradition. From these beginnings we then 
reason towards a general theory of the person and personal identity. While the extreme 
view may hold in a logically possible world, and while this claim may even be 
psychologically possible to believe, the practice theory suggests that this claim is false
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in the world we live in. We think that people can own up to past actions, we believe that 
our future interests have special weight, and we also assume that temporal bundles of 
experiences matter rather than isolated experiences as such. These practices cannot be 
reconciled with the claim that every intentional episode should be treated as a separate 
agent.
I then offered a more elaborate conception of personal identity along the lines of the 
moderate claim and the practice theory. According to this view, the identity conditions 
of a person are met when each person-stage avowed the authority of general principles 
or intentions. Integrity lies at the heart of the very idea of personhood as such. This 
notion also explains how past, present and future are integrated in a conception of 
personal identity.
We might conclude, then, that in this way individualist theories could successfully 
repel the Parfitian objection. Rationality and morality do not have to become more 
impersonal. Having said that, the move that ethical individualism has to make to save its 
own neck is not without consequences. In the remainder of this thesis, I want to show 
that the two key arguments on which it relies, that is, the practice theory and the notion 
of integrity, could be used to expand the scope of personality to groups. The irony, then, 
is that these arguments recoup ethical individualism but facilitate a move towards 
corporate personality at the same time. This is I think the two-homed dilemma that 
ethical individualism faces. If it embraces the first hom, it exposes itself to the extreme 
claim and the view that each temporal person-stage is an agent in and of itself. If it 
chooses the second, it cannot quite so easily shrug off the idea of corporate personality.
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CHAPTER III
CORPORATE PERSONALITY: A POLITICAL THEORY
If we consider my unity with myself at different times as the limiting case, 
we shall find it very hard to establish a difference of principle between the 
unity of what we call one mind and that of all the ‘minds’ which enter into a 
single social experience.
Bernard Bosanquet1
Introduction
By invoking the practice theory and the notion of integrity it can be argued that personal 
identity, while a relational fact, should be conceived of as a normative relationship. That 
is, personal identity is defined by mutual obligations and the authority of an intention or 
principle over the temporal stages of a person. At the same time it becomes apparent 
that integrity is not something we just have or not have, but also a virtue and an ideal. 
We at least need to recognise integrity as a normative standard of conduct. Thus, the 
person may still form the fundamental unit in normative analysis, in spite of the 
reductionist truth about personal identity as Parfit sees it.
With these arguments in hand, I now want to return to the idea of the corporate 
person. The standard case against corporate personality is articulated by claims that 
mirror Parfit’s objection to ethical individualism:
(Ql) Reductionism about groups is the familiar claim that the actions and 
intentions of collectives like states, nations and corporations are ontologically 
derivative from the actions and intentions of their individual membership. States 
are not grounded in some substratum, existing underneath its individual members, 
as some corporate realists may have mistakenly thought, but merely emerge from 
individual intentions and acts and the relatedness between them.
(Q2) Ethical individualism asserts that collectives, conceived of as a relationship 
between individuals, only have derivative significance in morality and rationality. 
In contrast to the temporal stages of a person, the fact that two individuals are in
1 The Philosophical Theory o f  the State, fourth edition (London: MacMillan, 1958), p. 166.
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some sense connected contains no moral and prudential significance as such. 
Instead, the significance and value of relational facts should ultimately be derived 
from their significance and value to the individual good.
Corporate personality is conceivable only if at least one of these claims could be 
rejected. Traditionally, perhaps, this has led us to deny Q l. But what I want to suggest 
is that we reject Q2 in favour of its counterpart:
(Q3) Associativism argues that even though the actions and intentions of 
collectives are reducible to a relationship between individuals, it could still form a 
non-derivatively significant unit in normative theory. The fact that two individuals 
are in some sense connected could be just as significant for rationality and 
morality as the fact that two person-stages are so related. So, associativism argues 
that interpersonal relatedness is inherently reason-giving, that is, its value does not 
always have to be reduced to the interests and desires of separate individuals.
Why accept associativism? To answer this question I want to use a line of argument 
similar to the one supporting the moderate claim. So we need to show that the same 
pivotal arguments could be made in the case of interpersonal relations.
To begin with, again we need to invoke the practice theory. That is, we need to start 
by assuming that certain practices are an inescapable feature of human life or of our 
form of life, and from this reason towards a theory of personal identity. As I explained 
in Chapter II, there are several normative grounds for accepting P3. But now we must 
demonstrate that there are also normative reasons for accepting Q3. And individualists 
will probably want to reject this claim. They will want to support the moderate claim 
and reject associativism at the same time. Consequently, we need to provide an 
independent argument for the necessity of corporate personality over and above 
individual personality. Such an argument must illustrate that a purely individualist 
interpretation of the idea of the person, leaves an important gap in normative theory. I 
try to put together one such argument in Chapters V, VI and VII.
Second, we also need to claim that P3 and Q3 refer at a more fundamental level to 
one and the same normative kind of relationship -  what I call integrity. The challenge, 
then, is to show that integrity is not necessarily confined to associative links between 
‘person-stages’ or ‘person-events’ contained in one human life span. Integrity, it will
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have to be argued, is also capable of covering a whole range of associative links 
between individuals, including even political association.
I want to confront the latter challenge first. In this chapter, I argue that the idea of 
integrity as a virtue is as applicable to interpersonal association as it is to the association 
between ‘person-stages’ or ‘person-events’. But let me first provide an overall agenda 
for the next five chapters. The argument for corporate personality needs to remain 
within four critical side-constraints.
First, it should be able to explain corporate personality within the limitations of 
reductionist metaphysics. I call this the reductionist constraint. This notion should 
therefore be framed in reductionist terms of ‘shared’ and ‘collective’ intentions and 
preferences.
Second, it should nevertheless give us an account of corporate personality that is 
independent from the normative point of view. I call this the sovereignty constraint. 
Corporate interests, preferences and intentions, I want to argue, are not merely the 
summation or function of individual interests, preferences and intentions. The concept 
of corporate personality needs to be defined in such a way that it can add something 
distinctive to the normative domain. Both constraints are largely conceptual and are 
addressed in Section 1 and 2 below.
Third, if the idea of corporate personality is to be applied to associations like the 
state, it should be able to avoid romantic and nostalgic conceptions of a monolithic 
community. I call this the empirical constraint. I propose an interpretive and 
institutional conception of integrity that accommodates the concern that our present day 
world is characterised by too much complexity and a diversity of identities. I tackle this 
problem in Chapter IV.
Fourth, and finally, corporate personality must have normative purchase. We could 
refer to this as the practicality constraint. As my argument plainly rests on the so-called 
practice theory, corporate personality must be able to do normative work. It must
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explain something that ethical individualism cannot adequately address. This is the 
subject of Chapters V, VI and VII.
With this out of the way, I begin in Section 1 below by introducing a general model 
of corporate personality using a reductionist conception of ‘shared’ and ‘collective’ 
intention. Couching corporate personality in these terms, I argue, takes care of the first 
constraint. However, if we follow this model, the sovereignty constraint turns out to be 
the greater challenge. Section 2 addresses no less than three different understandings of 
corporate personality in which the idea collapses back into a mode of ethical 
individualism: ‘conventionalism’, ‘contractualism’ and ‘voluntarism’. For each of these 
understandings, therefore, I advance an opposing interpretation.
1. The Reductionist Constraint
I begin with the issue of how the idea of a corporate personality could be made 
consistent with ontological reductionism about collectives. In order to stay within this 
constraint, I want to introduce the notions of ‘shared’ and ‘collective’ intention and 
preferences. These notions avoid anthropomorphism by arguing that the intentions of 
collectives emerge from a rational bundling of the intentions of a number of individuals, 
just as the intentions of individual persons consist out of the rational bundling of 
intentional episodes or person-stages. Essentially, the intentions of a group are viewed 
as the intentions shared by its members, to apply Bratman’s phrase. Without getting 
trapped in too much detail, I argue that the notion of a shared intention or preference 
meets the first challenge.
It is important to immediately note that there is something strange about the form of 
the intentions that are to be shared. While occurrences in the brains of individual
2
This concept o f ‘shared intention’ is set out in: M. E. Bratman, ‘Shared Cooperative Action’, pp. 93- 
108; ‘Shared Intention’, pp. 109-129; ‘Shared Intention and Mutual Obligation’, pp. 130-141; ‘I Intend 
That We JT, pp. 142-161, reprinted in: Faces o f  Intention. All page references are to this book.
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people, the key is that they need to be designed not for individual action but for group 
action. Another way of putting it is to say that while individuals always do the thinking 
and the intending, they can think and intend in different modes. More precisely, people 
can think in an individual and a group mode. When individuals think in the former 
mode, so-called ‘/-intentions’ are put in charge over their decisions and actions. When 
they think in the latter mode, so-called ‘we-intentions’ are put in charge over their 
decisions and actions.
The notion of a we-intention (or collective intention) needs to be unpacked a bit 
further. What does it mean for action to be guided by a collective intention? On 
Bratman’s account of shared intention, a we-intention is an intention to undertake 
something together. I can intend that /  do this or that -  in this case I think in the mode 
of an individual -  but I can also intend that we do this or that. In that latter case I have a 
collective intention. The hallmark of such intentions, then, is that they are defined over 
the actions of a group of people. For example, assume that John, Paul, George and 
Ringo intend to form a band and compose and play music together. Here, John does not 
just intend to play himself, he intends them to play together. And Paul, George and 
Ringo we-intend the same.
John Searle advances a similar notion of collective intention. As he puts the idea: 
‘We simply have to recognize that there are intentions whose form is: We intend that we 
perform act A; and such an intention can exist in the mind of each individual agent who 
is acting as part of the collective.’3 The point Searle emphasises is that such collective 
intentions are as primitive or as basic as so-called I-intentions.
Robert Sugden focuses on collective preferences rather than collective intentions. 
But the former have precisely the same features as the latter. According to Sugden, I can 
define a preference in order to guide my actions. But I can also define a preference 
aiming to guide our actions. If the former sort of preference directs my reasoning, I
3
J. R. Searle, ‘Collective Intentions and Actions’, in: P. R. Cohen, J. Morgan and M. E. Pollack (eds.), 
Intentions in Communication (Cambridge M.A.: The MIT Press, 1990), pp. 401-415, at p. 407.
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think as an individual. When the latter sort of preference directs my reasoning, I ‘think 
as a team’. He writes:
... although team-directed reasoning is carried out by individuals, it is not an 
instance of individual reasoning as that is represented in the standard theory of 
rational choice. The two kinds of reasoning are different in structure. In the 
standard theory, the individual appraises alternative actions by her in relation to 
some objective (her preferences), given her beliefs about the actions that other 
individuals will choose. An individual who engages in team-directed reasoning 
appraises alternative arrays o f  actions by members o f  the team in relation to 
some objective.4
Now, since we engage in collective action on a daily basis, it is not implausible to 
think that collective intentions and preferences are everyday phenomena. However, the 
idea of collective intentions and preferences invites an important logical obstacle, which 
needs to be removed.5 Let us concentrate on we-intentions. Evidently, at a physical 
level John, Paul, George and Ringo can only act individually. There is, of course, no 
separately existing band that could generate music by itself. And this fact points to a 
discontinuity between intention and action. Collective intentions can only result in 
individual actions. But is it really intelligible to say that John we-intends that he and 
Paul do something? After all, we have to assume that Paul, not John, is ultimately in 
control of his own actions and will have to make up his own mind whether or not to 
participate. How, then, could John intend for Paul? And to what use?
Bratman shows in my view persuasively how the discontinuity problem could be 
overcome.6 John can we-intend, he argues, on the basis of the further belief, assumption 
or the prediction that Paul will have the same intention. Given that John thinks that Paul 
intends to do his part, he can form the intention that they undertake something together,
4 R. Sugden, ‘Team Preferences’, Economics and Philosophy, 16 (2000), pp. 175-204, at p. 193. See also 
R. Sugden, ‘Thinking as a Team’, in: E. F. Paul, F. D. Miller and J. Paul (eds.), Altruism (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. 69-89. His notion o f a collective preference is similar to what 
Susan Hurley understands by collective agency in her book Natural Reasons: Personality and Polity 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989).
5 See for example J. D. Velleman, ‘How to Share an Intention’, Philosophy and Phenomenological 
Research, 57 (1997), reprinted in: The Possibility o f  Practical Reason, pp. 200-220.
6 M. E. Bratman, ‘I Intend That We T ,  pp. 142-161. Velleman now accepts this response, as becomes 
apparent in ‘How to Share an Intention’, footnote 11, p. 204.
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without assuming that he has direct discretion over Paul’s actions. Whether they play 
together is under his control. It might be objected that the need for such beliefs and 
assumptions detracts from this view as compared to individual agency. But the obvious 
response is here that future-directed intention operates by the same logic. Similar 
assumptions and predictions are required in order to understand how I could logically 
intend in the morning to go to the cinema tonight. After all, I have currently no more 
discretion over my future selves than John over Paul’s actions. Hence, I can only intend 
something in the future, on the basis of the assumption that my future selves will co­
operate.
I return to this analogy between collective and future-directed intention below. There 
is, however, a further point that is helpful in allaying the concern about discontinuity. It 
is certainly true that John’s we-intention has no discretion over Paul’s actions. But the 
point is rather that John’s we-intention guides and constrains his own intentions and 
actions in a particular way. And if Paul has the same we-intention, this will also serve 
to frame and constrain his own individual options in a particular way. This point is 
captured by Bratman’s important claim that the structure of collective agency is two- 
tiered. A collective intention to so something together necessitates a degree of planning 
and co-ordination so that each individual member knows what he must ‘I-intend’ to do 
himself in order to achieve the intended result at the level of collective action. In the 
above example, apart from having a we-intention, John will have to I-intend that he sing 
a certain tune, Paul will have the I-intention that he play certain chords the guitar, and 
so forth. A we-intention, then, involves having a plan delegating specific tasks in such a 
way that subsidiary intentions are defined over individual actions and their outcomes.8 
Collective agency, among other things, entails that lower-tier I-intentions are framed, 
constrained and guided by a higher-tier we-intention. To put it differently still,
7
M. E. Bratman, ‘Shared Intention’, pp. 115-116.
g
M. E. Bratman, ‘Shared Intention’, pp. 118-122; J. R. Searle, ‘Collective Intentions and Actions’, p. 
403.
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collective agency could only emerge if the collective intention or preference is 
ultimately in charge of an individual’s decisions. Thinking as a team, an individual will 
ultimately have to understand the rationality of his choices and actions, in terms of this 
higher-order, collective intention.9
Three further features of this model of we-intentions need to be mentioned here. 
First, a collective intention or preference could still leave ample discretion for 
individual choice and interpretation. Rather than having to describe to the last detail 
what an individual member will have to do, the latter may just constrain our options in a 
more general sense.10
Second, since associations often have specific purposes, we need to demand only that 
individual members put we-intentions in charge over those decisions and actions that 
are relevant to those purposes. So group members do not altogether lose their sense of 
individual agency. The point is merely that we think in the mode of the group where 
appropriate. While we think as citizens, members of staff, and so forth, on particular 
occasions, in numerous other contexts we can continue to think as individual agents. 
What we have reason to do, then, depends on the standpoint that we take. We can either 
conceive of ourselves as members of a particular group or as individuals.11
Third, we do not need to impose external restrictions on the content of collective 
intentions or preferences. In rational choice theory, individual preferences are generally 
taken as a given. They provide a ranking of action-outcomes, capable of guiding the 
agent towards one action or another. As has often been noted before, the ranking is not 
itself the subject of further normative evaluation. Collective preferences are similar in
1 9the sense that they provide the agent merely with instrumental reasons.
9
J. R. Searle, ‘Collective Intentions and Actions’, pp. 402-406.
10 M. E. Bratman, ‘Shared Intention’, pp. 119-121
11 For the idea that the range o f the collective intention o f a state should be restricted to a small number o f  
basic tasks, see R. Dworkin, ‘Liberal Community’, in: S. Avineri and A. De-Shalit (eds.) 
Communitarianism and Liberalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), pp. 205-223. See also R.
Sugden, ‘Team Preferences’, p. 201.
12 See R. Sugden, ‘Team Preferences’, pp. 197-199, and my discussion in Section 2.2 below.
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Once this two-tiered structure is in place, the question is not whether John can
logically intend to play while he has no discretion over the actions of Paul, George and
Ringo, but whether or not they all share this collective intention and are prepared to
accept its authority. It is important, at this point, to emphasise the distinction between a
shared intention and a collective intention. It is perfectly possible for one person to have
a collective intention. For example, John might have a we-intention to form a band with
Paul, George and Ringo, while the latter do not. In this case, John believes or predicts,
mistakenly, as it turns out, that they are all agreed on forming a band and that they are
all agreed on a certain plan delegating more specific tasks to each of them. Until he
finds out about this mistake, John will think he has a reason to proceed to carry out what
1 ^the plan instructs him to do. But it is still wrong to suggest that in this example there is 
a group agent. An association will exist only if Paul, George and Ringo share this 
intention. And an intention is shared if two or more people both intend to undertake a 
certain activity together. As Bratman puts it: ‘it takes at least two not only to tango but 
even for there to be a shared intention to tango.’14 So, the concept of shared intention 
refers not only to the intentions or preferences of a single individual, but to a state of 
affairs in which intentions and attitudes of several individuals interlock in a purposive 
way.
In the literature, this relation is conventionally described by a number of jointly 
necessary and sufficient conditions, which are the subject of ongoing debate and many 
subtle differences. To keep things simple, I want to introduce Bratman’s account as a 
working hypothesis.15 Roughly, his model consists of the following conditions. We 
share an intention if:
(1) You and I intend that we J\
13 J. R. Searle, ‘Collective Intentions and Actions’, pp. 406-408.
14 M. E. Bratman, ‘Shared Intention’, p. 117, footnote 17.
15 Ibid., pp. 116-122. For alternatives to and variations o f this model, see for example R. Tuomela, ‘We 
Will Do It: An Analysis o f Group-Intentions’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Volume 51, 
Issue 2 (June 1991), pp. 249-277; P. R. Cohen and H. J. Levesque, ‘Teamwork’, Nous, Volume 25, Issue 
4 (September 1991), pp. 487-512.
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(2) You and I intend that we J  in accordance with sufficiently meshing plans;
(3) I intend that we J  partly because you and I intend so, and you intend that we J  
partly because you and I intend so;
(4) It is common knowledge between us that the above conditions apply.16
The first condition requires that John must generally intend that they play, Paul must 
intend that they play, and so forth. By the same token, what Sugden calls a ‘team 
preference’ requires that two or more persons have the same collective preference or 
what he refers to as a ‘team-directed preference’.17
The second condition specifies that the parties also need sufficiently compatible 
plans. While it is not necessary that co-ordinating plans are filled out to the smallest 
detail, they should overlap at a more abstract level such that outstanding issues could be 
resolved in further rounds of bargaining or deliberation.
More controversially, the third condition demands a degree of respect for the 
individual agency of the parties involved. Using one of Bratman’s own examples, if 
Sonny handcuffs Donny and transports him to New York in the boot of his car, then 
they do not share an intention to go to New York together. Even though their actions are 
co-ordinated, it is not at all evident that Donny intends that they go to New York 
together. As Bratman puts it, this is ‘the Mafia sense’ of sharing an intention. I shall 
refer to this condition as the agency requirement.
The fourth condition, finally, stipulates that it is common knowledge or, weaker, a 
common belief between the parties that the above conditions apply. This means, as
1 ftSugden puts it, that each member must have ‘full team confidence’. That is to say, 
each individual must be confident that the other members intend to J, and each
16 M. E. Bratman, ‘Shared Intention’, p. 121.
17 As with collective intention, it is possible for one individual to have a team-directed preference. Like 
shared intentions, however, team preferences ‘are properties o f a set o f individuals, and require a network
o f common beliefs.’ See R. Sugden, ‘Team Preferences’, p. 195.
18 R. Sugden, ‘Team Preferences’, pp. 194-195. Sugden seems to subscribe to a model restricted to 
condition (1) and (4).
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individual is confident that the other members are similarly confident, and so on 
indefinitely.19
Now, something like this forms the conceptual core of the idea of corporate 
personality. We can begin to understand how small groups and associations, and 
perhaps even universities, corporations and states could intend and act collectively 
without abandoning reductionism. To see why corporate personality is no less credible 
than individual personality, it may be helpful to compare the following two cases. First, 
let us say that you and I intend to write a philosophical study together. You and I define 
an intention and a preference over something we want to do together. To achieve this 
purpose, we need a plan for the co-ordination of our individual efforts. It is my job, say, 
to write the first three chapters, while it is your job to write the last three. I take care of 
finding a publisher; you take care of certain other things. We also need to think in the 
mode of a group. That is, we need to evaluate our choices and actions in terms of our 
joint purpose. If our subsidiary intentions interlock in a coherent manner and we have 
‘team-confldence’, then you and I share an intention in the above sense.
Compare this to the case where I intend to write this treatise on my own. In order to 
succeed, it is obviously not sufficient to just form an intention to start with the first 
section at t. Starting the whole project also depends on my having an intention to write 
the next sections of the book at ti, ... tn. What is required, then, is not just an intention
to start writing now but another sort of intention covering my future actions over that
19 Interestingly, Margaret Gilbert advances a model that contains obligations and rights o f commitment. 
See her ‘Obligations o f Joint Commitment’, reprinted in: M. Gilbert Sociality and Responsibility: New 
Essays in Plural Subject Theory (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000), pp. 50-70, in particular pp. 52- 
54, and more generally M. Gilbert, On Social Facts (London: Routledge, 1989). On her view, a shared 
intention to A emerges if  two individuals ‘are jointly committed to intending as a body to A \  What a joint 
commitment precisely includes remains somewhat unclear. What is clear, however, is that such 
commitments cannot be rescinded unilaterally. In contrast to Bratman’s account, Gilbert’s model directly 
provides the basis o f associative entitlements and obligations. For her such entitlements and obligations 
are constitutive o f corporate personality. I address this important issue in Section 2.3 below.
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entire period of time.20 So, I will have to intend at t to write further sections at tj and for 
however long I think it is going to take me to finish.
Now, the crucial point is that having a future-directed intention like this is the 
equivalent to having a collective intention. To begin with, it is bogged down by the 
same discontinuity between intention and action. I presently need to define an intention 
over what I will do in the future. Yet, I know that presently I have no discretion over my 
future actions. My intention at t has just as little discretion over what I will do at tj as 
my intention that you write Chapter 4. In other words, my intention to write a treatise 
myself is defined over what we, my future person-stages and I, are up to together.
Furthermore, and also similar to collective intention, the success of my project 
therefore depends on the question whether or not my future person-stages will take this 
intention as authoritative. At any rate, having a future-directed intention necessarily 
involves a co-ordinating scheme allocating specific tasks over the coming weeks, 
months and years. If I begin with Chapter 1 this week, I will move on to the next within 
two months, and so on. To put it differently, my future selves and I have to think in a 
style analogous to the group mode of agency. Thinking in this mode, I ultimately take 
my future-directed intention to be in charge over my present decisions. So, my person- 
stages are guided by a purpose or a preference not just defined over what I could 
presently do, but over the outcomes of a temporally sustained sequence of actions, over 
what I could achieve over a period of time. Again, it is this two-tiered model that 
explains my agency.
Notice also that my project will succeed, not only if my future person-stages intend 
to write this treatise together, but also on the condition that our subsidiary intention are 
sufficiently adjusted to each other. There is, of course, some discretionary space for 
each person-stage. And my person-stages will probably also entertain other future- 
directed projects. But there must be a minimum of agreement on the co-ordinating
20 I discussed Bratman’s planning theory o f agency and the notion o f future-directed intention in Section 
6 o f Chapter II.
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scheme that distributes tasks over the coming period. Thus, my intention to write the 
book myself has all the hallmarks of shared intention, reductively understood. That 
intention is, in fact, a temporal bundle of interlocking intentions of several person- 
stages.21
Recall that I claimed that the personal identity of individuals should be understood 
entirely in terms of a rational bundling of purposive mind-states to which I also referred 
to as integrity. Integrity essentially means that we guide our actions according to a 
general policy. This policy must be general in the sense that it is guiding not only in the 
context of one concrete and temporally discrete decision, but also in a whole range of 
decision moments. In addition, it should be stressed that integrity is not just a kind of 
consistency or stability between temporal stages that, understood in terms of a system of 
rules or laws, allows us to predict behaviour. Integrity also involves a mode of thinking 
according to which this system of rules and laws is a normative standard for the 
appraisal of our attitudes and behaviour. So this system of rules is authoritative in the 
sense that it provides us with reasons for action.
Something like the above notion of shared intention precisely refers to such a 
bundling, the only difference being that this bundle does not consist of the temporally 
discrete mind-states of one individual, but of those of several individuals. As an 
individual but temporally extended agent, future-directed precepts like plans and 
intentions are put in charge of my choices and actions. In the context of corporate 
agency, integrity assumes the shape of collective intentions and preferences, that is, 
policies, plans and principles defined over the actions of a number of people and the 
outcomes thereof.
21 See also G. J. Postema, ‘Morality in the First Person Plural’, Law and Philosophy, 14 (1995), pp. 35-
64.
22 In her Natural Reasons (p. 142) Hurley makes a similar point: ‘The notions o f personal action and a 
personal unit o f agency already allow for the possibility and indeed the normality o f the corresponding 
sense of intrapersonal ‘collective’ agency -  it just is personal agency, which reflects the distinctive 
capacities o f persons in the presence o f conflicting reasons for deliberation, all-things considered 
judgment, and higher-order attitudes.’
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2. Sovereignty Constraints
The notion of shared intention, I want to claim, takes care of the reductionist constraint. 
We do not, at least, slip back in metaphysical theories postulating a spooky mind- 
substance of the group. Having said that, a number of serious challenges still remain. In 
this section, I argue that Bratman’s model -  his agency condition in particular -  needs 
to be read in a specific way to meet what I earlier referred to as the sovereignty 
constraint. Bratman’s model of a shared intention is open to attack from the opposite 
end. That is, it may collapse back into a form of ethical individualism, thus rendering 
the idea of corporate personality ultimately incapable of doing any real and independent 
work. To prevent such a collapse, the model needs to be read and fleshed out in a 
particular way.
2.1 Conventionalism
To begin with, shared intention must be carefully distinguished from what could be 
described as conventionalism.23 This view holds that the notion of we-intention could 
ultimately be broken down in standard I-intentions. The model discussed above argues 
that collective intentions are basic. However, a collective intention becomes a shared 
intention only if a we-intention is jointly held, and certain supporting attitudes are 
interlocking in the right way.24 In contrast, conventionalism argues that the idea of a 
collective intention itself consists in an interlocking network of I-intentions. Thus, it
23 The most important statement of this view is D. K. Lewis, Convention: A Philosophical Study
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1969).
24 Because Bratman’s notion o f shared intention is partly conceived o f as a network o f  personal intentions 
and beliefs, Gilbert argues that this model is conventionalist in spirit. See her discussion in ‘In Search of 
Sociality -  Recent Developments in the Philosophy o f Social Phenomena’, pp. 154-164, in particular p. 
156, in: M. Gilbert, Sociality and Responsibility. She contrasts it with Searle’s approach. In my view, her 
reading is well o ff the mark and confuses collective intention with shared intention. Shared intention, as I 
understand the model, requires a complex o f we-intentions, sub-plans and beliefs. It is not an alternative 
to we-intention, but aims to describe the social conditions that need to be in place for collective agency to 
fully emerge, an issue that Searle does not address.
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rejects the entire idea that we first have to think in the mode of a group. It explains 
collective action on the basis of the normativity of individual intentions and preferences 
alone.
Consider again the above example. On Bratman’s model, John and Paul have a we- 
intention to undertake something together. In addition, their attitudes converge 
according to a plan that co-ordinates their individual efforts, they respect each other’s 
agency, and so on. Instead, the conventionalist picture suggests that John I-intends to 
sing alone, that he further believes that Paul I-intends to play guitar, and that all this is 
common knowledge between them. What is more, Paul does in fact I-intend to play 
guitar, and he also believes that John intends to sing, and that this is common 
knowledge between them. In other words, it suggests that there is here a kind of 
convergence between their I-intentions and certain supporting beliefs so that they could 
successfully co-ordinate their efforts. As I understand it, conventionalism provides a 
model for social co-ordination and co-operation without having to resort to the idea of 
collective intentions or preferences.
Is conventionalism plausible? This is of course a key question. Fortunately, we do 
not have to settle it right now. Here, it is important just to emphasise the difference 
between both models. The idea that John and Paul share an intention remains 
fundamentally at odds with the conventionalist picture.25 Essentially, the notion of 
collective intention as basic entails taking a different kind of standpoint. It implies that 
individuals think as a group and guide their deliberations on the basis of collective 
intentions, preferences and purposes. The conventionalist account of we-intention 
cannot in the end be differentiated from ethical individualism. It supports the standard 
view that we guide our deliberations on the basis of individual intentions, preferences 
and purposes.
25 See J. R. Searle, ‘Collective Intentions and Actions’. In fact, Searle argues that collective intentions are 
‘biologically innate’. See his J. R. Searle, The Construction o f  Social Reality (London: Penguin Books, 
1996), pp. 23-26; 37-38.
109
Nothing I have said thus far actually implies that this notion of corporate personality 
also provides a more plausible explanation than the conventionalist model for a certain 
range of events. As far as I can see, the position taken here is still neutral to that 
question. But if we are serious about the idea of corporate personality, I suggest, we will 
have to commit to the view that we-intentions are primitive, even though collective 
agency requires an interlocking of further attitudes. Of course, it must ultimately be 
demonstrable that this difference has implications. And in Chapter V, VI and VII, I shall 
argue that this is indeed the case. But for now the point is merely that collective 
intentions are sui generis.
2.2 Contractualism
I return to the concept of a shared intention. As set out above, this concept is vulnerable 
to a further problem. This objection results from the interpretative discretion that the 
agency requirement, as set out above, appears to leave. How we understand this 
condition turns out to have pivotal significance, and I shall be occupied with it in a large 
section of this chapter.
One possible and strongly normative reading of the requirement demands that shared 
intentions have a contractualist basis. Essentially, this reading attempts to justify or 
rationalise collective intentions or preferences in terms of individual intentions or 
preferences. In other words, a shared intention must fulfil the normative requirement 
that for all the members it must be ‘reasonable’ to join the collective endeavour. And 
‘reasonable’ is likely to mean here that it must pay off individually to start reasoning in 
the group mode. Natural candidates for these normative requirements are the Pareto 
principle and, more restrictively, Rawlsian or other egalitarian principles of distributive 
justice.
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The problem with the contractual view, I want to argue, is that it rules out too 
26much. Of course, I see that when such conditions are not met, suspicions may be 
raised as to whether or not the participant’s agency is sufficiently respected. But it goes 
too far, in my view, to rule out the possibility that people can willingly have a we- 
intention even if the shared activity does not pay off in terms of their own individual 
preferences and interests. While it may well be that such conditions set out an external 
normative parameter for co-operative action, it is not persuasive to claim that 
individuals could only think in the mode of a group if there were good reason to do so 
from the individual point of view. To put it differently, I want to suggest that collective 
intentions are not normatively entrenched in I-intentions. Whether or not an agent has a 
we-intention is in my view ultimately an empirical question, no less an empirical 
question than whether or not agents have a certain individual intention or preference. 
Thus, what we need is the presence of an intention to undertake something together. 
This presence is a reason for action in and of itself. We do not need a further, normative 
test to the effect that by the lights of some criterion it must also be reasonable to adopt a 
certain collective intention or preference.
However, let me try to make the point against the contractual view in a different way. 
Contractualism, I have just said, is grounded in the idea that in order to respect the 
agency of the parties involved, collective intentions must be reasonably acceptable. And 
‘reasonably acceptable’ is hammered out in terms of individual intentions and 
preferences or rather in terms of individual gains and pay-offs. But why should this be 
true? Perhaps the most promising argument trades on a perceived distinction between 
shared and collective intentions on the one hand and I-intentions on the other. The idea, 
it seems, is that the former intentions do not count as a form of agency, while the latter
26 See R. Sugden, ‘Team Preferences’, pp. 186-190.
27 Cf. R. Sugden, ‘Team Preferences’, pp. 197-199; M. Gilbert, ‘Collective, Preferences, Obligations, and 
Rational Choice’, Economics and Philosophy, 17 (2001), pp. 109-119, at pp. 113-114.
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do, because we-intentions require us to think in a modus operandi fundamentally 
estranged from ourselves.
I believe this argument to be flawed. Take again the case where I intend to write a 
philosophical study on my own. As we saw, I do not just form an intention to start with 
the first few words. Instead, I also intend that my future selves write later paragraphs 
and chapters. Thus, my intention is defined, not over immediate action, but over 
temporally sustained action. Notice also that my future selves have to think in a mode of 
thought in which this future-directed intention is taken to be reason-giving. This 
explains why we think of our individual lives as continuous wholes rather than 
unconnected sums of infinitesimally brief moments. To put it differently, we have 
preferences and goals pertaining to how our whole lives go or at least large chunks of it. 
And in considering what we ought to do, we abstract from our present interests in order 
to also look at the good of our life as a whole.
The problem, then, is that we could also apply the contractualist thesis to individual 
personality. Contractualism would demand that our future-directed intentions be 
reasonably acceptable from the point of view of each person-stage. My future selves 
would all have to be able to share in the gain or receive their fair share under some 
criterion of justice. But this is absurd. We do not subject ourselves to such a restricting 
regime. If I presently decide against going to the cinema, while I would desperately like 
to, and, miserably, continue to work with the ulterior purpose of completing the task at 
hand, there is no one who would seriously doubt my free agency. We do not say that 
this could not reasonably be an intention or an end of mine because my present self is 
worse off than he would have been without this intention. On the contrary, we often 
take this to be an exemplary case of rational agency that needs to be singled out for 
praise. There is, of course, no insinuation of unfairness either. I just happen to have this
28 E. F. McClennen sometimes appears to support this view in ‘Rationality and Rules’ and, more 
generally, Rationality and Dynamic Choice.
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long-term goal, and if  I endorse that goal, that is pretty much the final word. That goal 
provides me with a reason not to go to the cinema.
It is important to note that I am not arguing against some distributive policy 
according to which, say, future-directed action must not disturb a certain allocation of 
well-being over my entire life-span as a measure o f the good life. I may well have good 
reasons to prefer to live the egalitarian life, a life without having to suffer such 
miserable moments, but perhaps also a life without having written a book. Distributive 
considerations of this kind, I suspect, do play a role in many of our deliberations about 
the good life. We set limits to how much sacrifice we presently want to endure in order 
to realise long-term goals, even though these limits seem a good deal less restrictive 
than Rawls’s difference principle or even the Pareto principle.29 But here my argument 
is not with these principles. It may not be absurd to impose distributive limits on how 
we divide well-being over time. What is absurd, however, is the suggestion that these 
limits are normatively powerful enough to rule out the conceptual possibility of my 
reasonably and willingly adopting a future-directed intention that requires a present 
sacrifice for a future good. This suggestion is absurd because such normative principles 
are external to agency. Whatever use they have, they are not a prerequisite for agency to 
emerge.
In resisting the contractual reduction of we-intentions to I-intentions, I am pressing 
the exact same claim. I am not suggesting that there are no external grounds for 
adopting some distributive criterion such that states or other co-operative schemes can 
be ethically appraised. Perhaps it is true in a particular context that some egalitarian 
distribution is what justice demands. I have, at any rate, no real quarrel with such a 
norm here. But I do have a problem with its specifically contractual grounding in
29 In Chapter VI, I endorse Velleman’s views in ‘Well-being and Time’, reprinted in: J. D. Velleman, The 
Possibility o f  Practical Reason, pp. 170-199. According to Velleman, the good o f a life cannot be entirely 
reduced to a simple addition o f synchronic well-being. Over and above this addition, an independent 
distributive criterion is at work. This criterion, however, is not adequately captured by egalitarianism. 
Rather it suggests that the good o f a life is partly shaped by its historical progression over time, by its 
narrative structure.
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agency. It is simply implausible to claim that it is impossible for someone to reasonably 
and willingly agree to participate in a joint venture that violates this criterion and, say, 
leaves him worse off than before. Contractualism effectively argues that such a joint 
venture cannot be grounded in a person’s will and, therefore, that there cannot be a 
shared intention in these cases. Now, it may not be mistaken to embed shared intentions 
in an individual’s volition and agency. What is mistaken, however, is the presumption 
that only individual intentions could count as constitutive of people’s volition and 
agency. This presumption takes the distributive requirement for an internal requirement 
constitutive of agency itself.
On the account I am suggesting here, we-intentions and collective preferences are no 
less expressive of a person’s will, no less normative than I-intentions. They may directly 
provide us, that is, with reasons to choose and act. If  John and Paul come to hold the 
collective preference that they play music together, then they rationally ought to do so, 
even if this means that they are worse off individually as the result. In this respect, I can 
really see no reason why we ought to treat we-intention or shared intention differently 
from future-directed I-intention. We do not generally think that future-directed I- 
intentions, like the one in my example above, deflect us from our agency simply 
because they require us to think in a particular mode of thought. We do not think that 
this kind of intention must be justifiable from the perspective of present-directed 
volition in order to count as a true expression of our agency. In fact, when our future- 
directed intentions are governed by the present-directed viewpoint we are vulnerable to 
what we commonly describe as weakness of will. Why should we think differently in 
the case of we-intentions?
I should add an important caveat. The very notion of the weakness of will clearly 
implies that our temporally discrete desires, far from being expressive of our free 
agency, actually threaten to undermine it. Our individual agency, according to this view, 
is always located in future-directed intention. In other words, by overriding the desire of
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a person-stage, we fulfil rather than impede our freedom.30 That said, we should be 
careful not to press the analogy with collective intention to its ultimate conclusion. If we 
were to claim that collective intention is always more expressive of our agency than 
individual intention, then we would end up in the position that Rousseau may have set 
out in The Social Contract, and which has provoked the wrath of classical liberalism 
ever since, namely that elements resisting the General Will could be ‘forced to be 
free’.31 Instead, we should emphasise the pluralist consequences of the argument. The 
main point I am trying to make is not that collective intention is ‘more real’ than 
individual intention; it is merely that it is conceivable that a collective intention is 
expressive of our agency. Individualists assume that future-directed intentions are 
somehow privileged, that it is somehow self-evidently true that these intentions 
correspond to our agency, and that our temporal selves can thus indeed be forced to be 
free. But there is in my view no ironclad argument to back up this assumption. As Parfit 
demonstrates, there is no logical reason why we could not argue for the autonomy or the 
rights of temporal selves, and deplore the repression that ethical individualism 
necessarily involves. More to the point, there is no logical reason to presuppose at the 
outset that collective intentions could never be truly expressive of the will, and should 
always be subjected to the contractualist test. What this leaves us with is not the 
Rousseauian position, which may indeed lead to the Gulag, but rather the view that the 
unit of human agency is more flexible than individualists normally assume, and could in 
principle take on several forms. We do not rub out the practical importance of the 
individual and conflicts between individual interests in favour of the interests of a 
collective person. But what we have to affirm is that individual and corporate 
personality may both have a role to play in practical reason. Moreover, the question
30 That would appear to be a view endorsed by J. Elster in his Ulysses and the Sirens. He typically views
the problem in terms o f  a breakdown o f rational agency.
31 J. J. Rousseau, The Social Contract, Book I, Chapter 7, in: G. D. H. Cole (ed.) The Social Contract and 
Discourses.
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which particular form our agency should assume is in itself the subject of normative 
inquiry.32
To sum up, we must be careful, at this stage, not to place conditions on corporate 
agency that prove to be too strict and are, at any rate, not properly applied to individual 
agency either. Certainly, some conditions of agency need to be met if intentions are to 
be really ‘shared’. But contractualism goes wrong in fixating on a norm that insofar as I 
can see is external to corporate personality.
2.3 Voluntarism and Obligations o f  Shared Intention
While I reject the contractualist interpretation of shared intention, I have not rejected the 
agency requirement as such, namely that such intentions must respect the volition and 
agency of the individuals involved. I merely want to keep it separate from distributive 
norms testing the reasonableness of collective intentions and preferences.
If the contractualist view is rejected, it might be thought alternatively that shared 
intention requires something like an explicit agreement, a promise or an actual contract 
between the parties involved. This thought is appealing because an actual contract 
would seem to satisfy all the conditions of shared intention set out above. The problem, 
however, with this view is that it involves the danger of excluding associations that do 
not obviously rest on such an agreement, yet should still be counted as corporate 
persons. The state is an obvious case in point. It is widely agreed that state membership 
does not rest on explicit consent or an actual contract.33 Hence, if we want to rule in 
non-voluntary associations like states, the actual contract view must be dismissed as too 
restrictive.
32 If I understand her correctly, Hurley makes a similar point when she sets aside the erroneous view that 
‘the unit o f agency must be fixed, somehow, once and for all’. According to Hurley, ‘... we must allow 
ourselves to survey the units o f agency that are possible in the circumstances at hand and to ask what the 
unit o f  agency, among those possible, should be.' See her Natural Reasons: Personality and Polity
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), pp. 145-146, and Chapter 8 more generally.
33 For an early statement, see D. Hume, ‘Of the Original Contract’, in Essays: Moral, Political and 
Literary, E. F. Miller (ed.) (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1985), pp. 265-487.
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I suggest the following argument. For a shared intention we need two or more 
persons possessing a collective intention, sufficiently meshing sub-plans, and so forth, 
as specified above. Now, express consent or a contract or a promise are merely 
manifestations of the fact that such intentions are present. To put it differently, 
agreement is not itself part of the criterion for shared intentions, but merely one 
indicator among a host of possible indicators revealing the prevalence of the we- 
attitudes in question. If John and Paul come to an agreement, sign the relevant papers, 
and so forth, this may be ample to satisfy the conditions of sharing an intention. 
However, while it is one thing to say that the presence of an explicit agreement is 
sufficient evidence for the presence of a shared intention, it is something else to claim 
that this is also a necessary condition for shared intention to emerge.
The latter half of this claim is false because it is possible for people to share an 
intention without explicit agreement or without making a promise. Bratman approvingly 
refers to the Hume’s conventionalist conception of justice.
I observe, that it will be for my interest to leave another in the possession of his 
goods, provided he will act in the same manner with regard to me. He is 
sensible of a like interest in the regulation of his conduct. When this common 
sense of interest is mutually express’d, and is known to both, it produces a 
suitable resolution and behaviour. And this may properly enough be call’d a 
convention or agreement betwixt us, tho’ without the interposition of a promise; 
since the actions of each of us have a reference to those of the other, and are 
perform’d upon the supposition, that something is to be perform’d on the other 
part. Two men, who pull the oars of a boat, do it by an agreement or 
convention, tho’ they have never given promises to each other.34
Hume’s rowers have the collective intention to row the boat together. They agree on 
where they are going, at what speed, and so on. In other words, they have appropriately 
interlocking attitudes. They are in fact prepared to row the boat. It might be claimed that 
their express consent is required as a means to signal to each other that they are 
prepared to row the boat. To be sure, consent and promises may help to facilitate mutual 
knowledge. But, again, it is a mistake to claim that they form a necessary means. What
34 D. Hume, A Treatise on Human Nature, p. 490. See M. E. Bratman, ‘Shared Intention’, p. 111.
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is necessary is that both men are confident that the other has the appropriate collective 
intention and supporting attitudes. However, this confidence may also rest on a different 
kind of evidence. As both men are in fact rowing the boat, their collective preference is 
revealed by their continued action. The rowers may simply base their expectations on 
stable patterns of behaviour. Shared intentions, then, may be different from conventions 
in that they rely on collective intentions or preferences, but it is nevertheless true that 
they could emerge in equally spontaneous and informal ways.35
The express consent interpretation, in short, is unnecessarily stringent. What is more 
important, it does not help to alleviate the concern with the agency of the parties 
involved. Essentially, the problem is that shared intentions could be elicited under 
duress. Recall the ‘Mafia sense of going to New York together’. Here, it is important to 
distinguish two version of this general case. Let ‘Case A’ refer to the scenario where 
Sonny wrestles Donny into the boot of his car and drives to New York. Clearly, Donny 
is brought to New York entirely against his will. Since the latter does not intend to go to 
New York at all, it is evident that there cannot be a shared intention either.
However, consider Case B. This time Sonny does not employ his brute strength, but 
threatens Donny with a gun. So Donny faces a choice. It may be a harsh choice, 
perhaps, but he can still decide to accompany Sonny to New York or get shot in Miami. 
Now, if he decides to join Sonny, it may be plausibly claimed that Donny does indeed 
form the collective intention that they go to New York together, their intentions may 
also be sufficiently meshing, and it is not unlikely that this is common knowledge.
The key question, however, is whether or not Donny’s agency is respected such that 
this collective intention could be shared. According to one view, it matters that Donny
35 Similarly, Gilbert argues that we could come to share an intention, not by promises, but merely by 
persistently using the pronoun ‘w e’ in a certain context. Thus, when we speak o f ‘our country’, ‘our laws’ 
or ‘our government’, this indicates that an intention is shared at the level o f the state. She also points out 
that many people have a sense o f political obligation. If I understand her correctly, these are forms o f  
identification that are sufficient to constitute us as a ‘plural subject’. See her ‘Reconsidering the ‘Actual 
Contract’ Theory o f  Political Obligation’, reprinted in: M. Gilbert, Sociality and Responsibility, pp. 97- 
122.
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has a choice, makes up his mind and intends that they go to New York together. Albeit 
under duress, there is a shared intention. Call this the harsh view. According to another 
view, Donny’s agency has not been respected. His collective intention is declared void 
precisely because it has been obtained under duress. Call this the no-real-choice view.
Notice first that the demand for express consent or a promise does not coincide with 
this latter view. After all, Sonny might even make Donny sign a contractual statement to 
the effect that he obligates himself to go to New York. In order to share an intention on 
the no-real-choice view we need voluntary consent. Whether consent is explicit or 
implicit is less important. What matters is that collective intentions are arrived at 
without any threats.
The real question, then, is whether or not we have to subscribe to this interpretation. 
In providing an answer, much seems to depend on the further question whether or not 
shared intentions involve mutual obligations (and entitlements). Bratman and Sugden 
propose a model on which shared intentions and preferences do not necessarily obligate 
the parties involved. The fact that you and I share an intention may have normative
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consequences. For example, it may create mutual expectations that we are obligated to 
meet. However, these obligations are not internal to the idea of a shared intention itself. 
You and I could share an intention without acquiring any obligation whatsoever. If this 
claim were correct, then the harsh view would be a good deal less harsh. As I 
understand him, Bratman and Sugden do indeed hold that in Case B there is a shared 
intention. But this result does not imply that Sonny has an obligation to do his share, at 
least not in virtue of sharing an intention.
Gilbert, on the other hand, advances a model on which such mutual obligations and 
entitlements are conceptually constitutive of sharing an intention -  what she prefers to 
call a ‘joint commitment’ or ‘joint decision’.37 This idea is to operate in the spirit of the
36 See M. E. Bratman, ‘Shared Intention and Mutual Obligation’, p. 140. Cf. R. Sugden, ‘Team
Preferences’, pp. 189-190.
37 This view appears throughout her work on the subject, but emerges perhaps most clearly in 
‘Obligations o f Joint Commitment’.
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obligations of actual contracts and promises. Yet she also supports the harsh view. 
According to Gilbert, if  Donny decides to go to New York in Case B, this becomes a 
‘joint decision’ of theirs. Typically joint decisions cannot be rescinded unilaterally. 
Thus if Sonny and Donny share an intention, this also generates an obligation on 
Donny’s part to see their joint commitment through.38
Now, Gilbert’s view that obligations are in part constitutive of shared intention 
seems to me correct. As I argued in Chapter II, the personal identity of individual agents 
over time should be defined in terms of a normative and obligation-creating 
connectedness or integrity.39 Since I now invoke the same notion of integrity in order to 
advance the possibility of corporate personality, shared intention has to be given a 
similarly normative foundation. However, intuitively it seems that something goes 
horribly wrong on this view. Surely, we would not seriously want to contend that 
Donny has a genuine obligation to accompany Sonny to New York. Either they do not 
share an intention at all or, if they do, they do not have Gilbert’s obligations and 
entitlements. Thus, we are faced with a dilemma. If we want to retain the view that 
obligations are constitutive of shared intention, there seems to be a strong case for the 
no-real-choice view. If we want to maintain the harsh view, then we have to drop the 
inherent obligations and entitlements. Something has to give.
Gilbert suggests an interesting way to slip between the horns of this dilemma. On her 
account, Case B contains both a shared intention as well as mutual obligations. Her 
solution is to distinguish between having an obligation and having a morally binding 
obligation. The key assumption of her argument is that practical reason is pluralist in 
nature. On this pluralist view, Donny’s obligation constitutes just one reason for action.
38 See M. Gilbert ‘Agreements, Coercion, and Obligation’, Ethics, Volume 103, Issue 4 (July 1993), pp. 
679-706; ‘Reconsidering the ‘Actual Contract’ Theory o f Political Obligation’, reprinted in: Sociality and
Responsibility, pp. 97-122; Collective Preferences, Obligations, and Rational Choice’, pp. 109-119.
39 Notice that in contrast to his model o f shared intention, Bratman’s planning model o f intention is less 
timid in embracing this normative dimension as constitutive o f  our individual agency. It seems to me an 
essential part o f his idea o f  future-directed intention that our time-sliced selves are obligated by this 
intention. You are a temporally extended agent just because your person-stages accept the normativity o f  
future-directed intention. See my discussion o f this model in Chapter II, Section 6.
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Apart from his obligation of joint commitment to Sonny, he may have obligations of 
fidelity or reciprocity to other people. He may have certain general obligations of justice 
or benevolence. And apart from other-regarding concerns, he may also have prudential 
reasons. Gilbert’s point, I think, is that it is perfectly possible to say that Donny is under 
an obligation to go to New York with Sonny, and yet to deny that Donny indeed ought 
to go to New York all things considered. Whether he ought to go in the final analysis 
depends on the relative weight of this obligation vis-a-vis other reasons. To put it 
differently, Donny has a genuine obligation, but we could claim that this obligation is 
trumped by more significant reasons.
It sometimes looks as if Gilbert regards the relative weight or the strength of 
obligations of joint commitment as a constant factor. Whether or not they are 
outweighed by other reasons does not appear to depend on the nature of the 
circumstances under which joint commitments are made. But I think it would be more 
accurate to suggest that this relative weight is a function, in part, of precisely these 
circumstances. Viewing the relative weights as such a function, something like the 
following picture results. The analysis of Case A remains unchanged. There clearly is 
no shared intention -  Donny’s agency is simply not effective -  and consequently there 
are no obligations either. In Case B, Donny has a genuine obligation to Sonny in virtue 
of the fact that they share an intention. However, the relative weight of his obligation is 
significantly reduced. There is a genuine obligation, even in this case, but the weight 
that this obligation can put in the balance in comparison with competing obligations is 
relatively weak.
When I say relatively weak, I mean weaker than in Case C. In this case Donny 
proposes to go to New York with Sonny out of his own accord. It is less likely, on the 
balance of things, that Donny ought to go to New York in Case B than in Case C, or so I 
argue. By the same token, it is also less likely, on the balance of things, that Sonny has 
reason to feel aggrieved if Donny ends up not going to New York in Case B than in
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Case C. To be sure, even in the latter case Donny may have stronger reasons to stay in 
Miami, say, because of a previous commitment to his pregnant wife. But it seems 
altogether more plausible that Sonny can rightfully censure Donny for breaking his 
commitment than in Case B. If Donny goes back on his commitment to Sonny he needs 
a stronger reason to trump his obligation to Sonny.
In this way we can do justice to the central intuition that something goes wrong in 
this view of associative obligations. Our intuitions, of course, are that such obligations 
and entitlements must at least be sensitive to coercion, pressure and threats. If I am right 
about Gilbert’s view, her solution is not really responsive to these circumstances. She 
merely argues that such obligations could be trumped by other reasons, all things taken 
into consideration. But presumably there can be such trumping even in cases where 
there is no duress. No amount of trumping does justice to the central intuition, unless we 
can also show that trumping is in fact more likely to occur in cases where there is duress 
than in cases where there is not. In contrast to this, I argue for the view that while 
threats may not snuff out our choice completely, they do constitute a more or less 
serious impairment to our agency. On this approach, then, there is scope for the view 
that obligations are inherent in shared intention only insofar as our agency remains 
intact.
Alternatively, the no-real-choice view aims to capture the same intuition by arguing 
that shared intentions, like agreements and promises, cannot be extracted under duress. 
If some credible threat is issued, or so the view goes, the shared intention is void and, 
consequently, there is no scope for obligations of joint commitment either. What 
commends my approach over this view? One reason, I think, is that it does not seem 
very plausible to argue that joint commitment, and therefore their obligations, become 
entirely void as soon as a threat is issued or some degree of pressure exacted. Clearly, 
agreements and joint commitments are reached under the sway of threats and pressures 
all the time. Furthermore, what we have to bear in mind is that there are many kinds of
1 2 2
threats and pressures, differing in degree and intensity. For example, instead of reaching 
for his gun, Sonny may threaten to blow the whistle on Donny’s illegal nightclub, he 
may threaten to pull out of some potentially lucrative business deal, in fact, he may just 
tell Donny he will no longer be welcome at his next birthday party. There is, I want to 
suggest, a fairly elastic difference between the issuing of threats on the one hand and 
what we would normally refer to as ‘bargaining power’ or ‘cajoling’ on the other. It 
would seem that if some shared intention were reached under the latter conditions, it is 
not entirely vacuous to suggest that these are genuine commitments that also generate 
genuine obligations.
The no-real-choice view could try to remedy this by capturing the complexity 
involved in what it means by real choice. But it would still need to propose a 
problematic cut-off point between joint commitment reached under the sway of 
legitimate cajoling and joint commitment reached under illicit duress. This refined view 
would declare a joint commitment void once agency is not sufficiently respected. At that 
point, concomitant obligations and entitlements simply cease to exist. There may or 
may not be such a cut-off point, but the point is that it is difficult to see how there could 
be degrees in the ‘sharedness’ of an intention. We either share an intention or not. 
Similarly, on the no-real-choice view either these obligations exist in their full glory or 
they do not exist at all. In contrast, my suggestion is that shared intention persists in the 
face of any form of pressure (with the exception of Case A). But the restriction placed 
on agency by this coercion is discounted in the relative weight of the resultant 
obligations.
That said, the difference between the no-real-choice view and the position that I just 
set out may seem minor. Ultimately, both views make obligations of shared intention 
sensitive to coercion, pressure and threats. Thus, we cannot claim that this argument 
answers any outstanding issues, for example, the question of political obligation, with 
any finality. Nevertheless, it still produces more than a merely semantic result. Two
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points stick out. To begin with, if we take the no-real-choice view, then we have to 
accept that non-voluntary associations like states may not qualify as corporate persons, 
implying that corresponding obligations of shared intention could not exist either. 
However, there is a difference between saying that associative obligations could not 
exist and saying that they may be outweighed by other reasons.
Second, and more important to my purposes here, this way of approaching the issue 
allows us to enjoy two benefits. On the one hand, we can treat the issue as to whether a 
corporate person exists separately from the question whether or not the interlocking of 
attitudes has emerged under duress. This is the key advantage of the harsh view that 
Bratman defends. On the other hand, it still allows us to advance Gilbert’s view that 
obligations are constitutive of shared intention, without necessarily embracing counter­
intuitive results. To put it differently, we can still claim that shared intention is a 
normative relationship comparable to personal integrity. Of course, once the existence 
issue has been settled, we must still decide on the weight of associative obligations of 
shared intention. The presence or absence of duress is clearly one variable that has to be 
taken in consideration. And in terms of political obligation, this variable may have a 
rather limited justificatory power. However, in Chapter VII, I shall discuss other 
variables that could give associative obligation a more substantial weight. With this 
hard question out of the way, I want to conclude this chapter.
Conclusion
I argued in Chapter I and II that the identity of persons over time should be understood 
entirely in terms of a bundling of mind-states without reference to a physical or spiritual 
substratum, that this bundling should be in part defined in normative terms of integrity, 
and that this conception of personal integrity is itself irreducibly practical. If these 
arguments are correct, then we face the following two challenges to get the idea of a
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corporate person up and running. First, we have to present an understanding of human 
association that corresponds to the idea of integrity. Second, because the model depends 
on its normative impact, we also need to show that this understanding of human 
association has practical benefits.
In this chapter, I tackled the first challenge. I wanted to show that the notion of 
integrity could be applied, not just to the temporal stages of a life, but also to the 
relatedness between individuals. To this purpose, I introduced the model of collective 
and shared intention. Essentially, this model explains how we could say that an 
association could have intentions without resorting to implausible versions of corporate 
realism, which postulate a group being separately from its membership. The model of 
shared intention relies on the view of intention as an interlocking set of collective 
intentions and preferences, and other supporting attitudes.
In order to further prevent shared intention from collapsing into a mode of ethical 
individualism, I rejected a number of interpretations. Contrary to conventionalism, 
corporate personality argues that collective intentions are primitive. That is, collective 
intentions are not to be broken down and analysed in terms of individual intentions. 
Against contractualism, corporate personality holds that collective intentions are not 
subjected to a contractualist test. Collective intentions do not have to be reasonably 
acceptable to an association’s members. Finally, in opposition to voluntarism, corporate 
personality maintains that shared intentions could exist under duress, and that 
obligations and other normative concerns are constitutive of shared intention.
Conventionalism, contractualism and voluntarism have to be resisted because the 
idea of corporate personality should ultimately be capable of doing independent 
normative work. But before confronting this practical challenge, I want to explore the 
empirical dimension of corporate personality. One obvious difficulty with the above 
model of shared intention is that it does not always correspond well to the realities of
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human association. To address this concern, Chapter IV introduces further adjustments 
to the model to make it applicable to the state.
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CHAPTER IV
THE PERSON OF THE STATE
Introduction
In Chapter III, I offered an account of corporate personality that fits within two largely 
conceptual side-constraints. First, I wanted to give an account of corporate personality 
without having to depart from reductionist metaphysics. I called this the reductionist 
constraint. The account that meets this requirement, I argued, is framed in terms of 
shared and collective intentions and preferences. The corporate thesis, thus understood, 
is merely the extension of the notion of integrity, set out in Chapter II, to the larger scale 
of interpersonal relationships. Second, I also emphasised that this account of corporate 
personality has to be able to provide a genuine alternative to ethical individualism. I 
referred to this as the sovereignty constraint. And so I rejected conventionalist, 
contractualist and voluntarist interpretations of shared intention.
In this chapter, I want to introduce a third constraint, which is empirical in nature. 
Corporate personality, I argue, should not merely be conceivable as a logical construct; 
it should also be possible to claim that this idea of corporate personality applies to 
human associations in this world. Moreover, while the literature on collective and 
shared intention is built largely around two or three people examples, I want to argue 
that the idea of corporate personality could be extended to apply to human associations 
on a larger and more complex scale. To be more precise, I want this notion to apply to 
the state.
The chapter proceeds as follows. Section 1 begins by outlining the challenge. 
Essentially, the difficulty with extending the notion of corporate personality to the state 
is that this conjectures a collective intention or identity that is shared at a societal scale 
and neatly coincides with certain territorial boundaries. This image, now, is alleged to
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be inconsistent with the complexity of associative life and the diversity of our practical 
identities. Briefly, the objection is that there simply is no shared intention that meets 
these conditions. In response, I attempt to amend the notion of shared intention in a 
suitable manner. Section 2 claims that we should think of intention in an interpretive 
rather than a psychological manner. But while successful in some parts, this approach 
falls short in certain others, or so I argue. Section 3 discusses two obvious but I think 
ultimately unpromising ways to make headway. Finally, Section 4 imports an 
institutional dimension into the model. It draws a distinction between deliberative 
integrity and institutional integrity and argues that only with the latter we obtain a better 
handle on the problem at hand.
1. Problems of Scale
I want to start by mapping out the challenge more precisely. Ex hypothesis the notion of 
the state as a corporate person seems to entail at least three different things. First, it 
implies that its citizens have sufficiently overlapping collective intentions at the societal 
level. And that level usually covers a wide-ranging number of people and many highly 
intricate and complex forms of co-ordination, planning and so on. Second, states are 
usually fairly sharply demarcated by territorial boundaries. In other words, a collective 
intention must be shared by a precisely defined population or membership. Third, 
within that territory states claim a kind of authority that is alien to most other 
associations. While most associations could logically co-exist with other, like-minded 
associations, states typically cannot, not on the same territory.
Since each of these things presents a prima facie problem to the idea of the 
personality of the state, the nature of the challenge is threefold. The first problem, 
highlighted in an article by Kutz, arises by moving from simple to more complex
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examples of collective action.1 I shall refer to it as the problem of complexity. On 
Bratman’s approach, individuals form a we-intention that they undertake some activity 
together. What this demands is an ‘executive perspective’, a point of view that 
comprehensively assesses what the group does or should do as a whole. On the second 
tier, people have to comply with a ‘sub-plan’, which delegates ‘subsidiary intentions’ 
pertaining to what each member should do as an individual by way of contribution to 
achieving the collective outcome. Now, the literature on shared and collective intention 
abounds in relatively simple cases such as: going for a walk, painting a house, and 
playing football. In such examples, it may well be conceivable that each of the 
participants first assumes this executive perspective and then constrains his actions 
accordingly. These cases involve a small number of people and take place in informal 
and discursive contexts that allow face-to-face contact, negotiation, and so on. 
However, on the face of it, the idea that all participants occupy the executive standpoint 
seems far less probable in the context of large-scale and complex associations like 
states. It seems downright naive to believe that ordinary citizens or middle-ranked 
bureaucrats or even politicians would generally bother to consider the question as to 
what they are aiming to achieve collectively. Generally speaking, in such contexts our 
deliberations remain restricted to the second, subsidiary tier. While our actions are 
perhaps configured by a larger plan, it is not true that this plan is a conscious intention 
of each and every participant.
The second problem relates to boundaries and membership. As I understand the 
issue, in the literature on collective and shared intention membership consists simply in 
having the right intentions and meshing sub-plans. So whether someone is an insider or 
an outsider to a group depends on the intention and attitudes of the persons involved. 
John forms a group with Paul, George and Ringo because they all share an intention to 
play a song together. Mick and Keith remain outsiders because they have different
1 C. Kutz, ‘Acting Together’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol., LXI, No. 1, July 2000, 
pp. 1-31.
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plans. The latter could become members, however, just by assuming the right group 
attitudes. Again, this may seem plausible in some contexts, but the membership of states 
differs significantly. As with many other organisations, we cannot just become members 
of states by forming the proper attitudes.2 An additional difficulty is that states are 
territorially bounded. Both facts suggest that other criteria are at work.
Finally, the third challenge is formed by what John Rawls calls the fact of
- j
(reasonable) pluralism. This fact appeals to a by now rather commonplace image of 
modem life in Western societies as characterised by an increasing plurality and fluidity 
of practical identities, purposes, ideals and values. This diversity of ends or 
‘comprehensive doctrines’ is naturally reflected into a variety and fluidity of 
associations and groups. Generally, it is not longer the case that people live their entire 
lives within the fixed parameters of one monolithic, authoritative and all-embracive 
community. This is not to say that modem man is solely committed to himself. Rather, 
individuals develop cross-cutting allegiances to many associations, to self and nation, to 
church and trade-union, to family, football clubs, sub-cultures, and so forth. On the 
Humean theory defended here, even individuals count as associations. All these 
associations and communities appeal to our loyalty and they all reflect particular 
standpoints and shared intentions that lie at the base of our practical identities. Yet it 
would seem that the notion of the personality of the state demands one project or one 
ethos or one identity. Thus, the problem is that corporate personality seems to depend 
on the obsolete picture of the state as Gemeinschaft, to use a concept coined by 
Tonnies.4 To put it differently, the corporate state would have to be based on the 
potentially oppressive mode of human association to which Oakeshott referred as 
universitas. In Roman legal discourse, universitas referred to ‘persons associated in a 
manner such as to constitute them a natural person; a partnership of persons which is
2 Ibid., pp. 28-29.
3
J. Rawls, Political Liberalism.
4 F. Tonnies, Community and Civil Society, J. Harris (ed.) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2001).
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itself a Person, or in some important respects like a person.’5 While initially based on 
legal fiction, later the universitas came to be understood as a unity derived from the 
substantive purpose that its members agreed to pursue jointly. As Oakeshott puts it:
It is not (or need we suppose it to be) many persons transformed in one Person.
It is a many speaking with one voice, not because all the tongues have 
miraculously become one Tongue, or because all the intelligences concerned 
have become one Mind, or all the wills one Will, but because [...] they are 
agreed, not merely to speak the same language, but to say the same thing and 
are equipped with the means of committing themselves to or acknowledging 
such common utterances as their own.6
Something like this, the objection goes, is precisely what the fact of pluralism rules out. 
This kind of moral order no longer exists.7
What could be said in response to these three charges? I do not think it is fruitful to 
deny their empirical accuracy. The first and second claim are I think evidently true, and 
even though I am much less certain about how deep the fact of pluralism really goes, I 
shall here simply assume that it goes sufficiently deep to raise an important concern. 
Instead, what I want to do is to investigate whether the notion of shared intention can be 
adapted such that it can accommodate these concerns.
2. Collective Intention: An Interpretive Approach
Let us first investigate an argument that aims to render the corporate thesis more 
amenable to the complexity problem. Essentially, this argument is based on an idea 
advanced by Ronald Dworkin in his book Law ’s Empire.8 There Dworkin argues that 
we should think of intention in interpretive rather than psychological fashion. The
5 M. Oakeshott, On Human Conduct (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975) p. 203.
6 Ibid., p. 205.
7
On a historical note, the fact and value o f associative pluralism was the very premise o f Das Deutsche 
Genossenschaftsrecht and the later work o f British pluralists like Laski, Cole and Figgis. For the 
historical development o f their ideas, see D. Runciman, Pluralism and the Personality o f  the State.
R. Dworkin, L aw ’s Empire (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 1998), Chapter 2. His interpretive conception o f  
intention goes back to the hermeneutic method pioneered by H. G. Gadamer, Truth and Method, second, 
revised edition (London: Sheed and Ward, 1989).
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interpretive view departs from the commonplace assumption that an intention is a 
mental datum, a conscious mind-state or event that takes place before we act. It agrees 
that intention guides action, but it suggests, rather, that it is implicit in what we do. An 
intention merely manifests itself by the ‘constructive interpretation’ of practice or a 
sequence of actions.
Briefly, in the context of the (future-directed) intention of one individual, the gist of 
the interpretive idea is that we start from a temporal series of interconnected activities 
(or present aims) and then -  in reverse, so to speak -  try to construct the intention that 
‘best fits’ this historical practice as a whole. So, the interpretive method purports to 
account for a sequence of actions Au A a ... A tn such that the entire sequence could have 
been planned by one agent. Put differently, it seeks to capture what these actions added 
together aim to achieve, presumably at t„. So the decisive issue here is not that this plan 
or aim figures as a conscious state in the mind of some person throughout the entire 
sequence. This may or may not be the case. Instead, the presence of a (future-directed) 
intention entirely depends on the question whether or not these actions (or present aims) 
do in fact cohere in this rational manner.
In the context of collective intention, the implications of the interpretive idea are 
similar. Again we start from a set of co-ordinated activities. But now these activities are 
not just connected in a temporal sequence; they are also connected in a bundle 
consisting out of the activities (or I-intentions) of a group of people 7j, h  ... /n. Here, the 
interpretive method aims to account for the entire practice as if it had been sanctioned 
by one rational agent. It tries to explicate how the activities of all group members 
cohere rationally, that is, how they collectively aim to achieve a certain end. Hence, a 
collective intention does not have to occur as conscious state in the minds of Tj, h  ... In- 
This may or may not be the case. What is necessary, however, is that their activities (or 
I-intentions) are ‘meshing’ or ‘overlapping’.
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In other words, I am invoking a notion of collective intention that does not 
necessarily correspond to what each participant in the practice actually meant by doing 
this or that. Some participants may just have meant to do as they were told, others may 
not have meant anything at all beyond what they were in fact doing. But constructing a 
collective intention is different from recovering actual mind-states. Above all, it aims to 
account for the rational purpose that is immanent in practice. In this way it gives a 
rational justification for what the participants do individually. While this justification 
does not necessarily sum up what they actually thought at the moment of acting -  their 
subsidiary intentions -  it does aim to capture how they, if pressed to account for their 
actions in terms of a reason, would ultimately express the purpose and meaning of their 
conduct.
On the interpretive view it is not necessary that all participants assume the executive 
perspective previous to taking part in collective action, as it is on Bratman’s model. 
Such a demand would indeed cast a grave doubt over the corporate thesis in this 
chapter. As Dworkin candidly concedes in his interpretive theory of law, this holistic 
standpoint requires an intellectual effort of Herculean proportions. Within the resource 
constraints of their office usually even judges are incapable of making this effort. The 
same conclusion would appear to hold a-forteriori for most members of a political 
association. More drastically, it is conceivable that no human being could make that 
intellectual effort. Hayek seems to have thought it epistemically impossible for any 
individual or any central agency to assume the executive perspective even in the most 
ideal of circumstances.9 If true, the executive intention could be no more conscious a 
mind-state than Hegel’s Cunning of Reason. On the interpretive view, however, it is not 
important that collective action is consciously designed. A configuration of second-tier 
intentions may well be the result of Spontaneous Order.10
See for example his Law, Legislation, and Liberty.
10 Note that Hayek also argued that ‘the individual [...] must be ready and willing to adjust himself to 
changes and to submit to conventions which are not the result o f intelligent design, whose justification in 
the particular instance may not be recognizable, and which to him will often appear unintelligible and
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However, what is important is that the practice itself, that is, the subsidiary intentions 
that the participants do have, possess enough internal coherence to permit rational 
justification in terms of a collective intention. Be it designed or not, that practice must 
be ordered in a purposive or rule-based manner. In addition, what matters critically to 
the idea of corporate personality is that its collective intention is effective as a reason- 
giving norm or an ideal that constrains, judges and, if necessary, discards and modifies 
the associative practice itself. This effectiveness as a norm, in the end, makes the 
difference between a corporate person and a loose aggregate or arrangement of 
individuals.
Could an executive intention be truly action-guiding if it were merely immanent? 
Clearly, the standard presupposes the value of the historical practice or association as a 
whole, for it merely expresses ideas and principles that are already embodied and 
objectified in it. However, the interpretive idea does not presuppose that each and every 
act contained in the practice will also form the perfect embodiment of its idea or 
principle. Nor does it deny the possibility of critical reflection and change. We do 
reflect on what we do and we do so by appealing to abstract theory and principle. But 
on the interpretive view, theory and principle do not provide cosmic standards. They 
merely encapsulate the intention that holds the practice together intellectually and that 
gives it its integrity and internal justification. So, while we can appeal to theory, we 
cannot forget that theory is merely the intellectual residue of a way of life, a ‘living 
morality’. And the upshot of this is that, intellectually, we can never advocate the 
wholesale rejection of that way of life. We can, however, find critical leverage by 
reflecting the practice as a whole into theory and then back into practice, claiming that 
some parts of the latter need adjustment to achieve a better fit with the former. In other 
words, we can say that certain actions or certain patterns of behaviour, belonging to a 
wider practice, ought to be judged by their own immanent or justificatory idea. And this
irrational.’ See his ‘Individualism: True and False’, in: Individualism and Economic Order (London: 
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1949), pp. 1-32, at p. 22.
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critical attitude is precisely what corporate personality demands. For a group to qualify 
as a corporate person it must endeavour to make its decisions and actions cohere in a 
rational way, that is, their actions and decision must fit a collective intention. Of course, 
like individuals, groups may not always fully achieve this goal, but they must at least 
recognise that integrity is the standard to which they are held to account. They must 
acknowledge the normative pressure to adjust action to its justificatory idea. Perhaps 
this approach merely supports piecemeal reform, but caution and conservatism are not 
the enemy of effective criticism.
3. Two Unpromising Solutions
Thinking of intention in this interpretive fashion takes the edge off the complexity 
problem. So at least I argue. But does this interpretive turn also address the concerns 
about membership, boundaries and pluralism?
Taking the last concern first, note that it is still far from inconceivable that we end up 
with competing interpretations of a collective intention. As I understand the issue, the 
principal criterion for the success of an interpretation is that it should fit the practice in 
question. And an interpretation fits to the extent that it accounts for the goings-on in a 
practice as the collection of individual activities aiming to achieve one purpose or 
willed by one single agent.11 By the lights of this criterion, the best conceivable 
interpretation will succeed in constructing an account showing how the practice in its 
entirety could be captured in the form of an executive intention. Evidently, this is an 
ambitious benchmark. It seems reasonable to settle for an interpretation that captures the 
greater part of goings on, giving special attention, moreover, to a range of paradigm 
cases. This is also how we could still gain a critical vantage point on a practice. The 
critic suggests that we reform the anomalous and tangential parts of the practice to its
11 R. Dworkin, L aw ’s Empire, pp. 65-68; 230-231.
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underlying principle so as to attain an even greater fit. However, the trouble with this 
less ambitious criterion is that it leaves room for the possibility of irresolvable conflict. 
Interpretive justification comes to a halt, among others, when we disagree on which 
parts of the practice are central or paradigmatic and which peripheral.
Dworkin argues that to settle these conflicts we need to appeal to a second criterion 
that as far as I can see is not fully internal to practice. We may feel that a practice would 
altogether be of greater appeal morally or aesthetically if it were justified under one 
interpretation rather than another. So we have to prefer the intention that fits with the 
bulk of the data and also depicts the practice and its history in its ‘best light’. But this is 
precisely where the interpretive approach may run up against the challenge of pluralism. 
After all, the pluralist points out that people disagree about such a criterion. And so we 
end up with different authoritative justifications and action-guiding principles.
In fact, pluralism seems to pose a dual problem for the idea of corporate personality 
so understood. If the state is to have integrity the following two conditions must both be 
met. In the first place, it is vital that the associative members arrive at a ‘pre- 
interpretive’ recognition of that what is to be interpreted: a practice composed of a 
certain set of activities.12 Evidently, it only makes sense to construct a collective 
intention if it is clear what delimits one set of collective activities as one practice from 
another. Thus, as a minimum prerequisite, the citizens of a state need to have an ex ante 
understanding of what the state is or what it essentially does as opposed to other 
associations and collective practices. We have to demarcate a public realm, for example 
the activity that involves coercion backed up by law, before we can construct the 
purposes or principles that govern this activity by means of interpretation.
The second condition, as we already saw, points out that while a collective intention 
may not have to be a mental state or a thought in a mind, it requires a genuinely 
authoritative interpretation when brought to consciousness. We may allow some room
12 Ibid., p. 66.
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for interpretive differences, but it cannot suffice if people consistently differ about what 
they purport to achieve together. In other words, citizens should be able to recognise ex 
post that they share a particular intention, at least at the level where it is immanent in 
common practices or goings-on. We need to have access to a genuinely shared 
executive intention that can rule things in or out.
To sum up, the first condition demands that we draw the same boundaries around the 
historical practice that we think is constitutive of political association. The second 
condition requires a level of agreement on the executive principles that guide this 
particular practice. We must come to some post-interpretive agreement on the substance 
o f a collective intention. Presumably, it is this last condition that causes the main 
problem. We need an executive intention that all consider to be authoritative within the 
public domain.
3.1 Liberal Nationalism
Here, then, the idea of corporate personality leaves no room for difference and 
pluralism. Many theorists who look favourably on community squirm when confronted 
with this upshot. Could we just piggy-ride on the back of the solutions they offer?
Consider David Miller, who in his book On Nationality tries to deal with this issue 
by making a distinction between conservative and good nationalism. He argues that the 
state should be implanted in national culture, custom and tradition because they provide 
the necessary settings for social justice, solidarity and democracy to flourish. But at the 
same time he baulks at ‘conservative nationalism’ for a number of reasons. 
Conservatism, he says, conceives of the nation ‘not merely in terms of horizontal ties to 
fellow-members, past and present, who share whatever features are taken to constitute 
the common identity, but in terms of vertical ties to established institutions, which are 
regarded as authoritative.’13 The conservative view also involves, in Scruton’s words, 
‘sanctity, intolerance, exclusion, and a sense that life’s meaning depends upon
13 D. Miller, On Nationality, p. 124.
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obedience, and also on vigilance against the enemy.’14 Hence, nationalism of this 
flavour promulgates hostility to those who do not share the national customs.
Miller makes clear that he believes these things to be wrong. However, his kind of 
nationalism ‘need not be (and as a matter of fact is not) authoritative in the way that the 
conservative supposes.’15 National tradition should not commend deference and it 
should not rely on the censure of criticism and exclusion. National values have no 
greater standing than the recipes in a cookery book, as he puts it at one point. As for 
non-nationals, ‘All it needs to ask [...] is a willingness to accept current political 
structures and to engage in a dialogue with the host community so that a new common 
identity can be forged.’16 Miller’s principal idea is here that the host’s identity must be 
‘stripped’ of parts that are ‘repugnant’ to immigrants, and vice versa, with the purpose 
of blending these diverging identities into an all-inclusive national identity.17
Why not simply track the Miller solution? To begin with, I am sceptical that it offers 
a genuine way out of the problem. Miller’s language may sound vaguely benign, but if 
politics and the law are infused with and guided by standards of conduct that belong to 
the customs of the nation, what he writes here fudges the issue. If it is the nation-state 
that we need, then we cannot treat our national values as somehow on par with the ethos 
of others. Above all, we have to recognise that the national ethos is normative within the 
public domain. To be blunt, we have to maintain that our national identity determines 
what the state and its citizens should and should not be doing. And as the law demands 
compliance, conservatives are entirely right to frame the issue partly in terms of vertical 
ties, exclusion and obedience to authority. No honest nationalist could mean to say that 
the nation’s customs are like recipes in cookery books, which cooks may freely add to 
or simply ignore if they feel like it. Whatever else we want to say about these values
14 Cited in D. Miller, On Nationality, p. 125.
15 Ibid., p. 129.
16 Ibid., p. 130.
17 This, at least would appear to be his preferred view in On Nationality. For further discussion see also 
his Market, State and Community (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), especially Chapter 9, and the essays 
in his Citizenship and National Identity (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2000).
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and customs, at some level they must be authoritative. We may tolerate a plurality of 
practices in private life, but in public life there must be one overarching and one binding 
recipe or there cannot be a unified nation-state.
What is more, Miller does not seem to realise the full extent to which there are limits 
to how far identities can be stretched and moulded to assimilate difference into one all-
• * • to #
inclusive identity. It is an undeniable fact, of course, that national identities are not 
cast in iron. What is deniable, however, is that change must consist in an indiscriminate 
process of scooping up all newly arrived identities and throwing them into a giant 
melting pot. The latter kind of change presumes that these identities are benign and 
compatible. But if pluralism is the problem, this may no longer be the case. Some 
substances do not mix. Moreover, stripping away the elements of the national identity 
that are repugnant to some groups may also seem a distinctly unappealing suggestion. 
Homosexuality, the consumption of alcohol and gender equality, to name a few possible 
examples, are practices that some cultures would probably reject as highly repugnant. 
British national values are based, among many other things, on tolerance, fundamental 
equality and perhaps no less on the consumption of copious amounts of alcohol, or so I 
imagine. Now, if Miller is right, not only do we need to welcome such perspectives to 
Britain, we should even be prepared to strip away these ‘repugnant’ elements and 
replace them by some half-baked compromise that would offend no-one. And to make 
matters still worse, this compromise would contain the standards that guide the state and 
thus claim final authority over its citizens in the public domain.
It is far from absurd to note that national traditions and identities change and evolve 
under whatever kinds of pressures are brought to bear on them, as conservatives are 
well aware.19 What is absurd is the suggestion that this fact somehow lends credibility
18 He acknowledges only two limitations in On Nationality, at pp. 128-129. The first limitation is that the
influx o f non-nationals cannot be allowed to take place too rapidly. The second that non-nationals may
not continue to form a separate nation themselves.
19 In a footnote Miller acknowledges that conservatives know that traditions and identities are not frozen 
in time (pp. 126-128). Instead, he accuses conservatism o f an inconsistency. Now, it may or may not be 
inconsistent to grant, on the one hand, that traditions do inevitably change over time and to reject any
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to the view that we should never guard our national identity from these pressures. For 
that view presupposes that all change is to the good, or at least neutral, and all resistance 
to change bigoted prejudice. What is perhaps even more absurd is the idea that it is in 
fact possible to amalgamate all different viewpoints into one national identity that 
would still make available to us the kind of spiritual home that nations are thought to 
offer. I have a sneaking suspicion that there are limits as to how much the melting pot 
can process even in theory, let alone in practice. But putting this issue aside, if a 
national identity were really as absorbent or spongy as Miller here claims, what good 
would it still do? Presumably, any collective identity must at least give us a strong sense 
of who we are and what we stand for. In Miller’s case it must also generate a social 
context for trans-generational solidarity, social justice, democracy and a host of other 
splendid things he and other egalitarians are partial to. For example, he claims: 
‘Because our forebears have toiled and spilt their blood to build and defend the nation, 
we who are bom into it inherit an obligation to continue their work, which we discharge 
partly towards our contemporaries and partly towards our descendents.’20 Elsewhere he 
further points to the fact that ‘we hold nations with their present memberships morally 
responsible for the deeds of their forbears; for instance we have recently witnessed the 
Queen apologising on behalf of Britain to the Maori’s of New Zealand for injustices 
perpetrated in the nineteenth century’.21 However, if this is the mushy stuff that national 
identity is made of, then I fail to see why Miller expects it to contribute decisively to the 
realisation of these ends. Miller is I think unduly prepared to cave in under the pressure 
of multiculturalist criticism. Much as he would like to escape the whiff of conservatism, 
that view comes much closer to what a viable defence of the nation would actually look 
like than the attempt to steer a middle course between nationalism and multiculturalism.
form o f change on the other. But surely it is not inconsistent to combine that fact with the claim that some 
changes are more welcome than others or the view that we ought to salvage what is good in the past and
reject what is bad in the future.
20 D. Miller, On Nationality, p. 23.
21 D. Miller, ‘Nationality: Some Replies’, The Journal o f  Applied Philosophy, 14 (1997), pp. 69-82 at p. 
78.
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3.2 Liberal Impartiality
We have to look for an alternative to liberal nationalism. Could we perhaps find it in 
liberal impartiality? This view argues that states should be guided by justificatory 
principles that no reasonable and suitably motivated person could possibly reject.22 
When based on such principles, states would be neutral to the plurality of reasonable, 
local identities that we may come across in contemporary societies. Instead, they would 
invoke the principles of ‘the party of human kind’, as Korsgaard puts it. This works out 
in such a way that states could only aim to facilitate or redistribute certain indispensable 
resources or goods that enable its citizens to pursue the purposes and life-plans of their 
own choosing. Here, I do not want to discuss a particular conception of what these 
indispensable goods are. And I certainly do not want to commit myself to one 
distributive rule or another. The bottom line is that liberal impartiality claims to rise 
above the fray of diverging ‘comprehensive doctrines’ by appealing to what it thinks are 
universal rather than parochial values. To put it in terms of Rawlsian political 
liberalism, the guiding and justificatory principles in the public domain capture the 
spirit of an ‘overlapping consensus’.
This is not the place to discuss the prospects of liberal impartiality at length. 
However, there are at least two grounds for general caution with this solution. First, 
while impartial principles of justice may plausibly specify the content of the collective 
intention of the state, it is still imperative that it be shared at the societal level, that is to 
say, these principles must be actually recognisable as normative standards to all 
citizens. Now, as I understand it, the liberal impartiality argument claims that all 
reasonable and suitably motivated persons would agree to its principles. However, this 
does not mean that people will in fact so agree. The contractualist test is of course 
entirely hypothetical and relies on a value-laden conception of ‘reasonableness’, which
22 For example, see B. Barry, Justice and Impartiality (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995).
23 J. Rawls, Political Liberalism.
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seems to fix certain outcomes in advance. Thus, the strategy’s success depends in part 
on how deep the fact of pluralism actually runs. If the fact of pluralism extends to our 
understanding of reasonableness itself, then little would be gained.
Second, even if pluralism runs less deep, the idea that we will ipso facto finish up 
with polities whose boundaries are congruent with those of present states is far too neat 
to be plausible. This leads to the problem of membership. If integrity could only be 
defined in terms of increasingly universal and impartial principles such as liberty, 
equality or fairness, then we cannot credibly expect to end up with the concrete identity 
and membership of a territorially bounded state. Certainly, it may be true that the 
collective intention of the British State is in part shaped by these values and ideals, but 
it is surely not these notions that set it apart from the French State or the United States. 
The problem is that such abstract ideals are likely to be shared by a public much wider 
than British citizens alone. If there is some shared identity of this sort, it will not 
correspond to a national or even political identity but to a moral community perhaps 
impossible to delimit geographically. The great difficulty with the personality of the 
state is not just that it needs to accommodate a degree of pluralism; it also needs to do 
justice to the particular and physical manifestation that is the state. States are formed by 
precisely delineated groups. Moreover, states have jurisdictions that are defined in 
equally precise geographical terms. So even if we stumble upon some shared identity at 
this level of abstraction, it still seems highly improbable that this could be cashed out in 
ways that correspond to the actual boundaries and the actual membership of states.
4. Institutional Persons
If pluralism is indeed a fact, the interpretive account draws its boundaries either too 
narrowly or too broadly. In order to address this problem, we therefore need to add a 
further ingredient to our account of state personality. The remainder of this chapter
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argues that we need to extend this notion of state personality with an institutional 
dimension. Thus far, I have assumed that integrity is a purely deliberative and 
egalitarian notion. On this account, the notion of state personality resembles the 
Rousseauian ideal of the psychological conversion or the melting of individual wills 
into the General Will of the state. This conversion takes place on the two-tiered basis of 
a collective intention, a plan or principle that is action-guiding for the group as a whole, 
and subsidiary intentions and objectives that guide the activity of the participants as 
individual. So the person of the state emerges if this collective intention is effective as 
an action-guiding principle, that is, if its citizens directly come to accept the collective 
intention as the standard by which their (relevant) individual desires and actions are 
rationally constrained.
However, I want to distinguish this deliberative account from an institutional 
approach. The latter approach suggests that the effectiveness of a collective intention 
could also depend on the acceptance of certain intermediary mechanisms. Essentially, 
these mechanisms coin procedures for the identification of particular expressions of 
intent and particular decisions as the expressions and decisions of the state. So they aim 
to establish certain criteria that amidst the cacophony of voices recognise which voice 
counts as the voice representative of the association. Hart, in his book The Concept o f  
Law, famously refers to such intermediary mechanisms as ‘rules of recognition’.24 To 
name a few examples: rules become binding law only when ratified by ‘Queen in 
Parliament’; individual transgressions of the law are adjudicated decisively only in 
courts of law, before the appropriate magistrates; the ‘Will of the People’ is only 
identified in a particular ballot governed by certain counting methods and other 
procedures. To put it another way, Hart’s rules of recognition are formulae that 
transform certain individual acts and decisions into acts and decisions of the association. 
They give the state a human face, for example, that of a King, President or Prime
24 H. L. A. Hart, The Concept o f  Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), second edition, p. 94 ff.
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Minister. On a purely institutional account, the rules of recognition are constitutive of 
the state and its personality. Without them there could be no Law, no Adjudication, no 
People, no unified action, but merely the chaos of conflicting intentions each claiming 
to be authoritative for the whole.
To clarify the general nature of these rules somewhat further, it may be useful to 
briefly consider Searle’s theory of ‘constitutive rules’.25 In the spirit of Hart, he defines 
constitutive rules as rules that, rather than regulate a pre-existing practice, create an 
entirely new kind of fact or activity. One of his examples is the game of chess. Searle 
points out that the laws of chess could not have been invented subsequent to the activity 
of chess-playing since they delineate what the game is about in the first place. They 
specify that certain bits of wood count as ‘King’, others as ‘Rook’, again others as 
‘Bishop’. And so they turn dumb bits of wood into chess pieces with a particular 
function and significance. They further declare that you win the game by checkmating 
your opponent’s King, that Bishops may move in diagonal direction only, and that ‘Pg7- 
g8(Q)’ means the promotion of Pawn to Queen. Of course, it is possible to fiddle with 
dumb bits of wood on a chequered board, but a purely physical activity like this could 
hardly be described as chess. It becomes chess-playing only after the rules have been 
put in place.
The game of chess is merely one example of what Searle describes as the broader 
category of ‘institutional facts’. In general terms, all institutional facts are ‘two- 
dimensional’.26 On the one dimension there is a ‘brute’ event X, some purely physical 
state of affairs or goings-on. (The fiddling around with dumb bits of wood.) On the 
other dimension there is an institutional matrix that assigns a particular meaning or 
status or function Y to this brute event in a particular context C. (The laws of chess.) 
Formally, as Searle points out, an institutional rule states that ‘X counts as Y in C’. On
'5 J. R. Searle, The Construction o f  Social Reality, especially pp. 27-29.
As Taylor puts it in his ‘Irreducibly Social Goods’, in: Philosophical Arguments (Cambridge MA: 
Tarvard University Press, 1995), pp. 127-145, at p. 134.
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the view that I am entertaining here, states too are institutional facts. That is, they are 
based on rules that stipulate that X counts as Y in C. For example, the fact that Britain 
has a Queen has a brute, physical aspect. The Queen, presumably, is a human being like 
everyone else. But this fact also depends on the rule that identifies her as ‘Elizabeth the 
Second, by the Grace of God, of the United Kingdom of Great Britain’, and so forth. 
The fact that Britain has a People has a similarly brute aspect. But it also relies on rules 
that identify the Will of the British People through elections. Strip away the principle of 
majoritarianism and what do you have?
With this notion of rules in hand, let us now return to the main problem. The
institutional model claims that the personality of the state is mediated by rules of 
recognition or constitutive rules. What does this entail? Essentially, I claim that it shifts 
the locus o f  integrity to a different level. To recapitulate, the general idea of corporate 
personality is premised on the notion of a collective intention. I already argued (in 
Section 2) that this intention is internal to a practice, that is to say, immanent in certain
overlapping intentions and activities rather than a conscious mind-state itself. But even 
so, it is still effective as a normative constraint on that practice and the subsidiary 
intentions that it involves. Now, the idea of a locus introduces another element. It 
specifies where that collective intention should be effective as a normative constraint. 
And since this intention is supposed to be internal to practice, it also specifies where 
that practice is situated. I argue that the locus is either deliberative or institutional. I 
now proceed by unpacking this distinction.
The Deliberative Model essentially demands that the population at large accepts one 
collective intention as authoritative. Since intention is read here in interpretive rather 
than psychological fashion, this implies in effect that we must all be engaged in the 
same social practice so that the collective intention internal to that practice is normative 
for us. The model also supposes the absence of interpretive conflict when this intention 
is brought to consciousness. But the main requirement is that there is a coherent practice
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that we all participate in. It is precisely there that the collective intention should be 
effective as a normative constraint. For example, what we would need is that the 
members of the state affirm, merely by doing what they normally do, the normativity of 
a common good. Or they must in the same implicit way affirm the normativity of a 
collective intention working towards the achievement of a conception of justice.
Now consider the Institutional Model. This model suggests that once certain 
procedures or official bodies are in place to legislate, adjudicate and govern on behalf of 
the community, the locus of integrity shifts from the population at large to the state’s 
institutions. While its citizens no longer have to acknowledge the normativity of an 
executive intention -  they just need to obey -  the virtue of integrity applies in full force 
to the legislative, policy-making and judicial institutions of the state. These institutional 
responsibilities must be guided and constrained by an executive intention, that is, by the 
justificatory principles that account for the state’s decisions and actions as those of one 
single and continuous agent.
Essentially, the model submits two closely related claims that need to be addressed 
separately. As I just mentioned, it first suggests that the collective intention may be 
effective at the institutional rather than deliberative level. So the norm of integrity 
applies to institutions rather than individuals. I shall come back to this argument a bit 
later because it already presupposes a second claim. While it is not necessary that we all 
recognise the direct authority of an executive intention, this claim argues that the rule of 
recognition, that is, the rule that allows certain officials to speak on behalf of the 
association, needs to be widely accepted. I look at this last claim first.
4.1 The Social Acceptance o f  Institutions
27Hart makes an important distinction between ‘primary rules’ and ‘secondary rules’. 
The former focus on ‘the actions that individuals must and must not do’; the latter
27 H. L. A. Hart, The Concept o f  Law, pp. 91-99.
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concern the primary rules themselves: ‘They specify the ways in which the primary 
rules may be conclusively ascertained, introduced, eliminated, varied, and the fact of 
their violation conclusively determined.’28 While primary rules do not have to be shared 
on the Institutional Model, it is absolutely critical that the secondary rules are widely 
accepted. According to Hart, acceptance involves two things.
First, it means that these rules are firmly entrenched in the patterns of conduct of the 
members of the association. It is possible to codify rules of recognition, as often 
happens, but formal codification is never quite sufficient. To put it differently, the 
constitutive rules of an association cannot be fixed or put in place by some external 
source. This would merely beg the question of the authority of this source. Instead, they 
depend entirely on the effectiveness and the public knowledge of the rule. The idea is 
that the rules in question are not imposed on a practice, but merely describe what is the 
normal conduct of its practitioners. They are customary rules or rules in practice. 
According to Hart, if judges, lawyers and civil servants generally treat decisions from 
Parliament as legislative, then this is the accepted rule of recognition for law.
Searle’s example of money could be used to emphasise that constitutive rules are 
rules in practice.29 In our current monetary systems, coins, banknotes and the like 
acquire their function as tender not because of their intrinsic value, which is of course 
slight, but only on the basis of the fact that enough people recognise and accept these 
objects as a form of tender. Usually all this happens on the basis of tacit assumption, but 
when I exchange a couple of coins for a cup of coffee, I do so on the basis of a 
collective acceptance of the rule according to which these metal things count as tender. 
Should sufficient people revoke this acceptance, which is what happens when 
confidence in a currency is lost, only the brute fact of a heap of metal and paper 
remains. Governments may attempt to shore up what they claim is legal tender, but the 
survival of a currency ultimately depend on our own perceptions.
28 Ibid., p. 94.
29 See the discussion o f this example in The Construction o f  Social Reality, pp. 37-51.
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Note that institutional facts still rely on collective intention. The difference with the 
Deliberative Model lies in the content of the intention. To use Searle’s taxonomy, 
collective intentions divide into ‘social facts* and ‘institutional facts’. He speaks of 
social facts when the content of collective intention refers to some activity we undertake 
together, for example, going for a walk. On the institutional notion, however, the 
content of a collective intention merely consists in assigning a functional status to brute 
or social facts.
It is also important to point out that constitutive rules tend to be second nature. In 
everyday life many institutional facts are treated precisely like brute facts. We do not 
normally have to tell long stories explaining, for example, why the Queen is Queen or 
why the Prime Minister is Prime Minister. To most of us it is perfectly plain that I 
would be both an impostor and a fool if I challenged these facts by claiming to be the 
only true King myself. These are facts that we ‘just know’ are true, like chess players 
‘just know’ that Pawns are Pawns. But we only know them to be true because they 
depend on an institutional background so firmly implanted in practice that they do not 
even have to be made explicit. Like chess pieces on a board, Kings and Queens and 
Prime Ministers exist by the mercy of a collectively accepted set of secondary rules.
Second, like primary rules in the Deliberative Model, the secondary rules must be 
endorsed from what Hart calls the ‘internal point of view’. From this point of view, 
rules are not just descriptive or predictive of what people are up to, but also normative. 
That is to say, they are taken to provide standards for our own present and future 
conduct. It is important to stress that the internal point of view does not imply that rules 
in practice have to be just, moral or democratic. Nor does it imply that they have to be 
based on an express consent. What it means is that they have to be affirmed as reason- 
giving. Secondary rules do not only illustrate how primary rules come about in a certain 
state, but also how they ought to come about.30 As Hart points out, the normative basis
30 The Concept o f  Law , pp. 88-91. Here I should stop to point out that I depart from Hart’s view in the 
following respect. Hart suggests that a legal system exists once the courts or the officials who in one way
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of the rules of recognition might be one of moral conviction. But it might also just be a 
matter of convention or respecting tradition. In the latter case, the rules are reason- 
giving or regulative of future conduct simply because they are and have been widely 
held and respected.31
4.2 Why Integrity Still Matters at the Institutional Level
This does not imply, however, that the norm of intention has no impact at the 
institutional level. As I understand the issue, the emphasis on secondary rules is not 
incompatible with the interpretive emphasis on collective intention. The Institutional 
Model just shifts the normative jurisdiction of intention to another locus. Put differently, 
while the general acceptance of a rule of recognition is a necessary condition of 
institutional personality, it is not in itself a sufficient condition. In addition, these 
institutions must be bound by the normativity of an executive intention.
There is, of course, a brand of legal positivism, which is commonly associated with 
Hart, that claims that we do not need collective intentions at the institutional level. 
Briefly, this view holds that the rules of recognition form the only source of the law. 
Once these rules are clearly specified and widely accepted, the courts know what the 
primary rules are and merely have to apply them. We have to turn to Dworkin’s 
conception of ‘law as integrity’ for a view on which the notion of an executive intention 
continues to matter.
or another practice law accept and assume the internal perspective o f secondary rules. See The Concept o f  
Law, pp. 113-117. It is not necessary that ordinary citizens take the same perspective. Citizens ‘only’ 
need to obey, out o f habit, fear or for whatever reason. They may be ‘deplorably sheeplike’, as he puts it 
(p. 117). However, I fail to see the rationale for this particular division o f labour. It is true that citizens 
could be ‘sheeplike’. One o f the features o f the institutional model is that we only have to obey primary 
rules and not also regard them as reasons. But in my opinion ‘sheeplikeness’ is not enough in the case o f  
secondary rules. It is evident that the practitioners o f law have to accept the rules o f recognition, but why 
should the law have any meaning for us, the subjects o f law, if  it is self-proclaimed? The idea that citizens 
grasp the full complexity o f secondary rules is perhaps a fiction, but surely it is not fictitious to suggest 
that citizens accept their most basic institutions such as Parliament and the courts.
31 For this claim, see Hart’s ‘Postscript’ in The Concept o f  Law, P. A. Bullock and J. Raz (eds.), pp. 254- 
259.
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According to Dworkin, jurisprudence is at least partially interpretive. Acceptance of 
secondary rules does not suffice on his view. In order to reach the right decision, 
particularly in so-called ‘hard cases’, the courts have to construct and appeal to 
justificatory principles that underpin the practice of law as a whole. And these 
principles are obtained by means of the interpretive method, that is, by accounting for 
the historical practice of law as the legal intent of one single agent. Not until these 
principles are taken as a source of law does it become fully clear what the law really 
demands, or so his theory goes. However, while Dworkin argues that we need 
interpretation and justificatory principles to identify the law, he has to admit that we 
need to know what the practice of law is before interpretation can lead us towards these 
principles.32 So he cannot dismiss the importance of institutional rules either. ‘Law as 
integrity’ needs to have a social source that is independent of principle, that is, it needs 
socially accepted rules of recognition.33 In effect, this would suggest that Hart’s rules of 
recognition and Dworkin’s emphasis on intention are jointly necessary. While the 
general acceptance of a secondary rule is indispensable, the law hinges as much on its 
integrity.
My point is here not that this or that theory of law is the most persuasive. It is rather 
that Dworkin’s account of institutional integrity describes what we mean when we 
apply the notion of collective intention or personality at the level of the state. What does 
collective intention or integrity stand for? Essentially, it demands of institutions 
precisely what it demands of individuals or deliberative groups.
We want our neighbours to behave, in their day-to-day dealings with us, in the 
way we think right. But we know that people disagree to some extent about the 
right principles of behavior, so we distinguish that requirement from the
32 Dworkin writes that for someone to interpret something, ‘He needs assumptions or convictions about 
what counts as part o f the practice in order to define the raw data o f his interpretation at the 
preinterpretive stage; the interpretive attitude cannot survive unless members o f the same interpretive
community share at least roughly the same assumptions about this.’ In: L aw ’s Empire, p. 66.
33 This is part o f  Hart’s critique o f Dworkin in his ‘Postscript’. It may or may not be necessary to 
construct Dworkinian principles to fully identify the law, but the objection is that such principles are 
themselves not sufficient either.
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different (and weaker) requirement that they act in important matters with 
integrity, that is, according to convictions that inform and shape their lives as a 
whole, rather than capriciously or whimsically.34
In other words, their aims and actions have to be authoritatively governed by an 
intention that justifies all their actions as one cohering, rational whole. Institutional 
decision-making should be subject to the same standard. As Dworkin puts it, the state 
should be ‘faithful to its own principles’.
Dworkin is mainly interested in jurisprudence. Law as integrity rules out legal 
decisions that rest on a compromise or inconsistency at the level of fundamental 
principle. To borrow one of his examples, consider a law that allows abortion in 
randomised fashion. Say that it sanctions abortion for women bom in even years and 
rejects abortion for women bom in odd ones. Assume that this happens to provide a 
modus vivendi in a society deeply divided on the issue. Assume further that this 
‘checkerboard law’ has travelled through all the appropriate legislative institutions. 
Thus, it is based on past decisions of the right kind. While for the legal positivist this 
fact must be decisive, integrity in jurisprudence still blocks this law. For it demands that 
we are capable of explaining all decisions of the courts as the decisions of one unified 
and rational agent.
Notice two further things. First, the virtue of institutional integrity remains distinct 
from institutional morality. Kantians like Korsgaard put it to us that intention requires a 
person to act and decide in accordance with higher order principles that he could 
reasonably want to guide, rank and constrain the aims of all persons.35 But I do not think 
we are logically bound to adhere to the strictures of impartiality to qualify as intentional 
agents, and I maintain that the same applies to states. Integrity is a non-moral virtue 
distinct from justice. It merely claims that individuals and states need to act in 
accordance with executive principles that guide, rank and constrain their subsidiary
34 R. Dworkin, L aw ’s Empire, p. 166.
35 See my discussion in Chapter 2, Section 5, above.
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ends. The claim, then, is that institutional decision-making is normatively bound by the 
collective intention that accounts for the historical practice of law as a whole.
Second, the normativity of collective intention does not just apply to judicial 
decisions. It directs the much broader process of legislation and policy-making. In this 
wider institutional context, one view that parallels legal positivism -  call it democratic 
positivism -  argues that once a certain institutional rule is accepted, legislation or policy 
will simply follow suit, without being subjected to further normative tests. To take the 
bull by the horns, assume that the relevant rule of recognition is formed by a particular 
majoritarian voting procedure. According to democratic positivism, we have no choice 
but to embrace whatever legislation or policy that procedure generates. However, if we 
want to advance a view of the state as a corporate person, we also need to reject this 
view.
Phillip Pettit has recently clearly showed why.36 He argues that purposive 
associations in general face what he describes as ‘the discursive dilemma’:
Any groups that seek to make deliberative, reasoned judgments [...] face a 
dilemma. They may maximise responsiveness to individual views, running the 
risk of collectively endorsing inconsistent sets of propositions. Or they may 
impose the discipline of reason at the collective level, running the risk of 
collectively endorsing a conclusion that a majority of them -  perhaps even all 
of them -  individually reject.37
To clarify the argument, consider one of his examples.38 Assume that a group needs to 
decide on a syllogistic argument, which has as its first premise ‘P \  its second premise 
‘i f  P, then Qf and as its conclusion ‘Q \ Further assume that this group conventionally 
arrives at a collective standpoint by counting the votes of individuals A, B and C, and
36 Pettit sets out his argument in a series o f recent papers: ‘Deliberative Democracy and the Discursive 
Dilemma’ (2001); ‘Groups with Minds o f  their Own’ (2001) and ‘Akrasia, Collective and Individual’ 
(2001), ANU Working Papers, all available at http://socpol.anu.edu.au. See also his A Theory o f  Freedom, 
Chapter 5; C. List and P. Pettit, ‘Aggregating Sets o f Judgments: An Impossibility Result’, Economics 
and Philosophy, 18 (2002), pp. 89-110.
37 P. Pettit, ‘Groups with Minds o f their Own’, p. 10.
38
P. Pettit, ‘Akrasia, Collective and Individual’, p. 7.
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let the voting procedure be majoritarian. Finally, suppose that A, B and C hold the 
following opinions on this matter:
P IfP , then Q Q
A Yes No No
B No Yes No
C Yes Yes Yes
Table 1. The Discursive Dilemma I. Source: P. Pettit, 'Akrasia, Collective and Individual p. 7.
The group could make its decision on the basis of its widely accepted rule of 
recognition. However, what happens if the group is ‘maximally responsive’ to the views 
of A, B and C? Pettit points out that if we simply count their votes on each of these 
propositions, the resulting collective standpoint will be incoherent. The group believes 
‘P \  it also believes *if P, then Q \  yet it rejects the conclusion that ‘0 ’. Note that 
individually the views of A, B and C are logically perfectly valid or coherent. Thus, the 
dilemma is not caused by a defect attributable to the reasoning of the individual voters 
themselves. The problem is purely due to its decision rule.
Alternatively, we could, as Pettit puts it, ‘impose the discipline of reason at the 
collective level’. This decision method prioritises the internal consistency of the 
collective standpoint. But it inevitably entails that the majority position on at least one 
of these propositions is sacrificed. Pettit further claims that the most obvious (but not 
only) way of doing this is to allow a vote to first decide on both premises and then to 
deduce the logically inevitable conclusion without further regard. On this ‘premise- 
driven’ approach, the group endorses Q, even though there is no majority for this 
conclusion.
Consider a second of Pettit’s examples.39 A political party has to decide on what 
platform to run. It does so in three temporal stages. It first needs to reject or embrace an
39 I have added a minor adaptation.
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increase in tax in March, knowing that a negative decision will allow for an increase of 
spending on either health or defence, but not on both. The party then needs to decide 
whether or not to advocate an increase in government health spending in June. Lastly, it 
has to decide whether or not to advocate an increase in defence spending in September. 
Assume further that it is a widely accepted rule in the party that its decisions are based 
on the votes of individuals A, B and C, and suppose that they have the following 
preferences.
March June September
Increase Taxes Increase Health Increase Defence 
Spending Spending
A No Yes No
B No No Yes
C Yes Yes Yes
Table 2. The Discursive Dilemma II. Source: P. Pettit, 'Groups with Minds o f  their Own p. 13.
Again, individually, the preferences of A, B and C are coherent. But if  the party wants 
to decide all three issues by majority vote, it will clearly struggle to explain the 
rationality of its political programme. Pettit thinks it is palpably evident that no serious 
organisation could tolerate this kind of irrationality, and he is probably right to remark 
that this party would quickly become a ‘laughing-stock’. Again, the alternative is to 
maintain the rationality of its proposals at the collective level. But this means that the 
party will either have to reject the vote in September or renege on earlier commitments. 
What is more, it is highly unlikely that the party could consistently renege on one of its 
earlier commitments. It could do so occasionally, perhaps, but it would clearly loose all 
its credibility if it reconsidered too often.
The idea of personal integrity implies that these kinds of considerations hold 
similarly for legislatures and governments. That is to say, there is a normative pressure 
‘to impose the discipline of reason at a collective level’. Pettit believes that this pressure
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is traditionally captured by republicanism and the idea of deliberative democracy.40 I 
take it to indicate that states could and should be organised as corporate persons. To say 
that a state is a corporate person, on this view, is to say that it does not rely fully on its 
majoritarian institutions. It is to point out, also, that it is not even sufficient to rely on 
the individual rationality of its voters. To ascribe personality to states, or any other 
association for that matter, their legislative and governing bodies need to be placed 
under the authority of a collective intention. So not only do we need the social 
acceptance of secondary rules, these governing institutions also need to generate 
legislation and policies that are justifiable in terms of the rational coherence of one 
unified and continuous intention.
4.3 Pluralism and Boundaries
Why is the Institutional Model better placed to get a grip on the issue of pluralism? The 
nub of the matter is this: If the secondary rules are relatively uncontested, it is strictly 
inconsequential that there is widespread disagreement about the content of primary 
rules. Ultimately, the executive intention of the state emerges not by reference to the 
claim that primary rules are reason-giving for all, as they would on the Deliberative 
Model, but by the general acknowledgement of certain institutional procedures that 
prescribe how the primary rules are created, changed, executed, and so forth. Integrity is 
only applied as a norm at the institutional level of the courts and legislative bodies of 
the state. Thus, citizens do not have to mesh their intentions as Bratman’s model 
suggests and they do not even have to agree; they only have to obey.41
We could expound this claim with help of the interpretive conditions that were 
introduced above in Section 2. There I suggested that both conditions had to be met. 
The first condition demands that a practice is widely recognised ex ante as one type of
40 P. Pettit, ‘Deliberative Democracy and the Discursive Dilemma’.
41 To avoid any misunderstanding, the idea o f institutional integrity only allows pluralism to exist. It does 
not, o f course, offer any assurances that the state will in fact respect pluralism, reasonable or any other 
kind. And it certainly does not claim that the state should respect pluralism.
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activity. It demands that we share certain pre-interpretive assumptions about what the 
state is or does. The second condition requires widespread, ex post agreement on the 
content of the executive intention within this realm. But while this is true on the 
Deliberative Model, the Institutional Model only needs the first condition to be met. If 
we take as a working assumption Dworkin’s view that the relevant practice is delineated 
by the practice of law, and if law is ‘the scheme of rights and responsibilities [...] that 
license coercion because they flow from past decisions of the right sort’, then in order to 
meet this condition, we would merely have to agree on what decisions are ‘of the right 
sort’.42 To share such an understanding is to accept an institutional matrix or a 
secondary rule that transforms certain ‘brute’ decisions into decisions that ‘count as’ 
law in a particular context43 There is, as we have just seen, a third condition, namely 
that institutional decision-making needs to acknowledge the normativity of a collective 
intention. But this condition is not affected by the fact of pluralism. Rather than 
requiring a societal consensus at the level of principle, it leaves this dispute for these 
institutions to settle.
Some additional points need to be made to get the Institutional Model up and 
running. To begin with, it could be objected that the fact of pluralism may not be 
restricted to conceptions of the good and the right. The rules of recognition could be 
hotly disputed themselves. If such disputes are rife it is no longer obviously true or false 
for someone to claim to speak on behalf of the association. Furthermore, like 
conceptions of the good and the right, institutions are subject to change. Now, I readily 
concede that there are limits to how much pluralism and change the idea of corporate 
personality could bear. In fact, these limits are a direct consequence of having defined 
corporate personality in terms of shared intention and integrity rather than fiction or 
spiritual substance. While fiction or Selves could not be touched by empirical fact, the
42 R. Dworkin, Law's Empire, p. 93.
43 . . .Dworkin uses the distinction between ‘concept’ and ‘conception’ to make a similar point. See L aw ’s
Empire, pp. 68-76.
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idea of shared intention will always call for some rule or intention to be shared at the 
societal level. However, to me this seems to be much less of a problem for two reasons.
First, on a more general note pertaining to institutional change, the idea of the 
personality of the associations rests clearly on a Humean conception of personal identity 
over time that admits to degrees and change.44 As we have seen, it is no anomaly on this 
conception that persons change if this happens gradually. On the Deliberative Model, 
the personal identity of a state is consistent with the fact that its political values and 
principles gradually change. Similarly, the institutional conception of corporate 
personality advanced here is not at odds with institutional change per se. There may be 
institutional change that implies that we can no longer sensibly talk of the continued 
personality of a state, for example, in the case of revolution, secession, civil war, 
annexation, and so on. But insofar as it tends to be gradual and sluggish, institutional 
change posits no major obstacle to the thesis advanced here.
Second, the claim that certain basic rules of recognition are widely shared seems 
empirically less vulnerable to pluralism than the claim that we share an entire political 
morality. It may or may not be true that monolithic, societal cultures no longer exist in 
the West, but it is evident that states still do. Most pluralists, presumably, would not 
contend that the fact of pluralism has advanced to the stage where states themselves are 
the chimera of a lost age of law and order. It is one thing to argue that Western societies 
like Britain, France or the United States harbour a great many conceptions of the good 
and even of justice, but it is quite something else to claim that they do no longer have an 
institutional framework that enjoys a basic degree of legitimacy and stability. Whatever 
kind of moral or cultural pluralism they may have to face up to, these and many other 
states do not teeter on the brink of revolution, civil war or annihilation.
Without denying its limitations, I simply press this model because its institutional 
fabric provides an added stability and continuity that is perhaps less likely to be derived
44 See Chapter I above.
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from the deliberative account. Consider again what David Miller is driving at in his 
book On Nationality. Although I am sympathetic to his view, pluralist critics may -  
perhaps not without reason -  express doubts as to whether the British nation, as Miller 
sees it, has enough integrity and continuity to merit such conclusions. However, such 
doubts are perhaps less obviously warranted in the case of the institution of the state. 
Few people I think would question the more concrete continuity of Parliament.
In addition, the institutional model seems much better suited to do justice to the issue 
of territorial boundaries and membership. The Deliberative Model, even if it advanced 
principles of impartial justice, would still have to show that its ethos is somehow 
confined to a particular population, a specific set of practices, within a precisely defined 
geographical context. While I find such an argument difficult to conceive, geographical 
contexts do not look out of place within the institutional approach. It is far from 
inconceivable that the secondary rules assign authority to certain people or bodies of 
people within a physical jurisdiction or domain. Incorporating such a territorial domain 
requires a fairly straightforward extension of the model. For example, the rules of 
recognition could specify that decisions of ‘Queen in Parliament’ count as law, but only 
in the specific geographical context defined as the territorial boundaries of Britain. On 
reflection, it seems fairly obvious that the territorially boundaries of states are such 
institutional facts. Certainly, frontiers exist in a brute way, and physically their location 
may be more or less natural, but their institutional significance as the border of a state 
derives solely from a widely shared rule according to which certain geographical lines 
count as the boundaries of the jurisdiction of a state.
What is more, a similar extension would seem to take care of the membership issue. 
Bratman’s notion of shared intention suggests a membership criterion that is exclusively 
attitudinal. Whether I am an insider or outsider to a particular group depends solely on 
whether or not its members and I have the right subsidiary intentions and acknowledge 
the normativity of an executive intention. Clearly, this is not how states operate. I
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cannot become a citizen of the United States just by subscribing to the principles 
underpinning its constitution. There is a myriad of additional conditions that need to be 
met. One of these conditions stipulates that I have to underwrite the constitutional 
principles of the United States, but this does not even begin to sum up what needs to be 
done. The Institutional Model has no difficulty in dealing with such conditions. It 
suggests that membership rests on institutional arrangements. The constitutive rules of a 
state do not only determine what counts as law, they also decide who counts as citizen.
Finally, I am not suggesting that the Institutional Model exists in a pure form. 
Theoretically, the corporate personality of the state is possible even when no one agrees 
to its primary rules. But in practice it is not very likely that a state could persevere -  let 
alone thrive -  without such support. That said, there is no reason to suggest that 
institutional integrity cannot be combined with deliberative elements. Only to the extent 
that a society falls short of the deliberative vision, does integrity depend on 
representative institutions and the attentiveness of these institutions to integrity. The 
orthodoxy is that scale is the decisive factor here. As the scale of an association 
diminishes, deliberative integrity gains in credibility. However, as this scale increases, 
corporate personality tends to become more reliant on intermediary institutions. The 
individual is perhaps the paradigmatic example of an association with deliberative 
integrity. The corporate personality of the state, it has been my claim, depends more 
heavily on an institutional chassis.
Conclusion
This chapter aims to extend the concept of corporate personality from two and three 
person examples to associations of a much larger scale including the state. Three 
problems appear to block such an extension. First, as political associations are often 
extremely complex, we cannot realistically expect its members to consciously assume 
the executive perspective. Second, while the notion of shared intention suggests a
159
conception of group membership that is relatively ‘open’, state membership is more 
narrowly defined. States, moreover, are confined to a certain geographical space. Third, 
the corporate thesis seems to rest on a deeply communitarian view of society. It 
presupposes moral consensus at the societal level that cannot be reconciled with the fact 
of pluralism.
I set out to meet these challenges with two different arguments. First, I offered an 
account of intention that is interpretive rather than psychological. This account departs 
from the view that collective intentions are mental data or conscious states in the minds 
of the group’s members. While it agrees that collective intention must be action- 
guiding, it also suggests that it tends be implicit in a practice. So we no longer have to 
suppose, somewhat naively at this scale of complexity, that associative members 
assume the executive perspective. It is adequate if their subsidiary intentions are 
sufficiently meshing in order to be able to construct the collective intention, the guiding 
plan or principle that fits the practice as a whole. Corporate personality, moreover, 
depends on the effectiveness of this executive intention as a normative constraint.
Second, I argued for a shift in the locus of integrity from the individual to the 
institutional level. Such a shift is possible on the basis of the general acceptance of a set 
of rules of recognition. These rules further limit the need for meshing subsidiary 
intentions to the institutional practices of legislation, policy-making and adjudication. 
So it is only the decisions and actions of institutions that need to be meshing in a 
rational way. It is only there that integrity applies as a normative standard. Hence, 
within limitations the institutional approach allows for greater social pluralism. The 
notion of institutional rules also allows us to come to grips with the problems of 
boundaries and membership.
I return now to the overall thesis. Together, Chapter III and IV develop a concept of 
corporate personality that I argue meets three objectives. First, by framing corporate 
personality in terms of shared and collective intentions we remain faithful to
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reductionism about persons and personal identity. Second, by pressing an interpretation 
on which of shared intention remains independent from ethical individualism, we have 
opened up a conceptual space for corporate personality to do normative work. Third, by 
injecting interpretive and institutional elements into the basic model, we can now see 
how corporate personality could be applied to larger and more complex associations 
including the state.
This leaves a fourth objective. Chapter III essentially argues that integrity is not 
necessarily confined to the connections between person-events or temporal person- 
stages, but also covers links between people. Chapter IV effectively claims that integrity 
can even be extended from simple, two-person examples to more complex associations 
like the state. So the case for corporate personality now stands or falls with an argument 
showing that this idea has practical purchase where ethical individualism falls short. I 
look for such an argument in Chapters V, VI and VII.
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CHAPTER V
EXPANDING OUR ETHICAL HORIZONS
In order that there may be institutions, there must be a kind of will, instinct, 
or imperative, which is anti-liberal to the point of malice: the will to tradition, 
to authority, to responsibility for centuries to come, to the solidarity of chains 
of generations, forward and backward ad infinitum. When this will is present, 
something like the imperium Romanum is founded [...] The whole of the 
West no longer possesses the instincts out of which institutions grow, out of 
which a future grows: perhaps nothing antagonizes its ‘modem spirit* so 
much. One lives for the day, one lives very fast, one lives very irresponsibly: 
precisely this is called ‘freedom*.
Friedrich Nietzsche -  Twilight o f the Idols1 
Introduction
The argument for corporate personality has two basic parts. The first part of the 
argument maintains that the concept of integrity fits groups as much as it fits 
individuals. Integrity does not only explain how different person-stages should be 
connected to form one person over time. It also explains how different persons should 
be connected to form one group person. What connects person-stages in the relevant 
way is the fact that their present aims are guided by future-directed intention. What 
connects persons in the relevant way is the fact that their individual aims are guided by 
a collective intention.
The second part is normative. It asserts that integrity is a virtue as much for 
associations as for individuals. It is important to unpack this claim a bit further. In 
Chapter II, I followed Rawls, Korsgaard and others in arguing that the concept of 
personal identity should be understood as a regulative ideal that is immanent in a wider 
normative practice or tradition, which is itself not again grounded in a metaphysical
1 F. Nietzsche, Twilight o f  the Idols: Or How One Philosophizes With a Hammer, in: W. Kaufmann (ed.), 
The Portable Nietzsche (Harmondsworth: Penquin, 1984), p. 543.
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theory of the self. In other words, our understandings of personal identity should be 
judged on the basis of reflective equilibrium, like normative theory in general. Now, the 
practice theory stands ethical individualism in good stead in holding off Parflt’s 
impersonal challenge. It points to an irreducibly normative argument for the moderate 
claim. So even though personal identity is relational, we still have good reasons to claim 
that personal identity has a basic normative input. However, the problem for 
individualism, I now want to argue, is that the practice theory could topple the argument 
over to the other side. We already know that it is possible to claim that associations are 
composed of a kind of normative relatedness that is comparable to personal integrity. I 
earlier referred to this claim as associativism. So if the practice theory is plausible, then 
we may also be able to construct corporate personality as a regulative ideal immanent in 
a practice or tradition. In other words, the idea of a corporate person could still prove its 
credentials as a normative conception in reflective equilibrium with our basic intuitions 
and well-considered judgements.
In Chapters V, VI and VII, I want to argue that corporate personality can indeed be 
seen in the same, normative vein as personal identity. This argument seeks to show that 
there are certain practices and types of aspiration, which also form part of our form of 
life, our way of being, that presuppose a sense of narrative unity and continuity that 
only associations could provide. These practices and aspirations cannot be fully 
captured by ethical individualism, the view that only individual goods and preferences 
enjoy moral and rational standing as reasons. They presuppose that we conceive not 
only of individuals, but also of associations or groups as the loci of independent 
interests and value, as lives with a unity and purpose, in sum, as corporate persons.
What does this argument look like? Let me briefly sketch the outlines of my answer. 
I begin by considering two familiar hypotheses. Section 1 briefly considers the notion 
that cultural goods are ‘irreducibly social’. Section 2 submits the view that 
associativism provides us with a proper account of human sociality or co-operativeness.
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Both ideas face important objections. Section 3 then switches to another, though clearly 
related idea. I want to argue that corporate personality lengthens the temporal horizons 
of agency in a way that ethical individualism is incapable of. The idea of corporate 
personality has the benefit that it gives us a theoretical foothold for explaining how past, 
present and future generations are interconnected in a normative sense, or so I shall 
argue.
This hypothesis has a negative and a positive component. Sections 4 and 5 elaborate 
on the negative component of the argument by focussing on the issue of 
intergenerational justice. Theories of distributive justice generally aspire to the 
conclusion that scarce resources ought to be distributed fairly over generations. The 
challenge, which they therefore set themselves, is to show that present generations have 
a duty of justice to pass on resources to future generations. I argue that the two main 
strands of this justice-based argument fail to meet this challenge.
Chapter VI then explores the positive component. It demonstrates that corporate 
personality evades the difficulties that haunt the individualist view of intergenerational 
justice. Finally, Chapter VII investigates how the argument could be extended to 
another transgenerational issue, namely how past generations can bind present and 
future generations by means of constitutions and agreements to third parties.
1. Irreducibly Social Goods
I want to begin by mentioning what might seem the most evident argument for 
corporate personality and is commonly subsumed under the banner of 
communitarianism. Briefly, the communitarian argument, as initiated by MacIntyre, 
Taylor and Sandel in the nineteen-eighties, alleges that political theory has succumbed 
to a fixation on individual rights, goods and interests. This, moreover, means that most 
theorists have ignored the vital importance of culture, language and national identity.
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Communitarians argue that such ties and associations are in more than one way 
essential to the flourishing of human life. In fact, the communitarian critique is 
supported by two closely related, but separate pillars. The first pillar establishes that 
culture and language are an essential ingredient to human well-being. Here, the 
communitarian thesis points out that the human capacity for making meaningful choices 
presupposes a context of background meanings and understandings provided by 
language, history, tradition and culture.2 The second pillar argues that such ‘communal 
goods’ are essentially and ‘irreducibly social’ and cannot be accommodated within the 
theoretical framework of ethical individualism. This last claim, holds that the 
background goods of language and culture are irreducibly social or participatory .3
Here, I do not have the space to discuss the issue at length, but as it stands, the 
communitarian thesis remains debatable. The controversy is not so much about the 
cogency of the first part of the argument. What is problematic, instead, is that 
individualism seems equally capable of articulating the importance of background 
goods. In recent years, it has become increasingly evident that so-called ‘liberal 
communitarian’ approaches have successfully reconciled a concern for culture with the 
individualist foundations of liberalism. For example, Buchanan has argued that 
individual rights to association, life, property, religion, thought and speech form a 
sufficient guarantee for civil society and communal life to flourish.4 More notably,
2
See for example C. Taylor, ‘Lichtung or Lebensform’, pp. 61-78; The Importance o f Herder’, pp. 79-99, 
both in: Philosophical Arguments.
See especially C. Taylor, ‘Irreducibly Social Goods’, pp. 127-145; ‘Cross-Purposes: The Liberal- 
Communitarian Debate’, pp. 181-203, both in: Philosophical Arguments. The same arguments are made 
by: J. Waldron, ‘Communal Goods as Human Rights’, in: Liberal Rights (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1993) pp. 339-369; L. C. Green, The Authority o f  the State (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1988), pp. 206-209; D. Reaume, ‘The Group Right to Linguistic Security: Whose Right, What Duties', in: 
J. Baker, Group Rights (Toronto: University o f Toronto Press, 1994), pp. 118-141; A. Mason, 
Community, Solidarity and Belonging (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), pp. 43-45.
4
A. E. Buchanan, ‘Assessing the Communitarian Critique o f Liberalism’, Ethics 99/1989, pp. 852-882; 
‘Liberalism and Group Rights’ in: J. L. Coleman & A. E. Buchanan (eds.), In H arm ’s Way: Essays in 
Honor o f  Joel Feinberg (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), pp. 1-15. For a related 
approach, see C. Kukathas, ‘Are There Any Cultural Rights’, Political Theory, Volume 20 (1992), pp. 
105-139.
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Kymlicka offers an argument for background goods from a liberal-egalitarian angle.5 In 
his view, culture and language are on a level pegging with conventional primary goods 
or resources or capabilities. Like Taylor, Kymlicka is keenly aware of the significance 
of culture. However, it is precisely for the reason that cultural variables affect individual 
autonomy, that justice demands that we look, not only at the distribution of material 
resources, but also of cultural resources. Both Buchanan and Kymlicka point out that 
individuals have stakes in background goods, and they incorporate a concern for these 
goods in the framework of liberalism. To put it differently, the key problem is that the 
communitarian argument from the good of culture, language and belonging collapses 
into ethical individualism.
2. Prudence and Beyond: Extending the Scope of Reason
I want to consider another well-known hypothesis, which may be linked to Hume, 
Burke and Hegel.6 The general idea is that our involvement in associations and groups is 
linked to why people act morally in the first place. Here, I use the term moral in the 
very general (and non-Kantian) sense of sociable, co-operative, civil and reciprocally 
responsive to other people. Burke once put the idea as follows:
To be attached to the subdivision, to love the little platoon we belong to in 
society, is the first principle (the germ as it were) of public affections. It is the 
first link in the series by which we proceed toward a love to our country and to 
mankind.7
5 W. Kymlicka, Liberalism, Community and Culture (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989). See also W. 
Kymlicka, ‘Individual and Community Rights’.
6 See also R. Sugden, ‘Beyond Sympathy and Empathy: Adam Smith’s Concept o f  Fellow-Feeling’, 
Economics and Philosophy, 18 (2002), pp. 63-87; M. Hollis, Trust within Reason (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1998); K. Graham, ‘Morality, individuals and Collectives’; D. Miller, On 
Nationality, pp. 57-58.
7
E. Burke, The Reflections on the Revolution in France, J. G. A. Pocock (ed.), (Indianapolis: Hackett 
Publishing Company, 1987), p. 41.
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Briefly the hypothesis claims that the reason why we extend our concern from a narrow 
focus on our present aims, to a wider view of our temporally extended good, and then to 
an even wider concern for the interests of other people, derives from the fact that, in 
various ways and to various degrees, we participate in associations like the family and 
the nation-state. On this view, then, the possibility of a corporate person emerges 
because we have reason to treat the interests of our fellow-members as fundamental, 
just as the idea of an individual person emerges because you have reason to treat the 
interests of your future selves as fundamental.
Consider again what the standard model of prudential reason claims. This model 
argues that what an agent has reason to do derives from the interests of both his present 
and future selves. That is, we have reason to do whatever promotes the goodness of our 
lives conceived as temporal wholes. Obviously, we may still show appropriate concern 
for the interests of other people, but this concern must be justifiable in terms of our own 
good. The essence of the model is that it leaves no room within the scope of reason for 
the non-derivative importance of the good and preferences of other people. The 
associative view, in contrast, claims that there is such room -  albeit only to the extent to 
which an agent is connected with these other people.8 But while the standard model of 
prudence conceives of reason more narrowly and associativism more broadly, both 
positions spring from a common source.
g
This claim, then, falls well short o f the stronger, Kantian view, which argues that there is room even for 
the non-derivative importance o f others per se. Nagel, in his book The Possibility o f  Altruism, argues his 
case for the latter view by analogy to the standard view of prudence. This account o f prudence, Nagel 
says on page 87, ‘derives from the requirement that reasons be timelessly formulable’. He believes (p. 88) 
that morality is ‘closely analogous to the formal principle o f  timelessness, in that it will deny the 
possibility o f restricting to one person the derivative influence o f  a reason for action, just as the formal 
principle which underlies prudence denies the possibility o f restricting such derivative influence to one 
tim e' While I am arguing for something like ‘the possibility o f  corporate personality’ on the basis o f a 
similar comparison, the difference between Nagel’s view and mine is that I reject his idea o f objectivity, 
viz. o f timelessness and impartiality. Nagel thinks that since we should conceive o f prudential reason as 
timeless, it is equally possible to conceive o f reasons as agent-neutral. I do not accept the premise o f that 
argument. My claim is that since prudence awards reason-giving value to interpersonal connectedness 
through time, we can also conceive o f an argument that assigns such value to interpersonal 
connectedness. However, the reasons in both cases are not ‘objective’ in Nagel’s sense as they clearly 
depend on the relational fact o f personal identity.
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Recall what Parfit claims. If the Humean view of personal identity is correct, then we 
could conceive of an argument that pushes prudential reason one step further back. 
Parfit’s present-aim theory suggests that we have reason to do, not what achieves the 
good of a temporally extended self, but whatever realises the aim or preference of our 
current person-stage.9 If this theory were indeed correct, then the scope of reason would 
have to be circumscribed still more narrowly. So, on the one hand, we have the present- 
aim theory, which leaves no room for the non-derivative importance of the interests or 
preferences of our future selves. On the other hand, we have the orthodox view of 
prudence, which claims that there is such room. This view claims that the preferences or 
interests of our future selves count as reasons in our present deliberations.
In claiming this, the standard view of prudence turns out to be merely a special brand 
of associativism. Given the discussion in Chapter II, this ‘micro-associativist’ view is 
easily clarified. On the Humean theory of personal identity, the self essentially is a 
temporal association. Why still care about my future well-being or preferences? Well, I 
have reason to care about my future because (1) I still form a psychological bundle with 
future person-stages St+\, St+2 ... •S't+n as set out above, and (2) this relational fact matters 
in inherently reason-giving ways. Since we may now have to allow a discounting rate in 
proportion to the strength of the relatedness, the result is not quite the same as on the 
standard account of prudence. But I do have reason to care.
If the combination of (1) and (2) extends the scope of reason to prudential concern, 
then associativism extends the scope of reason to moral or other-regarding concern. 
Why care about the well-being or preferences of others? According to associativism, the 
reason stems from (3) the fact of our psychological connectedness with these others, 
and (4) the claim that these relational facts matter in a similarly reason-giving manner. 
So I have reason to care because the well-being of my fellow-associates is at stake. This 
interpersonal connectedness gives me a reason to give to others the kind of non­
The present-aim theory is set out and defended in Reasons and Persons, Part 1 and 2. For the identity- 
based version o f the argument, see especially Chapter 14.
168
instrumental respect that the prudential model awards to my future selves. To put it 
differently still, associativism claims that the preferences and interests of connected 
others are directly reason-giving for myself.
The gist, then, of the associativist thesis is that our normative horizons are extended 
from the absolute minimum of present-aim theory, first to prudence, and then from 
prudence to morality, by the same underlying idea, namely that psychological 
relatedness, whether intra or z/zterpersonal, matters in reason-giving ways. The interests, 
aims and preferences of future selves constitute reasons for us now because these future 
selves are in some way connected to us. Likewise, claims (3) and (4) explain our 
triumph over narrow selfishness. If this understanding of interpersonal relatedness is 
correct, the divide between self and other becomes less sharp, not only in the 
metaphysical but also in the normative sense. The gap between self and other-regarding 
reasons is bridged by the claim that the interests of the one count as reasons for the 
other in much the same way as future interests count as reasons now.10 This effect is 
particularly strong in the case of family ties and friendship. But as the circle is drawn 
wider, as we include our country and even humankind, it gradually loses its force in 
proportion to the weakening strength of the connectedness. Another way of putting it is 
to say that associativism involves a social discounting mechanism. We do not have to 
give the interest of everyone an equal weight, but are allowed allocate our resources 
roughly in accordance with the strength of our connectedness to others.11
How does this relate to the idea of corporate personality? As I have been at pains to 
show, we should accept or reject conceptions of personal identity on the basis of
I David Brink’s conception o f ‘metaphysical egoism’ advances precisely this idea. See his ‘Self-love and 
Altruism’, Social Philosophy and Policy, Volume 14, Number 1 (1997), pp. 122-157; ‘Rational Egoism 
and the Separateness o f  Persons’, in: J. Dancy (ed.) Reading Parfit, pp. 96-134.
II Hume argued ‘that where, besides the general resemblance o f our natures, there is any peculiar 
similarity in our manners, or character, or country, or language, it facilitates the sympathy. The stronger 
the relation is betwixt ourselves and any object, the more easily does the imagination make the transition, 
and convey to the related idea the vivacity o f conception, with which we always form the idea o f our own 
person.’ In A Treatise o f  Human Nature, p. 261. I return to the issue o f the discounting mechanism in 
Chapter VI.
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reflective equilibrium. Part of the appeal of ethical individualism, I believe, is that 
humans tend to be deeply concerned about their future. We could, on the practice 
theory, still set aside the notion of prudential reason. But since this concern is so crucial 
to our form of life, it seems more plausible to embrace a view of the person that is 
tailored to fit this practice. The idea of integrity is in the end simply more persuasive 
than the notion that the temporal parts of a person are distinct agents. Could it be argued 
that the idea of a corporate person has normative appeal because it extends the scope of 
reason to other-regarding accounts of reason in the way just proposed? After all, we 
know that human beings are capable of co-operation and compassion and generosity. 
And we know that our relatedness to others plays a significant part in this. As Hume 
remarked,
... it appears, that in the original frame of our mind, our strongest attention is 
confin’d to ourselves; our next is extended to or relations and acquaintance; and 
’tis only the weakest which reaches to strangers and indifferent persons. This 
partiality, then, and unequal affection, must not only have an influence on our 
behaviour and conduct in society, but even on our ideas of vice and virtue; so as 
to make us regard any remarkable transgression of such a degree of partiality, 
either by too great an enlargement, or contradiction of the affections, as vicious 
and immoral.12
Associativism, then, seems as deeply embedded in our considered judgements and 
intuitions as our preoccupation with our selves. What is more, it has an important 
impact on our ethics.
That said, this hypothesis faces at least two familiar objections, which are both 
grounded in versions of what I shall refer to as contractualism. The first objection holds 
that associative relatedness is valued too highly. Briefly, it is claimed that things like 
social co-operation, justice, trust and reciprocity could well derive their justification 
from the prudential interests and preferences of individuals alone.13 Assuming this to be
12 D. Hume, A Treatise o f  Human Nature, p. 488.
13 What follows is o f course a very coarse synopsis o f what is an extremely rich and powerful idea going 
back at least to Hobbes’s Leviathan, Tuck, R., (ed.) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991). 
Influential contemporary contributions to this tradition in political theory include: J. M. Buchanan, The 
Limits o f  Liberty: Between Anarchy and Leviathan (Chicago: University o f Chicago Press: 1975); D.
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the case, the idea that wider associations and interpersonal relatedness have primitive, 
reason-giving weight is simply unwanted theoretical surplus. Norms of civility and 
justice, while ostensibly unselfish in intent, are in fact merely agreements or 
conventions serving the self-regarding preferences of all the participants involved. We 
could call this the ‘mutual advantage objection’. Essentially, this objection suggests that 
we can explain reciprocal or socially responsive behaviour in terms of agent-relative 
justifications. Such justifications are rooted in the agent’s preferences and desires.
Notice that this agent-relative justification is more plausible if the agent’s 
preferences and interests are defined over the long term rather than the short-term. If we 
assume that the agent is only disposed to his present interest or aims, it becomes more 
difficult to find a satisfactory answer to Hobbes’s ‘Foole’. That is, it becomes more 
difficult to see how rational agents could benefit from behaving in a co-operative and 
civil manner.14 Thus, this justification takes for granted that an agent is predisposed to 
the interests and aims of his future selves. The difference with the wider associativist 
view above is merely that this perspective is confined to the relatedness between 
person-stages. While it is affirmed that relatedness over time has reason-giving weight, 
it is denied that the relatedness between agents matters similarly.
The second contractualist objection moves to the level of agent-neutral justification. 
I shall refer to it as the Kantian objection.15 Essentially, it points out that we should 
carefully distinguish between, on the one hand, the problem of compliance with the
Gauthier, Morals by Agreement (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986); G. S. Kavka, Hobbesian Moral 
and Political Theory (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986); J. Hampton, Hobbes and the Social
Contract Tradition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).
14 The problem o f the ‘Foole’ is famously captured by the Pnsoner’s Dilemma. A common suggestion is 
that it becomes less pressing once a long-term perspective is introduced by iteration o f the game. The 
locus classicus is R. Axelrod, The Evolution o f  Social Co-operation (New York: Basic Books, 1984). 
Alternatively, it has been claimed that rational agents have reason to conditionally commit themselves, in 
the manner o f the planning model o f agency, to acting co-operatively in the future, and hold to this 
commitment even when this would be contrary to their present interests and aims. See E. McClennen, 
‘Rationality and Rules’, in: P. A. Danielson (ed.) Modelling Rationality, Morality, and Evolution 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), pp. 13-40.
15 See here for example T. Nagel, The Possibility o f  Altruism; B. Barry Theories o f  Justice (London: 
Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1989).
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standard and, on the other, what the standard of pure reason entails as such. Clearly, at 
the compliance level, people are primarily motivated to concern themselves with the 
well-being of relatives and fellow-members. But the Kantian objection plays down the 
significance of this fact to theories that aim to explain what we ought to do. 
Fundamentally, it is claimed, we have no reason to attach more importance to our future 
selves or our relatives and fellow-countrymen than to perfect strangers. Reason 
ultimately dictates that we concern ourselves with the interests of other people, not 
because we are fellow-associates, but because each individual agent forms an end in and 
of itself. At the deepest, normative level, the structure of reason is always objective and 
neutral. My own interests and preferences produce no greater reason than those of any 
other individual person. Of course, it may be true that people do not naturally comply 
with the demands of pure impartiality, but the principle is no less valid. Reason 
demands that all individuals weigh equally in our judgements, whether this principle 
corresponds to our de facto motivations or not. To put it differently, while we may live 
in a non-ideal world, where we may find it hard to act in full accordance with reason, 
this does not show that this view falls short at the ideal level.
Given the considerable weight and pedigree of these objections, it is less than 
straightforward to find conclusive support for associativism. Far be it for me to argue 
that contractualism is triumphant, but it seems to me a fair criticism that in view of these 
alternatives the idea of corporate personality should be able to clearly demonstrate its 
superiority as a normative political conception. The notion has to make plain why its 
account of the civil order is superior to its rivals.
Thus far, the concept of a collective intention or preference, which I discussed in 
Chapter III, has been employed mainly to show how social co-operation and co­
ordination come about in general. For example, Hollis, in his book Trust within Reason, 
has argued that, under certain conditions, both versions of the contractual model fail to 
provide a plausible account of the social order. According to Hollis, society would
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implode without the prevalence of a collective attitude that he describes as trust. On the 
one hand, the motivational assumptions of game theory, which prevent genuine trust 
from emerging, can be seen to encourage sub-optimal results in a spate of 
circumstances.16 Full-blown Kantianism, on the other hand, while avoiding some of 
these obstacles, does not capture the conditional and also personal nature that is typical 
of trust. And so associativism emerges as a third and winning theory of reasonableness.
Although I am sympathetic to Hollis’s view, I nevertheless suspect that ethical 
individualists would wish to express serious reservations with the gist of his arguments. 
Doubts linger as to whether the mutual advantage model really falls short of providing 
an explanation for the civil order at this level of generality. As is well known, the model 
is often claimed to depend on the introduction of a long-term perspective, but Hollis 
rejects these claims perhaps too easily as mere ‘technicalities’.17 By the same token, it is 
not all that evident that Kantian impartiality does indeed fail to grasp the personal 
nature of trust and human relationships. According to one common view, at least, 
impartiality should be understood to operate, not on the day-to-day level of human 
affairs, but only at the higher level of justification.18
16 The problem with rational choice, Hollis writes on page 68, is that agents ‘are like two methodological 
solipsists or windowless monads, each with an individual point o f view containing the other’s within it. 
There is no corporate body whose members they are. When Adam is trying to thread a needle, success 
does not depend on separate strategic choices by his right and left hands, each deciding where to best 
position itself, after considering what the other will do, since all choices are Adam’s. But this offers no 
analogy for harvesting as a corporate action, since Adam and Eve are not a corporation [ .. .] ’ In the same 
spirit, Robert Sugden appeals to ‘team-reasoning’ to solve co-ordination games, which standard game 
theory is said to leave unresolved. The problem with co-ordination, says Sugden, is that rational agents 
have to second-guess each other’s choices, leading to infinite regress. My reasoning depends on your 
reasoning, which in turn depends on my reasoning, and so the cycle continues. The key advantage o f  
team-reasoning is that it overcomes this problem. According to Sugden, team players deliberate like a 
corporate agent, with just one collective preference or utility function to guide their reasoning. See his 
articles ‘Team Preferences’, pp. 181, 191; ‘Thinking as a Team’; ‘Rational Co-ordination’, in: F. Farina,
F. Hahn, and S. Vannucci (eds.) Ethics, Rationality, and Economic Behaviour, pp. 244-262. Similarly, but 
now in the case o f the one shot Prisoner’s Dilemma, Hurley argues, in her Natural Reasons, Chapter 8, 
that agents will co-operate only if they assume the perspective o f collective agency. See also M. Hollis 
and R. Sugden, ‘Rationality in Action’, Mind, Volume 102, Issue 405 (January 1993), pp. 1-35; M. 
Bacharach, ‘Interactive Team Reasoning: A Contribution to the Theory o f Co-operation’, Research in 
Economics, Volume 53, No. 2 (June 1999), pp. 117-147; R. Tuomela, Cooperation: A Philosophical 
Study (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2000).
17 M. Hollis, Trust within Reason, p. 59.
18 Ibid., Chapter 5. See my discussion o f two-level impartiality in Chapter VII.
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Now, we could decide to dig in our heels at this point and hope to be able to 
demonstrate that these doubts are in the end unfounded. However, in the remainder of 
this thesis, I would like to explore a more specific variation on this theme instead. 
Albeit at a lower level of generality, this variation provides us with a more clear-cut 
case for associativism, or so I argue. It points out that associations tend to have a greater 
continuity than individual persons. Due to this greater continuity, associations are not 
merely essential to broaden, but also, and perhaps mainly, to lengthen our practical 
horizons in time. Associations do not merely extend our concerns and pursuits to our 
contemporaries, but also to the past and future.
3. Conservatism
I have already mentioned four different theories of the scope of reason. To begin with, 
Parfit’s present-aim theory confines reason to our own present interests or preferences. 
Second, the standard account of prudence extends the scope of reason to our own future 
interests or preferences. Third, associativism widens that scope to include the interests 
and preferences of others, but mediated by our social connectedness. Fourth, moral 
impartiality argues that, at the deepest level, the good and preferences of all individual 
agents weigh equally as reasons. We can now add a fifth view. This is that associativism 
allows for an extension of that scope to the interests and preferences of past and future 
generations.
On a historical note, the idea that associations make possible such a trans- 
generational extension is closely affiliated with Burke’s conservatism.19 In The 
Reflections o f  the Revolution in France, Burke advanced a conception of the state as an 
interconnecting chain between generations past, present and future. One of his 
objections to the French Revolution was precisely that by breaking free from this chain,
19 See also R. Scruton, ‘Corporate Persons’.
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all that previous generations had achieved and accumulated would stand to return to ‘the 
dust and powder of individuality’ and disperse ‘to all the winds of heaven’. As Burke 
wrote: ‘The perennial existence of bodies corporate and their fortunes are things 
particularly suited to a man who has long views; who mediates designs that require time 
in fashioning, and which propose duration when they are accomplished.’20
Now, recall that we rejected the extreme claim because we all have and need certain 
ground-projects and conceptions of the good, and because we are all inevitably 
immersed in relationships, which presuppose rights, obligations and responsibilities 
with temporal continuity. And so we ended up supporting the moderate claim. Here, I 
want to argue that the notion of corporate personality owes part of its appeal as a 
normative conception to the fact that we have even longer lasting projects and 
relationships, namely those that involve the participation of several generations. It is 
important to present this argument in the correct order because it comprises two 
separate parts. The first part is I think relatively uncontroversial and largely at the pre- 
theoretical level of intuition. It maintains that co-operation and relations between 
generations are part and parcel of the same practices and goings-on to which the ethical 
individualist have to appeal in order to defeat the extreme claim. Most people do not 
just care about themselves or about other people in their vicinity, they also look back 
and forward in time, and much further than their own lives. We find ourselves not 
merely absorbed by our own private plans and projects, but also by bigger plans and 
projects with their own history and continuity.
This is I think unquestionably true in the case of the past. In his wide-ranging study 
of our attitudes towards the past, Lowenthal writes:
The miracle of life is cruelly circumscribed by birth and death; of the 
immensity of time before and after our own lives we experience nothing. Past 
and future are alike inaccessible. But, though beyond physical reach, they are
20 E. Burke, The Reflections on the Revolution in France, p. 139.
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integral to our imaginations. Reminiscence and expectation suffuse every 
present moment.21
Elsewhere he points out: ‘Popular history, biography, autobiography, and historical 
fiction deluge bookshops and television screens; classroom re-enactments emphasize 
the immediacy and malleability of past events; ‘family-history’ has transformed 
genealogy from an elite pursuit into a popular preoccupation; oral archives celebrate the 
annals of hitherto unsung masses and local histories their most humdrum details’.22 The 
streets of Western capitals are generally littered with monuments commemorating past 
figures and events. Lord Nelson still stands high on his column in Trafalgar Square. 
Together with countless others, his statue is the material reminder of the achievements 
of and the tragedies suffered by our ancestors.
More importantly, the past is not merely of academic and aesthetic interest. We 
attach practical and political consequences to history. Sometimes we feel an enormous 
sense of pride or indignation in connection to events that took place long before we 
were bom. Examples abound: We honour those who gave their lives in the World Wars; 
the German state still accepts its war debt, while certain German corporations do the 
same; people demand apologies and reparations over alleged crimes committed by 
colonial powers and slave-trading organisations centuries ago; Greece is still adamant 
that the Elgin Marbles be returned from their current location in the British Museum in 
London; nationalist movements use and abuse past events for inspiration and 
justification of their present ends; past generations pass on their national debts to future 
generations; and century-old constitutions, laws and treaties continue to bind us today. I 
am not contending, of course, that all these claims and practices are perfectly good and 
reasonable. What I am claiming, however, is that we commonly affirm that our 
relatedness to the past is generally not unlike our relatedness to an earlier self. The past, 
indeed, is an integral part of us. We do not just draw a line under history, but consider
21 D. Lowenthal, The Past is a Foreign Country (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), p. 3.
22 Ibid., p. 367.
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ourselves bound to our ancestors. Our attitudes to the past are very complex and have 
themselves undergone many changes. Lowenthal suggests that to an important extent 
these complexities and changes pertain to how we have come to evaluate the past. But 
whether we characterise the past as a benefit or a burden, whether we exhort the past as 
an example or reject its authority, we are historical creatures who tend to frame the 
issues that face us today within the context of a conception of time that exceeds our own 
brief lives and connects us with earlier generations. History may sometimes stand in the 
way of our happiness, but the idea that generations are unconnected -  like ‘the flies of a 
summer’, as Burke put it -  does not appeal to us.
The past is not a foreign country but ‘assimilated in ourselves’, Lowenthal quite 
rightly concludes.23 What is less obvious, perhaps, is that this assimilation also extends 
itself in a forward direction. By linking ourselves with the past, we also link ourselves 
with the future. Burke saw that both perspectives spring from the same source. ‘People 
will not look forward to posterity,’ he said, ‘who never look backward to their 
ancestors.’24 Both perspectives appear as two sides of the same coin. Our connectedness 
with the future is perhaps less tangibly present than our assimilation with the past. 
Nevertheless, it still has an important impact on our practical deliberations. Many 
people take an interest in future states of the world, even though they are certain never 
to witness these states themselves. Most of us, I believe, are not wholly indifferent to 
what happens after our deaths. For example, we express concern about climate changes 
in the next hundred years. Of course, some people allege that such concerns are not 
justified. But typically these assertions are grounded in the belief that the effects of 
climate change will be less harmful than some fear. There are very few people -  let 
alone policy-makers -  who would openly argue that climate change constitutes no 
reason for concern simply because the adverse effects thereof will be noticeable only
23 Ibid., p. 412.
24 E. Burke, The Reflections on the Revolution in France, p. 29. The idea that a forward looking 
perspective goes naturally together with a backward looking perspective is affirmed in Bratman’s 
planning model o f agency, which I discussed in Chapter II.
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^  25 • •after our deaths. In a similar vein, people and governments are concerned to conserve 
buildings, ancient cities and valuable landmarks for the future.
Elster claims that human reason is comparable to that of a ‘globally maximizing 
machine’. Other animals are ‘gradient climbers’, who settle for the first ‘local 
equilibrium’ that they come across. But humans investigate the possibility of more 
rewarding equilibria in the future. So in contrast to other organisms, humans think 
several steps ahead. Moreover, they have acquired the crucial capacity to reject 
instantaneous gratification in order to reap a greater gain. We can see the point of taking 
one step backward in order to take two steps forward, even though we may have to face 
up to the problem of weakness of will. Now, according to Elster, this perspective of the 
future is constitutive of our very idea of personhood. He is probably right. But my point 
is that human reason is not confined to a global equilibrium within one life or one 
generation. There is a sense in which even the future beyond our own lives matters to 
us. And this last perspective, I want to suggest, is no less constitutive of our idea of 
personhood.
Here, it is important to reiterate that I do not intend to ground the claim that we ought 
to care about the future in an antecedent view of corporate personality. I merely want to 
point out that a sense of continuity between past, present and future is implicit in many 
of our political and moral practices. And the fact that we have such judgements and 
intuitions underpins the idea of corporate personality as a normative conception. Thus 
the case for associativism, like the case for the moderate claim, emerges only when we 
begin from a normative standpoint and we accept certain pre-theoretical judgements 
from the outset.
25 At the so-called ‘Earth Summit’ in Rio de Janeiro the United Nation reached agreement on the 
principle that ‘The right to development must be fulfilled so as to equitably meet developmental and 
environmental needs o f present and future generations.’ See the UN Report o f  the United Nations 
Conference on Environment and Development, at http://www.un.org/documents/ga/confl 5 1 (1992).
26 J. Elster, Ulysses and the Sirens, Chapter I.
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In what follows, I shall assume that the idea that future generations matter is 
relatively uncontroversial at the intuitive level. Conservatives, insofar as they are 
worthy of their name, would agree. More importantly, it is also evident that 
individualist theorists like Rawls, Barry, Kavka and Gauthier tend to share this intuition. 
Hence, I want to carry on with the second part of my argument, which is predominantly 
theoretical. Briefly, this maintains that the idea of corporate personality is necessary to 
corroborate this intuition within a plausible theoretical framework. In order to make this 
claim stick, it must first be argued that the mutual advantage and Kantian objections to 
associativism lose their gravity in the trans-generational context. I want to press home 
the negative part of this argument in the remainder of this chapter, mainly by focussing 
on the idea of justice between generations.
4. Reciprocity and Obligations to Future Generations
As I just said, I want to concentrate on the claims that generations could put on each 
other in terms of justice. In recent decades, such claims have been widely discussed, 
mainly in relation to the depletion of resources, environmental pollution, climate 
change, the accumulation of national debt, and so forth. Similar claims, I think, may be 
advanced for the conservation of cultural resources. But to keep matters simple, I shall 
build on an example of Parfit’s.
The Depletion Case: The present Generation A discovers and controls a non­
renewable but highly valuable resource X. There are two options: Generation A 
could nearly exhaust X. Near depletion maximises utility for A , it leaves 
Generation B worse off, and it means that Generation C will eventually face a 
catastrophe. Alternatively, A could conserve sufficient X , allowing B and C to co- 
profit from the resource. Conservation means that both A, B  as well as C have an 
equal share of this resource. Consequently, while A does less well than it would 
have done otherwise, B and C benefit considerably.
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Conservation
Depletion
Generation A Generation B Generation C
Figure 1 The Depletion Example. Source: D. Parfit, Reasons and Persons, p. 362
Now, I shall assume that most people agree intuitively that Generation A ought to weigh 
the interests of B and C in its decision. These people believe that A ought to decide for 
conservation. But the question is how to validate this intuition within the framework of 
ethical individualism. And for this, it is natural to turn to the idea of distributive justice.
To begin with, consider the argument from justice as mutual advantage, which 
essentially claims that conservation provides a Pareto-improvement leading to gains for 
all. On first inspection, this seems clearly false. While it leads to gains for B and C, and 
may even maximise overall utility, conservation leads to a loss for Generation A. This 
problem arises partly because A , B and C find themselves in conditions devoid of 
reciprocity and equality. As has often been noted, there is nothing that a future
n n
generation could do for us now. Consequently, conservation imposes a costs on A for 
which it could receive no compensation. As Heilbroner once put the problem: ‘Why 
should I lift a finger to affect events that will have no more meaning for me seventy-five
n o
years after my death than those that happened seventy-five years before I was bom?’ 
He finds it very hard to imagine a ‘rational’ answer in this case.29
27 A democratic process o f preference aggregation equally fails to capture future interests. See J. G. 
March and J. P. Olsen, Rediscovering Institutions: The Organizational Basis o f  Politics (New York: The
Free Press, 1989), pp. 146-149.
28 R. L. Heilbroner, ‘What Has Posterity Ever Done For Me?’, in: E. Partridge (ed.) Responsibilities to
Future Generations: Environmental Ethics (Buffalo: Prometheus Books, 1981), pp. 191-194, at p. 191.
29 For a frank assessment o f the limitations o f contractarianism in this context, see G. S. Kavka, 
Hobbesian Moral and Political Theory, especially pp. 443-446. For a further critical analysis, see also D. 
Braybrooke, ‘The Social Contract and Property Rights across the Generations’, in: P. Laslett and J. S.
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4.1 Generational Overlap
However, in his Morals by Agreement, Gauthier sets out to solve the problem by 
pointing out that generations overlap: ‘Each person interacts with others both older and 
younger than himself, and enters thereby into a continuous thread of interaction 
extending from the most remote human past to the farthest future of our kind.’30 Let us 
say, then, that Generation A overlaps with B , and B with C, and so forth. Let us further 
grant, as seems plausible, that since their lives are partially overlapping, A and B could 
agree on a fair distribution of X. For example, B would get a share if it provides for a 
pension scheme in return. Now, while there is no direct reciprocity between A and C, 
the key to Gauthier’s solution is that this reciprocity will be mediated by B. Thus, C can 
benefit or harm By and B can benefit or harm A, and so they all connect. It seems that he 
believes that the interests of posterity can be adequately secured in this way. B knows 
that it could benefit from the same agreement with C. So, as B negotiates terms with A, 
it ‘must keep in mind [its] need to establish similar terms with those of a later 
generation’.31
Notice that Gauthier claims that the terms of the contract must necessarily be similar 
or the same. In order to be able to gain from an agreement with C later, B has an 
incentive to insist on terms similarly acceptable to C, and it would further know that C 
would insist on terms similarly acceptable to Generation D, and so forth. Hence, some 
equitable policy would result. Or so at least the theory claims. For example, A might 
initially suggest to B that they divide the resource between them. But B could not accept 
this proposal because it knows that it will eventually need to secure co-operation with 
C. A then proposes a three way split. But still, B  also knows that C will eventually need
Fishkin (eds.), Justice Between Age Groups and Generations (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992), 
£j>. 107-126.
D. Gauthier, Morals by Agreement, p. 299.
31 Ibid., p. 299, emphasis added. For a similar view, see J. Heath, ‘Intergenerational Cooperation and 
Distributive Justice’, Canadian Journal o f  Philosophy, Volume 27, Number 3 (1997), pp. 361-376.
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to co-operate with D , and D  with E. Consequently, we arrive at an equal cut for all 
future generations. If there are an n number of generations, each generation obtains l/«th 
share.
However, while intriguing, this solution is in the end not very credible. On closer 
inspection, there appears to be no persuasive reason why B  must offer the exact same 
terms to C. Why not simply negotiate one deal with A and reach an entirely different 
agreement with C, with the aim of profiting optimally from co-operation with A and C 
respectively?
Assume again that overlapping generations A and B are trying to find a scheme that 
is mutually beneficial to them both. While A fully controls access to resource X , B could 
offer certain benefits in return for a share. Now, surely it is not beyond the realm of 
possibilities that A and B agree to use, say, 40 percent each and leave only 20 percent to 
future generations. In fact, such an agreement is prima facie plausible because A would 
still control a good part of X, while gaining from B ’s co-operation in return for saving 
the remainder. B still receives a far greater share than it would have received either if A 
had taken it all or the resource would be shared equally between all future generations. 
Moreover, B would still be able to profit from a degree of co-operation with C. When it 
arrives on the scene, B could tell C: ‘X  is now almost exhausted and we have benefited 
nicely from our contract with A. If you want what is left, then you would have to do this 
for us in return.’ The terms of this agreement are not the same as the one between A and 
B. C does not get the share that A and B receive. Hence, it may in turn find it more 
difficult to secure co-operation with D. But there is no reason why B and C could not 
come to some sort of agreement. It may be true that B will not manage to elicit a high 
level of co-operative gain from C. But it is not implausible that the benefits from having 
a greater share of X  still outweigh the reduced benefits from co-operation with C.
To put it differently, A and B will each calculate the advantages of having full access 
to X, compare these to the expected benefits of full inter-generational co-operation -
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call these Y -  and opt for the most attractive arrangement or bundle of X  and Y  they 
could possibly obtain. Since it is clearly impossible to fully deplete and maximise co­
operative benefits at the same time, each generation will trade X  off against Y until an 
equilibrium is reached.
Now, theoretically, it is a still a possibility that this optimum converges with 
intergenerational equality. But Gauthier’s approach could only guarantee this 
convergence by attaching an unrealistic weight to the relative benefit of 
intergenerational co-operation vis-a-vis the benefit of resource depletion. His argument 
suggests that present generation A should be prepared to give up its monopoly over a 
valuable resource, and satisfy itself with 1 /«* share of X f all in return for B's  co­
operation. Now, it may be plausible, perhaps, that A would give up half or even two- 
thirds of its share in X  to obtain a certain share of co-operative benefit in return. But is it 
also plausible that A would consider a drop to having a mere 1/10th or l/20th or even
th 321/50 share? It is not unreasonable, I think, to claim that generational overlap explains 
how just distributions between a limited number of generations could emerge. This 
claim seems quite credible for generations that directly overlap, like A and B, and 
possibly even for the next one or two generations. What is unreasonable is Gauthier’s 
further claim that ‘indirect co-operative links’ extend ‘to the farthest future of our kind’. 
For some «, the present generation will simply find it more profitable to hang on to what 
it now has and to break free from Gauthier’s chain of inter-generational co-operation.
4.2 The Morality o f  Feeling
Now, Gauthier claims that the alternative routing to justice between generations invokes 
what he describes as ‘the morality of feeling’. This morality, we may surmise,
32. For this and other objections, see L. S. Temkin, ‘Justice and Equality: Some Questions About Scope’, 
Social Philosophy and Policy, Volume 12, Number 2 (1995), pp. 72-104; K. Sauve, ‘Gauthier, Property 
Rights, and Future Generations’, Canadian Journal o f  Philosophy, Volume 25, Number 2 (1995), pp. 
163-176; A. De Shalit, Why Posterity Matters: Environmental Policies and Future Generations (London: 
Routledge, 1995), p. 96.
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recognises that people normally take an interest in the well-being of their immediate 
successors. Other writers do indeed advance this solution. In A Theory o f Justice, for 
example, Rawls claims that the parties in the original position will care about the well­
being of at least some persons in the next generation.33 We should regard them as 
‘heads of families’ and ‘having a desire to further the welfare of their nearest 
descendants’. Again the suggestion is that the ‘overlapping interests’ between two 
adjoining generations expand into a much longer chain of interests. A wants to benefit 
B , and B wants to benefit C, so A indirectly wants to promote the welfare of C. Now, 
this argument is I think still a form of individualism. It merely extends its motivational 
assumption by assuming that people are not completely disinterested in each other. A 
finds a reason to conserve because it has an indirect interest in the well-being of C. 
However, this also forms the weakness of the argument. The interests of C have weight, 
not as such, but only because they affect A ’s own well-being. Moreover, it only acquires 
this weight through the intermediary position of B. It is obvious, therefore, that the 
interest of future generations could only have an impact in a diluted form. Kavka rightly 
remarks that this argument succumbs to a ‘multiplier effect over generations’.34
Ernest Partridge argues along similar lines, but in favour of a bolder revision of the 
motivation assumption.35 Whereas Rawls limits himself to the view that we should think 
of ourselves as fathers or mothers, Partridge writes: ‘healthy, well-functioning human 
beings have a basic and pervasive need to transcend themselves; that is, to identify 
themselves as a part of larger, ongoing, and enduring processes, projects, institutions, 
and ideals.’36 People need to extend their interests and concerns beyond the narrow 
confines of their own banal lives, which are all too often ruled by ‘gadgetry’, 
‘diversions’ and ‘opulence’, and also beyond their own births and deaths. For only by
33 J. Rawls, A Theory O f Justice, p. 128 and pp. 284-293. See also D. C. Hubin, ‘Justice and Future
Generations’, Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol. 6, Issue 1 (1976), pp. 70-83.
34 G. S. Kavka, Hobbesian Moral and Political Theory, p. 444.
35 E. Partridge, ‘Why Care About the Future?’, in: E. Partridge (ed.) Responsibilities to Future 
Generations: Environmental Ethics, pp. 203- 220.
36 Ibid., p. 217.
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getting involved in such things as ‘philanthropy’, ‘the arts’, ‘social work’, and ‘political 
issues’ are we capable of leading truly meaningful lives. Only in these activities do we 
find an escape from ‘alienation’ and ‘narcissistic disorder’. Since Partridge also believes 
that the good of posterity is ‘a valid object of transpersonal devotion’, the convenient 
upshot is that ‘life is immediately enriched by the collective agreement of the living to 
provide for the well-being of the unborn.’37 Hence, his theory is still meant to fit into 
the mutual advantage mould. Why care about the future? The answer is that in doing so 
I am in fact promoting my own good properly conceived.
However, there are important difficulties with this view. To begin with, I cannot help 
but feel deep uneasiness about the fact that these so-called self-transcendent concerns 
are somehow still grounded in the interests of the self. Partridge probably shares this 
worry. For he goes out of his way to show that ‘full’ self-transcendence requires that we 
engage with these concerns not because we thereby fill up our own existential voids or 
triumph over our mortality -  this would quite obviously be self-defeating -  but because 
we are under the (false) impression that these things are valuable for their own sake. So 
while transcendence is good for me, this cannot logically be my internal motive. 
Nevertheless, since Partridge looks at the issue from an external standpoint, for him the 
real (and necessarily secret) reason why I should care about the future is still that I have 
reason to care about myself.
Even so, I still find this attempt to bring everything together in self-interest highly 
questionable; First, there is the obvious suspicion that the whole approach is rigged 
from the outset. From the initial assumption of mutual disinterest, our motivations are 
simply stretched up until they generate the correct results. The individualist first tries 
out the appeal to parenthood. Since that idea does not work, he introduces the notion of
37 Ibid., p. 217.
38 See Barry’s criticism o f Rawls in ‘Justice Between Generations’, in: Liberty and Justice: Essays in 
Political Theory 2 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991), pp. 242-258, at p. 253. There he writes: ‘Our limited 
sympathies towards our successors are fed into the sausage-machine o f ‘justice as fairness’ and returned 
to us duly certified as obligations.’ In the end, Rawls is left looking like ‘a conjurer putting a rabbit in a 
hat, taking it out again and expecting a round o f applause.’
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self-transcendence. And if that were insufficient too, I suppose, he could continue 
bringing in alternative assumptions until the desired outcome were reached. Now, the 
only way to remove the suspicion of rigging is to argue that self-transcendence is not 
just something that certain people do, but a constitutive part of the human good 
objectively speaking. If pressed hard enough, I might even come to accept this view. 
What I find much harder to accept, however, is that this good must necessarily involve a 
concern with the future. As Kavka notes, not all other-regarding interests have 
something to do with the good of posterity.391 might just want my football team to win 
the championship, study naval history, or advance the good only of my children. Why, 
then, assume that precisely this concern for the good of posterity is what enriches our 
lives?
Second, there is the further suspicion that Partridge’s theory does not really fit the 
Hobbesian mould after all. Why care about the future? In the end, the answer is highly 
ambiguous. On the one hand, he claims that we should care about the future because 
posterity matters for its own sake. This describes what we actually have to believe and 
think in order to attain ‘full’ self-transcendence and thus our own personal good. 
However, oddly enough he does not appear to hold that this motive or attitude forms a 
bona fide reason for caring about the future. The real reason why we should care is that 
in doing so we are in fact helping ourselves. I find this position baffling. To all intents 
and purposes, we need to think like Kantians. We have to go native, as it were, and 
think of our fellow men as ends in themselves. But externally, that is to say, 
philosophically, this attitude only recommends itself as ‘a more prudent policy for 
achieving self-enrichment and personal satisfaction’. What I am particularly unclear 
about is why Partridge thinks he still has to appeal to this prudential element. The 
standard Hobbesian account is clear enough in this respect. Prudence is supposed to 
give us a non-moral reason for being moral in the first place. So the crucial task is to
39 See Kavka, Hobbesian Moral and Political Theory, p. 445.
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show that moral conduct pays off in terms of our own happiness or good, terms other 
than morality itself. This seems a reasonable challenge. However, for Partridge this 
cannot be the case. After all, for him people are already supposed to think like fully 
committed Kantians. Hence, our own personal good cannot have an independent 
motivating or reason-giving force. In order to achieve ‘full’ transcendence, the 
philosophical truth about what we have reason to do must remain consigned to the 
crevices of the mind. But if this is his view, it makes more sense to embrace Kantianism 
in a more open fashion. The challenge is then to show that it pays off to care about the 
future in terms o f  morality itself
5. What, if Anything, is Wrong With Resource Depletion?
The ethical individualist may therefore renew the Kantian objection. Leaving our 
motivations aside, moral individualism could still explain why conservation is the moral 
choice, or so this objection goes. The conclusion that the interests of future generations 
ought to count no less than our own is well within the reach of contractualist theories of 
justice. One key assumption of contractualist theory is that each individual qua 
individual enjoys the moral right to a reasonable justification for the institutions and 
policies that affect his or her well-being or the conditions thereof. This justification 
needs to be based on principles that no agent motivated to reach general agreement 
could reasonably reject.40 When applied to generations, the contractualist assumption is 
that living generations need to be able to justify relevant policies and decisions to future 
generations. If Generation A wanted to deplete resource X, it could do so only on a 
principle that Generations C could not reasonably reject.
Let us say that A prefers depletion. Does C have a reasonable complaint? To put it 
differently, can A justify its preference for depletion to future generations? On first
40 This is the gist o f the contractualism o f T. M. Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other (Cambridge MA: 
Belknap Press, 1998).
187
inspection, this may seem highly unlikely. Depletion appears to rest on the principle of 
generational egoism at best. Surely, Generation C could reasonably reject this principle. 
Instead, it could offer the egalitarian principle that, all things equal, all generations have 
an equal claim to basic resources like X. This principle may further be grounded in the 
luck-egalitarian intuition that from the moral point of view it is ultimately arbitrary that 
we belong to generation A rather than C. No person has earned his place in the 
generational chain on the basis of ambition. As far as we know, all this is a matter of 
brute luck. Thus, no generation can derive a right to appropriate more than its equal 
share merely because it comes earlier than others. If this egalitarian principle goes 
through, then it seems easy to show that A violates the principles of justice. To be sure, 
it may be inefficient to give each generation an equal but infmitesimally small share of a 
finite resource. But the right to an equal share means that if present generations 
appropriate more than what is rightfully theirs, future generations at least ought to be 
compensated for their loss. They should be able to share in the efficiency gains. This 
seems to be the view that Brian Barry supports. According to him ‘depletion should be 
compensated for in the sense that later generations should be left no worse off [...] than 
they would have been without the depletion.’41
But we do not have to be luck-egalitarians to make this point. We could also turn to 
Locke’s theory of property. Developing this argument, Wolf suggests that while future 
persons have no property rights, their interest should weigh notwithstanding.42 For an 
explanation, he turns to the proviso, which stipulates that appropriation is legitimate 
only if it leaves ‘enough and as good’ for others. Wolf acknowledges that this 
formulation of the proviso is out of date. A key problem is that once we start taking 
future people into account it would be impossible to leave ‘enough and as good’. To 
avoid this problem, he further suggests that we relax the proviso by linking it with
41 B. Barry ‘Intergenerational Justice in Energy Policy’, in D. Maclean and P. G. Brown (eds.), Energy 
and The Future, Totowa: Rowman and Littlefield, 1983), pp. 15-30, at p. 23.
42 C. Wolf, ‘Contemporary Property Rights, Lockean Provisos, and the Interests o f Future Generations’, 
Ethics, 105 (July 1995), pp. 791-818.
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Mill’s principle that ‘people should usually be left free to do as they wish provided that 
their actions are no[t?] harmful to others.’43 He then deduces that ‘A ’s appropriation of 
an unowned resource X constitutes a valid property claim iff no other person is harmed 
by A’s appropriation of X.’ In other words, we do not literally have to worry about 
leaving ‘enough and as good’. We merely have to make sure that our initial appropria­
tion, all things equal, does not impose a significant harm on others. Once this principle 
is up and running, we could offer yet a further explanation for our duties to posterity. 
Generation C has a reasonable complaint because A ’s appropriation o f X constitutes a 
clear violation of the proviso.
However, it remains to be seen whether or not these principles really support the 
right results. The intergenerational context is commonly thought to cause at least four 
special complications. While the first two are not directly fatal, the third and fourth are 
more profound.
The first problem stems from the fact that we need to treat future persons as the 
bearers of interests and rights in the present. De George argues that something that does 
not exist cannot have anything. “This follows from the briefest analysis of the present 
tense form of the verb ‘to have’.”44 Macklin argues that we cannot assign rights to 
future generations because the latter have ‘no identifiable members’ 45 And pointing out 
that future persons do not presently have a capacity for choice, Hillel Steiner arrives at 
the same conclusion 46 That said, there are I think persuasive arguments to the opposite. 
For example, Feinberg argues that we should concede that the interests, and therefore
43 Ibid., p. 804.
44 R. T. De George, ‘The Environment, Rights, and Future Generations’, in: K. E. Goodpaster and K. M. 
Sayre (eds.) Ethics and Problems o f  the 21st Century (Notre Dame: University o f Notre Dame Press,
1979), pp. 93-105, at p. 95.
45 R. Macklin, ‘Can Future Generations Correctly Be Said to Have Rights’, in: E. Partridge (ed.) 
Responsibilities to Future Generations: Environmental Ethics, pp. 151-155.
46 H. Steiner, ‘The Rights o f Future Generations’, in: D. Maclean and P. G. Brown (eds.), Energy and The 
Future, pp. 151-165.
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the rights, of future persons are contingent on the existence of the latter.47 
Consequently, a future person does not presently have an interest or a right in being 
created. He also concedes that the identities of future persons are unclear. Nevertheless, 
we can still realistically assume that someone will exist in the future. It is sufficient to 
know that there will be an interest, even if we do not precisely know whose interest it 
will be. Nor should we be fazed by the fact that future persons are currently unable to 
exercise a capacity for choice. After all, this fact does not stop us from awarding rights 
to babies and the mentally ill. As Scanlon points out, people lacking the ability to form 
and express their will might not be moral agents in the full sense, but when they can be 
said to have an interest or a good, they could still be represented by trustees acting and 
deciding on their behalf 48
The second complication arises from the fact that the preferences of future 
generations could quite conceivably be different from ours.49 Autres temps, autres 
moeurs. It could be said that the future is like a foreign land or culture. Consequently, 
even if we wanted to, we simply could not know how to promote the good of posterity. 
Could we really be sure that future generations will appreciate Venetian architecture? 
Should we preserve what we think are precious landscapes rather than build more 
airports? Perhaps not, but I suspect that this argument does not carry enough weight to 
dismiss the above principles. In fact, it is unclear why the issue should be anymore 
problematic in the z>ztergenerational context than in the wfragenerational context. 
Contractualist approaches already rely on a thin theory of the good, a theory of primary 
goods or basic resources that facilitate any reasonable conception of the good. We may 
not know to the last detail what the interests of future generations are, but is it really
47 J. Feinberg, Rights, Justice, and the Bounds o f  Liberty, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980). 
See R. Elliot, ‘The Rights o f Future People’, Journal o f  Applied Philosophy, Volume 6, No. 2 (1989), pp.
159-169.
48 T. M. Scanlon, ‘Contractualism and Utilitarianism’, in: A. Sen and B. Williams (ed.), Utilitarianism
and Beyond, pp. 103-128, in particular pp. 113-115.
49 See A. De Shalit, Why Posterity Matters, pp. 102-103; T. Ball, ‘The Incoherence o f Intergenerational 
Justice’, Inquiry, 28:3 (1985), pp. 321-337.
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that presumptuous to predict that future generations will benefit, for example, from 
inheriting a world fit for human habitation, a stable institutional framework and a 
prospering economy? In other words, we may have to accept that there are limits to 
what we could know about the preferences of future people, but to suggest that we 
could know nothing seems implausible.
I should make clear that I am not assuming these objections to be either individually 
or even jointly decisive. That said, a more serious obstruction is caused by the third 
complication. As Laslett and Fishkin have remarked, future generations are potentially 
unlimited in number.50 Compared to a thousand generations to come, our own well­
being appears infmitesimally small. Consequently, the demands of egalitarianism are 
unrealistically high, unless, that is, we could somehow justify a discounting rate for 
future interests. But a discounting rate seems to be in breach of the core assumption of 
impartiality.
The fourth objection, which I want to discuss at greater length, is often described as 
the ‘non-identity problem’.51 To see why, let us return to the example of the depletion of 
resource X. Thus far, we have assumed that the identities of the individuals belonging to 
generation C remain unaffected by A ’s choice. Parfit has argued that we should 
eliminate this assumption. In that case, the choice for either depletion or conservation 
will co-determine which persons, out of a larger domain of potential future people, will 
become the people that actually form Generation C. If A decides for depletion, C is 
formed by a particular set of people dC. However, if A decides for conservation, C 
consists entirely out of a set of different people cC. This difference is explained by the
50 P. Laslett and J. S. Fishkin, ‘Introduction’, in: P. Laslett and J. S. Fishkin (eds.), Justice Between Age 
Groups and Generations, p. 6. See also T. T. Thompson, ‘Are We Obligated to Future Others?’, in: E. 
Partridge (ed.), Responsibilities to Future Generations (Buffalo/New York: Prometheus Books, 1981), 
pp. 195-202.
5 See D. Parfit, Reasons and Persons, Chapter 16; T. Schwartz, ‘Obligations to Posterity’, in: R. I.
Sikora and B. Barry (eds.), Obligations to Future Generations (Philadelphia: Temple University Press,
1978), pp. 3-13; D. MacLean, ‘A Moral Requirement o f Energy Policies’, in: D. Maclean and P. G.
Brown (eds.), Energy and The Future, pp. 180-197; J. S. Fishkin, ‘Limits o f Intergenerational Justice’, in:
P. Laslett and J. S. Fishkin (eds.), Justice Between Age Groups and Generations, pp. 62-83.
52 D. Parfit, Reasons and Persons, pp. 351-355.
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impact that this decision has on the routines and actions of the members of Generation 
A . Small differences may have big consequences on the long term.
Once this assumption goes through, are the complaints of future generations really 
that reasonable? As Parfit points out, Barry’s egalitarian principle presupposes that 
without depletion dC would have been better off. But the truth of the matter is that 
without depletion they would not even have existed. If A opts for conservation, the 
future belongs to cC. Assuming that dC would not have been better off not existing at 
all, perhaps dC ought to be grateful for the selfishness of those presently alive. At any 
rate, it is no longer obvious that future generations have reason to protest because 
depletion is bad for them. W olfs proviso is bogged down by the same problem. It is 
simply not true that full appropriation is harmful to dC. Wolf simply brushes the non­
identity problem aside in a footnote. ‘Fortunately,’ he says, ‘few accept Parfit’s 
important arguments, though many find them perplexing.’ Perplexing they are indeed, 
but if correct, the proviso does not explain what is wrong with depletion. And if Parfit is 
mistaken, I would like to find out why.
Note that we may grant Feinberg that, contingent on their existence, future 
generations have interests or rights now, and that we should not harm these interests. 
This, however, is simply not enough to avoid the problem. The difficulty is not due to a 
lack of rights, but results from two other factors:
(1) The Person-affecting Constraint on Morality: The moral principles here 
advanced assume that an act or policy could be wrong only if this act or policy is 
worse for some particular person (or generation) than another act or policy.53
For obvious reasons, this feature is closely aligned with the main tenet of moral 
individualism itself. In judging acts and policies we take the interests of continuous 
persons as our guideline, not the interests of time-sliced persons or even non-humanist 
criteria. If some act or policy is to be objectionable, at least someone must be worse off.
53 . . . .Here I follow D. Parfit, Reasons and Persons, p. 394. See also Kavka’s ‘obligation principle’ in ‘The
Paradox o f Future Individuals’, Philosophy and Public Affairs, Volume 11 (1982), pp. 93-112, p. 95.
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(2) The Rejection o f the Same Persons Assumption: Future generations consist out 
of a set of potential beings whose actuality is, all else equal, determined precisely 
by the very policies and decisions that need moral appraisal. In other words, we 
have given up the assumption that dC and cC are the same people.
It is this combination of assumptions that leads to the Catch 22 that Parfit describes. If 
we deplete, we know perfectly well that dC will exists and we also fully agree that it 
may have interests now. But opting for conservation will not make any prospective 
member of dC better off. We might still think that depletion is wrong, but we cannot 
appeal to the interests and rights of future people in order to explain why. Depletion is 
not wrong because dC’s rights or any rights are violated, and so we need to look for 
other solutions and principles.
5.1 The Veil o f  Ignorance
One obvious suggestion is that the problem would simply disappear if we applied the 
veil of ignorance in a more rigorously Kantian way than Rawls himself claims is 
advisable. Rawls has always favoured what he calls ‘the present-time point of entry’. 
This assumes that the parties in the original position are aware of the fact that they are 
contemporaries. Hence, the principles of justice are also biased to the present.54 
However, if it were possible to include parties from all generations, would we not be 
certain to arrive at more impartial judgements? Given the risk that the parties belong to 
dC, conservation would seem to maximise the position of the worst off. 55
Rawls rejects this view of the original position on at least two grounds. The first 
argument for retaining his present-time point of entry is that this seems more consistent
54 J. Rawls, A Theory o f  Justice, p. 139; 292. In order to nevertheless arrive at a just savings principle 
Rawls used to prefer to amend the motivation assumption. More recently, however, his view has changed. 
In Political Liberalism (p. 274) he holds that under the present-time o f entry interpretation the parties will 
adopt the correct saving principle ‘subject to the further condition that they must want all previous 
generations to have followed it.’ For a critical analysis o f this solution, see R. Paden, ‘Reciprocity and 
Intergenerational Justice’, Public Affairs Quarterly, Vol. 10, Number 3, July, 1996, pp. 246-266.
55 For this view, see D. A. J. Richards, ‘Contractarian Theory and Intergenerational Justice’, in: D. 
Maclean and P. G. Brown (eds.), Energy and The Future, pp. 131-150.
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with the general role he allots to the circumstances of justice.56 Briefly, he believes that 
the scope of justice is circumscribed by empirical conditions of reciprocity and equality. 
However, because the purely impartialist approach disposes of these circumstances 
altogether, this argument poses no real threat to a more inclusive approach. This view 
rejects the circumstances of justice in the first place.
The second argument is more specifically aimed at the issue of justice between 
generations. According to Rawls, the inclusive approach fails because it ‘stretches
cn
fantasy too far’. While he does not explain at length why this is the case, I suspect that 
here he is nevertheless correct. Once we have rejected the same persons assumption, it 
should be recognised that there are two ways in which a purely impartial approach 
could set up the original position. To begin with, we could admit all persons who will 
live or have lived at some point in history. This means that the parties in the original 
position know for a fact that they will actually live. Alternatively, the original position 
could contain all persons who could potentially live at some point in time. So, the 
parties know that they might or might not live, depending, among other things, on the 
principles or policies actually chosen. However, both interpretations are equally 
problematic. On the one hand, it has been claimed that the idea that we should include 
only actual persons is founded on illogical reasoning.58 If Parfit is right, we should 
assume that the very principles of justice that are adopted in the original position co- 
determine who will actually exist. But then we would have to fix these principles before 
the procedure could even commence. For example, if we say that Generation dC is 
represented behind the veil of ignorance, then we have already committed ourselves to 
depletion. Once it is assumed that the parties in the original position know that they will 
exist at some point in the future there is little left to say. On the other hand, the idea that
56 See B. Barry, ‘Circumstances o f Justice and Future Generations’, in: R. I. Sikora and B. Barry (eds.), 
Obligations to Future Generations, pp. 204-248; and more generally his Theories o f  Justice.
57 J. Rawls, A Theory o f  Justice, p. 139.
58 B. Barry, ‘Justice Between Generations’, pp. 254-255; D. Parfit, Reasons and Persons, p. 392; A. De 
Shalit, Why Posterity Matters, pp. 110-111.
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we should admit all potential persons may seem to do greater justice to the theory. At 
least it avoids fixing certain outcomes in advance. Nevertheless, this interpretation 
seems a non-starter for a different reason. The parties in the original position must now 
decide on their very own existence, and to put it mildly, it is not at all clear on what 
rational basis they are exactly supposed to do that. Assuming that all parties want to 
avoid non-existence, how do we maximise the position of the worst-off? To be frank, 
the whole exercise seems rather absurd. Rather than doing its job as an ‘expository 
device’, here the veil of ignorance only works to complicate the issue even further.
5.2 K avka’s Solution
A further and more interesting suggestion appeals to the Kantian imperative that we 
ought to treat persons and their creation as ends in themselves, never as means to some 
other end. This argument is pressed in Gregory Kavka’s treatment of the issue.59 He 
compares the non-identity problem to a range of what he thinks are comparable cases, 
most notably:
The case o f  the slave child: Assume that slavery is legal. A slaveholder offers 
$50,000 to a couple to first produce a child and then sell it into slavery to him. 
The couple did not have any prior plans to create a child. But since they are keen 
to buy a yacht, the extra money would be extremely useful. Should they decide to 
go ahead with it?
Most of us think that this would be terribly wrong, of course. But how could we argue 
for this conclusion? As in the depletion case, the difficulty is that we cannot appeal to 
the interests of the child. If the couple reject the offer, they will not have that child. 
Assuming that being a slave is still better than not being at all, the child would be better 
off if the couple accepted the offer, as would the couple and the slaveholder. We cannot, 
then, appeal to principles that fall within the person-affecting constraint, which could
59 G. S. Kavka, ‘The Paradox o f Future Individuals’, Philosophy and Public Affairs, Volume 11 (1982), 
pp. 93-112.
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reject policies or acts only on the condition that these policies or acts harm the interests 
o f some person.
Essentially, Kavka suggests we tinker with and stretch up the person-affecting 
constraint until we have found an acceptable result. He aims to find principles that could 
show that it is possible to wrong someone without actually harming him.60 Two ideas 
appeal to him in particular. First, the agreement is wrong because it creates a state of 
affairs that is intrinsically undesirable. Even though it harms no one, a world with the 
slave child is inherently bad, Kavka claims, because it contains a ‘restricted life’. That 
is, it contains ‘a life that is significantly deficient in one or more of the major respects 
that generally make human lives valuable and worth living.’61 Second, the agreement is 
wrong because the couple use the creation of a person as a means to an end, which in 
this case is a yacht. According to Kavka, it is wrong to treat a person as a commodity, 
even if  in doing so we make him or her better off.
Now, these principles may or may not explain our intuitions in the case of the slave 
child. But the problem is that we cannot rush to the conclusion that these principles are 
similarly applicable to the depletion case. In fact, the Kantian imperative seems only of 
limited value here. Kavka pithily acknowledges that the depletion case is unlike the case 
of the slave child in the following way. While it is obvious that the couple treat the 
creation of the child as a means to an end, this is not so in the case of future generations. 
The present generation does not exploit the creation of a future generation as a means to 
its own well-being. Rather, the fact that future generation might contain restricted lives 
is merely a side effect of its wish to exploit a certain resource. Now, Kavka supposes 
that this requires only minor adjustment. Depletion is wrong, he says, because ‘the fact 
of creation is used as a means of cancelling the prima facie moral prohibition on the acts 
in question that derives from their undesirable effects.’ To put it differently, present
60 Ibid., p. 97.
61 Ibid., p. 105.
62 Ibid., p. 111.
196
generations exploit their powers of creation to get around what should be a perfectly 
obvious moral obligation. However, this modification is not without its problems. The 
main difficulty is that the principle now presupposes depletion to be wrong. 
Consequently, it can no longer do the work that it does in the case of the slave child. 
The Kantian argument seems to rely on a prior moral principle to explain that there is an 
obligation to cancel in the first place.
And so it is Kavka’s first principle that carries the full weight of the argument. The 
claim is that depletion would lead to a future state of affairs that contained restricted 
lives, that such a state is intrinsically bad, and that we are consequently obligated not to 
create it. Notice that according to this principle we are not under a positive duty to 
produce the best life or any life at all. It merely claims that we have a negative duty not 
to create restricted lives. So, it maintains that it is inherently worse to lead a restricted 
life than no life at all. But is this a plausible? One important difficulty with the principle 
is its vagueness. Everything depends on how the notion of a restricted life is fleshed out. 
According to Kavka’s definition, a life is restricted if it lacks at least one of the basic 
elements that make a life worth living. For example, the life of a slave is restricted 
because it lacks autonomy. Other examples he gives are the lives of the seriously 
handicapped, of people ‘struck down in the prime of life by illness’ and of many of 
those ‘living in a very overcrowded world’. He further adds that restricted lives will still 
be worth living on the whole, sometimes even more so than many non-restricted lives. 
The former, he says, are only ‘on average’ less worthwhile than the latter.
It has been argued that this definition is inadequate because, in this form, the 
principle produces many counterintuitive results.63 Take Ludwig, a deaf person. Is it bad 
that he ever lives, even if his life is on the whole more fulfilling and enjoyable than the 
average life? It is one thing to claim that it is a bad thing that Ludwig is deaf -  although 
apparently even might be controversial. However, it is quite another thing to say that
63 See D. Parfit, ‘Future Generations: Further Problems’, Philosophy and Public Affairs, Volume 11 
(1982), pp. 113-172, at pp. 120-121.
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Ludwig had better not live at all. This is unquestionably absurd. Parfit mentions another 
example. Many people believe that having children is something that makes life 
worthwhile. Is it intrinsically bad that there are people who cannot have children? 
Again, this seems highly unlikely.
To avoid these results, could we not simply define the principle more restrictively? 
Kavka might have suggested that we focus on people who lack not one, but several 
elements that make life valuable and worth living. Let us say, then, that Ludwig is not 
merely deaf, but also suffers from a more serious handicap. This leaves him in a chronic 
state of physical agony, depression, despair, and so on. If we pushed Ludwig’s case to 
ever higher levels of deprivation, then it would surely follow, at one point, that his life 
were intrinsically undesirable? Now, that may well be the case. However, this strategy 
falls short for a different reason. First, notice that by increasing the level of 
restrictedness, we are also decreasing the scope of the principle. We may now have to 
conclude that cases like those of the slave child and depletion do not contain sufficiently 
restricted lives. Second, there is also a point at which the appeal to the intrinsic badness 
of restricted lives becomes entirely superfluous. If Ludwig’s life is restricted to the 
extend that it is no longer worth living, then we might as well appeal to principles that 
fall within the person-affecting constraint. Such a state of affairs would not only be 
intrinsically bad, it would also be bad fo r  Ludwig. To put it differently, Kavka’s 
principle is in threat of being flattened between a lower and an upper limit of 
restrictedness. At the lower limit, it loses its intuitive plausibility. At the upper limit, the 
principle loses its scope and efficacy.
I have said that Kavka tinkers with the person-affection constraint. Let me briefly 
mention a more radical departure from this notion. Kavka argues it is undesirable to 
create restricted lives, less desirable than not creating anyone at all. Parfit takes the next 
logical step. He claims that it is undesirable to create a restricted life if we could have
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created a less or non-restricted life instead.64 According to him we should compare the 
possible lives that we could create and produce the life or the state of affairs that 
contains the greatest measure of utility. Depletion is wrong, not because it is harmful to 
anyone or produces restrictive lives, but because possible future generation cC would be 
better off than dC. Similarly, we ought not to produce Kavka’s slave child because a 
free child, presumably, would generally be better off than an enslaved child. To put it 
briefly, of all possible future states of affairs, we should create the one that maximises 
total or average utility.
It falls beyond the scope of this chapter to discuss this maximisation criterion at 
length. Suffice it to note that it rejects person-affecting constraints altogether in favour 
of an entirely impersonal morality. According to the latter morality, an act or policy 
would be wrong if it promoted other than optimal future states of affairs. Whether or not 
an act or policy is harmful to a person is neither here nor there. Rather, what counts is 
the level of total or average utility, regardless of the persons to whom this utility is 
attached. While such an impersonal approach may indeed be successful in avoiding the 
non-identity problem, it encourages other unattractive conclusions. One persistent worry 
is that this criterion is too demanding. It may suggest a duty to reproduce when this 
would lead to a higher level of future well-being.65 Another persistent worry is that 
utilitarianism supports ‘absurd’ and ‘repugnant’ conclusions in the domain of 
population ethics.66 But even if we would manage to avoid these embarrassments, 
liberal individualists like Kavka could not subscribe to impersonal morality. To ethical
64 Ibid., p. 120. See more generally his Reasons and Persons, Part 4.
65 G. S. Kavka, ‘The Paradox o f Future Individuals’, p. 99.
66 See D. Parfit, Reasons and Persons, Chapters 17 and 18. Briefly, what he calls the ‘absurd’ conclusion 
argues that we have to add more people to the world as long as this maximises total utility. What he calls 
the ‘repugnant’ conclusion claims that we may have to reduce the population until we have maximised 
average utility. Parfit admits that he cannot avoid these conclusions. Notice also that utilitarianism does 
not have to subscribe to impersonal morality per se. For an approach that claims to be utilitarian and 
person-affecting at the same time, see J. Narveson, ‘Future People and U s’, in: R. I. Sikora and B. Barry 
(eds.), Obligations to Future Generations, pp. 38-60. Narveson is right to claim that his person-affecting 
utilitarianism avoids these awkward conclusions. But his approach copes no better with Parfit’s non­
identity problem than egalitarian and harm-based solutions. See also the discussion in A. de-Shalit, Why 
Posterity Matters, Chapter 3.
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individualism personal interests and harm are never neither here nor there. Persons are 
what fundamentally matters in morality. Ethical individualism needs to find a solution 
to the problem of generations that is consistent with that central assumption.
Conclusion
Chapter II argues that personal identity should be seen as a normative ideal, not an 
anterior concept aiming at the justification of a particular normative theory. While 
personal identity is relational, these relations should be seen to facilitate responsibility, 
obligation and prudence, and so restore the ethical unity of agency. Chapter III and IV 
argue that associations and groups could have their own personal integrity. Chapter V, 
VI and VII investigate whether or not corporate personality is plausible as a normative 
conception.
To this purpose, Chapter V introduced three hypotheses. The first thesis claims that 
the so-called background goods of culture and language are irreducibly social. 
However, I concluded that these goods could be accommodated by liberal 
individualism. The second thesis advances the proposition that associativism explains 
why we have reason to act morally. The first problem with this view is that mutual 
advantage contractualism offers a rival explanation. The second problem is that 
impartial contractualism denies that this refutes moral individualism at an ideal- 
normative level. Finally, the third hypothesis is associated with Burkean conservatism. 
Briefly, the central claim is here that moral individualists cannot account for the 
practical connectedness that we are commonly thought to have with generations past 
and future.
This last hypothesis derives its strength from the fact that both contractualist 
objections lose their validity in this context. To validate this view, I focused on the 
individualist attempt to extend to scope of distributive justice to generations. More
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precisely, I looked at the Hobbesian school of thought that justice should benefit the de 
facto interests of all parties involved -  what Brian Barry calls ‘justice as mutual 
advantage’. I also looked at the Kantian notion that we should conceive of justice from 
the point of view of a hypothetical baseline of equality, a point of view from where all 
bias towards one’s own interests is barred -  what Barry refers to as ‘justice as 
impartiality’. Banking on a variety of strategies, theorists of both schools claim to be 
able to show that present generations have certain duties of justice to future generations.
I argue that these claims are mistaken. This failure can be traced to one common 
assumption. While justice as mutual advantage allows us to be biased to our selves, and 
justice as impartiality demands that we treat people equally, both approaches maintain 
that individual well-being is what ultimately matters in a reason-giving sense. Both 
varieties of contractualism operate within the person-affecting constraint. They assume 
that an act or policy could be wrong only if this act or policy would be worse for some 
individual than another act or policy. Whether actions, policies and institutions are just 
or unjust pivots on how they affect the interests and rights of individuals.
The hypothesis of conservatism, then, may be the most promising. While it is one 
thing to claim that ethical individualists could explain why we have reason to attach 
significance to culture, or to be moral or sociable, it is something else to say that we 
also have reason to care about future generations. That said, in order to demonstrate that 
the idea of corporate personality fares better in this latter regard we still have to 
construct a positive alternative. I turn to this task in Chapter VI.
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CHAPTER VI
WHY CARE FOR THE FUTURE?
Man owes what he is to the union with his fellow man. The possibility of 
forming associations, which not only increase the power of those alive at the 
time, but also -  and most importantly, because the existence of the associati­
on outspans that of the individual personality -  unite past generations with 
those to come, gave us the possibility of evolution, of history.
Otto von Gierke -  Das Deutsche Genossenschaftsrecht1 
Introduction
In the previous chapter I have argued that individualism is a ‘one-generation 
philosophy’. We saw that individualist theories struggle to explain why we should 
consider the interests of future generations. One important point to emerge from this 
discussion is that these theories fail at two levels. First, insofar as agents take only their 
own preferences as reason-giving, they do not provide the agent with a proper 
motivation. Second, even when assuming -  unrealistically -  that agents make no 
distinction between their own interests and those of others individuals, ethical 
individualism still falls short. The problem is not just that people are not motivated to 
do the right thing, but also that we cannot even explain what the right thing is. The 
normative case for the idea of corporate personality is closely linked with this double 
shortcoming.
So far the argument has been entirely negative. How should we proceed? I have 
already argued that the concept of a person should be included within the field of study 
of normative theory itself. I propose, then, that we try to make headway, not by 
constructing a novel principle of justice, but by changing our conception of the person.
1 O. von Gierke, Das Deutsche Genossenschaftsrecht, in: Community in Historical Perspective, A. Black 
(ed.), p. 2.
As J. Gray once put it in Beyond the New Right (London & New York: Routledge, 1993), p. 136.
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That is, we first have to switch to an alternative unit of agency, and then look for action- 
guiding principles.
Leaving non-humanist accounts aside, there are two options. As we already saw, we 
could change the unit of agency to the temporally discrete stages of a person, and 
therefore reject the person-affecting constraint. This is what Parfit proposes. According 
to him, whether or not an act or policy is harmful to a future individual is of no 
importance to morality. What counts is the level of total or average utility contained in a 
future world. The notion of a temporally extended interest no longer places limits on 
consequentialism.
This chapter develops the second option, which in a sense remains within the person- 
affecting constraint. Rather than dropping this constraint altogether, this option seeks to 
make progress, not by curtailing, but by extending the concept of the person. It suggests 
that we should turn to the notion of corporate personality. I develop this idea as follows. 
Section 1 introduces the notion of transgenerational association by merging the concepts 
of collective and future-directed intention. Section 2 concentrates on /«/rapersonal 
distributions of well-being over time, and makes a distinction between an aggregative 
and a narrative conception of the goodness of a life as a whole. Section 3 applies these 
conceptions to temporal distributions between generations, and argues that in doing so 
we overcome the problems that obstruct ethical individualism.
1. Transgenerational Association
Earlier I argued that for a person to be identical over time we need a particular attitude 
towards the past and the future. That is, we need to acknowledge that our earlier and 
later person-stages are rationally and morally integrated. First, we must have a 
particular attitude to the future, a plan or future-directed intention. Second, we should 
also assume a certain attitude to the past. We have to take future-directed intentions as
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reason-giving. What is more, we should be prepared to acknowledge past actions and 
decisions as our own, and try to maintain a level of internal consistency between them. 
Precisely this is what is meant by integrity.
I have also argued that corporate personality requires two similar attitudes. First, we 
must share an intention. A collection of individuals forms a corporate person when 
individual intentions are interlocking in such a way that they are aiming to achieve a 
purpose together. Second, we need to think in a mode in which this collective intention 
is considered to be normative. In other words, the collective intention should provide 
the group with a standard of conduct.
I now want to add a temporal dimension to the notion of corporate personality. 
Clearly, associations are not frozen in time. Not only do they connect individuals to 
each other, they also connect individuals over time. This could be explained as follows. 
To begin with, it should be pointed out that a collective intention could also be future- 
directed. Collective intentions are usually defined not just over the present actions of 
several people, but also over what they could achieve together over a period of time. 
Thus, the identity of a corporate person over time depends on a collection of people CP, 
whose intentions cohere rationally such that they could be said to be aiming to achieve 
something together at some future point in time. So, CPt needs to be connected with its 
own ‘person-stages’ CPSti, CPSa ... CPSm in the same way that individual persons are. 
Associations have their own narrative, their own plot and structure, their own 
beginnings and ends. They emerge, moreover, where individuals think in a mode 
containing collective intentions referring to the life of an association as a temporal 
whole or at least an important chunk of it.
The key is that the continuity of individual and association differs in that the latter 
could span several generations. For the continuity of an association it is not necessary 
that its membership consist out of the same individuals. It is not the case, clearly, that an 
association could have continuity only if the same set of people at t share the same
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intention at t„. We know that every day many British citizens die and many new citizens 
are bom. Yet in spite of this permanent flux we think that the state retains its continuity. 
What is more important, clearly, is that old and new members share the same intention. 
It is more important, in other words, that the association retains its integrity.
To see how the idea of corporate personality copes with the problem of generations, 
let us assume, then, that Generations A , B and C form part of the same trans­
generational association.3 So, A , B , and C form a bundle of intentions with a degree of 
integrity. That is, their intentions are normatively guided by a collective and at the same 
time future-directed intention in the sense that I explained above. Now, if we give this 
associative relatedness the kind of importance that the moderate claim demands for 
personal identity, then we can perhaps begin to understand how generations are 
significantly connected.
To begin with, I shall focus matters on the problem discussed in the previous chapter. 
Why should present generations take the interests of future generations into account? 
Consider again Parfit’s depletion case. Most people agree that the interests of 
Generation 2? and C should count, and that A therefore ought to conserve rather than 
deplete this resource. The problem, however, was that we could not find a theoretical 
justification for this intuition. Ethical individualists could appeal to theories of 
distributive justice. But when we applied these theories to the letter, it appeared that A 
does not have a strong duty of justice to hand down resource to its successors.
Why am I claiming that associativism provides us with a better theory? 
Associativism gives us a justification that could be compared to the reason why I should
De-Shalit, in his book Why Posterity Matters, has recently revived the idea o f transgenerational moral 
and cultural community. While there are clear similarities between his approach and the one set out in this 
chapter, two important differences remain. First, and most importantly, I conceive o f transgenerational 
association as a corporate person. That is, I do not necessarily want to invoke the communitarian notion 
o f a moral or cultural community that is constitutive o f its members’ identities. Second, in order to 
capture the ethical importance o f future generations, I draw more explicitly on a comparison with future 
selves and a conception o f the goodness o f a life conceived as a continuous whole. See also A. De-Shalit, 
The Environment: Between Theory and Practice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), Chapter 4. For 
another approach to the same idea, see J. O’Neill, Ecology, Policy and Politics: Human Well-Being and 
the Natural World (London: Routledge, 1993), Chapter 3.
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care about my own private future well-being. According to the moderate claim, my 
future well-being has a bearing on my current decisions and resolutions because I am 
connected with my future selves PStj, PSt2 ... PStn in the manner of a person. I should 
not be indifferent to a future that holds some catastrophe in store because it will affect 
my future good. I might conceivably have less reason to care if this catastrophe takes 
place in thirty years rather than in three months time, but I do have reason to care. To 
put it differently, it is through this relatedness that I extend my hopes and fears into the 
future. Now, if the future interests of a person could still acquire normative relevance in 
our present deliberations, we need to consider one key question more carefully. Given 
that the moderate claim holds, how should we distribute costs and benefits over our 
lives, not as a matter of justice, but rather as a matter of the goodness of a life taken as a 
whole? I shall look at some answers to this question in the case of individual persons 
first and then investigate what happens when we put them into operation in the case of 
transgenerational associations.
2. Temporal Distributions Within Lives
Notice again that temporal distributions within lives are not normally thought to be 
constrained by the Paretian or any other egalitarian principles of justice. It is not 
generally believed to be irrational, let alone wrong, to incur costs now in order to make 
greater gains in the future. To put it differently, compensation between the person- 
stages of one life seems unproblematic. In fact, it would seem that many of our plans 
and ends presuppose compensation. Typically, they require that we give up certain 
things presently in order to reap the rewards later on in life. Yet we do not believe that 
such sacrifices are irrational. And we definitely do not believe that making such 
sacrifices is wrong or unjust. This belief, moreover, is not invalidated by reductionism
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about personal identity. For the moderate claim still allows us to frame the issue in 
terms of the goodness of one life rather than justice between multiple selves.
But if contractualism is implausible, how then do distributions of costs and benefits 
over the stages of a life affect its goodness? What kind of criteria do we appeal to? The 
standard reply, of course, is the utilitarian view that we should not distribute at all, or 
only insofar as certain distributions maximise the total utility contained in a whole life. 
The goodness of a life, therefore, depends purely on the sum-total of utility achieved at 
the end of a life.
This reply touches on two very distinct issues. First, there is the question whether we 
should be partial or impartial to the temporal parts of our life. The utilitarian view 
shares with egalitarianism that each person-stage counts for one, just as much as each 
person counts for one in the social calculus or distribution. There is, in short, no room 
for ‘pure time-preferences’. Whether the same benefit or cost materialises now, in the 
near future, or at some later time in the future should have no impact on our decisions. 
All else equal, we should be impartial to when goods or costs transpire.4
The second question is whether temporal distributions have a value independent of 
maximisation. As they do on the social level, both the egalitarian and the utilitarian 
advocate impartiality. But while according to the former it matters how costs and 
benefits are divided over a life, the latter maintains that we should just maximise. To the 
goodness of a life as a whole, it matters not that each person-stage gets a certain share; 
what counts is how much it adds up to in the end.
However, I think a more persuasive reply would in fact challenge both components 
of the standard view. Consider the legitimacy of time preferences first. To be more 
precise, consider a time preference, all too familiar to most of us, for what comes nearer 
rather than later in the future, relative to where we are presently. Now, while 
reductionism about identity may not undermine the validity of prudential reason
4 See J. Rawls, A Theory o f  Justice, pp. 293-298; T. Nagel, The Possibility o f  Altruism , Chapter 8.
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altogether, the moderate claim does appear to justify a discount rate for the future.5 This 
is not to say that the mere fact of temporal distance means that the costs and benefits of 
later person-stages weigh less. Temporal distance is as irrelevant as spatial distance. 
However, what justifies the discount rate is the weakening strength in the connectedness 
between the present and person-stages in the far future. If the relatedness with my later 
person-stages fizzles out as we move further into the future, then so does the relative 
weight of my future interests and preferences in my present reasoning. The strength of 
this reason is mediated by the strength of the relation. And in most cases this means that 
we may or even should rationally prioritise the near future over the further future.6
Second, and I think more importantly, David Velleman has argued that the goodness 
of a life taken as a whole cannot be entirely reduced to a simple addition of temporally 
discrete well-being.7 Over and above mere addition, some independent distributive 
criterion comes in. This criterion, however, is not fully captured by egalitarianism 
either. Rather, it suggests that the good life is partly shaped by its progression over time, 
by what he refers to as ‘the overall structure of events’ and ‘their narrative or dramatic 
relations’. In other words, he suggests that there is a distributive aspect of the good after 
all, and that this is captured by how we evaluate the story or the plot of a life. At any 
rate, in judging the narrative coherence of lives we do not just add up temporally
5 D. Parfit, Reasons and Persons, Chapter 14 and Appendix F. In Chapter 8 o f that book, Parfit explores a 
different argument against temporal neutrality. Briefly, this holds that a strict rejection o f  time 
preferences implies that we should not distinguish, not just between the near and the later future, but also 
between the past and future. However, intuitively (and on any conception o f personal identity) it matters 
very much whether desires or benefits and costs are in the past rather than in the future. We are clearly 
biased towards the future, which is in itself a departure from temporal neutrality. Here, I shall leave that 
issue for what it is and focus on the bias towards the near.
6 Michael Slote, in his ‘Goods and Lives’, in: Goods and Virtues (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983), pp. 9- 
37, argues for an opposite time preference in favour o f later over the earlier stages o f a life. But when he 
distinguishes between these stages, he does not mean later and nearer relative to where we are presently. 
He believes that our lives can normally be divided in a number o f phases like childhood, adolescence, 
middle age, and so on. Judged from an absolute point o f view, that is, regardless o f the phase we find 
ourselves in presently, it is the case, as Slote says on page 23, ‘that what happens late in life is naturally 
and automatically invested with greater significance and weight in determining the goodness o f lives.’
J. D. Velleman, ‘Well-being and Time’, in: The Possibility o f  Practical Reason (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 2000) pp. 170-199. See also S. R. Wolf, ‘Happiness and Meaning: Two Aspects o f the Good Life’, 
Social Philosophy and Policy, Volume 14, Number 1 (1997), pp. 207-225.
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discrete moments of well-being. As Velleman remarks, we do not just say, Monday was 
a good day, Tuesday a bad one, Wednesday an uneventful one, and so forth, until we 
have covered all the days of a life. Instead, we need to look at how lives evolve and 
progress towards their end.
Take one of his examples:
Consider two different lives that you might live. One life begins in the depths 
but takes an upward trend: a childhood of deprivation, a troubled youth, 
struggles and setbacks in early adulthood, followed finally by success and 
satisfaction in middle age and a peaceful retirement. Another life begins at the 
heights but slides downhill: a blissful childhood and youth, precocious triumphs 
and rewards in early adulthood, followed by a midlife strewn with disasters that 
lead to misery in old age. Surely, we can imagine two such lives as containing 
equal sums of momentary well-being. Your retirement is as blessed in one life 
as your childhood in the other; your nonage is as blighted in one life as your 
dotage is in the other.8
Now, ex hypothesi these two lives contain an equal amount of added momentary well­
being. Even so, there is clearly a sense in which we tend to evaluate them differently. 
Hence, Velleman makes the wider point that in our judgements on the issue we are also 
looking at ‘trends’ rather than just ‘sums’. But his example also suggests a more 
specific idea, namely that a life characterised by an upward trend is, all things equal, 
better than a life typified by a downward trend.
The wider point that trends matter still falls suitably short of the egalitarian principle 
of justice that trade-offs between earlier and later moments of a life are strictly 
inadmissible, as if each person-stage formed a separate agent. On Velleman’s view, 
such trade-offs are only constrained by the narrative aspects of the goodness of a life 
taken as a whole. So, on the one hand, his view allows that distributive trends have 
independent value. Pure addition does not account for the goodness of a life alone. But 
on the other hand, it is not committed to the more specific notion of an equal 
distribution per se. That is, the notion that well-being has to be distributed equally or the
8 J. D. Velleman, ‘Well-being and Time’, p. 58.
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thought that inequality between person-stages is allowed only insofar as this maximises 
the position of the worst off
Some people are of course drawn to this egalitarian view for the following reason. 
They prefer a life with a relatively consistent and unbroken level of well-being over a 
life with extreme peaks of delight and many extreme depths of despair, even though 
both trends average out at precisely the same level. Their view is that it is better to forgo 
the greatest joy if we can thereby avoid the greatest sorrow and come down somewhere 
in the middle.9 This seems a respectable and judicious position. For example, Sen 
believes that it is normally ‘not the case that no importance is attached to z>z/nzpersonal 
distributions.’10 More precisely, he thinks there is an intuitive basis for saying that the 
z/z/rapersonal equality between the utility of the life-stages contributes to the overall 
goodness of that life. But surely -  and this is my point -  it does not give us the entire 
picture. For a strict interpretation of egalitarianism would surely rule out too much. It 
would altogether disallow the possibility of people incurring costs in the present in 
order to reap a reward or benefit later.
For example, consider the following two career tracks.11 Track A involves accepting 
scantily paid work for the first five years. The job earns you equally little social esteem. 
But little by little you will move up the wage-ladder. Eventually, you will be vastly
9
The Romantics disagreed. Goethe famously wrote:
Blissful 
And tearful,
With thought-teeming brain;
Hoping And fearing 
In passionate pain;
Now shouting in triumph,
Now sunk in despair;—
With love’s thrilling rapture 
What joy can compare!
From: Goethe, J. W. von, Egmont, Act III, Scene II, translated by Anna Swanwick, Vol. XIX, Part 3, The 
Harvard Classics (New York: P.F. Collier & Son, 1909-14; Bartleby.com, 2001.
www.bartleby.com/19/3/).
10 A. Sen, ‘Utilitarianism and Welfarism’, The Journal o f  Philosophy, Vol. 76, No. 9. (1979), pp. 463- 
489, at p. 470-471.
11 Velleman’s example tests how we appreciate upward as opposed to downward trends. This example 
tests how we appraise upward trends in contrast to an egalitarian distribution.
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better paid and widely respected. Track B starts at a higher level. It involves accepting 
an averagely paid and respected job. But there is no prospect of promotion. You will 
earn the same wage your entire life. Assume that both tracks add up to the precise same 
sum of temporally discrete well-being at the end of your life. Now, if the only criterion 
is maximisation, we should be indifferent. If we are egalitarian, we must endorse the 
second path. But my and I think Velleman’s intuition is that the first option is more 
preferable. It is better to start at a low level and to progress towards a much higher level.
If, then, we have to judge a life as a whole, there may indeed be good reasons to 
reject a great variance or inequality in temporal well-being. We might have reason to 
prefer more evenly distributed to wildly fluctuating lives especially if  we thereby avoid 
moments of extreme pain or immense depths of despair. But there are clearly also many 
good reasons to welcome a degree of temporary restraint for the purpose of some later 
accomplishment. Put differently, there is an intuitively strong case for the idea that an 
upward trend -  the advancement of a life towards an end or telos -  adds to the value of 
a life taken as a whole, and so justifies a departure from egalitarianism.
What is the rationale behind the intuitive importance of upward trends? As Velleman
1 9notes, it is not that the later stages of a life naturally count for more than earlier ones.
If this were the case, the importance of trends could still be reduced to the additive 
criterion. We would just have to affix a greater weight to later person-stages and upward 
trends would routinely produce greater aggregates than downward or egalitarian trends. 
But why should the later stages of a life count for more in the first place?
One answer to this question is that later events can retroactively influence the 
momentary well-being of earlier person-stages.13 Assume that you opt for Career Track
12 This is the view o f time preferences that Slote defends in ‘Goods and Lives’. But while he believes that
this preference is allowed, he does not challenge the criterion o f maximisation. Velleman, on the other
hand, does not make the point that the utility o f some person-stages weighs more than others, either in a
relative or absolute sense. His point is that trends or distributions matter for reasons irreducible to
quantities o f temporally discrete utility.
13 See the discussion in J. D. Velleman, ‘Well-being and Time’, pp. 67-68. Another answer refers to the 
importance o f anticipation and rising expectations. See for example J. Rawls. A Theory o f  Justice, p. 421.
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A. If successful in later life, then your initial hardship will have paid off. And according 
to this view, that makes the temporally discrete experiences of earlier person-stages less 
bad than they were back then. Again, if this were the case, trends would after all be 
reducible to sums. Upward trends would contribute ex post facto to the well-being of 
earlier person-stages. But is such retroactive influence really possible?
Velleman thinks we should reject all such attempts to explain the value of upward 
trends in terms of their effect on the total sum of momentary well-being. His point is 
that there is a perspective of the goodness of a life as a whole that is entirely different 
from and not reducible to the maximisation criterion. From this standpoint, the unity of 
a life is understood in terms of what Bratman calls a plan or future-directed intention 
and MacIntyre famously describes as a quest.14 But consequently, the goodness of a life 
as a whole should equally be judged in terms of the successful completion of plan or 
quest. As MacIntyre puts the point:
The unity of a human life is the unity of a narrative quest. Quests sometimes 
fail, are frustrated, abandoned or dissipated into distractions; and human lives 
may in all these ways also fail. But the only criterion for success or failure in a 
human life as a whole are the criteria of success or failure in a narrated or to-be- 
narrated quest.15
That is to say, we need to look at what the past, present and future stages of a life will 
eventually achieve together in terms of an end-product; and we also need to look at the 
adversity and barriers that were conquered in order to get there.16
Now, from this point of view, the reason why upward trends have a greater value 
than downward or egalitarian ones is that the later stages in a life tend to retrospectively
14 I have this discussed this conception o f personal identity in Section 5 o f Chapter 3 above.
15 After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory, pp. 218-219. See also C. Taylor, Sources o f  the Self, Chapter 2.
16 Nietzsche may have held an extreme version of this view. In Twilight o f  the Idols (p. 542), he wrote: 
‘For what is freedom? That one has the will to assume responsibility for oneself. That one maintains the 
distance which separates us. That one becomes more indifferent to difficulties, hardships, privation, even 
to life itself. That one is prepared to sacrifice human beings for one’s cause, not excluding oneself. 
Freedom means that the manly instincts which delight in war and victory dominate over other instincts, 
for example, over those o f ‘pleasure’. The human being who has become free -  and how much more the 
spirit who has become free -  spits on the contemptible type o f well-being dreamed o f by shopkeepers, 
Christians, cows, females, Englishmen, and other democrats. The free man is a warrior.’
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change the meanings of the earlier stages. To be more precise, the former allow us to 
interpret the latter as a prelude to bigger and better things to come and to judge earlier 
stages in terms of their contribution to achieving precisely these things. For example, 
the earlier setbacks in Track A are, as Taylor points out, ‘redeemed’ because they turn 
out to be a link in a chain of events leading to the fulfilment of a greater purpose and 
later happiness.17 Once you are indeed successful and well-regarded in your profession, 
the temporary misery by which progress was wrought seems to detract only little from 
the overall good of your life. In other words, if we consider person-stages to be 
rationally linked by a ‘narrated or to-be-narrated quest’, then the evaluative emphasis 
shifts away from the sorrow and bliss of separate moments towards the overall end to 
which your working life evolves and progresses.
Consider what happens when Track A goes wrong. I sacrifice my momentary well­
being for the next five years in preparation of a career in a particular profession. I am 
about to reap some of the benefits. But instead I am fired and forced to accept a job in 
an entirely separate field. Assume that on balance my new profession turns out to offer 
me the same financial and social reward. Now, even though my new career provides as 
much temporally discrete well-being, there is a sense in which I am still worse off than I 
would have been otherwise. The reason is that my five years of hardship now seem like 
wasted time. Not only does this period contain many bad moments, it is also no longer 
connected to the later fulfilment of a greater purpose or my later happiness. Put 
differently, these years lose their meaning as a prologue to a finale. While professional 
success would have redeemed earlier deprivation, my failure causes my misery to be 
also utterly pointless.
Notice that this is not meant to imply that there are now actually more bad moments 
in my life. What happens later on makes no difference to what is experienced at an 
earlier moment. The fact that then-and-then I had a bad experience cannot be undone.
17 C. Taylor, Sources o f  the Self pp. 50-51.
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Consequently, from the standpoint of impartial maximisation it really is the case that 
once a moment of sorrow has come to pass, it is fed into the calculus and will blemish 
my life forever. However, the thesis is here that there are two distinct standpoints from 
which overall well-being should be assessed. Instead of trying to force these intuitions 
into one comprehensive utilitarian metric we should recognise that the goodness of a 
life taken as a whole is irreducibly plural. A person, Velleman says, ‘has two distinct 
sets of interests, lying along two distinct dimensions -  his synchronic interests, in being 
well off at particular moments, and his diachronic interests, in having good periods of 
time and, in particular, a good life.’18 What this means, then, is that there are also two 
criteria for evaluating what self-interested persons should rationally do, each with its 
own authority. On the one hand, the ‘synchronic’ criterion suggests, with the utilitarian, 
that we should look at the temporally discrete well-being of our person-stages. 
However, we should now add that, within this perspective, the moderate claim implies a 
departure from the assumption of impartiality. That is, we have a strong justification for 
allowing a time preference for the near as opposed to the further future relative to where 
we are presently. On the other hand, the ‘diachronic’ criterion argues that we should do 
what promotes the good when the unity of life is understood as a quest for excellence. It 
emphasises the importance of upward trends or the successful achievement of a certain 
plan or objective at the end of one’s life.
To sum up, if we are trying to find out how the goodness of a life taken as a whole is 
affected by the temporal distributions of well-being over person-stages, there appear to 
be at least three criteria at work. The first criterion denies that such distributions have 
other than instrumental value. It argues for outright maximisation of the sum-total of the 
utility of the person-stages that form one life. The second criterion expresses an 
egalitarian concern with distributions. It claims that we should prevent moments of 
extreme anguish and suffering. The third criterion suggests that temporal distributions
18 J. D. Velleman, ‘Well-being and Time’, p. 71.
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matter from the standpoint that views the unity of a life in terms of a plan or quest. This 
standpoint advocates the importance of upward trends.
3. Temporal Distributions within Associations
The crux of the normative argument for associativism is that these criteria apply in 
similar fashion to temporal distributions within transgenerational associations like 
states. Corporate personality opens up a mode of reasoning at the social level that 
individualism keeps confined to /wfrapersonal issues. It suggests that we tackle the 
generational problem by appealing to the criteria that govern the goodness of a life 
rather than those of contractual justice. Put differently, it suggests that we view 
generations like we view the temporal stages of one person.
This essentially is the Burkean view, which stands directly opposed to what Thomas 
Jefferson believed. The latter viewed each generation as a separate sovereign nation. As 
he put it:
... between society and society, or generation and generation there is no 
municipal obligation, no umpire but the law of nature. We seem not to have 
perceived that, by the law of nature, one generation is to another as one 
independent nation to another.19
If we view generations like Jefferson does here, the almost inevitable upshot is that the 
issue could only be framed in terms of contractual justice and equality, even if this 
invites the difficulties raised in the previous chapter. Even more problematically, 
perhaps, the generational issue must be compared to the problem of distributive justice 
between nations.
I suspect that there is indeed a widespread tendency to take it as a matter of course 
that both issues are the expression of what is in the end one and the same problem: how
19 T. Jefferson, ‘The Earth Belongs to the Living’, Letter to James Madison (September 6, 1789), in: M.
D. Peterson (ed.), Writings (New York: The Library o f America, 1984), pp. 959-964, at p. 962.
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to extend the scope of justice or equality to a wider scale. More generally, it is perhaps 
distinctive of normative political theory after Rawls to want to bring within the purview 
of justice and equality an ever-increasing range of issues, problems and domains. The 
realm where these principles have no competence -  we could call it freedom of 
association -  has been forced on a steady retreat. But, predictably, this retreat leads to 
difficulties in cases where justice and equality are not cut out for the work, and thus 
tend to generate counter intuitive or even disturbing results.20 The idea that we should 
feel compelled to bring generational relations under the authority of justice is I think 
another example of this mistake. We should realise that we only feel so compelled 
because we have been tricked into believing Jefferson’s conception of generational 
sovereignty. And as long as this peculiar idea continues to slumber at the back of our 
minds, we will be hard pressed to see how we could ever think otherwise. We will carry 
on struggling to overcome paradoxes, absurdities and complexities like the non-identity 
problem, without realising that mutual advantage and equality are not the only available 
approaches. Generational relations are not necessarily like the relations between 
sovereign nations. The former are not by definition placed under the ‘law of nature’ 
without ‘municipal obligations’. In fact, insofar as Jefferson claims logical exclusivity, 
his view is plainly false. The fundamental difference between sovereign nation-states 
and generations is precisely that generations could conceivable belong to one nation­
state. This way of thinking is not just intuitively plausible but, more importantly, also 
logically possible. The idea of corporate personality shows that it is no less possible to 
see generations as the temporal stages of one association or community than it is to 
view the temporal stages of a life as part of one person.
20 Notice that this is precisely what Parfit does. To wit, he first brings the relations between person-stages 
under the competence o f  justice and equality by means o f  the reductionist argument. However, 
paradoxically, he then claims that by so extending their scope, the principles o f justice lose their weight 
aind ultimately even collapse in a form o f impersonal utilitarianism. See Reasons and Persons, pp. 332- 
345. Intriguingly, the argument suggests that this attempt to forever increase equality’s scope to wider 
domains is ultimately self-defeating.
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I suggest, then, that we reject Jefferson’s conception and replace it with the Burkean 
view of the state as a transgenerational person. Once we change to this associative 
perspective, we have to admit, of course, that we are not making any claims about a 
moral duty of justice, at least not as Kantians like to think of it. The reasons or 
obligations we are talking about do not have the form of categorical duty. At the same 
time, we should also recognise that we are not making any claims about what narrowly 
self-interested agents have reason to do, at least not as understood by Gauthier and other 
followers of Hobbes. While the reasons I propose are agent-relative, they are also 
framed in terms of the good of a wider group of people. There is, then, a sense in which 
the idea of corporate personality overcomes the classic dichotomy between other- 
regarding duty and self-regarding interest. Unlike Kantian duty, it provides us with 
ethical reasons that are rooted in the motivations, interests and preferences that are 
constitutive of the self. Unlike justice as mutual advantage, however, corporate 
personality expands the notion of the self such that it includes not only present and 
future interests and preferences, but also the interests and preferences of certain other 
people. However we describe these reasons, the main argument is here that they avoid 
some of the problems that beleaguer the idea of intergenerational justice.
3.1 Society is Indeed a Contract
To begin with, consider again the problem that confronts mutual advantage theories of 
intergenerational justice. These theories rely on the guiding intuition that it is not right 
to transfer resources or goods from one party to another, unless both parties stand to 
gain from the transfer. Going back to the depletion case, it therefore has to be claimed 
that conservation leads to gains for the present and future generations. Ultimately, this is 
not a plausible claim. While conservation leads to serious gains for B and C, it is 
difficult to see why generation A should agree to such a policy, even though the 
sacrifice it involves may be trivial in comparison. The key problem with these theories
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is that the scope for mutual co-operation between generations is limited. Present 
generations can transfer goods and resources to future generations, but there is little 
room for transfers in the opposite direction.
Conversely, corporate personality offers a view of intergenerational co-operation that 
is strikingly different. Justice as mutual advantage, on the one hand, conceives of 
society as a co-operative scheme between rational individuals, each with a separate 
interest. Like Jefferson, it views generations in a similar way, that is, as each having 
interests entirely separate from the other. This is precisely where the problem originates. 
Corporate personality, on the other hand, compares generational relations to co­
operation between person-stages. We already saw that the interests of person-stages do 
not have a separate standing -  this view, indeed, would merely induce madness. Instead, 
our temporally discrete interests are linked and governed by the idea of the goodness of 
a life taken as a continuous whole. To put it differently, while there is a real sense in 
which person-stages have to co-operate, this occurs under the normative guidance of a 
kind of collective intention. It is co-operation in a mode that does not include the 
Paretian principle. It is true, of course, that there is no room for a transfer of goods and 
resources from the future to the past. But this should not stop me, as a rational agent, 
from making such transfers from the past to the future. In the m/rapersonal mode, co­
operative schemes operate on the basis of the principles of the goodness of a life taken 
as a whole. I make such transfers for reasons that have to do with the achievement of 
certain goals at a later period or even the end of my life, or the avoidance of extreme 
suffering, or even the maximisation of temporally discrete well-being.21
If there were to be intergenerational co-operation at all, then it would have to be in 
this mode of agency. That is, it must be co-operation under the normative guidance of a 
shared and collective intention, not the mutual advantage of sovereign generations, each
21 K. Sauve, in his ‘Gauthier, Property Rights, and Future Generations’, p. 175, similarly suggests that 
‘contractors want to be participants in a society that extends and improves into the future, rather than one 
that does not.’
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taken to have an entirely separate interest. This is what Burke must have meant when he 
famously wrote that society was indeed a contract, though
... not only between those who are living, but between those who are living, 
those who are dead, and those who are to be bom. Each contract of each 
particular state is but a clause in the great primeval contract of eternal society, 
linking the lower with the higher natures, connecting the visible and invisible 
world, according to a fixed compact sanctioned by the inviolable oath which 
holds all physical and all moral natures, each in their appointed place.22
The Burkean social contract is unlike any mutual advantage contract because it extends 
through time and across generations. It does not deny that we form mutual advantage 
partnerships for ‘occasional interest’ or for things that are merely ‘temporary and 
perishable’. Justice as mutual advantage may well apply to many o f our dealings with 
contemporaries. Even so, each generation is at the same time joined in a partnership to 
obtain greater things, things that cannot be achieved by one generation alone. Society, 
says Burke, ‘is a partnership in all science; a partnership in all art; a partnership in every 
virtue and in all perfection.’23 His quarrel with the French Revolution was essentially 
that this contract should never have been overturned. However, my point is here merely 
that the generational contract is not governed by the Paretian idea -  it cannot be -  but by 
the principles of the goodness of a life taken as a whole.24
Notice that these principles do not deny that the transitory interests of each 
generation could still matter in a non-additive manner. As suggested, it might also be 
true that the temporally discrete well-being of each person-stage still matter in a non-
22 E. Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France, p. 85.
23 Ibid., p. 85.
24 It is perhaps not surprising that Burke’s liberal critics sometimes fail to understand what he means in 
the passage cited above. For example, Don Herzog, in his article ‘Puzzling Through Burke’, Political 
Theory, Volume 19, No. 3 (1991), pp. 336-363, at pp. 341-342, thinks this passage contains ‘excess 
conceptual baggage’ and is ‘mysterious’ and ‘perplexing’. According to Herzog, Burke’s view o f  the 
social contract provides little else than a set o f theological and metaphysical ramblings, which have 
consequently been shown to be erroneous by ‘the astonishing success o f  modem mechanism’. However, 
what Herzog, like before him Jefferson and Thomas Paine, in his Rights o f  Man, P. S. Foner, (ed.) 
(Secaucus: The Citadel Press, 1974), typically fails to comprehend is that the ‘modem mechanism’ o f the 
social contract is at least in one sense a failure. While it may liberate us from the past, it may equally 
liberate us from the future. Burke, in contrast, saw this weakness and attempted to depict a contract 
according to which past and future generations were included in the deal.
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additive manner. The point is merely that these interests matter in a less than overriding 
way. To put it differently, it is not the case that each generation could veto any proposed 
distribution. Should we avoid imposing terrible hardships on some generations, even if 
this is compensated by the even greater joy of others? On the diachronic view, I can 
imagine there being such reasons. Yet I cannot imagine believing in any strict sense that 
a generation should never be allowed to be worse off. That principle is clearly counter­
intuitive, as the depletion example shows.
Take another example. Dahrendorf feared that former communist states needed to 
cross a ‘valley of tears’ in order to reach more democratic, just and affluent pastures.25 
Assuming he was right, imagine further that the first generation after the capitalist 
revolution is less well off than it would have been under communist rule, the second 
generation breaks even, the third reaches out of the valley, and all next generations start 
on the route to the wonderful summits of capitalism.
Zenith of 
Capitalism
Communism
Valley of Tears
Generation B Generation CGeneration A
Figure 1 The Valley o f  Tears
We may ask: ‘Is this rightV Mutual advantage theories must answer that it is not. The 
first generation receives nothing in return for its loss, even though that may be slight. It 
has been noted before that these theories are hostile to change -  in this instance much 
more so than Burke’s -  but they may also support communism. Should communism in 
this case really have prevailed? Clearly not, for we tend to ask ‘Is it worth it on the long
25 R. Dahrendorf, Reflections on the Revolution in Europe (New York: Time Books 1990), p. 77.
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run?’ And in asking this question, the unit of agency shifts from the individual towards 
the associative level. Here, from the synchronic standpoint we could claim that 
capitalism would add up to more well-being if we counted all generations. The 
diachronic standpoint compares trends and suggests that while communism perpetuates 
stagnation, capitalism will eventually elevate society to a higher stage of civilisation. 
We might claim, that is, that it matters more that these societies progress towards some 
measure of excellence. This may be an ideal of civil freedom or justice; it may be 
artistic grandeur; it may simply be a general level of well-being. But whatever its exact 
content, it is clear that in doing so we move away from co-operation in the mode of 
mutual advantage.
3.2 Why an Appeal to the Rights o f Future People is Unnecessary
I turn to the problems of justice as impartiality. As we saw earlier, the sceptics of justice 
between generations often point out that it is hard to believe and ultimately illogical to 
claim that people who are not yet alive could have rights. Others deny this. If 
associativism is true, then we simply avoid this debate. The fact that generations are 
connected as described above means that the interests of future generations count as 
reason-giving for us now, just as our own future interests and preferences count as 
reason-giving on the moderate claim. We do not have to propose such rights because 
their interests are like our own interests. Associativism has the same impact as the 
moderate claim: while the latter explains why we have reason to care about my own 
future, the former extends the temporal scope of such concern beyond our own life­
time.
Perhaps more important is that we also steer clear of the non-identity problem. To 
recap, this problem stems from fact that future persons are merely potential beings 
whose actual existence in the future depends precisely on the actions and policies under 
scrutiny. In the depletion example, the trouble is that depletion is strictly not harmful to
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anyone at all. Briefly, if we did not conserve, other future people would exist. 
Consequently, by switching from conservation to depletion we would not hurt anyone at 
all. However, if generations A and C were all part of one and the same association, then 
the problem would disappear. We know that A will be related to either dC or cC. 
Whichever generation will exist, it will form part of the same transgenerational 
association. A ’s reason to conserve will thus derive from the good of the association.
It may help to make the following comparison. Notice that for the extremist, the non­
identity problem occurs even within our own individual lives. For example, is smoking 
harmful to one of my future person-stages? I could argue that if I quit smoking, other 
future person-stages would exist. So quitting does not make any person-stage better off. 
Yet I do not think in this way precisely because the future person-stages that will 
actually exist will still be part of my life, whether I quit smoking or not. It does not 
matter that these are different person-stages. It is not important that I may or may not 
affect the interests of some temporally discrete person-stage. What matters is that both 
person-stages, if actualised, would become part of the greater whole that is my life. 
Thus, I have reason to quit if this has a beneficial effect on my life as a whole. That is to 
say, I can imagine having this reason because quitting maximises my total temporally 
discrete well-being. I can imagine having this reason because it avoids moments of 
extreme agony and despair, even though these moments are ultimately outweighed by 
the earlier enjoyment derived from smoking. What is more important, I can imagine 
having this reason because quitting allows me to successfully complete the pursuit of 
certain quests and ends later on in life. From this diachronic standpoint, what is 
particularly bad is that my life may be cut short in its prime. What matters are the 
unfinished projects and the things left undone.
The idea of transgenerational association allows us to view the issue of the temporal 
distribution over generations in the light of these three criteria. Generation A has a 
reason not to deplete because this would be hurtful to the association taken as a whole.
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Thus, from the additive standpoint, A should not deplete if, all else equal, conserving 
turns out to maximise the sum-total of utility of all generations belonging to the 
transgenerational association.26 From the diachronic viewpoint we might say that A 
should conserve if that avoids imposing enormous costs on one generation. But more 
importantly, we might also say that generation A should conserve because upward 
trends matter.
Consider another notorious problem. Assume that we could somehow phase out the 
human race in an entirely painless and voluntary manner. The present generation would 
unanimously agree not to reproduce. Humanity would vanish forever. But in return 
present people could deplete all resources free of guilt. Are there any reasons not to 
abort the species in this way? For causes similar to the non-identity problem, it is hard 
to think of a person-based answer. We do not harm anyone by deciding not to bring him 
or her into being. It is certainly not the case that individual rights are being trampled. 
However, there are such reasons when we turn to the idea of corporate personality. To 
understand why we should not abort the species, that is, we should change the unit of 
agency.
When Kavka asked himself this question, he admitted to believing that certain 
‘collective enterprises of man’ -  it seems he had the arts and sciences in mind -  possess 
a value irreducible to their utility to us now. He found that ‘we should prefer a longer 
life of increasing accomplishment for mankind, to having human history cut short to
97facilitate present consumption.’ We should not abort humanity, he claimed, for the 
precise same reason that individual lives should not be cut short: we feel that their 
overall goodness depends on the progression and struggle towards the accomplishment 
of certain ends. A life cut short in its prime is often thought more tragic than death at a 
later stage, not so much because there will be less person-stages, and therefore less total
26 It this were the only criterion, we would again encounter Parfit’s repugnant and absurd conclusions 
when considering population policy. See Reasons and Persons, Part IV.
27 G. S. Kavka, ‘The Futurity Problem’, in: R. I. Sikora and B. Barry (eds.), Obligations to Future 
Generations, p. 197.
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well-being, although that may play a role, but mainly because they tend to be lives spent 
in the pursuit of things never obtained, lives, therefore, with less narrative unity and too 
much time left unredeemed. If we look at generations as the stages of one association, it 
is for similar reasons that we should want humanity to continue.
Briefly notice that we now also avoid a number of further problems that are often 
associated with the notion of justice between generations. First, there is the difficulty 
that the preferences of future generations are unknown to us.28 Consequently, justice as 
impartiality is limited to a thin theory of the good. De Shalit has pointed out that if 
history or the future is viewed, not like a foreign nation or country, but like a connected 
person-stage, then we must presuppose that future preferences and interests are to some
90extent continuous with ours. So the argument does not have to remain entirely neutral 
to future conceptions of the good. We only have reason to care about the future 
precisely on the presumption that generations are in fact bound by a collective 
preference.
Second, there is the difficulty that future generations are almost unlimited in number 
and therefore dwarf the interests of present people. If we had to share resources with all 
persons equally and impartially, then the demands that the future places on us would be 
unrealistically high. In fact, given a finite quantity of resources, and an infinite number 
of generations, no one would get anything. However, like the moderate claim, 
associativism is less hostile to time preferences. Future interests only count as present 
reasons because of a kind of relatedness between person-stages or generations. Hence, 
we can now argue that future interests could legitimately be discounted insofar as the 
temporal relatedness diminishes. Put differently, according to the corporate model, the 
interests of distant generations could be assigned less relative weight than the interest of 
present or nearby generations, much in the same way that Hume proposed a social 
discounting mechanism.
28
See Chapter V, Section 5.
29
A. De-Shalit, Why Posterity Matters, pp. 102-103.
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Third, there is the problem of motivation. I have argued that justice as impartiality 
does not explain why depletion is wrong. But even if this were false, justice as 
impartiality would still be vulnerable as it provides us only with agent-neutral reasons. 
In contrast to justice as mutual advantage, it does not show or pretend to show that 
conservation pays off in terms of A ’s preferences. It argues instead that A ought not to 
deplete in spite of its preferences. The argument, typically, operates within an ideal- 
theoretical context where agents are imagined to fully comply with whatever impartial 
morality demands.30 But it is unlikely to have a clear normative foothold outside this 
hypothesised context. Why be moral?
Associativism also fares better in this regard. It identifies reasons that are agent- 
relative, that is to say, grounded in the identities, preferences and interests of the agent, 
but argues further that such preferences and interests must be understood in a wider, 
collective sense. So it is able to explain why it pays off not to deplete by rejecting the 
categorical difference between self and other-regarding concerns. The benefit of this 
argument is that it is not restricted to the ideal-theoretical context that presupposes full 
compliance with the impartial standpoint. Assuming that we are connected to others in 
the way we have described, it will thus have greater normative purchase on our actual 
deliberations. To be precise, we have an argument that seems to appeal to 
considerations that are likely to actually motivate people: not pure impartiality, and not 
just the self, but also our relatedness to others.
It could be objected at this point that whether we have such reasons or not still 
depends on our being members of a particular transgenerational association. Do non­
members have no reason, then, to concern themselves with future generations? To put 
the question differently, do rich states have no reason to concern themselves with the 
future interests of poor countries?31 We may not have to draw this conclusion. If there
30 See J. Rawls, A Theory o f  Justice, pp. 8-9.
31 See for example Barry’s critique o f De-Shalit’s communitarian approach in ‘Sustainability and 
Intergenerational Justice’, in: A. Dobson, Fairness and Futurity (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999),
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were corporate persons, then we could fall back on theories of justice. Here, it is 
important to notice that the idea of corporate personality allows us to widen the person- 
affecting constraint on morality. As I argued in Chapter V, this constraint stipulates that 
an act or policy could be wrong if, and only if, that act or policy were worse for some 
individual than an alternative act or policy. If, apart from individuals, there were 
corporate persons, then an act or policy could be wrong if, and only if, it were worse for 
some particular individual or association than an alternative act or policy. So while 
depletion may not be worse than conservation for any individual, it may still be worse 
for an association, and therefore possibly unjust. Consequently, we have at least carved 
out some space to argue that non-members have moral reasons not to deplete resources 
if doing so would be harmful to a certain association. Similarly, from the perspective of 
international justice, we could also claim that transgenerational associations like states 
may have moral reasons to respect each other’s future interests.
Notice also that I am merely arguing that there is room for such reasons. This room is 
created by the fact that the person-affecting constraint is now drawn wider than on 
individualists theories. Whether or not certain policies that are harmful to other 
associations are in fact unjust is a question that goes beyond the scope of the argument 
here. However, the answer could rely on familiar theories of justice and now apply them 
to the distributions between corporate persons rather than between individuals. Hence, 
we could argue, for example, that conservation offers co-operative gains to all 
associative parties involved. Alternatively, we could claim that each state or association 
has a basic right not to be harmed by others. In other words, the notion that collectives 
have continuous interests, and that these interests affect the wrongness of acts or 
policies, addresses some of the problems that perturb purely individualist approaches to
pp. 93-117, at p. 99. For a similar objection, see A. Dobson, Justice and the Environment (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1998), pp. 106-107.
32 I have looked at the issue mainly from an internal perspective, that is, the standpoint o f a member. But 
corporate persons may also have reason-giving weight from the external perspective o f  an outsider. As 
such, they may also impose moral claims on us. See here K. Graham, ‘The Moral Significance o f  
Collective Entities’, pp. 21-42.
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intergenerational distributions. While I find it difficult to see how moral individualism 
could avoid the conclusion that the notion of justice has no real intergenerational use, 
we might well return to this notion once it is recognised that there are corporate 
persons.33
Conclusion
There is I think a sense in which Parfit’s extremist could have been right. Normative 
reasons could have come exclusively in the shape of present aims or a preference or 
interest that we have currently. If so, our agency would have been temporally fractured. 
Every intentional episode would have been a separate agent. But there is also a sense in 
which this view need not be right. Our agency could still be temporally united by the 
normativity of future-directed intention. In other words, there is no argument that 
demonstrates the logical impossibility of temporally extended agency. Which view is 
true? This is a question of some importance, but, as I have argued, it is at bottom a 
normative question, and I have supposed that it must therefore be answered in reflective 
equilibrium with our basic intuitions, the practices that happen to be constitutive of our 
form of life, and the things that we tend to think are valuable to most humans. There 
may be a logically possible world in which Parfit’s extremist is right, but, when we 
view the matter from this normative standpoint, it is not all that difficult to see that in 
this world, at least, he is not.
We have also seen that there is a sense in which ethical individualism could have 
been right. Our agency could have been fractured alongside our corporeal existence. If 
so, every individual human being would have been a separate agent, and this is often 
believed to be the case. But there is also a sense in which this view need not be right or 
at least not exclusively right. Our agency could still be united by the normativity of
33 For the idea that we can avoid the non-identity problem by advancing collective rights see especially E. 
Page, ‘Intergenerational Justice and Climate Change’, Political Studies, XLVII (1999), pp. 53-66.
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collective intention. As I argued in Chapter III, corporate personality is a logical 
possibility. Which view is true? Again, this is a normative question, a question that must 
be tested against our intuitions and the goings on that are constitutive of our world and 
lives. There may be a logically possible world in which moral individualism is 
exclusively right, but in Chapter V, VI and VII, I argue that this is not the case in this 
world.
A basic premise of my argument in these chapters is that we do not merely care 
about ourselves, or even about our contemporaries, but look back and forward in time, 
much further than our own lives. We are immersed not only in our own life-plans, but 
also in plans and projects with a greater history and continuity. In Chapter V, I argue 
that ethical individualism cannot account for this connectedness with the future. In this 
chapter, I argue that associativism offers a genuine alternative. Corporate personality 
allows us to compare distributions between generations to distributions between the 
stages of one person.
I shall next try to widen the scope of this argument. So far, I have based the entire 
idea of corporate personality on the intuition that future generations should have weight 
in our deliberations. This intuition may not be strong enough to carry this burden. 
Hence, I want to suggest a way in which this case may be further strengthened. 
Corporate personality, I propose, also explains why we are presently bound by rules, 
plans and commitments assumed by past generations. The idea that we could be bound 
by previous generations figures centrally in the debate on associative and political 
obligation. And it is to this debate that I turn in Chapter VII.
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CHAPTER VII
WHY CARE FOR THE PAST
Wherefore, as any Man’s Deed past is good as long as himself continueth: so 
the Act of a Publick Society of men done Five hundred Years sithence, 
standeth as theirs, who presently are of the same Societies, because 
Corporations are Immortal; we were then alive in our Predecessors and they 
in their Successors live still.
Richard Hooker -  Laws o f the Ecclesiasticall Politie1
Introduction
Associations consist out of systems of roles, offices and positions, and whether 
anchored formally or not, these roles are partially, if not entirely, defined as duties, 
responsibilities and rights. Hence, associative members acquire all sorts of specific 
obligations to do this or that, depending on the specific sort of role or office they hold. 
For example, associates may be required to take special care of certain designated 
persons, to perform certain hazardous tasks, to be strictly impartial, and so forth. The 
specific and variegated content of such obligations is not what I want to discuss here. 
As I use the term, associative obligation refers more abstractly to the loyalty and 
commitment that all members owe to the association over and above the specific tasks 
attached to a particular role or office. In this chapter, I focus specifically on the question 
how political obligation could be justified or normatively grounded. In the context of 
this question, I want to further strengthen the case for corporate personality or 
associativism. As Heath Wellman has recently defined the term, associativism 
maintains that we should accord a basic and independent and obligation-generating 
weight to relational facts. It claims that the mere fact that individuals are
1 Cited in P. Laslett and J. S. Fishkin, ‘Introduction’, in: P. Laslett and J. S. Fishkin (eds.) Justice Between
Age Groups and Generations, pp. 1-32, p. 15.
2
C. Heath Wellman, ‘Relational Facts in Political Theory: Is There Magic in the Pronoun ‘M y’?’, Ethics, 
110 (2000) pp. 537-562.
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interconnected in a specific way, that is, the mere fact of their membership, provides us 
with the justificatory grounds for their associative obligations. This associativist thesis 
or principle is often thought to have a specific impact on the following set of 
interrelated issues.
First and foremost, there is the long-standing problem of political obligation. Put 
simply, associativism claims that it is the fact of political membership or of citizenship 
that explains why we are obliged to comply with the law or have a wider obligation to 
protect and advance the interests of the political community.3 Second, there is the claim 
that the members of a political community have a special obligation to consider the 
needs and interests of their fellow-associates, roughly analogous to the special 
obligations that we have to our relatives or friends or neighbours. Here, associativism 
argues that such special obligations emerge out of the factual presence of such relations, 
without needing to invoke consent theory or a general duty applicable to humanity at 
large.4 Third, though less obviously, there is the idea that the members of a political 
association are in a collective sense morally accountable for the actions of their state. In 
this case, associativism argues that citizens partake in a collective sense of 
responsibility or guilt or desert merely on the basis of their de facto membership.5
With a few notable exceptions, most liberal theorists take exception to these claims 
for a number of reasons to be discussed later.6 But it is important to also note that 
liberalism, in contrast to philosophical anarchism, still supports the idea that political 
obligations are normally legitimate. Likewise, many mainstream liberals are also keen 
to argue that people have legitimate grounds to prioritise their fellow-citizens over the 
interests of humanity at large. The difference between the associativist thesis and these
3 B. Parekh, ‘A Misconceived Discourse on Political Obligation’, Political Studies, XLI (1993), pp. 236- 
251, draws special attention to this distinction.
4
For the terminology o f ‘special’ and ‘general’ obligations, see H. L. A. Hart, ‘Are There Any Natural 
Rights?’, in: A. Quinton (ed.), Political Philosophy (London: Oxford University Press, 1967), pp. 53-66.
5 See M. Gilbert, ‘Collective Remorse’, pp. 123-140; ‘The Idea o f Collective Guilt’, pp. 141-153, 
reprinted in her Sociality and Responsibility.
6 A notable exception is R. Dworkin, L aw ’s Empire, Chapter 6.
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broadly liberal approaches consists largely in the fact that for most liberals the mere 
occurrence of relatedness or the mere fact of membership does little in itself to establish 
the normativity of these special obligations. For most liberals, the legitimacy of special 
obligation depends entirely on the logical derivation of these obligations from the 
higher root of our universal and general duty to mankind.
Along these lines we can distinguish between two different justificatory theories, 
each aiming at the same objective. Associativism grants a special normative quality to 
relational facts. It suggests that there is something special about political relationships 
and bonds such that we can understand, among other things, why citizens have special 
welfare obligations to each other or why they owe a degree of loyalty to the state or 
even why they sometimes have to own up for what their state does. As Horton writes:
My claim is that a polity is, like the family, a relationship into which we are 
mostly bom; and that the obligations which are constitutive of the relationship 
do not stand in need of moral justification in terms of a set of basic moral 
principles or some comprehensive moral theory.7
And in his book On Nationality, Miller argues for a view that ‘holds that relations 
between persons are part of the basic subject-matter of ethics, so that fundamental 
principles may be attached directly to these relations.’8
Most individualist liberals, however, tend to prefer what Wellman calls the 
‘reductionist’ model. Here, I want to borrow Scheffler’s term ‘assimilationism’.9 
According to this approach, relational facts have no basic obligation-creating 
significance. There is no magic in the pronoun ‘my’, as the view is often put. Special 
obligations are, like all moral concerns, ultimately grounded in a universal master 
principle, but that principle could be kneaded and massaged until it is capable of 
explaining why political obligation emerges and why we ought to have greater concern 
for the needs of associates than non-associates.
7
J. Horton, Political Obligation (Basingstoke: MacMillan, 1992), p. 150.
8 D. Miller, On Nationality, p. 50.
9
S. Scheffler, ‘Families, Nations, and Strangers’, in: Boundaries and Allegiances: Problems o f  Justice 
and Responsibility in Liberal Thought (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 48-65.
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I proceed as follows. Section 1 argues that at the heart of the problem of political 
obligation lies the question whether one generation could bind another. Section 2 
introduces the assimilationist model and discusses both a general and a more specific 
objection to this model. Sections 3 advances a value-dependent associativist alternative. 
Section 4 explains how this alternative tackles the most important objections to 
associativism.
1. Whether One Generation Has a Right to Bind Another
I want to start by following Hume in claiming that most of us are born into political 
obligation.10 As Hume pointed out, it may or may not be true that at some mythical 
moment in the past our ancestors expressly consented to a certain original contract, but 
it is an indisputable fact that we, who are alive presently, have never done so. If there 
are any political obligations at all, express consent has very little to do with it. Instead, 
political obligation comes to us as a bequest from the past. One way or another -  how 
precisely is not at issue here -  our ancestors developed structures of political authority 
and law, and in doing so they managed not only to bind themselves, but also every 
generation since. Fundamentally, the challenge is to show how such obligations can be 
passed on from one generation to the next. The central question of political obligation 
is, as Thomas Jefferson once put it, ‘whether one generation of men has a right to bind 
another’.11
The claim that past generations obligate present generations is perhaps most visible 
in the following two cases. To begin with, there is the case of constitutional 
precommitment.12 Constitutions are generally intended to put limitations on the future
10 David Hume, ‘Of the Original Contract’.
II T. Jefferson, ‘The Earth Belongs to the Living’, p. 959.
12 S. Holmes, ‘Precommitment and the Paradox o f Democracy’, in: J. Elster and R. Slagstad (eds.) 
Constitutionalism and Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), pp. 195-240, and 
more generally S. Homes, Passions and Constraint: On the Theory o f  Liberal Democracy (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1995).
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decisions of states. They form an attempt to obligate ourselves to follow one particular 
course of action rather than another. There are at least two reasons why constitutional 
commitment is thought to be controversial. First* there is the question whether a 
sovereign people could bind itself to some future undertaking. Traditionally, this has 
been a moot issue. It has often been thought that a sovereign power capable of binding 
itself at one time retains the power to release itself at later convenience.13 But what is 
more important here is that constitutions do not just bind the living; they also obligate or 
claim to obligate future generations. For example, the Preamble of the United States 
Constitution (1789) reads:
We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect Union, 
establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defence, 
promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves 
and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United 
States of America.14
Second, there is also the case of commitments to third parties. In one way, this case 
is less controversial. Once an individual or a state binds itself to a future undertaking 
involving the participation of another, it cannot quite so easily release itself from its 
earlier commitment. However, the intergenerational aspect of the problem remains. 
When a sovereign state acquires an obligation to another party this continues to bind all 
successive generations. Thus, Article X of the Treaty of Utrecht (1713) affirms:
13 In his sequel book Ulysses Unbound: Studies in Rationality, Precommitment, and Constraints 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), Elster turns out to be sceptical o f the idea o f  
constitutional binding. Self-binding, he argues, depends on the presence o f ‘external institutions or forces’ 
(p. 95). Ulysses could bind himself to the mast, making it physically impossible to give in to temptation, 
b u t1 there is nothing external to society’. Thus, one reason why he objects to constitutional self-binding is 
its impossibility. However, Elster fails to appreciate that self-binding has internal aspects. That is, he fails 
to see that the planning and time-slice models o f agency are normative. They prescribe what rational 
agents do. The planning theory, on the one hand, claims that rationality entails that we take earlier 
intentions as reason-giving. The time-slice model, on the other, argues that we ought to consider these 
intentions as external factors. To put it differently, both models advocate a different idea about what a 
rational attitude to the past consists in. To suggest that, in the absence o f external ties, self-binding is 
impossible is already to assume the time-slice view. See E. F. McClennen, Rationality and Dynamic 
Choice, pp. 14, 231-238; S. J. Shapiro, ‘Ulysses Rebound’, Economics and Philosophy, 18 (2002), pp.
157-182.
14 The Constitution o f  the United States o f  America, 1787, in: C. Rossiter (ed.), The Federalist Papers 
(New York: Mentor Book, 1999), pp. 509-530, at p. 509. Emphasis added
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The Catholic King does hereby, for himself, his heirs and successors, yield to 
the Crown of Great Britain the full and entire propriety of the town and castle 
of Gibraltar, together with the port, fortifications, and forts thereunto belonging; 
and he gives up the said propriety to be held and enjoyed absolutely with all 
manner of right fo r  ever, without any exception or impediment whatsoever.15
As the example makes clear, the obligations and commitments of one state to another 
are not nullified as soon as one king makes place for another or when one generation is 
succeeded by the next. They are inheritable.
Do we have such obligations? Now, that one individual (or one generation) could 
and should limit its own future discretion is plausible if imposing such limitations would 
generate certain pay offs on the long run or would be normatively desirable for other 
reasons. At the level of the individual agent, it is this suggestion that informs Bratman’s 
planning model.16 While intentions are in principle not irrevocable, Bratman reminds us 
that the cognitive capacities of humans are limited. Given these limitations, it is not 
prudent to have to reconsider each and every alternative before we could proceed to act. 
It is more rewarding to pre-commit to a basic plan as the default, and so to funnel 
deliberation in more precise directions. What is more, we need to commit ourselves to 
future actions in order to be able to attain ends or conceptions of the good that require 
co-ordination and co-operation between our person-stages. In other words, 
precommitment allows us to secure the long-term benefits.
At the collective level, Holmes makes a similar point about constitutional pre­
commitment. Paradoxically, constitutional binding is ‘enabling’ rather than purely 
‘disabling’. For example, if we pre-commit to a set of decision rules and side- 
constraints, future deliberation could focus purely on solving problems of substance 
rather than having to engage in a costly re-evaluation of the procedures. Moreover, 
according to Holmes, it is only after such constitutional procedures and constraints have 
been put in place that we have the proper conditions for political deliberation to begin
15 Cited in: A. Heath, 'Research Roundup: The Assault on Gibraltar', The European Journal, Vol. 9, 
Number 3 (2001), pp. 8-9, p. 9.
16 See my discussion o f  his planning model o f agency in Chapter II above.
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with. That is, we need antecedent rules to conduct and organise the political process 
before political deliberation can actually commence. ‘The people cannot act as an 
amorphous blob.’17
However, this argument does still not show that constitutions could also obligate 
future generations. Jefferson was aware that liberal constitutionalism relied on the idea 
of corporate personality. He argued that it was wrong to allow the dead to obligate the 
living, either by constitutional means or by contracting debts to third parties. He 
grounded his case in his distinctive view of generations as sovereign agents. As he put 
it: ‘We may consider each generation as a distinct nation, with a right, by the will of its 
majority, to bind themselves, but none to bind the succeeding generation, more than the 
inhabitants of another country.’18 By viewing generations in this way, he made it 
perfectly clear why he thought placing constraints on future generations was 
illegitimate. What he described as a ‘perpetual constitution’ amounted to little more 
than perpetual oppression. Essentially, the earth belonged to the living, and each living 
generation enjoyed the right to a fresh beginning, unencumbered by the commitments 
and debts of the dead. As he put it, the dead had no rights: ‘They are nothing; and 
nothing cannot own something.’19 Hence, he insisted that constitutions, positive law and 
national debts naturally expired after nineteen years. This was how long it took for one 
majority to be replaced by a new generation, or so Jefferson reckoned.
17 S. Holmes, ‘Precommitment and the Paradox o f Democracy’, p. 230. Holmes’s notion o f enabling rules 
is similar to the Searle’s concept o f constitutive rules set out in his The Construction o f  Social Reality.
18 T. Jefferson, ‘Debt, Taxes, Banks, and Paper’, Letter to John Wayles Eppes (June 24, 1813) in: M. D. 
Peterson (ed.), Writings (New York: The Library of America, 1984), pp. 1280-1286, at pp. 1280-1281. 
Paine, in his Rights o f  Man, arrived at a similar conclusion. He wrote (p. 56): ‘Those who have quitted the 
world, and those who are not yet arrived in it, are as remote from each other, as the utmost stretch o f  
mortal imagination can conceive. What possible obligation, then, can exist between them; what rule or 
principle can be laid down, that two nonentities, the one out o f  existence, and the other not in, and who
never can meet in this world, that the one should control the other to the end o f  time?’
19 T. Jefferson, ‘Reform o f the Virginia Constitution’, Letter to Samuel Kercheval (July 12, 1816), in: M. 
D. Peterson (ed.), Writings (New York: The Library o f America, 1984), pp. 1395-1403, at p. 1402. For 
the interests and rights o f past individuals in liberal political theory, see T. Mulgan, ‘The Place o f the 
Dead in Liberal Political Philosophy’, The Journal o f  Political Philosophy, Vol. 7 (1999), pp. 52-70; 
Brecher, B., ‘Our Obligation to the Dead’, Journal o f  Applied Philosophy, Volume 19, No. 2 (2002), pp. 
109-119.
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The argument that self-binding enables rather than disables does not as such address 
this crucial point. Holmes is probably correct to remark that such the introduction of 
such expiry dates would result in a major catastrophe. The anticipation of a 
constitutional repeal alone would probably suffice to propel society in a spiral of 
madness. To be sure, this is an exce
llent argument for self-binding. But the nub is that it is a bad argument for encroaching 
on the liberty of others™ And the nub of Jefferson’s objection was that future 
generations were others. To put it differently, once we accept Jefferson’s view, and still 
want to argue that our commitments bind future generations, then we need to look for 
other justificatory strategies.
The foremost candidate is of course the principle of consent. However, since no state 
relies on the express consent of its citizens, the only plausible candidate is the principle 
of tacit consent. If generations were sovereign, so the idea goes, then we should assume 
that each generation consents to the laws of previous generations by choosing to accept 
the property, goods and benefits it inherits from them.21 For example, if a new 
generation elects to remain in its country of birth, it thereby tacitly consents to its 
constitution and law, and it also inherits all earlier incurred debts. The underlying idea, 
of course, is that political obligations are attached to the property and the land that 
children expect to receive from their parents.
Now, this is not the place to look at consent theory at length. However, perhaps it 
will suffice to note that the theory of tacit consent relies on the condition that consenting 
generations should at least have the opportunity not to consent without facing
20 Elster would seem to agree. He writes: ‘It is only by the dubious device o f construing the nation over
time as a single entity that constitutions can be viewed as acts o f self-binding.'' In his ‘Interpersonal
Choice and Political Thought’, in: G. Loewenstein and J. Elster (eds.) Choice over Time (New York:
Russell Sage Foundation, 1992), pp. 35-53, at p. 37. In his more recent book Ulysses Unbound, p. 92, he
further turns away from the initial idea that constitutions are correctly construed as mechanisms for self-
binding. Apart from the objection that constitutions may not bind at all (see above), the problem is that
‘constitutions may bind others rather than being acts o f self-binding’.
21 As Locke proposed in his Second Treatises o f  Government, edited by C. B. Macpherson (Indianapolis: 
Hackett Publishing Company, 1980), especially Chapter VIII, paragraph 116, p. 62.
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unreasonably high costs. And in the case of states the problem is invariably that this 
condition is not met. How could we possibly avoid inheriting the land and other goods 
from our ancestors? After all, we cannot simply choose to settle down elsewhere.22
How, then, do generations put each other under political obligations? This is the 
puzzle that needs solving. To make headway, we could turn either to associativist or 
assimilationist justifications. I want to look at the latter first.
2. Impartiality and Special Allegiance
Essentially, the assimilationist model explains political obligation in terms of moral 
duty. It ultimately relies on the basic premise that the laws of morality are general such 
that they apply to all human beings equally and impartially. As Hart noted in his 
seminal article on the topic, general rights and duties are rights and duties that people 
have ‘if they are capable of choice: they have it qua men, and not only if they are 
members of some society or stand in some special relation to each other.’23 In other 
words, morality is impartial to all particular identities.
Two standard objections have been raised to this model. The first objection invokes a 
fairly wide-ranging scepticism pertaining to the basic premise of universality and 
impartiality. This objection argues that in order to get an operative moral theory up and 
running, we need to pack it with value-contents, which are invariably entrenched in our 
local Sitten. Important though this issue may be, this is not the place to deal with it.
Instead, I want to investigate the second objection, which Ronald Dworkin describes 
as the ‘special allegiance objection’.24 This objection points out that political obligations 
are essentially special. In contrast to moral duties, their scope is restricted. We have
22 Hume already pointed this out in his essay ‘O f the Original Contract’. We simply cannot avoid 
inheriting their benefits, whether we want to or not. In this sense, past generations are like Nozick’s 
public address system. See his Anarchy, State, and Utopia, pp. 93-95. See also R. Dworkin, L aw ’s 
Empire, pp. 192-195.
23 H. L. A. Hart, ‘A re T here A ny N atural R igh ts’, p. 53.
24 Dworkin, L aw ’s Empire, p. 193.
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such obligations, not in virtue of our humanity, but in virtue of our membership of a 
political association. So Frenchmen only have political obligations to France, New 
Zealanders only to New Zealand and their fellow-countrymen, and so on. In this sense 
political obligations are comparable to family obligations. In the latter case, surely, the 
impartialist does not want to suggest that it is immoral for parents to nourish their own 
children rather than relieve suffering in general? Certainly, we should probably donate 
our old shoes, rags, and what not more to Oxfam, but the idea that we are morally 
compelled to treat everyone impartially is clearly absurd. As Williams puts the 
complaint: ‘For morality the ethical constituency is always the same: the universal 
constituency.’25
However, the by now standard response is that this objection rests on a flawed 
reading of what impartiality entails. The constituency of morality is not always 
universal. In fact, this response suggests that we should distinguish between two levels 
of impartiality. First, ‘substantive’ impartiality demands that in our actions we betray 
no prejudice to people’s particular identities and our relatedness to them. Evidently, 
there can be no compromise between impartiality and special allegiances here. 
Second, ‘formal’ impartiality merely demands that the principles that are supposed to 
ground or justify our actual treatment of other people should be acceptable to all 
reasonable persons. This is usually taken to mean, among other things, that these 
principles must at least be generic or impartial in form. For example, ‘British Interests 
Come First’ is not a principle that is likely to survive the test. However, at this 
justificatory level, impartiality does not mean that principles must be generic in content.
25 B. Williams, Ethics and the Limits o f  Philosophy, p. 14.
26 See for example B. Barry, Justice as Impartiality (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995); T. Nagel, Equality 
and Partiality (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991); A. Gewirth, ‘Ethical Universalism and 
Particularism’, The Journal o f  Philosophy, Vol. 85, No. 6 (1988), pp. 283-302; M. Baron, ‘Impartiality 
and Friendship’, Ethics 101 (1991), pp. 836-857.
27 The locus classicus is W. Godwin, An Enquiry Concerning Political Justice, Book II, Chapter II, pp.
49-54.
28 I borrow these labels from J. McMahan, ‘Nationalism and the Demands o f Impartiality’, in: R. McKim 
and J. McMahan (eds.), The Morality o f  Nationalism (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), pp. 
107-138, specifically pp. 116-117.
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So, it is not inconceivable that the general principle that ‘One’s Children Come First’, 
or indeed ‘One’s Country Comes First’, could still be endorsed. For all that formal 
impartiality demands is that partiality in action rest on a principle that is reasonably 
acceptable to all. We do not always have to treat everyone equally, but if we prioritise 
some over others, then this should be a kind of partiality that remains within the bounds 
of impartiality at the higher level of justification. In other words, if they could be shown 
to derive from our universal duty to humanity, there would still be local obligations to 
family, friends and the state.29
Assimilationism, then, purports to explain how we could carve out space for special 
obligations and partiality within impartial morality at the formal level. However, two 
objections could again be levelled against this attempt. The first objection is much 
bolder than the second. It claims that the whole idea of a derivation from impartiality is 
essentially misguided as it makes associative obligation dependent on impartial 
morality. The second objection is weaker. It merely claims that there is currently no 
successful derivation of our inherited political obligations from moral duty.
2.1 One Thought Too Many
According to the strong objection, assimilationism will always fail to deliver a plausible 
justification for special obligation. Briefly, the criticism is that impartial deliberation is 
both unnecessary and inappropriate in a context that is considered to be deeply personal. 
So even if a derivation of special obligation from moral duty would succeed, 
assimilationism would still get the wrong end of the stick. For it would simply fail to 
capture the intimacy and trust that is implicit in these obligations.
The point is most clearly made in the context of familial obligations. Typical of these 
obligations is their robustness. Ask any parent why he cares for the well-being of his
29 See J. Rawls, A Theory o f  Justice, pp. 132-133, and for utilitarianism, C. D. Broad, ‘Self and Others’,
D. R. Cheney (ed.), Broad's Critical Essays in Moral Philosophy (London: Allen & Unwin, 1971), pp. 
262-282, at p. 280.
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child and the normal response is ‘because it is my child’. That relational fact is 
sufficient reason for most people. But more importantly, there is also something 
distinctly odd about a parent who would need an external justification. Such 
justifications would appear to be deeply antithetical to the bond between parent and 
child.30 Apart from being superfluous, impartiality is also unbefitting of a good parent. 
Williams famously captures this last point with his phrase that a derivation from 
impartiality requires us to think ‘one thought too many’. He considers the archetypal 
case of the man who can either rescue his drowning wife or a perfect stranger. While 
assimilationism agrees that the man is right to rescue his wife, it involves
the idea that moral principle can legitimate his preference, yielding the 
conclusion that in situations of this kind it is at least all right (morally 
permissible) to save one’s wife... But this construction provides the agent with 
one thought too many: it might have been hoped for (for instance, by his wife) 
that his motivating thought, fully spelled out, would be the thought that it was 
his wife, not that it was his wife and that in situations of this kind it is 
permissible to save one’s wife.31
Williams’s objection is that a husband should come to the aid of his wife, not for the 
additional thought that a universal principle dictates that he should, but specifically and 
only ‘because she is his wife’. Assimilationism evokes the uncomfortable image of a 
husband coolly calculating the moral benefits and costs of his action, while a more full- 
blooded and unreserved expression of loyalty would be more appropriate.
A similar view underpins Oldenquist’s account of patriotism. The impartialist 
attempt to acclaim a form of patriotism, for example, fails on the following ground:
An impartial patriot says that he supports his country just because it has 
features a . . .  n, and therefore he is committed to the position that if his country 
and its adversary exchanged the features a . . .  n, he should support the 
adversary. If it is true that he supports his country solely because he thinks it is 
in the right, it follows that the fact that one of the countries is his does not enter 
at all into his decision. Such ‘patriots’ believe themselves to be objective, like
30 See also J. Horton, Political Obligation, pp. 147-148.
31 B. Williams, ‘Persons, Character, and Morality’, pp. 214-215.
32 For this point, see also A. Oldenquist, ‘Loyalties’, The Journal o f  Philosophy, Vol. LXXIX, No. 4 
(1984), pp. 173-193.
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ideal observers, and simply lucky that their own country is in the right, whereas 
I think that most of us believe that their underlying motives usually are pure 
loyalty and their reasons rationalizations.33
Oldenquist taps into the same intuition that the judgment of the true patriot ‘is partly 
determined by the fact that the good of his country is at stake.’34 The patriot who first 
needs the assurance that his country is in the right -  like the husband or the parent who 
first needs to flip a coin, so to speak, and then proceeds to rescue his wife or daughter -  
stands accused of having no loyalty at all, precisely because he requires impartial 
grounds. The key-problem, of course, is that the coin could have fallen the other way 
up, even if in fact it did not; impartial reason could just as well have gone the other way, 
which is why we think assimilationism makes for lousy patriots, husbands and parents. 
For we expect from friends and mothers and patriots, at least sometimes -  though not 
necessarily always -  that they will help us even if that were not justified by impartial 
principles. In other words, assimilationism makes associative obligations entirely 
conditional on higher-order, impartial morality, while our understanding of these 
obligations suggests that the two may conflict in fundamental ways.
There is I think a great deal of truth in this objection. Nevertheless, there are also 
some persistent doubts. Many critics have noted how much the associative argument 
relies on the analogy between the family and the state.35 The idea that assimilationism is 
inappropriate may seem incontrovertible in the example of our family-members and 
those relations that are relatively intimate and close. But the idea is not so obvious in the 
case of large-scale associations like states. What is more important, there is the further 
problem that our understandings of political and associative obligations also suggest 
that they are not quite so unconditional at all. The problem, after all, is that states, like
33 Ibid., p. 183.
34 Ibid., p. 184.
35 Most influentially, J. Locke in his Second Treatises o f  Government. For recent examples, see A. J. 
Simmons, ‘Associative Political Obligations’, Ethics, 106 (January 1996), pp. 247-273; C. Heath 
Wellman, ‘Friends, Compatriots, and Special Political Obligations’, Political Theory, Vol. 29, No. 2 
(April 2001), pp. 217-236; R. Dagger, ‘Membership, Fair Play, and Political Obligation’, Political 
Studies, 2000, Vol. 48, pp. 104-117.
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families, are often malicious or even criminal. As impartialist critics delight to point 
out, do we really want to say that there are associative obligations in these cases?
2.2 Justice, Expedience and Political Obligation
On balance, the strong objection may therefore be less than conclusive. To see why the 
assimilationist model nevertheless fails, it is necessary to turn to the weaker objection. 
As we saw, this objection claims that currently there is no derivation of moral duty that 
actually succeeds in grounding political obligations. While this objection does not reject 
a derivation from higher-level impartiality on principle, it argues that all attempts to do 
so have thus far failed.
To expose this failure, we have to turn to the view, shared by theorists such as Kant, 
Rawls, Waldron and Goodin, that political obligation is the corollary of our natural duty 
of justice. According to this view, political institutions are a prerequisite to justice. 
Briefly, the first premise of the argument is that justice is a natural duty. The second 
premise is that justice can never be achieved without political organisation and positive 
law. It then follows that individuals have a natural duty to establish, concur with and 
support political institutions, provided that these institutions do indeed promote justice.
This explanation faces the following challenge. The special allegiance objection 
points out that political obligations are member-specific. However, it is not immediately 
clear how this scope-restrictedness could be accommodated within a natural duty 
framework. The natural duty to advance justice obviously binds universally and
36 Kant speaks o f  the civil state not as a union for some common end that the contractors all agree to 
share, but ‘as an end in itself which they all ought to share' It is our natural duty to submit to civil 
authority and positive law because justice can only be attained within a civil state and the rule o f law. See 
his ‘On the Common Saying: ‘This May be True in Theory, but it does not Apply in Practice’, in: H. 
Reiss (ed.), Kant: Political Writings (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 61-92, 
especially p. 73. For a more recent statement o f the principle, see J. Rawls, A Theory o f  Justice, pp. 114- 
117, 334, where Rawls subscribes to the view that justice is a natural duty, and goes on to claim (p. 115) 
that ‘This duty requires us to support and to comply with just institutions that exist and apply to us.’ In a 
similar frame o f mind, J. Waldron, ‘Special Ties and Natural Duties’, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 
Volume 22, Issue 1 (1993), pp. 3-30, at p. 27, writes that an ‘organization that is just, effective and 
legitimate (in the sense o f being singled out as the salient organization for this territory) has eo ipso a 
claim on our allegiance.’
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generally. But if associative obligations are derived from the natural duty to facilitate 
justice, then why do we not owe such obligations to all just institutions and states?
Waldron suggests in response that the principles of justice are ‘range limited’. By 
this he means that these principles distinguish between ‘insiders’, who are to secure just 
institutions among themselves, and ‘outsiders’, whose interests are not affected by what 
goes on in the particular institutional context to which justice applies. Whereas the 
insiders of just institutions continue to have the full associative obligation to submit to 
the authority of the law or, at any rate, to divulge the right kind of loyalty to the state, 
outsiders are merely under the weaker duty not to interfere or obstruct the course of 
justice.
However, it is far from clear that justice actually lends support to the insider-outsider 
distinction. ‘Substantively,’ Waldron writes, ‘an individual is within the range of a 
principle if it is part of the point and justification of the principle to deal with his 
conduct, claims, and interests along with those of any other persons it deals with.’37 But 
how can we justify making such a distinction? Citing Kant, Waldron then tells us the 
following little story. In the state of nature we all have a duty to found political 
associations such that we may enter in peaceful, stable and just relations. However, it 
would be quite pointless to immediately seek to secure just institutions for each and 
everyone. On the whole, it is far more expedient to begin by establishing a just order 
among those people living in one’s immediate proximity, and with whom conflict over 
the appropriation of resources is more likely to occur. Thus, political regimes enter into 
the world on a local scale and their regulatory force extends only to a bounded territory, 
and those residing in it. Drawing boundaries, in short, is simply the most efficient way 
to accomplish a just world.
But the appeal to expedience in this story is ultimately too thin. It may well be right 
to circumscribe the scope of justice to certain insiders, but it is of course highly unlikely
37 J. Waldron, ‘Special Ties and Natural Duties’, p. 13.
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that these restrictions will conveniently coincide with the territorial boundaries of the 
state. I can see, perhaps, why Waldron’s story makes sense in a state-of-nature-scenario, 
when justice and the rule of law are just starting to emerge from primordial madness, 
but in more advanced scenario’s further considerations come in view. For example, 
Waldron acknowledges that the ‘poorest person in New Zealand is considerably better 
off than most people in Bangladesh’.38 But if justice includes the fair distribution of 
basic resources, why should it be conducive to that ideal to limit a New Zealander’s 
duty to secure justice to New Zealand?39
Robert Goodin has attempted to distinguish insiders from outsiders in a similar but 
perhaps more sophisticated manner.40 His attempt is grounded in the consequentialist 
duty to promote well-being across the board. While this duty is general, his thesis 
similarly claims that it is performed more efficiently within truncated structures that 
differentiate between members and non-members. In his view, special duties are merely 
‘distributed general duties’.
That is to say, special duties are in my view merely devices whereby the moral 
community’s general duties get assigned to particular agents... A great many 
general duties point to tasks that, for one reason or another, are pursued more 
effectively if they are subdivided and particular people are assigned special 
responsibilities for particular portions of the task 41
38 Ibid., p. 14.
39 In On Nationality, p. 63, David Miller nghtly protests: ‘Why does it make sense to assign 
responsibility for the rights and welfare o f Swedes to other Swedes and the rights and welfare o f  
Somalians to other Somalians, if  we are looking at the question from a global perspective?’ Scheffler 
similarly argues that if  we take distributive justice seriously, we seem stuck with ‘the idea that associative 
duties provide a mandate for those who are already rich in resources to turn their attentions inward, and 
largely to ignore suffering and deprivation in the rest o f the world’. See his ‘Families, Nations, and 
Strangers’, at p. 58. For his ‘distributive objection’, see also the essays ‘Liberalism, Nationalism, and 
Egalitarianism’, pp. 66-81, and ‘The Conflict between Justice and Responsibility’, pp. 82-96, all reprinted
in Boundaries and Allegiances.
40 R. E. Goodin, Protecting the Vulnerable (Chicago: University o f Chicago Press, 1985). See also R. E. 
Goodin, ‘What Is So Special about Our Fellow Countrymen?’, Ethics, 98 (July 1989), pp. 663-686; R. E. 
Goodin, ‘The State as Moral Agent’, in: P. Pettit & A. Hamlin, (eds.) The Good Polity: Normative 
Analysis o f  the State (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989), pp. 123-139; R. E. Goodin and P. Pettit, ‘The 
Possibility o f Special Duties’, Canadian Journal o f  Philosophy, 16 (December 1986), pp. 651-676.
41 R. E. Goodin, ‘What Is So Special about our Fellow Countrymen?’, pp. 678-679.
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In other words, these special obligations result from a division of moral labour. Goodin 
furnishes the following example. Drowning swimmers are entitled to assistance on the 
basis of the general duty of beneficence. However, this does not imply that we should 
all immediately rush into the water. It is far more efficient to assign this responsibility 
to a handful of lifeguards, who are selected on their ability to carry out such operations. 
Other examples come to mind. While all children are generally entitled to care, the 
responsibility to discharge this general duty is best assigned to the parents. And we can 
now also see how political obligations could emerge. All people have a claim to 
assistance in need. But again, this does not necessarily mean that we ought to provide 
for the needy all over the world. It is probably more efficient to assign this task 
primarily to states operating within a confined territory.
But we still need to know how such distributions of special obligations come about. 
How do we know, say, that I have a special duty to Johnny and not to Sonny? Goodin’s 
answer is that special duty is a function of a constant factor, which is the general duty of 
beneficence, and a variable x  that accounts for the allocation of special tasks to specific 
people. This variable is to be understood as a principle of responsibility, which must be 
read in consequentialist fashion. So the principle of responsibility directs our general 
duty to those persons who are particularly vulnerable or susceptible to our actions or 
omissions. We all know that some people are more vulnerable to what we do (or fail to 
do) than others. If my actions or omissions cannot possibly benefit or harm Sonny, I 
have no special duties to him. There is no relation of vulnerability between Sonny and 
myself. If my actions or omissions have an effect on Donny’s well-being, then I acquire 
a special obligation to Donny. However, if my actions have a greater impact on the 
well-being of Johnny, then my obligation to Johnny is even stronger. In this way the 
strength and urgency of our duties begins to vary.
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Applying this logic, Goodin insists that his model allocates duties roughly in accor­
dance with commonsense morality.42 Our own well-being, the well-being of our 
children, neighbours, and so forth, are obviously more dependent on our decisions and 
actions than the well-being of distant others, or so he claims. For that same reason, citi­
zens have an obligation to primarily promote each other’s well-being rather than the 
well-being of humanity at large. As he puts it,
... persons relatively near to us in space and in time probably will be rather 
more vulnerable to us... This fact saves my argument from the traditional 
reductio of requiring that we give everything we have to starving Asians or that 
we forever save everything for infinitely receding future generations.. 43
Furthermore, by appealing to vulnerability, political associations and institutions can be 
established to facilitate the administration of certain of these special tasks and duties.
Now, the idea that we live in an institutionalised web of social relations from which 
we derive non-voluntary moral obligations is, in my view, convincing enough. But the 
main problem with Goodin’s model is that its distributive criterion, vulnerability, is not 
entirely independent of the duties it is supposed to distribute in the first place. Hence, 
the argument succumbs to a vicious kind of circularity. Take the example of parental 
duties. Superficially it may be true that children are most vulnerable to their natural 
parents. However, going one step further, one could wonder why this is so. One 
plausible answer must surely be that this vulnerability arises precisely because 
convention assigns the duty to rear, feed and educate children to their natural parents. 
Given this conventional model of parental duty, children are indeed specifically 
vulnerable to parental neglect because there is no one else who feels responsible in the 
same deep way. But what if convention assigned that responsibility to grandparents or, 
say, in Platonic fashion, to some state-nursery run by philosophers? It might also be 
correct to say that in welfare states people are vulnerable to their fellow-citizens and the 
state. But having said that, is this vulnerability not due to the fact that we have welfare
42 R. E. Goodin and P. Pettit, ‘The Possibility of Special Duties’, p. 666.
43 R. E. Goodin, Protecting the Vulnerable, p. 121.
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states in the first place? Given the fact that we have awarded so much responsibility to 
the state, it should hardly be surprising to see that we have become more vulnerable to 
our fellow-citizens, and less to friends, relatives and local communities.
Ultimately, then, vulnerability is a problematic distributive criterion of duty because 
the vulnerability between persons is co-determined by how duties are de facto assigned 
by traditional conventions and historical patterns. These institutions allocate duties that 
in their turn distribute vulnerability rather than the other way around. Goodin anticipates 
this problem, but he does not seek to deny it.44 The allocation of duty, he says, is indeed 
a mere social fact, but he argues that vulnerability is nevertheless required for the moral 
justification of that allocation. So, while he accepts that special responsibilities are 
assigned to people simply on the basis of historical patterns, he also insists that the mere 
fact of such institutions is insufficient to make these obligations morally binding. It is 
only the element of vulnerability that is fostered by these patterns that allows us to say 
that special obligations and associative loyalties are normative: ‘The pragmatic moral 
‘ought’ (‘What ought I to do?’) attaches to the vulnerabilities, rather than to conventi­
onally defined duties and responsibilities per se.’45
Formally this might be a tenable position. Strictly speaking, we do not need to espou­
se what Goodin describes as the ‘traditionalist cum intuitionist’ position regarding your 
station and its duties. We can maintain that we have special duties, not because social 
convention determines that we do, but only because convention places people in a 
vulnerable position to us. We can argue, indeed, that it is only with the added element of 
vulnerability that people enter into moral relations. But unless we say something about 
the desirability of these de facto allocations of vulnerability, it does not appear to be 
much more than a formal point. Does Goodin’s thoroughly theorised model really add 
anything to, as he scathingly calls it, the ‘most primitive form of moral consciousness’? 
Goodin says that parents have special duties to their children because our institutions
44 Ibid., pp. 124-125.
45 Ibid., p. 125.
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are such that the latter are specifically vulnerable to the former. Primitivism says that 
we acquire these duties simply because they inhere in the institution of parenthood. And 
to be frank, I do not see all that much difference.
We may agree, then, with the general point behind this model that some division of 
labour between state-like institutions is likely to increase the sum-total of human well­
being. However, it is a big leap from this insight to the justification of our political 
obligations to specific states as we have inherited them from our ancestors. Goodin’s 
approach simply fails to cope with the contingent nature of human vulnerabilities. 
Moreover, it is simply false to believe that our family members or fellow-countrymen 
are always more vulnerable than the next person. To put it differently, while in some 
circumstances it may be perfectly permissible for husbands to rescue their wives rather 
than a stranger, other circumstances may necessitate a different course of action. For 
example, there may be a far better chance of successfully rescuing the stranger’s life. 
Why still rescue your wife? The problem, in short, is that there does not appear to be an 
easy and internally stable rule that explains how special duties are appropriately 
distributed in accordance with the consequentialist duty to human-kind.
3. Associativism: One Thought too Few?
The impartialist’s toolkit contains explanations for how the constituency of moral duty 
could be reduced from the universal to a local constituency. However, for the reasons I 
have just set out, these tools are simply too blunt to craft an adequate account of our 
inherited political obligations.46 This failure leaves liberal impartiality exposed to
46 C. Heath Wellman, in his ‘Friends, Compatriots, and Special Political Obligations’, Political Theory, 
Vol. 29, No. 2 (April 2001), pp. 217-236, at pp. 231-232, agrees that assimilationism has not been very 
successful. Yet he is convinced that its problems are merely due to ‘the unfortunate unwillingness’ o f  
contemporary liberals to confront this issue. However, if, in recent years, political theory has mainly 
occupied itself with ‘more fashionable concerns like the difference principle’, then this is perhaps because 
such a justification is precisely not forthcoming.
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radicalism. In the remainder of this chapter, I want to develop the associativist 
alternative.
As a general thesis, associativism asserts that relational facts possess obligation- 
creating significance. To put it briefly, associativism maintains that statements such as 
‘because she is my wife’, ‘because he is my friend’, and so forth, need no external 
justification. The model claims something similar for political obligation. We have such 
obligations purely because we are members of a particular state, without needing a 
derivation from moral duty.
Now, we already saw that political obligations are usually inherited. We are 
obligated as a result of the fact that previous generations built particular political 
structures, constitutions and laws. How does associativism explain this? Briefly, 
associativism claims that we have to reject the Jeffersonian premise that inevitably 
steers us towards consent and natural duty theories. That is, we need to jettison the view 
that generations are necessarily like sovereign nations. Instead of this view, we need to 
conceive of the possibility that states could be transgenerational associations. More 
precisely, we need to claim that rather than each generation forming a separate agent, 
generations could be related in such a way that they form a corporate person. On this 
view of corporate personality, generations are linked in the manner of the temporal 
stages of one continuous person. This means that they are related such that the 
collective intention of earlier generations continues to be authoritative over the present.
But the idea that relational facts are primitive in this way provokes the objection that 
associativism ‘thinks one thought too few’. In fact, there are at least two problems that 
stand out. First, we still need to explain why generational relations should have this 
basic obligation-creating significance. This explanation cannot be deduced from 
universal duty, but some clarification is still in order. Second, if it is claimed that a 
relational fact has basic obligation-creating status, then this suggests that all similar 
facts must have this status. In other words, we still have deal with the pivotal objection
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that transgenerational associations may be criminal and corrupt. I shall discuss the last 
objection in Section 4 of this chapter. For now, however, I want to focus solely on the 
first problem.
3.1 The Conceptual Argument
Associativism is often claimed to derive support from the notion that being a member is 
already conceptually linked to being the subject of associative obligations.47 In other 
words, the contention is that our understandings of certain relationships and associations 
are normatively laden. As we have already seen, we use the term friendship to describe 
a particular kind of relationships that is based on loyalty, mutual respect as equals and 
trust. Thus, if you were to treat me in a purely instrumental way, you could not qualify 
as a friend. Friendship simply is the equivalent of acknowledging certain mutual 
obligations. On this view, too, compliance to the law is similarly inherent in the 
meaning of concepts like citizenship, authority and the state. By rejecting the legitimacy 
of your political obligation, you are rejecting citizenship, law and the state.
However, revealing such conceptual links is one thing, justifying political obligations 
quite another. The critics of this view have rightly complained that this argument 
obfuscates the real issue at hand.48 For while these links exist, we still need to show 
why such obligations are normative. And for this we need to clarify why concepts like 
citizenship, law and the state, together with their implicit normative cargo, should 
appeal to us in the first place. So, it may be correct to note that our understandings of 
citizenship, law and the state are, as Dworkin puts it, ‘pregnant’ with obligation. But it 
is not valid to conclude from this that the issue of justification has thus been solved.49 
That conclusion would merely succeed in moving the problem from one place to 
another. Expounding the normative connotations hidden in our conceptual
47 For a discussion o f this position, see J. Horton, Political Obligation, pp. 137-145.
48 For example A. J. Simmons, Moral Principles and Political Obligation, pp. 38-43.
49 R. Dworkin, L aw ’s Empire, p. 206.
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understandings of relations does not suffice to show why we should want these 
associations.
3.2 Identity-dependent Arguments
The most popular argument for associativism appeals to people’s identification with 
groups and associations. On this view, special obligations are grounded in communal 
attachments that are constitutive of our sense of selfhood. The fact that one identifies 
with an association, on this view, is a necessary and sufficient condition for special 
obligations to emerge. To put it differently, this approach agrees that many of our 
relationships are conceptually pregnant with obligations. But for the additional 
normative argument, it turns to the fact that people define their identities in terms of the 
associations to which they belong. So, the argument is identity-dependent. According to 
Hardimon, the gist is that (1) the community we identify with is not just a figment of 
our own imagination, (2) mutual obligations are inherent in our understanding of the 
community, and (3) when people identify with a community, they view themselves in 
such a way that it simply becomes illogical to resist institutional norms and obligations 
of roles and membership.50 Concurring with this last point, De-Shalit writes:
... if and when one admits the existence of a community, and if one 
acknowledges that the community constitutes one’s identity, then it is absurd at 
the same time to deny any obligation to the community and its members. If one 
acknowledges the importance of the community, then one wishes the 
community to be sustained, and even to flourish.51
Miller accounts for the obligations between fellow-nationals on the same basis:
50 M. O. Hardimon, ‘Role Obligations’, The Journal o f  Philosophy, 91, Number 7 (1994), pp. 333-363, at 
p. 358.
51 A. De Shalit, Why Posterity Matters, p. 15. Horton writes in his Political Obligation, p. 157: ‘It should 
not be surprising [...]  that some institutional obligations, through their deep-rooted connections with our 
sense o f who we are and our place in the world, have a particularly fundamental role in our moral being. 
That these kinds o f  institutional involvement generate moral obligations, and that these obligations rather 
than standing in need o f  justification may themselves be justificatory, is only to be expected.’ See also the 
discussion in Y. Tamir, Liberal Nationalism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), pp. 95-116.
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Because I identify with my family, my college, or my local community, I 
properly acknowledge obligations to members of these groups that are distinct 
from the obligations I owe to people generally. Seeing myself as member, I feel 
a loyalty to the group, and this expresses itself, among other things, in my 
giving special weight to the interests of fellow-members.
While this view has certain merits, it also suffers from the weakness that it does not 
distinguish between a sense of duty and its rational justification. It may well be that 
constitutive attachments explain why members want their communities to flourish, or 
why they are more concerned about the well-being of fellow-members than non­
members. Indeed, it probably is unusual and perhaps even absurd for someone to 
identify with a community and yet to completely ignore its interests at the same time. 
But does this intimation of a duty mean that we actually have such obligations? One 
problem is that some people altogether fail to identify with their country to begin with. 
Another problem is that, as a foundation for associative obligation, self-identification 
seems rather indiscriminate. We identify with many groups. Aside from our country, we 
feel loyalty to the firm we work for, a local football club and what have you. I may 
derive a sense of obligation from these attachments, but why should this be sufficient 
reason to bind me morally?53
3.3 Value-dependent Arguments
In an essay on nationalism, Simon Caney has drawn attention to a range of ‘value- 
dependent arguments’ that he thinks are more appropriate for the job.54 The general idea 
is that associativism is justified if the association or relationship in question is valuable
52 D. Miller, On Nationality, p. 65.
53 For examples, see C. Heath Wellman, ‘Relational Facts in Liberal Political Theory’, p. 555, ff.; A. J. 
Simmons, ‘Associative Political Obligations’, pp. 261-265; J. McMahan, ‘Nationalism and the Demands 
o f Impartiality’.
54 S. Caney, ‘Individuals, Nations and Obligations’, in: S. Caney, D. George, P. Jones (eds.), National 
Rights, International Obligations, (Oxford: Westview Press, 1996), pp. 119-138, at pp. 130-133. Caney 
does not believe this argument is successful in the case o f  nationality. However, his general assessment o f  
value-dependent arguments seems to be more optimistic. See also S. Scheffler in ‘Relationships and 
Responsibilities’, in: Boundaries and Allegiances, pp. 97-110.
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in itself. Friendship is a plausible example.55 Obligations of friendship are justified 
because (1) obligations are intrinsic in friendship and (2) friendship is something 
intrinsically valuable. However, Caney does not think that such an argument can be 
successfully mounted in the case of our special obligations to fellow-nationals. The idea 
that nationhood is intrinsically valuable like friendship, he claims, is far too contentious. 
So, the question is how value-dependent arguments could help to explain our 
obligations to a political community.
Andrew Mason has furnished another example of a value-dependent argument.56 
According to Mason, the justification of our political obligations ultimately originates in 
the value of citizenship rather than in the value of nationality.
Citizenship has intrinsic value because in virtue of being a citizen a person is a 
member of a collective body in which they enjoy equal status with its other 
members and are thereby provided with recognition. This collective body 
exercises significant control over its member’s conditions of existence (a degree 
of control which none of its members individually possesses). It offers them the 
opportunity to contribute to the cultural environment in which its laws and 
policies are determined, and opportunities to participate directly and indirectly 
in the formation of these laws and policies. Part of what it is to be a citizen is to 
incur special obligations: these obligations give content to what it is to be 
committed or loyal to fellow citizens and are justified by the good of the wider 
relationship to which they contribute.57
Because (1) political obligations are conceptually implicit in the idea of citizenship and 
(2) citizenship is an intrinsic good, associative obligations are truly normative. It is the 
latter part of the argument that does the justificatory work in Mason’s account.
But his argument also has certain weaknesses. One potential weakness is the
co
republican conception of citizenship as an intrinsic good. By describing citizenship as 
an intrinsic good, Mason suggests that citizenship is not just valuable because it is 
instrumental to another good, but also because it is part of the good in itself.
55 Here, Caney builds on J. Raz, ‘Liberating Duties’, Law and Philosophy, Vol. 8 (1989), pp. 3-21.
56 A. Mason, ‘Special Obligations to Compatriots’, Ethics, 107 (April 1997), pp. 427-447.
57 Ibid., p. 442.
58 For a critical view, see C. Heath Wellman, ‘Friends, Compatriots, and Special Political Obligations’, 
pp. 222-224.
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Citizenship, he says, is ‘a constituent of well-being’ rather than ‘a means to well- 
being’.59 However, the argument designed to explain why this is the case is not 
completely convincing. Mason argues that citizenship provides us with social 
recognition as equals. However, I doubt that that citizenship in modem states can really 
satisfy the need for social recognition. Representative democracies, after all, are not like 
ancient republics. In addition, Mason claims that citizenship gives us greater leverage 
and control over our cultural environment, public policy and law. However, unless we 
assume that leverage and power is an intrinsic good itself, this claim remains 
instrumental. What is more, in this form, the argument does not account for the fact that 
political obligation is typically passed on from one generation to the next. Mason does 
not explain why political association and obligation is a relationship between 
generations.
Despite these problems, the value-dependent strategy provides what is in my view 
the most attractive account of associativism. I want to employ this theory by building on 
the notion of corporate personality and integrity as set out in previous chapters. My 
argument is value-dependent, but it appeals to the intrinsic value of integrity rather than 
that of nationality or citizenship. In this form, I argue, the theory avoids some of the 
problems linked with Mason’s account. Essentially, the claim is that we inherit certain 
political obligations because (1) to have personal identity is to recognise the normativity 
of earlier intentions and (2) personal identity is of intrinsic value.
To begin with, consider what these two claims imply in the instance of individual 
persons. First, the claim that earlier selves could bind later ones is captured by the idea 
of integrity. Integrity means that the intentions and commitments of earlier selves have 
normative weight for us now. We cannot just disown our past actions. Integrity is 
opposed by the notion of a time-slice agent, which prescribes a mode of thought in 
which past intentions and actions are like external facts. Second, the argument that
59 A. Mason, ‘Special Obligations to Compatriots’, p. 441.
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integrity has intrinsic value rests squarely on the practice theory of personal identity. 
According to this theory, whether we should be temporally extended or time-sliced 
agents, moderates or extremists, is itself a normative question. One branch of the 
practice theory claims that integrity is integral to the idea of the goodness of a life as a 
whole. Integrity is what makes us into a unified person, capable of having a unified 
good. A second argument is that integrity facilitates responsibility.
If we want to make the same case for political obligation, we have to apply the 
notion of integrity at the wider level of the state. First, the claim that a present 
generation of citizens is bound by earlier generations is summed up in the model of 
corporate personality. The idea is that the collective intentions and the commitments of 
earlier generations continue to have normative weight for present and future 
generations. We cannot just disown the actions of past generations. This model of 
collective integrity stands in sharp contrast to the Jeffersonian model of generations as 
independent agents. The latter model regards future-directed intentions and 
commitments, as we find them in founding constitutions and treaties, as tyrannical. Both 
models are normative in the sense that they advocate different views about what our 
attitude to the collective past should be.
Second, we again need to appeal to the practice theory of personal identity to explain 
why corporate integrity, too, is a virtue. One important claim, which I advanced in 
Chapter VI, continues the argument from the goodness of a life as a whole. The claim is 
here that present generations participate in shared projects and goods, whose 
achievement requires co-ordination and co-operation between several generations. It is 
for the sake of this transgenerational nature of the human good, so the argument goes, 
that generations should be normatively connected to each other. A second approach, 
which I have left largely unexplored until now, continues the argument from 
responsibility and action ownership. It points out that corporate personality explains 
why later generations could be held responsible for the actions of earlier ones. Thus, it
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facilitates a view on which accountability does not just slip through the cracks of time, 
but passes on from one generation to the next.
There might be other normative arguments that underscore the importance of 
integrity. But whatever these arguments are, the point is here that the value-dependent 
strategy explains why associativism, as an account of political obligation, is a plausible 
theory. Inherent in corporate personality is precisely the view that one generation could 
bind other generations, share responsibilities and interests, as it is inherent in the notion 
of one individual person that one person-stage could bind another, and share 
responsibilities and interests. By showing that the relation of integrity facilitates 
transgenerational goods and transgenerational responsibility, we have an account of 
why associative obligations are normative.
4. Bad Associations
Rather than appealing to self-identification or the intrinsic value of nationhood or 
citizenship, I have suggested that political obligations are immanent in the idea of 
corporate personality, and that integrity is a virtue not derivable from a more basic 
virtue. However, critics often object that associativism fails to appreciate that relational 
facts greatly vary in character, substance and purpose. Heath Wellman points out:
... if there is truly magic in the pronoun ‘my’, then we apparently must have 
special duties to all our relations, just as the magic in promising means that we 
have special moral duties to keep all of our promises. Such a view is untenable, 
however, because it is absurd to posit special duties to all relations.60
Some relations, like some promises, are morally more attractive than others, but 
associativism makes us blind to this fact, or so the allegation goes.
To demonstrate this point, the critics begin by citing numerous examples of 
associations that foster unjust practices or immoral ends. Dagger notes: ‘Philanthropic
60 C. Heath Wellman, ‘Relational Facts in Liberal Political Theory’, p. 553.
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groups have members, but so does the Mafia.’61 Heath Wellman points to racist and 
sexist groups. And according to Simmons, ‘local practices and institutions can be 
unjust, oppressive, pointless, woefully inefficient, and in other ways normatively 
defective.’ They then ask whether associates of a defective association, say, the Mafia, 
are bound by the organisation’s codes of silence and loyalty. Finally, because the Mafia 
is a relational fact, it is pointed out that associativism is compelled to defend the 
opposite view. Since it claims that such facts have obligation-generating significance, 
associativism must also hold -  absurdly -  that Mafia membership generates obligations. 
Since this is assumed to be self-evidently mistaken, associativism must clearly be 
wrong. For we are only able to nullify associative obligations to the Mafia once we 
move to assimilationism, and subject these obligations to review from the viewpoint of 
impartial duty. To sum up, we need to bring in principles of justice to either certify or 
declare void special or political obligations.
Usually, associativists respond to this challenge in one of the following two ways. 
First, some associativists bank on including a proviso, effectively claiming that 
associative obligations are only conditionally valid. That condition invariably states that 
the practices sustained by the association, its character, substance and purpose, should 
be consistent with an external norm or a principle of justice. For example, according to 
Hardimon, ‘it is crucial to distinguish between the idea that one might be under a moral 
obligation simply because one occupies a particular role given that certain moral 
background conditions are in place (for example, that the institution is just and that the 
role is reflectively acceptable) and the idea that a moral role could generate moral 
obligations regardless of the moral background conditions.’ But including such a 
robust proviso hollows out associativism to an extent that it leaves unclear why we need
61 R. Dagger, ‘Membership, Fair Play, and Political Obligation’, p. 110.
62 A. J. Simmons, ‘Associative Political Obligations’, p. 266. For what he describes as the ‘obnoxious 
identity objection’, see also S. Caney, ‘Individuals, Nations and Obligations’,
63 M. O. Hardimon, ‘Role Obligations’, p. 351.
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this thesis at all.64 In the end, Hardimon is not really an associativist at all. Certainly, he 
rejects voluntarist approaches, but because he insist that role obligations must be 
‘reflectively acceptable’ his approach slips back into what is essentially a hypothetical 
mode of contractualism reminiscent of the natural justice models advanced by Kant, 
Waldron and Goodin.
A similar relapse occurs in Dworkin’s treatment of the issue. However, here the 
caveats are largely smuggled in through the backdoor. In Law’s Empire, Dworkin wants 
to distinguish between ‘bare’ and ‘true’ (or ‘fraternal’) communities.65 A bare 
community refers to a loose grouping of individuals who are physically brought 
together by biological, geographical and historical factors. The existence of a bare 
community is a precondition for a fraternal community to emerge. However, a 
community is ‘fraternal’ only if it meets a further number of conditions. First, its 
members must view their associative obligations as special. Second, these obligations 
must also be seen as personal, meaning that I cannot be released from my duties to a 
specific fellow-member merely by benefiting the group at large. Third, these obligations 
must be taken to express concern for the well-being of the members. Fourth, and most 
notably, there must be an equal concern for all members. ‘True’ communities, Dworkin 
claims, are ‘conceptually egalitarian’. Obviously, this last condition is intended as a 
check on associations that harbour basic inequalities, like caste societies. According to 
Dworkin’s classification, such societies do not even count as associations. Moreover, he 
adds that if certain morally repugnant associations should slip through this maze of 
caveats, then associative obligations are simply cancelled by ‘severe and deep’ 
injustices.66
64 . •Here, I agree with Tamir’s claim that ‘If only morally valuable communities could generate associative
obligations, the latter would become a meaningless concept.’ See Liberal Nationalism, p. 102. In his
‘Relational Facts and Liberal Political Theory’ (p. 555), Wellman refers to the proponents o f this view as
‘closet assimilationists’.
65 R. Dworkin, L aw ’s Empire, p. 201.
66 Ibid., pp. 202-206. For a dissenting voice, see J. Horton, Political Obligation, pp. 156-157.
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The second and in my view more credible solution suggests that we bite the bullet. 
On this view, associative obligations persist even in the face of severe and deep 
injustice. As Tamir argues,
There is no reason to assume, as Dworkin does, that only membership in 
morally worthy associations can generate associative obligations. For example, 
members of the Mafia are bound by associative obligations to their fellow 
members, meaning that they have an obligation to attend to each other’s needs, 
to protect each other, to support the families of those killed ‘in action’, and the 
like.67
But, as she points out, this view is actually less far-fetched than most assimilationists 
assume it to be. Clearly, associativism endorses such obligations only on a prima facie 
basis. While associative obligation may be one factor in my judgment about what I 
ought to do all things considered, this is not the only consideration. So, associativists do 
not deny that there are other, moral obligations and concerns that could overrule what 
we owe in virtue of our membership to a particular association.
This solution, too, is claimed to have drawbacks. First, we have to accept a form of 
moral pluralism that claims that neither impartiality nor associativism is capable of 
going it alone. At the level of ultimate judgements, the potential for a deep and all too 
familiar conflict remains. Second, even at the prima facie level, assimilationists will 
maintain that there is something absurd about the suggestion that we could have an 
obligation to unjust or criminal associations. Assimilationism appeals to the intuition 
that the members of such associations are under no such obligation at all. If Tony 
instructs Donny to kill Sonny, it is erroneous to think that Donny acquires a prima facie 
obligation to assassinate Sonny, which is only later overruled by a general, moral 
obligation. There can be no obligation to murder Sonny to begin with.
67 Y. Tamir, Liberal Nationalism, p. 101. For a similar argument, see also A. Oldenquist, ‘Loyalties’; and
M. Gilbert, ‘Agreements, Coercion, and Obligation’.
68 For example, Oldenquist claims: ‘In terms o f the logic o f reasons they provide, loyalties are a third 
category o f the normative, distinct from both self-interest and impersonal morality.’ See his ‘Loyalties’, 
p. 176.
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What could we say in response to these objections? It is important to begin by 
pointing out that although the problem of bad associations may not entirely disappear, 
the value-dependent underpinnings of associativism offer more room for manoeuvring 
than identity-dependent accounts. If, indeed, identification is a sufficient and necessary 
condition, then we have to agree with Tamir that moral provisos and caveats are, like a 
ghost from the machine, introduced all too conveniently and with the sole purpose of 
ruling out the existence of prima facie obligations when someone happens to develop 
constitutive attachments to associations like the Mafia. Such an insurance policy is 
inconsistent with the identity-dependent basis of associative obligations itself. However, 
if we turn to value-dependent accounts, the inconsistency vanishes. Since associative 
obligations are grounded in the value of the association in question, that value already 
serves as a screen itself. For example, Mason notes that ‘there are limits to what a 
citizen body can do to their individual members without destroying the relationship of 
citizenship.’69 In his view, states that undermine the political equality of their members 
also destroy the very grounds on which they can demand loyalty and support. Corporate 
personality imposes a similar screen. It points out that associative obligations are 
conditional on the state’s integrity. And there are also limits to what a political 
community can do without compromising its integrity.
The exact scope of the limits thus drawn by this approach naturally depends on how 
the content of integrity is fully spelt out. But it is clearly not inconsistent to claim that 
when a state jeopardises its own integrity, it releases its citizens from their political 
obligations. So, this value-dependent approach seems more suitable than Dworkin’s 
approach. Dworkin’s mistake, in my view, is that he does not appeal directly to the 
value of integrity itself. Instead, he complicates things by putting too much weight on 
the distinction between ‘true’ and ‘bare’ communities. States need to have integrity to 
qualify as ‘true’ communities. But it seems that in order to generate political
69 A. Mason, ‘Special Obligations to Compatriots’, p. 444.
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obligations, states need to possess a mix of many other characteristics as well. And to 
round things of, he offers an external proviso. Instead, it seems more logical to start 
with a value-dependent account of what integrity is and why it is valuable. This account 
imposes its own internal limitations on what a state could do without destroying the 
foundation of political obligation. States need to respect the laws and principles, the 
‘intention’, embodied in their constitutions. These laws and principles thus function as a 
filter on our obligations and responsibilities.
It must be conceded that this value-dependent approach may not entirely solve the 
problem of bad associations. States can do many awful things, or so I believe, and still 
maintain their integrity. I have argued that integrity is a virtue or value because that is 
what it takes for both individuals as well as states to qualify as one continuous person, 
capable of having a long-term good and owning up to action. But having this virtue is 
not inconsistent with performing a morally defective or wrong action. Two things have 
to be kept apart here. While it is one thing to say that he or she is a unified person, it is 
another thing to say that he or she is a moral person. These judgements invoke a 
different meaning of the term ‘badness’. Korsgaard has argued that when we say that an
70association or a person or his action is bad, we can mean two things. First, we can 
mean in the conventional manner that this person or his action is morally wrong or 
unjust. This involves an external judgment. But second, we can also mean to censure an 
act in the sense that we say ‘This is a bad car’ or ‘This is a bad free kick’. We could 
describe this as an internal judgment. My judgment presupposes that there is a standard 
internal to the thing or activity in question, usually expressed in terms of a function or a 
purpose. A car is usually meant for driving and the purpose of a free kick is to score a 
goal. From the internal standpoint, a bad car fails ‘as a car’. It fails to live up to what it 
means to be a good car. And a bad free kick fails ‘as a free kick’. It fails to live up to 
what free kicks aim to achieve.
70 C. M. Korsgaard, ‘Self-Constitution in the Ethics o f Plato and Kant’, pp. 12-15, and more generally 
The Sources o f  Normativity.
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Integrity serves as a filter on associativism, but only in the context of this internal 
standpoint. We can only exclude bad associations insofar as bad means that its actions 
fail ‘as action’. According to Korsgaard, action fails to live up to the standards of what 
it is to be an action if it fails to be authorised and owned. And for the ownership of 
action we require that it could be accounted for in terms of a coherent reason or
71intention. In this sense, integrity screens bad associations insofar as these associations 
are ‘badly constructed’ rather than morally flawed.
There is no reason for such modesty, if, as Korsgaard believes, the internal standards 
for what is and is not an action would coincide with the external standards for judging 
the morality or wrongness of an action. The upshot of this view is precisely that evil 
stems from the internal defectiveness of action ‘as action’. Morality is grounded in the 
free will, wickedness in subordination of the free will. To put it differently, willing and 
acting in accordance with the moral law are simply what it means to be an agent capable 
of willing and acting at all. We have to be moral, for this is what it takes to be fully 
autonomous. Now, if this view were true, then we could claim to have completely 
solved the problem of bad associations.
However, I have already argued that this view of things does not hold in the case of 
individual persons.72 The same objections apply to this bolder version of associativism. 
While it is true that integrity demands that the state act on laws or maxims that are 
authoritative for its own actions, there is no reason to believe that integrity should 
further require that the content of these laws and maxims should be such that they could 
reasonably be willed to guide the choices of states in general. Moreover, if the immoral 
nature of an action would spring from its defect ‘as an action’, then the immoral actions 
of a state could never be owned by that state. Conceiving of integrity in this way may 
lead to a moral vacuum in which it is impossible to hold any agent responsible for 
immoral deeds. We should, therefore, keep these internal and external standpoints apart.
71 See Chapter II, Section 4 above.
72 In Chapter II, Section 4.
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Integrity is a procedural virtue emphasising that associations should be constituted on 
the basis of the coherence and unity provided by rule-governed order. Integrity is about 
the rule of law or principle. The content of these laws and principles, that is, their moral 
rightness or reasonableness, is a different matter altogether.
To sum up, value-dependent associativism of the sort that I am defending here 
provides at least some filter whereas identity-dependent associativism either resorts to 
exogenous provisos or offers nothing at all. That said, we have to recognise that unjust 
associations may still create prima facie associative obligations. And this may still 
sound absurd. In order to explain why this is not entirely absurd, the value-dependent 
approach needs to show that even the integrity of unjust associations, like the Mafia, is a 
virtue.
Generally, integrity is an independent virtue partly also because it allows us to 
understand how actions are attributable to persons who have authorised them. Integrity 
explains, among other things, how it is possible that there are continuous agents who 
can be held to account for what they have done in the past. Now, a person’s character 
may be substantively flawed in the sense that this person adheres to maxims that ought 
to be rejected from the moral point of view. But this does not entail that the integrity of 
that person is no longer a virtue or a value. Take the example of Donny, a Mafioso, who 
assassinates Sonny. Clearly, this constitutes a moral wrong. Moreover, Donny appears 
to be a person of highly dubious morality as his practical identity is organised according 
to the principle of selfishness and the laws of the mob. Now, while he ought to renounce 
his mobster principles, it is still arguable that the bare fact that Donny has integrity 
counts for something. Despite of what he has done, indeed, precisely because of what he 
has done, most of us think it important that we are able to treat Donny as an agent. After 
all, we think it proper that he be held accountable for his earlier actions, receive 
punishment, show a sense of remorse, and so forth. So, all other things equal, it is in a 
way still more preferable that Donny commits this crime, not a loose collection of
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intentional episodes. If, on top of this crime, Donny had no integrity, if he were 
temporally discontinuous in the way that the extremist imagines, then accountability 
would inevitably slip through the cracks of time.
In other words, integrity is a virtue distinct from justice, because it allows us to 
assign responsibility where responsibility should be assigned. It facilitates a mode of 
agency. This is essentially no different in the case of associations. If a state, say, wages 
war on its neighbours under the principle of collective selfishness, we may rightly 
describe this state as unjust. But this does not mean that the associative relatedness or 
the integrity constitutive of this state is entirely without value. It is precisely because a 
state possesses a degree of integrity that we can treat it as a unified and continuous 
agent. In contrast to an unruly multitude, we can assign responsibility to corporate 
persons, and insist later, for example, that sanctions be levied or reparations be paid. All 
things equal, it is still better to face an unjust state than a loose band of robbers. The 
value of integrity is not concurrent with the importance of justice. Justice is one thing, 
accountability and moral personality another. If, then, associative obligations are 
grounded in the value of integrity, it is not absurd to suggest that there could be prima 
facie obligations even where they clash with morality. These obligations may 
consequently have to be overruled by other considerations, but integrity is a virtue 
whatever a person does.
Finally, this leaves the objection that we have to make do with a form of value 
pluralism. Associativism argues that associations and relations have a basic value such 
that membership could directly create associative obligations. At the same time it may 
have to be acknowledged that there are duties that we owe to all human beings. Put 
differently, associative obligation could come into conflict with the wider concerns of 
justice or morality. Moreover, our obligations to one association may collide with our 
obligations to others. What we have to come to terms with, then, is that political 
obligation operates on the basis of an all things equal condition. And whether in the
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final analysis a particular obligation should be decisive or trumped by other obligations 
or concerns, may be difficult to say. For example, if I discover that my good friend 
Donny is planning to kill Sonny, intuition suggests that the duty of justice should 
outweigh my duties of loyalty as a friend. But what do I say upon learning that Donny is 
involved in embezzlement and tax fraud? Do I gather evidence by covertly recording 
our conversations, and then make an anonymous phone call to the Inland Revenue? 
Such hard cases present us with profound dilemmas.
Now, from an ideal point of view it might have been expected that political theory 
could harbour no room for a plurality of values and obligations. Ideally, we have a full 
set of priority-rules, and ultimately a theory of everything, capable of telling us what we 
ought to do even in these cases. But I doubt that this ideal is much more than a 
pipedream. It should be recognised, in my view, that in many of such cases the dilemma 
is not apparent but profoundly real and persistent. We can take the formal impartialist’s 
advice and ask ourselves whether or not it is ‘reasonable’ for anyone to reject this or 
that principle, but the fact is that at some point we simply run out of intuitions to work 
with. At times we simply do not know what ‘reasonable’ means, and which obligation 
should overrule the other. In my view it is far more preferable to appreciate that 
practical reason harbours this dilemma than to conjecture theoretical harmony at the 
expense of getting stuck with the answer that there are no political obligations at all.
Why is the dilemma deep and persistent? To conclude, I offer a brief answer. 
Throughout this thesis, I have been concerned to show that there is a kind of reasoning 
and obligation that is constitutive of a particular mode of agency. This is not just the 
case for corporate persons -  we could, in fact, leave the idea of corporate personality 
aside here -  but also for the personal identity of individuals. As we saw earlier, the 
notion of personal identity refers to a kind of connectedness or association. To be a 
temporally extended person or agent is merely to recognise a kind of associative 
obligation to your past and future selves. I further argued that these obligations are
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primitive because the mode of agency that they facilitate happens to be an essential part 
of our way of being, our intuitions and judgements. Now, apart from this kind of 
associative obligation, it may be true that morality places us under a different sort of 
duty, to wit, a duty that we owe to other persons. However, while I do not want to 
affirm or reject such moral duties, it is I think obvious that ethical individualism has no 
choice but to affirm the associative obligations that are constitutive of the personal 
identity of individuals. At least insofar as theories are based on the notion of the 
individual as the bearer of interests and responsibilities, they presuppose these 
associative obligations. Thus, it is not surprising to see dilemmas emerging, even 
without having introduced wider obligations to the state or other associations. Since 
individualists claim that we are bearers of interests and responsibilities, they clearly rely 
on the idea of personal identity. And, as we have seen, to rely on the idea of personal 
identity, is to corroborate associative obligations and other normative considerations 
that derive, not from the higher ground of impartial duty, but directly from the relational 
fact of identity itself.
Conclusion
In this chapter, I compared two basic theories of associative obligation. Assimilationism 
argues that principles, thought to be universally ‘non-rejectable’, may nonetheless 
sanction political obligations with a narrower scope. Voluntarism seems a prime 
candidate for this job, but in the non-contractual setting of states this merely implies that 
there are no associative obligations. A better prospect is offered by combining the 
imperative of justice with an acute sense for administrative efficiency. I have argued, 
however, that for several reasons this attempt is problematic and likely to collapse.
Associativism presents a natural alternative by arguing that associations have 
obligation-generating significance. Associativism underpins this argument by appealing
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to the claim that political obligations are conceptually inherent in the concepts of law, 
citizenship and state. However, while this claim is correct, we need an additional 
argument to account for the normativity of these obligations. Many associativists appeal 
to identity-based arguments. However, in contrast to these approaches, I argue that 
value-dependent arguments are more persuasive. In addition, while these value- 
dependent arguments tend to focus on nationality and citizenship, I have suggested an 
account emphasising the virtue of personal integrity.
In sum, I wanted to demonstrate that there are reasons to avow corporate personality 
as an irreducibly normative idea. Chapter V put forward the hypothesis that the 
corporate model is most plausible when placed in the context of our connectedness with 
past and future generations. I claimed it to be widely acknowledged that future 
generations matter, that individualist theories of intergenerational justice fail to account 
for this significance, and that the idea of corporate personality, when cashed out in 
terms of transgenerational association, addresses this issue more successfully. The same 
line of argument, this chapter suggests, can be directed towards the past. I argue that 
political obligations and responsibilities are handed down by inheritance, that these 
inherited obligations are not adequately captured by ethical individualism, and that 
corporate personality provides us with a more promising model.
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CONCLUSION AND SUMMARY
This thesis argues that human associations qualify as moral persons in and of 
themselves. Most political theorists are firmly committed to the principle of ethical 
individualism. On this view, associations have no independent moral standing. Their 
ethical importance derives solely from the standing of their individual members. This 
thesis maintains, in contrast, that we need to revive corporation theory. We should 
return to this theory, because the notion of corporate personality, unlike the 
communitarian appeal to culture and language, is able to explain why associations 
matter in a fundamental way. Like ethical individualists, I believe that persons matter 
fundamentally. But there are no good reasons to hold that only individuals are persons.
Ethical individualism seems to derive mainly from the ontological prejudice that 
groups are reducible to their individual members in a way that individuals are not. 
Groups do not have a will or interest, at least not separately from their individual 
members. And so there appears to be little room for corporate personality. Essentially, 
this thesis shows that the case for ethical individualism is never that straightforward. 
The philosophical catch is that the individual, when viewed in a diachronic context, is 
just another kind of association. Individual persons are merely bundles of psychological 
states, as Parfit reminds us. To be sure, this fact need not stop us from claiming that 
individuals have responsibilities and rights as unified agents, but the basic question 
shifts from: ‘Could relational facts have obligation-generating significance?’ to ‘Why 
do these relations have ethical standing, not others?’
The gist of my argument is that corporate personality could be revived by 
constructing it as a normative theory. This reconstruction directs us to the ideas of 
associativism and integrity, which are in fact interchangeable with the notion of 
corporate personality. It is due to their integrity that individuals and associations 
become single agents, capable of willing and acting as a unified whole. Integrity is a 
virtue both for individuals as well as for groups. It captures an important standard of
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associative conduct, which I claim is constitutive of our agency, while distinct from 
justice or morality. Associativism is the view that relational facts have a basic value and 
directly impose obligations on their members. It finds support in the idea that corporate 
personality elongates our ethical horizons. Corporate personality, I argue, has the 
unique ability to connect past, present and future generations in meaningful and 
practically significant ways.
Let me spell out the entire argument of this thesis in greater detail. Essentially, 
corporation theory contends that associations should be regarded as the independent 
bearers of interests, rights and obligations. That is to say, the interests, rights and 
obligations of the association are directly reason-giving, without needing a further 
justification in terms of the interest or good or will of the individual. The notion of a 
corporate person further entails that associations are capable of unified agency.
This notion of corporate personality is traditionally thought to depend on one of the 
following two justifications. According to the fiction theory, a group is a corporate 
person if certain people or institutions are prepared to feign its personality. Ultimately, 
associations do not have interests and intentions that exist separately from individual 
interests and intentions. We merely pretend that they do. According to corporate 
realism, the personality of a group depends, not on the acceptance of a fiction, but on its 
own reality as an agent. In other words, associations have real interests and intentions. 
Their personality is not just made up, but comparable to that of individuals. Like the 
latter, the group qualifies as a right-and-duty-bearing unit on the grounds that it forms 
an organism with a life and a mind of its own.
The problem is that each of these justifications faces serious objections and 
limitations. The fiction theory, on the one hand, is of no use to ethical and political 
theory. On the basis of fiction we could personify anything. Corporate realism, on the 
other, is simply not plausible. At any rate, the latter view cannot give corporation theory 
a new lease of life.
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Given these limitations, it is hardly surprising that the notion of corporate personality 
has almost disappeared from the debate. In the main, contemporary political theory is 
based on the principle of ethical individualism. The individual is the basic unit of 
analysis in theories of rationality and morality. All conceivable reasons for action -  the 
standards of both the right and the good -  are claimed to derive from an action’s impact 
on individual well-being. What is more, only the individual is thought to be genuinely 
capable of assuming responsibility for his actions. Ethical individualism could still 
argue that associations or communities play an important role in our lives. But their 
value is at best instrumental to the individual good. Associations are never a good in 
and of themselves.
Is corporate personality dead? It is widely believed that this is indeed the case. 
However, this thesis shows there are still ways to breathe new life into this notion. In 
order to accomplish this, we need to break with the received dogmas that view group 
personality either as a fiction or as a separately existing collective mind. We need a 
different kind of justificatory theory. While this theory cannot appeal to fiction, the 
main challenge is to show that, at the same time, it manages to steer clear of corporate 
realism. Another way of putting it is to say that we have to reconcile the notion of a 
corporate person with a reductionist or individualist ontology. We have to argue that 
associations qualify as moral persons in the sense set out above, but acknowledge that 
groups do not have separate minds.
How can this paradox be unravelled? Part of the answer involves a switch from an 
ontological to an irreducibly normative conception of the person and personal identity. 
This normative conception has in fact been developed by ethical individualists 
themselves. But I go on to claim that it can be employed against individualism itself. 
However, before discussing that issue, it is important to understand that the paradox 
does not only emerge in the case of corporate personality. Although this is often 
overlooked, it also surfaces at the level of individual personality.
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Chapter I explains why this is the case. The idea is that individuals and associations 
are analogous after all. However, in contrast to what corporate realists have always 
claimed, this analogy is argued to hold up inversely. Groups are not individuals ‘writ 
large’, but individuals are groups ‘writ small’. This inversed comparison emerges from 
a reductionist theory according to which the identity of a person consists in the 
psychological continuity and/or connectedness between its temporal stages. On this 
view, there is no indivisible Ego, which exists separately from this bundle of 
psychological states and is sometimes said to be its owner. Personal identity is purely 
relational. Whether or not I am identical with a future self is a matter of degree, of 
stronger or weaker psychological relatedness.
Now, it will be objected that by inversing the analogy between individuals and 
groups we have only made a bad situation even worse. For the bundle theory seems to 
imply that we have to abandon the notion of the person altogether. Indeed, according to 
the ‘extreme claim’ we should not just reject the appeal to the interests and good of 
associations, we should also reject the appeal to the temporally extended interests and 
good of individual persons. Far from having rescued the idea of corporate personality, 
we have only damaged ethical individualism. What we are left with is a highly atomised 
brand of consequentialism, according to which the importance, not just of social 
groupings, but even of personal identity is at best derivative.
However, this is not the only interpretation of the bundle theory. In Chapter II, it is 
argued that ethical individualism could reject the extreme claim. For this to be 
successful, ethical individualism has to modify its understanding of the role of the 
person and personal identity in normative theory. Assuming that a return to the Self is 
not a plausible option, the key is to advance an understanding of personal identity, not 
just as a purely psychological bundling of mind-states, but also as a form of 
connectedness that is inherently normative. According to the moderate claim, for 
example, the relatedness between the stages of a person is partly constituted by a
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concern for each other’s well-being. Being connected to a future self is to feel a kind of 
prudential concern. And being connected to a past self in the manner of a person is to 
accept past commitments, intentions and actions as your own. In short, while the 
moderate claim acknowledges that personal identity is essentially a relation, this 
relational fact gives us reasons for action.
Why should we support the moderate rather than the extreme claim? Two arguments 
are important here. First, we have to concentrate on the concept of a person in general 
and its role in normative theory. One way of approaching this subject suggests that 
theories of the person and personal identity provide normative theories with an 
objective foundation. However, this approach fails to help us out. The problem is that 
both claims are at odds, not over ontology, but over the question whether psychological 
bundles have an inherent and basic normative significance. The second way of 
approaching this issue -  I call it the practice theory -  suggests that theories of the 
person and personal identity are the subject of normative theorising. On this view, 
normative theory operates on the basis of reflective equilibrium. If, then, we apply the 
practice theory to the dispute between the extreme and moderate claims, the former 
seems very implausible. The idea that every stage of a person forms a separate agent as 
such, with interests, duties and rights of its own, simply does not correspond to our way 
of life. We all recognise that we are in a practically relevant sense deeply connected 
with our past and future lives.
Second, we have to give more depth to the idea that personal identity is partly 
defined by normative connectedness. I therefore look at the notion of integrity. It is 
argued -  first only from a synchronic point of view -  that in order to be a unified agent 
at all, a person needs to be able to organise his beliefs, desires and choices on the basis 
of reasons. That is to say, as a unified agent, my actions must be explicable in terms of 
general principles or policies that are authoritative over all my actions. I must be able to 
justify or account for my choices and actions in terms of their internal coherence. Three
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further points should be noticed. First, integrity does not necessarily coincide with 
morality. It is not the case that in order to be a unified agent one must necessarily be a 
moral agent. Second, unified agency or personality turns out to be an end, a goal or an 
achievement. It is something we should do our best to attain, that we could attain to 
certain degrees. Third, the notion of integrity can be seen to apply at a diachronic level. 
It offers a particular conception of personal identity over time.
With the practice theory and this conception of integrity in place, the argument then 
returns to corporate personality. I claim its possibility is demonstrated by extending the 
moderate claim to the level of nations or states or other groups. This extension of the 
moderate claim could be referred to as associativism. Roughly, associativism suggests 
that mterpersonal forms of connectedness could have the same normative significance 
as the m/rapersonal connectedness between past, present and future selves. While 
associations are quite clearly relational facts, this theory goes on to argue that they still 
directly impose obligations on their members. For example, it argues that the communal 
good, like the good of a temporally extended person, still has non-derivative weight in 
our practical reasoning.
But why should we accept associativism rather than ethical individualism? 
Fundamentally, our task is to use the practice theory and the related notion of integrity 
to build a case for associativism, a case that therefore mirrors the justification for the 
moderate claim. Building on the practice theory, we first have to show that 
associativism and the idea of corporate personality are normatively attractive when 
tested against our well-considered judgements and intuitions. Moreover, corporate 
personality has to be capable of doing justificatory work that ethical individualism 
leaves undone. Second, we have to show that the notion of integrity could also be 
applied at the wider level of associations like nations and states.
Chapter III begins with the last part of that task. Corporate personality, most people 
agree, must be consistent with ontological reductionism or individualism about
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collectives. This means that we have to understand the notion, not as a mysterious 
Group Ego, but as a bundling of the intentions and preferences of individuals. To put it 
differently, a group-person emerges when a number of individuals come to share a 
collective intention or preference, just as the personality of an individual emerges when 
a number of person-stages come to share a future-directed intention or preference. 
Above all, what this requires is that the associates think in a particular mode of thought, 
containing two levels. On the first level, so-called collective intentions (or purposes or 
preferences) must be defined over the actions of a number of individuals (and their 
outcomes). Collective intentions relate to things or ends that we could do or achieve 
together. Second, instead of basing their decisions purely on individual intentions, those 
individuals who think in this mode of thought take these collective intentions to be 
authoritative over their choices. When a number of people thus come to hold collective 
intentions that are sufficiently overlapping, an association may be correctly said to have 
personal integrity, just as an individual may be said to have personal integrity when a 
number of person-stages come to hold individual intentions that are sufficiently 
overlapping.
Since this approach to corporate personality is clearly reductionist in an ontological 
sense, care has to be taken to prevent the model from collapsing back into a form of 
ethical individualism. We could distinguish at least three ways in which such a collapse 
is likely to occur. Conventionalism argues that collective intentions and preferences 
could ultimately be broken down in individual intentions and preferences. 
Contractualism argues that associativism must be subjected to the normative test that 
no-one should be allowed to be worse off as the result of his participation. Finally, 
voluntarism argues that all members need to have freely given their consent to 
becoming an associative member. In opposition to these three interpretations, it is 
argued respectively that collective intentions are basic, that whether or not intentions or
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preferences are shared in the above sense is an empirical matter, and that while 
voluntary consent may be a sufficient condition, it is not a necessary condition.
This idea of corporate personality is thus designed to remain within two side- 
constraints. First, it does not lapse into an implausible kind of anthropomorphic 
metaphysics, which earlier theories relied on. So it fits the reductionist constraint. 
Second, it is nonetheless able to make an independent contribution to normative theory. 
That is to say, it fits what I call the sovereignty constraint. I next take up a different 
challenge. As it stands, the model of associative integrity and shared intention 
developed in Chapter III seems applicable mainly to small-scale, deliberative and 
egalitarian contexts. Chapter IV aims to modify this account of corporate personality 
such that it could more plausibly be applied to larger human associations and to the state 
in particular. In other words, the question is whether or not this notion of a corporate 
person could also be made to fit a third constraint, which is empirical in nature.
Essentially, the problem with the idea of the personality of the state is that it projects 
a collective intention that is shared at a societal scale. Such a projection is problematic 
for at least three reasons. First, states usually include a vast number of people and many 
intricate and elaborate forms of collective activity, co-ordination and planning. So there 
is a clear problem with complexity. That is, we simply cannot expect all citizens to be 
consciously aware of and guide their actions according to a collective or executive 
intention at this level of complexity. Second, states are often sharply demarcated by 
territorial boundaries. If states are corporate persons, a collective intention would have 
to be exclusively shared by a population or membership that can be defined territorially, 
a requirement that seem empirically vulnerable. Third, states claim a kind of authority 
that is alien to most other associations. While associations can in principle co-exist with 
other, like-minded associations, states are monopolies. The problem, then, with the 
notion of the integrity of the state is that it would seem to rule out pluralism, dissent and 
difference. Yet, as has often been argued, it is a fact that most states harbour a great
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many different practical and cultural identities. Given this ‘fact of pluralism’, it is 
difficult to see how states could have integrity in the sense defined above.
In response to these challenges, I attempt to revise the model so as to accommodate 
the complexity, territoriality and internal pluralism of states. As a first step, I argue that 
we should think of intention as an interpretive rather than a psychological concept. 
According to the latter concept, a collective intention should always be thought of as a 
conscious state in the minds of all those who are members. Each citizen must assume 
the executive point of view on what they as a citizen-body aim to achieve together. 
According to the interpretive approach, however, this need not be the case. What is 
important, on this view, is merely that our actions are sufficiently ‘meshing’ such that a 
collective intention could later be constructed. Collective intentions, it suggests, are 
implicit in what we do. They manifest themselves only by the ‘constructive 
interpretation’ of a coherent practice. The principle idea is that we start from a 
historically evolved pattern of collective action, and then try to account for the practice 
as a whole in terms of one single purpose or principle. To put it differently, while none 
of the participants actually needs to assume the executive point of view, the state has 
integrity when the actions of its citizen-body are justifiable on the basis of a single 
principle or rationale.
However, while this interpretive approach seems to assuage the problem of 
complexity, it does little to alleviate the problems of boundaries and pluralism. It is 
important, therefore, to also introduce an institutional dimension to the model. 
Essentially, the idea is here that the corporate personality of the state could be facilitated 
by intermediary rules of recognition or constitutive rules. Such rules shift the locus o f  
integrity to a different level. Notice that even though the idea of integrity is interpretive, 
that is, immanent in a set of overlapping or meshing activities, it should still be effective 
as a normative constraint on that practice. The notion of a locus goes on to specify 
where precisely integrity should be effective as such a constraint. On a non-institutional
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approach, a collective intention must be normative for the population or citizen-body at 
large. However, once the appropriate rules of recognition are in place, the locus of 
integrity shifts from the population at large to the official bodies of the state, which 
legislate and adjudicate on behalf of the community. By equipping corporate personality 
with this institutional dimension, we are thus in a much better position to deal with the 
problems of boundaries and pluralism.
The remainder of the thesis turns to normative issues. Like personal identity, 
corporate personality is not so much an ontological theory as a theory of practical 
reason. It must therefore demonstrably have practical merits. We could call this the 
practicality constraint. Chapter V investigates a number of hypotheses to this effect. 
First, it briefly discusses and calls into question the communitarian thesis that culture 
and language are irreducibly social or communal goods. Second, I look at the idea that 
associativism extends our concern from a narrow focus on the present, to our temporally 
extended good, and then to an even wider concern for the good of others. On this view, 
corporate personality suggests that we have grounds to treat the good of our fellow- 
associates as reasons, just as the idea of an individual person suggests that you have 
grounds to treat your future interests as basic. To put it differently, associativism 
provides the grounding for norms of justice and civility without which the social order 
could not endure. However, this hypothesis remains debatable, mainly for the reason 
that ethical individualism supports powerful rival explanations. On the one hand, there 
is the Hobbesian view that norms of reciprocity or justice or civility are mutually 
advantageous to each of the individuals involved. On the other hand, there is the 
Kantian view of justice as impartiality, that is, the idea that each individual agent is 
entitled to an equal and fundamental respect as a matter of pure morality.
To avoid these objections, I introduce a more specific variant of this general 
hypothesis. Corporate personality, I argue, extends our ethical horizons, not only to 
others, but also to past and future generations. And here, I argue, neither justice as
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mutual advantage nor justice as impartiality provides a persuasive alternative. To 
demonstrate the shortcoming of justice-based accounts, I begin by focussing on the 
interests of future generations. Theories of justice often claim to be able to show that we 
are under a duty of justice to take these interests in consideration. However, as has been 
acknowledged before, these theories fail to make good on that pledge for a variety of 
reasons.
Chapter VI furnishes the positive half of the argument. I argue that corporate 
personality extends across history in such a way that generations of associative 
members could be compared to the stages of a person. Ethical individualism, on the one 
hand, conceives of each generation as a sovereign nation, in control of its own destiny 
and unburdened by the sins of its ancestors. Since generations are viewed as separate 
nations, the reason why present generations care about the good of future generations 
could only be derived from a conception of justice. Corporate personality, on the other 
hand, holds that all generations belong to the same association. In fact, this conception 
of a transgenerational association allows us to conceive of the issue in terms of the 
goodness of a life taken as a whole instead of justice between separate lives. To further 
elaborate on this idea, I compare a maximisation criterion with certain narrative or 
diachronic criteria for the intrapersonal distribution of well-being. I suggest that the 
latter, especially, could be fruitfully applied to transgenerational associations.
Finally, Chapter VII seeks to expand this temporal argument for corporate 
personality by looking at the past. It has often been argued that political obligations are 
not freely assumed, but inherited. Similarly, present generations are bound by 
constitutions, laws and treaties that are often well over a century old. Still, liberal 
individualists would agree that we are normally bound by such obligations and 
commitments. At the same time, the validity of such obligations seems clearly 
contestable. How could political obligations be passed on down the generations without 
our consent? Again, ethical individualism is committed to the idea of generational
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sovereignty. On this view, the only available explanation of political obligations and 
commitments could be found in an appeal to justice. Natural justice theories argue that 
political and associative obligations derive from our duties of universal morality. The 
general idea is that we need political associations and institutions in order to be able to 
effectively realise justice. And insofar as the institutions of a particular state are indeed 
just, the associative obligations of its citizens are best understood as a specific 
manifestation of their moral duty to humanity at large. But this derivation from justice, 
too, has its problems. One well-known problem is that many of our associative duties 
seem to call out for an independent basis in a way that assimilation with duties of justice 
rules out. Another problem is that in many cases natural justice theories fail to deliver 
the goods. At any rate, it is argued that a more plausible explanation could be found in 
the idea of corporate personality. On this view, generations are part of one 
transgenerational association. Again, this conception allows us to compare the 
relatedness between generations with the relatedness between the stages of one person.
I should, as a final point, say something about the limitations of this thesis. First, it 
does not address the empirical issues that could be raised by the idea of corporate 
personality. Most conspicuously, perhaps, I provide no general classification of all the 
kinds of association that might qualify as corporate persons in contemporary societies. 
Chapter IV focuses on the personality of the state, but I say little about associations like 
the family, voluntary associations, trade-unions, cultural groups or more loosely 
organised groupings such as social-economic class, mobs and crowds.1 Nor am I 
interested in questions as to whether this or that particular association qualifies as a 
continuous person or not. These questions will no doubt arise at some point, as 
sometimes they will also arise for individuals, but they are not decided here. I confine 
myself to using broad strokes, not because these things are unimportant, but because
1 For the position o f  mobs and crowds, see L. May, The Morality o f  Groups: Collective Responsibility, 
Group-based Harm, and Corporate Rights (Notre Dame: University o f Notre Dame, 1987). The origins 
and the plurality o f human group life are investigated in A. Black, State, Community and Human Desire.
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corporation theory requires a new philosophical justification. Before we can confront 
these empirical issues we need to rediscover new conceptual space. And to find this 
space, we have to re-examine the idea of a person and its position in ethical and political 
thought.
Second, this thesis is about corporate personality; it does not explore the issues raised 
by the related theory of associative pluralism, as it flourished in Britain at the start of 
the Twentieth Century. According to Nicholls, this school, with among its leading 
figures people such as Figgis, Cole and Laski, advanced three basic arguments, each 
pertaining to the appropriate relation between the state and other associations within its 
territory.2 First, it argued that liberty was the greatest end in politics. Second, it 
advanced the notion of the real and moral personality of associations. Third, it 
maintained that the state had no greater authority over its members than other 
associations. Thus, pluralism was highly critical of the state and the notion of 
sovereignty, as it figured in the theories of Hobbes and Rousseau for example. I should 
point out that I am interested only in the second claim. I argue in Chapter IV that the 
state, although clearly different in many ways from other associations, has its own 
personality and unity. Furthermore, although I do not press this claim here, it seems to 
me that some notion of sovereignty cannot be avoided. Of course, how precisely 
modem, representative democracies should be organised internally to give sufficient 
liberty and weight to associations that reside within their higher order unity remains a 
pertinent question.3 But it is not the topic that this thesis addresses. I am interested 
mainly in the question how associations in general should be ethically appraised, in 
particular in view of the challenge presented by ethical individualism.
Third, the idea of the corporate person of the state has been claimed to raise the 
spectre of a kind of collectivism that seems unacceptably hostile to individual rights and
2
D. Nicholls, The Pluralist State: The Political Ideas o f  J. N. Figgis and his Contemporaries, second 
edition (Basingstoke: St. Martin’s Press, 1994).
3 For a recent attempt to revive pluralist thinking, see P. Hirst, Associative Democracy: New Forms o f  
Economic and Social Governance (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1994).
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liberties. For example, apart from making a valid theoretical point, Popper was also, 
perhaps even mainly, concerned with bringing the theories of Plato and Hegel and 
others in political disrepute. Like other liberals of that period, he linked corporation 
theory, often in a loose and entirely unconvincing manner, to fascism, communism, 
racism and the glorification of war.4 However, it is important to see that the corporate 
notion of a person -  at least in the shape that I have given to it here -  does not make 
light of the ethical significance of the individual. Rather, it suggests that both notions 
co-exist. We still have prudential and moral reasons for action that are entirely 
justifiable in terms of our own interests and preferences and those of other individual 
agents. But my point is that there is also a category of reasons that is ultimately only 
explicable on the basis of collective interests, preferences and associative membership. 
It seems to me a fundamental mistake to think that we are ultimately either corporate or 
individual persons. We could have reasons qua and duties to individuals and reasons 
qua and duties to groups. To put it differently, what emerges from the discussion below 
is the view that the unit of a person is not fixed either at the collective or individual 
level, but more flexible and adaptable. A strict dichotomy between individualist and 
collectivist theories should in any case be dismissed. Co-existence need not be peaceful 
co-existence. And the pluralism that results on this view may well lead to deep practical 
conflict -  for example, between our moral and associative duties -  and so to the further 
question of its resolution. But that question, too, goes beyond the scope of my 
argument. What I want to demonstrate is that this conflict could exist. Not all our 
reasons are reducible to the goods and preferences of individual persons. The point, 
then, is not that we ought to reject individual rights and liberties, but that ethical 
individualism has limitations. And it is these limitations that lead us back to the notion 
of corporate personality, and towards a greater sense of balance between the two.
4
K. R. Popper, The Open Society and its Enemies.
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Associations, in short, should qualify as persons because they accommodate a kind 
of temporal continuity that individual persons cannot provide. Associations do not only 
widen our ethical horizons, they also lengthen them to embrace the past and the future. 
If personal identity supplies the ground for longstanding projects or relationships 
between individuals based on love, friendship and reciprocity, the wholeness of 
corporate persons furnishes even longer standing projects and relationships. That is to 
say, we need corporation theory to obtain a handle on those projects and relationships 
that stretch out beyond a single generation. Whereas individual rights, obligations and 
responsibilities are destined to remain generationally fractured, corporate personality 
holds out the possibility of a genuinely transgenerational ethic, and with that, the 
accumulation and conservation of the knowledge, capital and resources on which 
human civilisation is built. Associations do not have to start from a clean slate once one 
generation of members has been replaced by the next; they accumulate achievements 
and pass them down the generations. In other words, corporation theory furnishes the 
grounds for the fulfilment of exactly those human goods, those plans and ambitions that 
require more than a lifetime’s effort. I shall not waste time by stating the self-obvious, 
that many great human aspirations are of this nature, how much we are ourselves the 
produce of historical evolution. It is perhaps less obvious, though, that only in the 
persisting nature of associative ties we find the possibility of evolution and history in 
the first place.
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